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KEPNOTE ADDRESS BY 
GENEBAL B.3. SCHRIEVER 
SEVENTH MILITARY-INDUSTRY MISSILE AND 
SPACE RELIABILITY SYMPOSIUM 
SAN DIEDO, CALIFORNIA 
MANAGEMENT -- THE KEY TO ACCOMPLISHMENP 
It gives me great pleasure t o  be with you th i s  morning. The symposium th i s  week 
is  a welcome chance to  tackle specific re l iabi l i ty  problems--and t o  come up with some 
solutions. The exchange of ideas is  always valuable, and I am confident t h i s  meeting 
w i l l  lead t o  even greater teamwork between military and industry on problems of mutual 
concern. 
I am certain that  I do not have t o  convince you of the importance of re l iabi l i ty .  
I f  you are not convinced already, no words of mine could persuade you. Nevertheless, 
it may be helpful t o  look a t  the increasingly urgent requirements for dependability i n  
modern aerospace systems. 
In recent years it has become clear %hat performance has outstripped re l iabi l i ty  
i n  a number of areas. This imbalance needs to  be corrected. Overall systems effective- 
ness implies considerably more than performance. In the past, perfomance has received 
the l ion 's  share of our attention. It has leaped ahead i n  a spectacular fashion, while 
r e l i ab i l i ty  has been hidden away i n  a lump of things called "just  good engineering." 
But as  our missions become more sophisticated and hardware grows more complex, 
re l iabi l i ty  becomes a primary consideration. It becomes a &sign parameter l ike  size, 
weight, speed, and accuracy. To put it i n  another way, we do not consider that we 
have a weapon system--until we have a reliable one. 
- - - FORGING MILITARY SPACEPOWER - - - 
The requirements of our national security make t h i s  point obvious. In  a credible 
deterrent force, operational readiness is ful ly  as  important as  mission profile 
capability. We can make predictions of probable losses due t o  enemy action. It is 
equally important t o  predict probable failures due t o  unreliability. 
Reliability problems are complicated by the fact  that  missile systems must not 
only be capable of long storage; they must also be capable of quick response. This 
combination imposes extremely high demands for  re l iabi l i ty  i n  systems, sub-systems, 
and components. I f  a missile cannot be launched when it is  needed, then we would be 
better  off without it. 
A s  space missions become a larger part of our program, the demand for re l iabi l i ty  
increases a t  a tremendous rate. Space systems are growing i n  complexity. They are 
required t o  operate i n  a new environment which we have yet to completely understand. 
They w i l l  be required to  operate for exceedingly long time periods without maintenance. 
We dust approach inf in i ty  i n  re l iabi l i ty  of space systems. 
Cost--in both time and money--is also a major consideration. The fai lure of a 
single component does not affect  just that  one part.  It may cause the fai lure of an 
entire system, with s resulting loss of millions of dollars. Moreover, fai lures a t  a 
c r i t i c a l  point i n  development can cause delays of weeks or  months i n  a program of great 
national importance. For manned space systems, the cost of unreliability runs even 
higher. 
A l l  of these factors have caused us to direct our attention t o  the specific 
re l iabi l i ty  requirements of missile and space systems. We can no longer afford t o  
take the easy view that  re l iabi l i ty  is something that  "just  happens." It must be 
planned fo r  and worked for--in a careful, organized, and systematic manner. In systems 
acquisition today, re l iabi l i ty  is more than just a technical problem--it is a definite 
responsibility of management. 
The A i r  Force, which is a major customer for missile and space systems, has taken 
a number of specific actions to improve management i n  th i s  v i t a l  area. I n  my Command 
we have attacked the re l iabi l i ty  problem on a broad front, aiming a t  both short and 
long term solutions. 
A r e l i ab i l i ty  office i n  my Headquarters coordinates our efforts. Similar offices 
are se t  up i n  each of our four development divisions and i n  the three contract manage- 
ment regions. Representatives from each of these offices serve on our Reliability Task 
Force, a group established more than two years ago as a focal point for  Command-wide 
action i n  this area. 
The basis for attack on unreliability is  adequate knowledge by management of the 
specific problems that  exist  i n  each stage of system acquisition. As a means of 
analyzing the progress made toward establishing goal's, we publish a semi-annual "Reliabil- 
i t y  Status Summary." This document indicates i n  de ta i l  the problems that  have been met  
i n  our many programs, and the actions tha t  have been taken to solve them. 
Our th i rd  step, as  customers, is  t o  insure the greatest possible understanding 
between the A i r  Force and industry with regard t o  specific re l iabi l i ty  requirements. 
One action toward improving our mutual understanding was the publication of Military 
Specification M I L - R - W ~ ~ ~ ,  "Rel iBi l i ty  Requirements fo r  Aerospace Systems, Sub-systems, 
and Equipments." This replaces several ear l ier  documents and reduces the number of 
re l iabi l i ty  specifications now i n  effect. It i a  now a standard section i n  a l l  new 
systems contracts, 
A further step toward defining our requirements more precisely is the inclusion 
of quantitative re l iabi l i ty  figures i n  system inception documents--that is, Specific 
Operational Requirements (SOR'S) Operational Support Requirements (wR's) and System 
Package Plans. Last January I sent a l e t t e r  to our four development divisions directing 
tha t  "all Future systems contracts specify probability of mission success o r  mean times 
between fai lures a s  requirements i n  quantitative numerical terms." 
This use of specific numerical r e l i ab i l i ty  requirements w i l l  provide a basis for  
more effective controls on trade-offs and re l iabi l i ty  expenditures. I am convinced 
it w i l l  substantially accelerate our progress toward systems effectiveness. 
Looking a t  the long term needs i n  the re l iabi l i ty  field, we have focussed our 
attention on two areas: research, and increased training for our personnel. We 
visualize an expanded research program that might involve the outlay of several million 
dollars a year--and bring us savings of many times that  amount. It would provide for  
investigation of a number of promising areas, such a s  development of better  r e l i ab i l i ty  
numerical models and prediction techniques; study of accelerated aging and non-destructive 
testing; mathematical simulation; improvement of incipient fai lure detection; and study 
of the environment-reliability relationship. 
The adequate training of personnel is just as  important' a s  increased research. 
We are currently taking part  i n  several types o$' eYlucationa1 programs. Twenty-five 
WAF officers are enrolled i n  the f i r s t  18-month graduate course at the Air Force 
Inst i tute of Technology working toward a M.S. degree i n  re l iabi l i ty  engineering. 
More than 300 AFSC personnel have completed one-week re l iabi l i ty  courses sponsored 
by professional societies and non-profit institutions. Four hundred @SC and AFLC 
personnel have taken a three-week course i n  re l iabi l i ty  that  bas been established by 
the A i r  Logistics School of the Air Force Inst i tute of Technology. 
A l l  of these actions are directed toward improving our management capability, and 
I am certain they w i l l  pay off with increased rel iabil i ty.  Already we have seen some 
highly gratifying results of concentration i n  t h i s  area. The progress of the Minuteman 
system is a good example. During the past two years we have made a sustained effor t  
t o  bring some 40 individual electronic components for Minuteman to an entirely new level 
of rel iabil i ty.  The result  has been an increase i n  re l iabi l i ty  of about two orders 
of magnitude i n  these components. In other words, an the average they are about a 100 
times as  rel iable as  similar components of two years ago. 
In the Army and the Navy and throughout the government generally there is a 
similar strengthening of reliability management. This is essential in acquiring 
the kind of systems we need. But there is another factor that is equally important 
to progress in this area. This might be called a matter of attitude. 
In this connection, two points need to be stressed. First of all, there seem 
to be no theoretical limits on reliability. If there are practical limits, we.have 
not yet reached them--and I would not like to predict that we never will. We are 
aware of apparent limitations today, but many of them may exist only in our imagi- 
nations. In recent years we have seen the solution of a variety of supposedly 
"impossible" problems. Management must never rule out the possibility of new technical 
breakthroughs. 
A second point is that reliability is a basic responsibility of management, In 
this respect, management needs to recognize at least four principles: 
(1) Reliability begins with initial design. 
(2) It depends on aggressive management methods of controlling the reliability 
program. 
(3) It must be verified by a test program that takes into account the complete 
operating environment. 
(4) It cannot be separated from other aspects of management such as human 
engineering, technical training, and personnel turnover. 
It is clear that we can greatly improve systems reliability--if we want to badly 
enough and will accept our management responsibility. Obviously, there will always 
be problems when we are operating at the limits of technology. But the presence of 
problems we can't solve should never stop us from dealing with the problems we can 
solve. 
I am hopeful that this symposium will have two results. It should indicate a 
number of the long-term reliability considerations that will concern us during the 
next years. And it should point out some of the immediate practical steps that can 
be taken to increase reliability at this time. Both results will contribute to our 
common goal--the acquisition of operational systems that can be depended upon to help 
insure our national security and survival. 
I am sure you will have a series of stimulating and fruitful sessions. 
Thank you. 

SPECIFYING RELIABILITY I N  MILITARY CONTRACTS 
~ a j / ~ e n  0. J. Ritland 
Commander, Space Systems Division 
Los Angeles, Calif.  
I am grateful  for  t h i s  opportunity t o  t a l k  
about r e l i a b i l i t y  specifications. It i s  a 
subject of paramount importance i n  modern 
weaponry. 
The resul t s  we have experienced i n  pro- 
ducing r e l i ab l e  militaxy systems have stemmed 
direct ly f romthe  decisions made and support 
given by the individuals present here today. 
Yet despite significant progress i n  the past, 
we s t i l l  have.a substantial distance t o  t rave l  
i n  r e l i ab i l i t y .  Of t h i s  you are well aware. 
Therefore, I w i l l  not dwell on the importance 
of re l iab i l i ty ,  nor direct  my remarks i n  a 
motivational vein. Instead, I should l i k e  t o  
present t o  you some concrete experience of the 
A i r  Force during several years of contracting 
for  r e l i a b i l i t y  i n  ba l l i s t i c  and space systems. 
Today, I plan t o  discuss the following 
areas: 
Some Basic Reliabi l i ty Concepts 
Brief History of Contractually Specifying 
Reliabi l i ty Requirements 
Management Requirements 
Quantitative Requirements 
Control of Piece Parts  
Current Trends i n  Specifying Reliabi l i ty 
Requirements 
In  set t ing the stage, I would l i k e  t o  
consider several basic r e l i ab i l i t y  concepts of 
importance t o  my subject. These are: 
First :  Reliabi l i ty i s  one of the major system 
design characteristics. It i s  a character- 
i s t i c  which must permeate a l l  technical, cost, 
schedule, or  other management considerations 
for  decision making. There are two d is t inc t  
complementary methods of attaining re l iab i l i ty ;  
one is  through technical development. The 
other i s  through management control. Relia- 
b i l i t y  through technical development begins 
with design assurance, and progresses thru 
developmental test ing and measurement t o  
production control and handling and packaging. 
A s  an area of management control, r e l i ab i l i t y  
i s  attained through application of system re- 
l i a b i l i t y  requirements a t  a l l  decision making 
levels, and by rigid, uncompromising en- 
forcement of discipline i n  every action or  
decision. 
In bo%h approaches r e l i ab i l i t y  cannot be 
l e f t  t o  chance. It can only be assured through 
a carefully planned and executed program. It 
cannot be expected from some significant 
sc ient i f ic -or  engineering breakthrough. It 
w i l l  be accomplished through minute and met- 
iculous at tent ion t o  detai l .  
Second: The controls exercised aver the selec- 
t i o n  tes t ing  and use of piece parts  are pro- 
po r t iona l to  the potential  f o r  r e l i a b i l i t y  
payoff . 
Third: Successful competition for  mil i tary 
systems contracts w i l l  be increasingly de- 
pendent upon a f irm' s demonstrated capability 
t o  produce a rel iable product. 
Fourth: Qualitative superiority is the key t o  
successful exploitation of space. 
These concepts a re  not new t o  you. Col- 
lect ively we have been on a learning curve i n  
the  f i e l d  of missile and space re l iab i l i ty .  
From lessons learned over the  past f i ve  o r  s ix  
years we know tha t  we must t a i l o r  the "design 
characteristic" aspect of r e l i ab i l i t y  t o  the 
performance requirements of each system and 
then provide the management controls t o  a t t a in  
these requirements. The mil i tary services 
recognized the need t o  specify r e l i ab i l i t y  
requirements i n  contracts a s  early as  1956. 
Early requirements were i n  the form of clauses 
oriented toward the technical or  "design 
characteristic" aspect of re l iab i l i ty .  One of 
the  f i r s t  specifications developed and issued 
by the military was MIL-R-25717 (USAF) "Re- 
l i a b i l i t y  Assurance Program f o r  Electronic 
Equipment", 11 Januasy 1959. Subsequently, 
many specifications, bulletins, and exhibits 
were published by the services. 
As  we moved up the r e l i ab i l i t y  learning 
curve, it became increasingly apparent tha t  
there was an urgent need t o  pu l l  together the 
various management factors  into an integrated 
requirements package. One of the f i r s t  
documents developed with t h i s  objective i n  mind 
was Air Force Bal l i s t ic  Missile Divis'on (AFBMD) 
Exhibit 58-10, "Reliability Program f 2r Bal l i s t ic  
Missile and Space systemst1. That exhibit was 
incorporated into Bal l i s t ic  Missile and Space 
Contracts resulting i n  a significant impact on 
the appropriate segments of industry. Shortly 
thereafter,  ~ 1 ~ - ~ - 2 6 6 7 4  (usAF) "Reliability 
Requirements fo r  Weapon systems", 18 June 1959, 
was issued by Hq A R E .  This paralleled AFBMD 
Exhibit 58-10 and was applied t o  manned a i r -  
c r a f t  systems. 
Subsequently, the best features of these 
three documents were incorporated into the 
current specification, MIL-R-27542, "Relia- 
. b i l i t y  Program Requirements fo r  Aerospace 
Systems, Subsystems, and Equipment," published 
in  June of 1961. 
With tha t  brief outline of how our basic 
re l iabi l i ty  specification was developed, l e t  
us turn t o  some of the more significant 
management aspects of an adequate re l iabi l i ty  
propam. 
Some of the most formidable problems in  
the production of reliable systems l i e  i n  the 
management area. An axiom long recognized 
by the military services is that  the inherent 
re l iabi l i ty  of design represents the highest 
re l iabi l i ty  the product has any chance of 
reaching. Everything that  happens downstream 
of design release, with the exception of 
design changes, tends t o  degrade the inherent 
re l iabi l i ty  of des%gn. Theref ore, af ter  
i n i t i a l  design phase, the major re l iabi l i ty  
effort  should be concentrated i n  prevention of 
t h i s  degradation. The re l iabi l i ty  effort 
should be organizedto provide aU the 
necessary design, service and staff  functions 
and ski l l s  t o  minimize the degradation that  
may occur during materiel procurement, storage, 
issue, manufacturing, handling, packaging fo r  
shipment, and tra+sportation t o  the customer. 
A l l  of the major functional areas just 
mentioned are assigned l ine  responsibilities 
within most companies. A legitimate question 
might be, why a re l iabi l i ty  organization? 
The reason i s  obvioug. As pointed our earlier, 
re l iabi l i ty  cannot be l e f t  t o  chance. It is a 
fact  of Military and Industrial organizational 
l i f e  that  many groups, whose efforts  bear 
directly upon reliabil i ty,  do not possess the 
necessary authority and responsibility t o  
achieve reliabil i ty.  Furthermore, the ever- 
present demands for  more effort i n  a shorter 
time span a t  lower costs can, and often do, 
influence such groups t o  slight re l iabi l i ty  
considerations -- often with subsequent costly 
results. Unless these weaknesses are over- 
come, it is virtually impossible t o  achieve 
the required level  of rel iabil i ty.  
MIL-R-27542, mentioned earlier, estab- 
lishes minimum requirements that  must be 
followed i n  planning and organizing a rel ia-  
b i l i t y  program. Its purpose is t o  introduce 
and maintain management v is ib i l i ty  into the 
re l iabi l i ty  program t o  assure that  contractual 
re l iabi l i ty  requirements are met. Many of you 
are familiar with t h i s  document. It contains 
the  major ,requirements which we have found 
essential ' to a well conceived re l iabi l i ty  
program. 
The Design Selection Phase of th i s  document 
se ts  forth the requirements t o  be accomplished 
by a prospective contractor i n  developing the 
re l iabi l i ty  portion of h is  proposal. Briefly, 
th i s  section of the m i l  spec requires estimates 
of maximum environmental and stress conditions 
the system may encounter. This estimate is t o  
be used as the basis fo r  a prediction W 
achievable re l iabi l i ty  during the developmental 
period. I n  t h i s  phase anticipated problem areas 
should be identified together with proposed 
approaches t o  thei r  solution. A system relia-  
b i l i t y  model with appropriate re l iabi l i ty  block 
diagrams showing the apportionment of rel iabil-  
i t y  over the major subsystems and components is 
also required. 
The prospective contractor must also 
develop, as a separate section of his proposal, 
a description of the re l iabi l i ty  program t o  
include a detailed l i s t ing of specific tasks 
in a form that  permits technical auditing by 
the government. It i s  intended that  the pro- 
gram plan identify the organizational elements 
responsible t o  management f o r  the re l iabi l i ty  
program and delineate the responsibilities and 
authority of these elements. 
Reliability Program Management requires 
continuous refinement. The actions necessary 
fo r  complete systems planning, management, and 
engineering must be explicitly defined, in- 
cluding the programming and control of re- 
l i a b i l i t y  activit ies and a milestone chart 
showing the timing of every major task. Formal 
program review points are established t o  assure 
that  the program remains adequate and that  all 
effort affecting re l iabi l i ty  is accomplished 
as planned. 
In  accordance with th i s  specification, a 
re l iabi l i ty  program activity status report i s  
required a t  intervals not t o  exceed three 
months. The information submitted w i l l  be 
used fo r  Air Force and contractor management 
review and program control. This report w i l l  
contain such information as re l iabi l i ty  pre- 
dictions, status and results of design reviews, 
actual or potential problems, pertinent t e s t  
results, and all other data, as mutually agreed 
to, that  would aid i n  program status assess- 
ment. 
So f a r  I have discussed the Management 
Requirements fo r  a Reliability program. I 
would l ike  t o  turn now t o  a discussion of firm 
quantitative requirements and demonstration 
procedures. Measurement of any parameter, 
whether tangible or intangible, requires refer- 
ence t o  some standard or base. This applies t o  
re l i ab i l i ty  just as it does t o  any other 
parameter. Admittedly, there are varying 
degrees of measurement difficulty and relia-  
bi l i ty ,  a t  t h i s  point i n  time, l i e s  f a r  out 
on the scale of difficulty. It is possible, 
however, t o  se t  forth a firm engineering 
approach t o  t h i s  measurement problem. 
Until we learn t o  measure or evaluate 
required re l iabi l i ty  efforts, it will  be 
di f f icul t  realist ically t o  assign cost t o  
such effort. There are several actions that  
take place i n  A i r  Force Procurement Cycles 
which require the uti l ization of quantitative 
expressions fo r  re l iabi l i ty  requirements as a 
basis for  evaluation. These actions include 
cost est-tions, analysis of competitive bids, 
evaluation of proposals, and evaluation of 
achieved re l iabi l i ty  t o  determine that contract- 
ual  requirements have been met. However, the 
most significant use of quantitatsve require- 
ments i s  in the early design considerations of 
the contractors' engineering efforts. 
The design groups should use quantitative 
requirements i n  basic design considerations 
such as re l iabi l i ty  apportionment and pre- 
diction i n  parts selection, and i n  establishing 
re l iabi l i ty  block diagrams. The incorporation 
of these constderations will be verified 
through design review and proven through the 
t e s t  program. 
In order t o  aid industry and the govern- 
ment i n  the proper assessment of the rel ia-  
b i l i t y  effort  , we have been specifying quant i ta-  
t ive  re l iabi l i ty  i n  contracts f o r  some time. 
This is the base against whi&h achieved re- 
l i a b i l i t y  is measured. We believe that  the 
AGREE (~dvisory Group on Reliability of 
Electronics Equipment) Committee was completely 
right i n  stating that  the best way t o  arrive 
a t  good re l iabi l i ty  requirements i s  t o  begin 
with the practice of specifying quantitative 
re l iabi l i ty  requirements. 
When quantitative requirements for  
re l iabi l i ty  are specified i n  contracts, we 
attempt t o  augment these requirements with 
s ta t is t ica l ly  valid demonstration techniques 
as waxranted by the circumstances surrounding 
the program. We realize, however, that  the 
number of deliverable systems on some programs 
is insufficient t o  justify a re l iabi l i ty  
testing program t o  prove s ta t is t ica l ly  that  
quantitative requirements have been met. 
Nevertheless, we specify quantitative 
requirements i n  such contracts t o  be demon- 
strated by alternate methods as may be 
mutually agreed t o  by the A i r  Force and the 
contractor. For example, re l iabi l i ty  per- 
formance incentive clauses, where such per- 
formance a l ters  the contractor's fee, may be 
.tied t o  the attainment of these requirements. 
Some other alternate approaches t o  re l iabi l i ty  
demonstration include: ( 8 )  the careful and 
continuing evaluation of the design selection, 
which is a major basis fo r  developing confidence 
i n  the probability of the system meeting its 
re l iabi l i ty  requirements; and (b) insuring every 
possible use of the available t e s t  data from 
developlnental test ing t o  determine the rel ia-  
b i l i t y  of the system. To a id  in  t h i s  evaluation, 
re l iabi l i ty  program plans must contain specific 
methods fo r  implementing and documenting the 
results of design techniques such as re l iabi l i ty  
apportionment, safety factor analysis, derating 
procedures, redundancy, fai lure mode identifi- 
cation and identification and control of 
c r i t i ca l  characteristics of c r i t i c a  parts. 
We expect industry t o  conduct system 
analysis through developuent of re l iabi l i ty  
block diagrams, re l iabi l i ty  predictions, parts 
lists, and t o  select parts cazefully based 
upon such analysis. Contractors should perfom 
environmental t e s t s  t o  failure, and failure 
effect~malyses.  Also, the technique of design 
review is an invaluable aid. 
Another necessary management tool i n  
achieving re l iabi l i ty  i s  a responsive and 
effective fa i lure  correction system. 
Industry has taken the lead i n  developing 
these techniques. We anticipate that  industry 
w i l l  continue t o  refine existing, and develop 
new techniques i n  the future t o  dem0a"strate the 
capability of military systems t o  meet rel ia-  
b i l i t y  requirements. 
I n  the specification of re l iabi l i ty  re- 
quirements, it is t o  the advantage of industry 
f o r  government agencies t o  be as definitive as 
possible. It is our objective t o  continue t o  
eliminate vagueness and generality from re- 
l i ab i l i ty  requirements. We wil l  continue t o  
request that  industry does the same. 
Turning now t o  another important rel ia-  
b i l i t y  management area, one of the most for- 
midable challenges t o  management i s  effective 
controls over the selection and application of 
reliable piece parts. The Air Force has 
experienced expensive holds during countdown, 
aborts, and catastrophic fai lures traceable 
t o  the fai lure or  malfunction of seemingly 
insignificant piece parts. Items such as 
semi-conductors, capacitors, resistors, valves, 
etc., became c r i t i c a l  when incorporated into 
component&yQich, by .malfunctioning, can cause 
fai lure ior serious degradation t o  accomplish- 
ment of f l igh t  objectives. Thisf problem beceme 
so acute that  SSD sent ateam of Reliability 
personnel out t o  review the re l iabi l i ty  work 
of several of our space program contractors. 
. .. 
Some significant findings resulted f rom that 
series of investigations. 
This review revealed that  one of the 
primary problems i n  t h i s  area is the lack of 
adequate piece part military specifications 
for  the space environment. Severa1,members of 
industry, who were visi ted by the teem had 
recognized t h i s  fact  and were either augmenting 
t e s t  and inspection requirements i n  current 
military specifications or writing thei r  own 
specifications. 
The team findings i n  th i s  area merely 
confirmed that  of other groups such as the DOD 
Ad Hoc Group on "Parts Specification Management 
for ~ e l i a b i l i t y " .  
There is a concerted effort  under w a y  
within the Air Force Systems Command t o  bring 
t h i s  parts specification problem under control. 
In  order t o  develop a logical approach t o  the 
problem, an AFSC Parts Improvement Group 
composed of membership from AFSC Divisions, 
has been formed and has held several meetings. 
Recommendations have been maae by the group, 
and these wi l l  be submitted t o  the Aerospace 
Industries Association and the Electronic 
Industries Association for  evaluation and 
comment prior t o  @her action. 
a-3: 
'order t o  effect a more 
solution t o  th i s  problem, the 
Minuteman P rking Group and the Space 
Parts Working Group of the Ball ist ic Systems 
Division and Space Systems Division, respective- 
ly, is  rapidly developing certain high relia- 
b i l i t y  parts specifications f o r  application 
t o  Ball ist ic Missile and Space Systems. 
Appropriate members of industry are participat- 
ing i n  th i s  ef for t  with the Air Force, and we 
hope t o  have the f i r s t  of these Hi-Re1 specs 
available by July 1962. 
In  addition t o  inadequate specifications, 
the re l iabi l i ty  survey team found several 
management weaknesses which, as corrected, would 
significantly improve the piece part selection, 
application and control areas. Typical re- 
commendations f o r  improvement are the follow- 
ing: 
- 
% ,  First: Each company should maintain a central 
standards group charged with the responsibility 
f o r  keeping abreast of the parts field, and for  
providing assistance t o  
selection and application within thei r  
systems. Without such cent 
indiscriminent or  uninf 
application of parts is inevitab 
Second: The re l iabi l i ty  group should be a 
-
party t o  the selection of piece part vendors 
supplying c r i t i ca l  parts. The advice and 
assistance of the standards group, the re- 
l i ab i l i ty  group and the design group should be 
sought i n  establishing the c r i t e r i a  for  
receiving inspection and t e s t  of piece parts. 
Suppliers of c r i t i ca l  piece parts should be the 
subject of recurring source inspections t o  
assure that  the system of controls i n  the man- 
ufacture of such parts are maintained consistent 
with the re l iabi l i ty  requirements of the system 
i n  which the parts are t o  be used, and t o  assure 
that  no changes in  design or manGacturing 
processes are made without adequate notification. 
Third: There should be an integrated and 
-
effective fai lure reporting, analysis and closed- 
loop corrective action system t o  assure that, 
when failures occur, the cause is determined 
and corrective action is immediately taken t o  
preclude recurrence. This corrective action 
system should. be established t o  f i t  the needs 
of both the quality and the re l iabi l i ty  effort. 
Fourth: Cr i t ica l  parts handling is a subject 
of increasing importance. All contractors must 
develop parts handling methods consistent with 
the re l iabi l i ty  requirements of the parts. 
The foregoing comments on piece parts have 
emphasized the term "Critical Part. It I n  view 
of the tremendous number of parts employed i n  
today's system, we believe that  the most 
practical approach t o  control of these parts 
i s  t o  identify pasts in  the system where the 
application of the part is c r i t i ca l  t o  the 
proper performance of the overall system. After 
parts for  c r i t i ca l  applications have been 
identified, they should be managed i n  a manner 
consistent with the cri t icali ty.  
I n  t h i s  regard the Space Systems Division 
i s  now requiring, on new contracts, that  the 
contractor compile a l i s t  of c r i t i ca l  parts 
within the system together with his methods 
of control of such parts and a submission of 
t h i s  list t o  the appropriate systems program 
office for  review. 
A t  t h i s  time I would l ike  t o  mention some 
relatively new contract requirements for  re- 
l i ab i l i ty  that  the Air Force i s  either employing 
or considering for  inclusion in  future contracts. 
Participation in  the Interservice Data 
Exchange Program (IDEP) has, i n  the past, been 
voluntary on the part of industry. The benefits 
that  have been derived from th i s  program through 
elimination of duplicate testing have been 
significant. The Space Systems Division i s  now 
planning t o  require contractors t o  participate 
i n  IDEP on a mandatory basis. In  addition, 
IDEP is  being expanded through a system called 
PIDEP (preliminary Interservice Data Exchange 
program). This w i l l  require contractors t o  
report thei r  plans fo r  test ing with the 
objective of reducing duplicate t e s t  planning 
efforts. 
The Space Systems Division and Ballist ic 
Missile Division have recently developed, and 
are now placing i n  contracts, an exhibit which 
supplements the standard quality controi 
specification MIL-Q-$358. This standard 
quality requirement, while suitable for  many 
procurements, was found t o  be too general i n  
some areas t o  provide the kind of specific 
direction t o  industry which is required on 
Aerospace Systems. 
The supplementary exhibit (EAS Exhibit 
62-10) is being placed on new contracts within 
SSD. Among other things, it requires that  the 
contractor's engineering and design groups 
classify inspection characteristics and place 
the classifications on the drawings. This 
procedure requires the designer t o  determine 
the cri t ical ,  major and minor characteristics 
of the design. 
The philosophy behind t h i s  requirement is 
that  the most knowledgeable individual with 
respect t o  a pas-ticular design is the designer 
himself. He, therefore, should be the individu- 
a l t o  identify the c r i t i ca l  characteristics of 
c r i t i ca l  parts for  manufacturing, inspection 
and handling. This classification of character- 
i s t i c s  procedure can result  i n  considerable 
dollar savings through reduction of scrap, 
rework, inspection, and manufacturing effort 
during the manufacturing cycle. 
In  conclusion, through the collective 
efforts  of the military services and industry, 
we have made significant strides i n  fielding 
reliable systems. The performance requirements 
and operational environments of tmorrowls 
systems will  require greater strides. We must 
be continually aware of system re l iabi l i ty  
requirements and reflect  th i s  asiareness i n  
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Introduction 
More than ever before the absolute necess- 
ity for acquiring highly reliable weapons and 
equipment i s  being recognized i n  both Oouernment 
and Industry. A s  t o  Defense procurement prac- 
t ices  having a dlrect bearing on quality and re- 
liability, there have been several, major develop- 
ments within the past few months. 
Notably among these are the positive 
actions being taken to  reduce cost-plus-fixed- 
fee contracts, t o  increase the use of incentive 
type contracts, and t o  Rrrther emphasize value 
engineering. As a result, our abili ty t o  con- 
, tract for reliable equipment has improved consid- 
erably. 
These efforts have been motivated and are 
fully supported by Secretary of Defense McNamwa; 
the Deputy Secretary, Mr. Gilptr ic j  and Assis- 
tant Secretaries of Defense IPhomas D. &mi8 and 
John H. Rubel, as  well. as all other top Defense 
of'ficials involved in  this  field. 
In June of 1961, before the NSIA Joint 
Industry--Defense Depwtment Symposium on "The 
Profit Motive and Cost Reduction, " Mr. Morris, 
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (1nstalI.a- 
tions and Logistics) stated: 
"I feel  it i s  mandatory that we 
increase our use of a l l  our present 
incentive type contracts, There are 
very few situations i n  which there i s  
not an upportunity to W o y  either 
performance incentives, value en&- 
neering or a combination of these . . . 
In addition t o  more emphasis on price 
analysis, we must sharpen our ability 
to differentiate between good and bad 
work. There are several measurable 
~rardsticks wMch should be readily 
apparent--meeting schedules, q W t y  
and reliabili ty of the product, secur- 
ing competition i n  purchasing, emphasis 
on value engineering, past perfarmance 
on other contracts. I' 
Since that t i m e  the Armed Services Procure- 
ment Regulation has been reworked t o  change the 
emphasis on the selection and use of the variaue 
types of contracts m o y e d  by the Department of 
Defense. By this  effort, we hope t o  improve the 
quality and reliabili ty of Defense material, as  
well as reducing overall costs. 
The character of defense procurement has 
been changing, bringing with it corresponding 
changes i n  defense industries. While our Arnds 
for weapons have continued a t  a very high level, 
these funds have not been used generally for 
high volume production of weapons. An increas- 
ing proportion i s  going into research, develop- 
ment and prototype testing. New weapons and 
weapons systems- fewer, more colnplicated and 
costly with no assurance of large scale produc- 
tion. Follow-on production contracts are not 
as  plentiful as  heretofore. These conditions 
have notioeably affected the nature of our con- 







plus-fixed-fee contractsa~Ws risen f r o m  13 per- 
cent t o  39 percent, as fixed-price contracts 
declined proportionately f rom 78 percent t o  47a 
percent. This means that we are currently 
feeding approximately $10 billion a year into 
the defense industrial c m t y  under cost-plus- 
fixed-fee contractual arrangements that & not 
discriminate i n  terms of f i n a l  profits, between 
good performance and bad, between early success- 
f u l  accauplishment and protracted failure, be- 
tween tight management control of costs and 
waste. Under cost-plus-fixebfee contracts, the 
profit i s  fixed a t  the outset and does not vary 
by the quality of perforuiance. In addition, 
under some of the _earlier "incentive" contracts, 
the profit was frequently on too narrow a 
scale, f e  instanoe, ~ r o m  a minimum of 6 percent 
t o  a mrodmMl of 8 percent. We believe i n  such 
contracts, as  i n  CPFF contraots, we have been 
praviding too l i t t l e  incentive t o  give any real 
encouragement far cost control, efficiency, per- 
fommnce and reliability. 
Our aim i s  t o  create and sustain a hi& 
level of military procurement efficiency, and 
cause the same imovements t o  be br&t about 
i n  Industry. !ih &eve this end we pian t o  
reduce t o  a minimum our use of cost-plus-fixed- 
fee contracts, and t o  substitute contracts 
which pravide more motiwtion for  developing or 
producing weapons of good perfurmance and high 
reliability, for early completion and for very 
close cost control. Obviously, as  we move 
through the cycle of initial development, test, 
early production, and volume production, the 
importance of various motivating factors will 
vary and, accordingly, the contract types niU. 
vary* 
It i s  our belief that, for each of the 
variws objectives we seek t o  accomplish, there 
must be available a wide range of profits from 
very low--in same cases, undoubtedly, losses-- 
t o  qdte.high, so that the distinction between 
very good and very baa performance can be reward- 
ed or penalized sufficiently t o  require the most 
intensive management attention. By pruviding 
this  range of possible profits we seek t o  induce 
reductions i n  cost and improved perfnmnance that 
would conpletely outweigh, as  an advantage t o  
the Government, any amounts by which werall 
profits msy be affected. 
There i s  no question i n  our minds as  t o  the 
difficulties t o  be encountered i n  this multi- 
measurement approach t o  ily-entives. Foremost 
among these i s  the task of deriving r e a i s t i c  
standards of measurement. Te.chni& requirements 
will have t o  be exandned i n  terms of precise 
specification of rel iabi l iw levels and agreed 
formulas developed fm measuring and computing 
achievements. 
.i ASPR Changes 
A t  this  time, we are not introducing any 
new types of contracts. However, pursuant t o  
the foregoing conunents, we have made the follow- 
ing specific changes i n  the Armed Services Pre 
curement Regulation: 
1. We are encouraging a much wider use of 
firm f ixed-price contracts. In  the 
past we have tended t o  use such con- 
tracts only when we had extensive can- 
petition or we knew from past experience 
what the costs of parfomnsnce would be 
within very narrow limits. In  the 
futwe we expect to use the firm fixed- 
price contract whenever we are sure 
that we can identify the cost risks or 
contingencies with considerable accuracy 
and can assure a reasonable sharing of 
such risks between the Gwernnent and 
the contractor. Contracts of this type, 
iwolvlng as they do the greatest risks 
and the greatest incentives for oost 
reduction, can be eqected t o  produce 
the widest range of profits and losses. 
This aide spread of profits is the 
n d  result of the extensive use of 
fixed-price contracts and should not be 
of concern unless the average profit 
rate gets too high. 
2. We are eliminating trirtuaI3.y all 
fixed-price redeterminable contract 
types where the price can be set after 
a;U or a portion of performance, and 
such price covers work already done a t  
the time it was fixed. Such retro- 
active pricing arraugemnts encourage 
high costs up t o  the point of final 
pricing since the higher the costs a t  
that point. the higher the f inal  price 
i s  likely t o  be. 
3. TO re-emphasize, we are Beejring a 
drastic reduction i n  our use of oost- 
plus-fixed-fee contracts. We hope 
that we can largely confine the use 
of this  type of contract t o  resewch 
studies and other contractual situa- 
tions where our obdectives cannot be 
closely defined. Most important, we 
hope that our large weapons develop- 
ment work, most of which has, i n  the 
past, been done under CPFF contracts, 
can, i n  the future, be done under some 
type of incentive contract. 
4. As stated, we are seeking a great in- 
crease i n  our use of incentive con- 
tracts--a fa r  wider spread, both up 
and down, i n  potential profit ranges 
i n  such contracts as an inducement to  
better management efforts, and a very 
ranid extension of our incentives t o  
L i t e r s  relating t o  the quality of 
weapons, performence and the timeliness 
of contract completion, as well as t o  
purely cost control matters, with 
which our past usage of incentives has 
been principally concerned. 
Incentive Contracting 
In negotiating incentive contrscts it is 
necessary, i n  each instance, t o  determine 
specifically what phases of contractor perfor- 
mance are important to  us. We must then ascribe 
t o  such factors sufficient weight, by which we 
mean a sufficient proportion of the total  profit 
swing, so that those things which are very 
important receive the greatest inducement for 
good performance and those which are of lesser 
importance receive a lesser inducement. The 
incentive feature should reflect a balancing of 
the various oharacteristics which together 
account for overall perforniance, so that rn one 
characteristic will be exaggerated to  the 
detriment 6f the end i t em as a whole. A t  the 
beginning o i  the cycle of a new major weapon 
dwelarnaentwe would norm fill^ be most concerned 
with aisuring that the weapon being developed 
wauld perform i n  the manner tie required. If 
this  were a new missile, for instance, we would 
be most concerned with such factors as range, 
payload, accuracy, and reliability. We might 
ascribe one-half of the profi t  swing t o  such 
factors. Secondarily, because of the necessity 
fo r  time-phasing this weapon with our own other 
weapons and with those of potential enemies, we 
would be concerned with the t i m e  of successful 
completion of development. We might ascribe 
one-third of the profi t  swing t o  this factor. 
A t  this stage we might ascribe only one-sixth 
of the profi t  swing t o  the factor of cost con- 
t r o l  on the theorythat  extreme attempts at cost 
savings a t  the very early stage of the develop 
ment of a new weapon may deteriorate the quality 
of the weapon. 
Later i n  the development cycle of the same 
weapon, say af ter  we had achieved the requisite 
performance characteristics and were producing 
for  an extensive operational and testing program, 
we might want t o  reward performance imprwements 
such as improved reliability, continue t o  provide 
some reward for  timely performance, but give f a r  
heavier weight for close control of costs. 
Etnally, when all performance goals were 
assured on a production basis, and we had 
similar assurance of timeliness of deliveries, 
we would be concerned only w i t h  imprwements i n  
cost control. This could be accomplished either 
by a wide-ranging cost reduction incentive, or  
by a f i r m  fixed-price contract. 
A s  a highly important feature of th i s  pro- 
gram, we w i l l  require, Wherever possible i n  
development programs, for more precise determin- 
ations on the part of the military depwtments 
of desired performance objectives and schedules 
of completion. A s  a result, we should be able 
t o  make such desired objectives known t o  prospec- 
t ive  contractors i n  advance of source selection 
by including them i n  Requests fo r  Proposals. 
Then performance and schedule completion targets 
proposed by each prospective contractor, to- 
gether wfth the estimated cost, w i l l  be consider- 
ed i n  the evaluation and selection of the 
successful contractor. 
We expect lmny advantages t o  accrue from 
this arrangement since it will permit the nego- 
t ia t ion of targets and incentive patterns in to  
the contract while competitive proposals are 
still available. I n  other words, the individual 
incentive proposals will be a major factor i n  
the competitive selection of the successful con- 
tractor. Thereafter his proposal (as it may be 
modified i n  negotiation) w i l l  be the basis fo r  
the contractual incentive provisions, and w i l l  
govern the profi t  ultimately earned. 
Thus it will  be seen that contractnrs sub- 
mitting unduly cowersative proposals, or 
targets which involve l i t t l e  or no risk, w i l l  
endanger thei r  competitive position and, hence, 
the likelihood of thei r  getting the award. 
Conversely, if contractors are unduly optimistic 
i n  their  promises they wi l l  be i n  danger of 
being awsrded a contract a t  a very low profi t  
or a loss. A s  a result, we expect that  these 
arrangements will  compel more care and integrity 
i n  the preparation and subndssion of proposals 
for  development contracts. The use of th i s  
technique w i l l  be extended as  rapidly as  poss- 
ib le  t o  a large number of weapons development 
situations. It should substantially increase 
the objectivity of development contractor 
selection and should somewhat simplify the pro- 
cedure of negotiating targets. 
In  cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts, we 
have eliminated the administrative ceiling on 
maximum fee (currently ten  percent for  research 
and development contracks), malring it possible 
for  full use of the fee range up t o  the statu- 
tory limitation of f i f teen percent. 
We will  str ive t o  make our negotiations of 
targets and sharing formulas as precise and 
carefully analytical, a s  i s  possible. The pro- 
blem of negotiation of targets i s  basically no 
different than the negotiation of the price of 
any other type of contract, although more 
difficult ies may be anticipated. The hazards, 
that is  t o  say the pricing risks, t o  both the 
Government and the contractor are less  i n  in- 
centive contracts than i n  firm-fixed-price con- 
tracts, but greater than i n  cost-plus-fixed-fee 
contracts. These risks provide the motivation 
for  better performance. There i s  no question, 
however, that  the negotiation of real is t ic  
targets, based on f u l l  disclosure of accurate 
and current data, i s  essential, i n  incentive 
contracts. We believe more intensive efforts  
must be undertaken, by both Government and 
Industry, t o  develop better estimating techniques 
and systems for  measuring accomplishments. We 
believe further that increased use of incentive 
contracts w i l l  be an inducement t o  that end. 
Value Engineering 
In  the near future we will  be issuing a 
policy encouraging the increased use of value 
engineering techniques and w i l l  provide standard 
contract clauses fo r  this purpose. Through this  
new enrphasis we plan t o  incorporate incentives 
for contractors t o  appraise intensively products 
purchased by the Government under specifications 
and t o  develop and recommend changes i n  specifi- 
cations which wi l l  enable them t o  be produced 
at a measurable savings i n  cost without adverse- 
ly affecting the required performance, quality, 
~mintainability, standardization, and inter- 
changeability as determined by the Government. 
We are speaking of changes i n  specifications 
which include, among others, the deletion of 
requirements found t o  be i n  excess of actual 
needs as  t o  materials, material processes, toler- 
ances, components, testing requirements and 
testing procedures. To motivate the contractor 
t o  develop and submit cost savings prcrpo~s ,  
value engineering incentives w i l l  prcnride for 
the contractor t o  share i n  the estimated con- 
tract cosC reductban resulting from a specifi- 
cation change proposed by the contractor and 
accepted by the G u v e r ~ n t .  Through value en- 
gineering we expect t o  wed technical skill to  
cost sensitivity. 
Conalusion 
In summary, we have launched a contr+tual 
system whlch rewards risk taking, efficiency 
and the surpassing of performance and reliability 
goals. After coordination w i t h  ~ a q y  industry 
associations, we are certain they agree with our 
incentive contracting philosophy, and that we 
can depend on their support. Progress will de 
pend on the acceptability of incentive contracts 
by individual firms. It i s  imperative that 
adequate understanding be developed, and that 
the deiisils of the program and i t s  objectives be 
adequately conmrunioated t o  the indivldusls who 
w i l l  be directly involved, both i n  and outside 
of Gwernm~nt. 
We believe the tools for doing a better 
job are now a t  hand. It behooves all of us to 
use them. 
RELIABILITY SPECIFICATIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS 
A. H. Drayner 
Martin Company General Offices 
Friendship International Airport, Maryland 
Summary. This paper covers in brief form the 
currently significant reliability specifications, and 
includes a reliability specification "tree" for ready 
reference. Management requirements for effectively 
complying with these documents are  discussed, and 
one multi-Division systems manufacturer's organiza- 
tion for reliability management is briefly described. 
Cost implications of reliability specifications, as  
well as reliability considerations of incentive-fee 
contracts are mentioned and several of the current 
reliability management problems in these areas are 
reviewed. 
Introduction 
For purposes of discussion, a specification is  
conveniently defined as: "A formalized system of 
documentation, usually relating to details of work to 
be performed under a contract." In the United States, 
military specifications have apparently been arbund 
for a long time; for example, in a recent paperl, 
there was included a reproduction of a cannon ball 
specification issued one hundred and sixty-three 
years ago (incidentally, people were not as techni - 
cally ignorant then as one might think: in this partic - 
ular specification, there are numerical test require- 
ments for material elastic limit, tensile strength, 
elongation after rupture, and test specimen area re- 
duction). It is not recorded whether the cannon ball 
specification was ever cancelled. Since that time 
military specifications have proliferated in great 
number, their rate of preparation being greatest 
since the second World War. 
Reliability inclusion in specifications dates from 
the early 1950's and again, the growth in numbers 
has been great. Data in this area may be found in 
a remarkably complete history of reliability that is 
contained in a recent paper by C. M. Ryerson, 
covering many of the early documents in the field2. 
Gamut of Specifications 
It has been said that there are  currently approxi- 
mately twenty-eight hundred cubic feet of Govern- 
ment specifications extant (accumulation, one copy 
. r 
each). Naturally, these cover a range of topics from 
"A -NaptholV (a chemical reagent) to "X -Ray Labora - 
tories" (procedures for certification of), across all 
Government activities. 
Specifications appear under many names and 
forms. In addition to pure specifications, there are 
also standards, specification bulletins, exhibits, 
technical reports, notebooks, handbooks, guides, 
even contract appendices, all of which fall under the 
above definition. 
Additionally, there are a body of intimately re-  
lated regulatory and directive documents. Publi - 
cations such as  Air Force Regulations, Special 
Aeronautical Requirements, and the Armed Services 
Procurement Regulations are very important in our 
business, but relatively unknown to many reliability 
organizations. 
To reduce quantity and increase acceptability of 
documentation, elements of industry are  continually 
working closely with the Services in specification 
development and review. Every trade association 
with technical activities, and most technical soci - 
eties, have significant specification committees in 
fields related to their interests. Many of the aero- 
space companies also directly contribute the time 
of specialists to Government agencies on particular 
tasks. 
There are, as well, moves within the Government 
to reduce the quantity and increase the quality of 
specifications in specific areas. As an example, the 
280 or so specifications and standards for prepara- 
tion of technical manuals are being reduced to 
approximately 40 in a determined effort by the 
Defense Supply Management Agency, Standardization 
Division. 
Reliability Specifications 
Here, too, we have an embarrassment of riches. 
There are in excess of two hundred identifiable 
Government specifications and documents related to 
the establishment and support of reliability require- 
ments. 
In the type of business in which the Martin 
Company is engaged we are concerned, essentially 
daily, with about one hundred of these specifications. 
They are noted and categorized in figure 1. 
In addition, in common with other Aerospace 
companies, we deal with a number of special 
"interpretive" reliability specifications aimed 
directly at such programs a s  GEMINI, TITAN, 
PERSHING, BULLPUP, etc. 
It is interesting in the examination of a chart such 
a s  this, to note the "inversiod'phenomenon --- such 
tremendous general specifications a s  MIL-W -941 1, 
MIL-E -8189, MIL-E -5400, and MIL-E -16400 become 
"support" documents when a reliability specifications 
analyst views the situation! 
Because of the wide-spread use of the cited docu- 
ments in our diversified activities, our Contract 
Technical Requirements sections prepare abstracts 
of the most significant specifications, from which 
concerned personnel can quickly extract pertinent 
information. The data so abstracted is not meant to 
be particularly interpretive, but readily provides 
6. Establishment of specifications and standards 
for use in manufacturing and inspection, 
including classification of characteristics; 
7. Conducting of design reviews, with approval 
of reliability organization required prior to 
design finalization; 
8. Conducting of development testing for 
estimation of reliability in accordance with 
MIL -R -26667; 
9. Demonstration of achieved reliability in 
accordance with customer approved plans; 
10. Collection, summarization, and submittal of 
many types of data throughout the program. 
The complete framework for satisfying the 
requirements of MIL-27542 must be included in the 
proposal prior to award of contract, including spe- 
cific tasks and procedures for implementation and 
control, and predictions of reliability based on 
estimated environmental and stress conditions. 
program planning data for people concerned with the 
broad aspects of projects. MIL-STD-441 (DOD) is specifically concerned with 
electronics equipment, and  is unnque in being a De - 
- 
Major Reliability Specifications partment of Defense document rather than a single 
service output. It is mandatory for use by the 
First, and most important to most of us, is the military Departments. It emphasizes: 
systems type reliability specification. Perhaps the 
best current example of this is MIL-R-27542, which 
replaced three other large specifications; MIL-R- 
26674, MIL-R-25717, and AFBM Exhibit 58 -10. 
These major documents a re  truly omnibus specifi- 
cations, almost suitable for text book use. They 
cover in reasonable depth the thirty or more elements 
of a complete reliability program, including reporting 
systems and methods of analysis. (In the case of 
MIL-R-27542, the sequence of its sections is not one 
that a program plan should necessarily follow, but 
most of the information is there). 
MIL-R-27542 (USAF) establishes requirements for 
an organized reliability program to assure attain- 
ment of contractual requirements at  a specified time 
for a complete system and its sub-systems, including 
requirements for collection and reporting of consid- 
erable reliability data. General requirements on the 
systems contractor are: 
1. Development of a complete reliability program 
based on eight fundamental principles; 
2. Continuous program review at preplanned 
steps; 
3. Continuous reliability training for all 
personnel who contribute to product 
reliability; 
4. Responsibility for subcontractors' and 
suppliers' reliability programs; 
5. Inclusion of reliability principles in design, 
1. Analysis of feasibility during "Phase I", with 
extensive utilization of parts failure rate data. 
It assumes an exponential distribution of 
failures and requires investigations and 
allocations to the parts level. 
2. Prototype construction and extensive test 
evaluations during a "Phase II" , A major 
report is required at the end of this phase 
that provides detailed information covering 
eleven general consideration areas. 
3. Selection and application of standard circuits 
and parts. It controls utilization of non- 
standard items through strong approval r e -  
quirements. 
Equipment and Sub-system Reliability Specifications 
The next level of documents in this rather arbi- 
trary breakdown covers reliability in design, devel- 
opment, and production of equipments and sub- 
systems. These seven important specifications are  
particularized from the equipment class point of view, 
and in addition, some are  phase -related to develop- 
ment or production. 
MIL-R-27070(USAF) provides general reliability 
procedures and criteria for initial development of 
ground electronic equipment, and details minimum 
reliability requirements to be demonstrated if this 
is not covered in the detail equipment specification 
with seventeen examples included; or  contract. It requires tests to demonstrate 
achievement of specified reliability at a confidence 
level of 90% as  well as continuous analytical esti- 
mates. Since both MIL-R-26484 (USAF) and MIL- 
R-27173 (USAF) cover much of the same material, 
this particular document appears to be redundant. 
MIL-R-27173 (USAF) is applicable to research 
and development contracts and details the minimum 
requirements to assure design and manufacture of 
reliable ground electronic checkout equipment. If 
not called out otherwise, it requires a mean-time- 
between-failure (MTBF) of 300 hours for checkout 
equipment or 500 hours for major sub-systems and 
assemblies. Demonstration of compliance i s  r e  - 
quired by tests on a t  least two items, and test time 
must be at least three times the specified MTBF. 
Extensive documentation and approval procedures 
a re  established. 
MIL-R-26484 (USAF) covers minimum require - 
ments and procedures for reliability that must be 
followed during research and development of elec- 
tronic sub-systems or individual equipments. This 
specification is based largely on MIL-STD-441, and 
requires a t  least three times the specified MTBF in 
demonstration testing, utilizing a cycle that includes 
five types of multiple environments. Also, unless 
otherwise specified, i t  requires a 3000 hour minimum 
operating life with reasonable servicing, and a test on 
at least two equipments for the specified longevity 
time using the MTBF test and cycling. Extensive 
documentation and approval requirements a re  
established. 
MIL -R-26474 (USAF) is based on MIL -STD -441 
and is  aimed at production ground electronic equip- 
ment. It requres a detailed reliability program 
consistent with this specification and MIL-STD -441. 
It requires preproduction and production reliability 
tests on randomly selected samples of equipment 
that have passed all acceptance tests. Iterative 
reliability analyses and estimates throughout the 
program a re  required in addition to other reliability 
documentation. The test requirements of this spec - 
ification a re  in conflict with MIL-R-26667 (USAF) 
"Demonstration Requirements" and negotiators 
should examine this carefully. 
MIL-R-19610 (WEPS) outlines minimum require- 
ments for production electronic e~uipment. It 
- 
establishes several levels of reliability based on 
hours of operation and failure criteria. It requires 
a plan for maintaining equipment quality, and the 
contractor must establish costs involved, above 
"normal" quality control costs, to comply with this 
specification prior to award of contract. A group 
of tests are  specified in lieu of acceptance tests 
required in the detail equipment specification, plus 
life tests on equipment selected by the Government 
Inspector, based on MIL-T-18303 as  a guide. There 
have been numerous detailed objections to this docu- 
ment and i ts  use should be carefully evaluated. 
MIL-R-22256 (WEPS) outlines procedures to en- 
sure high inherent reliability in the design and de - 
velopment of electronic equipment or systems 
planned for production. It requires a thorough r e  - 
liability program (15 areas of activity a r e  discussed) 
extending through to completion of model evaluation. 
Demonstrations for reliability or  longevity a re  not 
required but several environmental tests a re  speci- 
fied. Phase I reports in accordance with MIL-STD- 
441 are  required, a s  well as  preliminary and final 
Phase I1 reports. Reports on study, design plan- 
ning, reliability calculations, tests of detail parts, 
subassemblies, and circuits a re  required. 
MIL-R-22732 (SHIPS) prescribes procedures for 
establishing and verifying reliability requirements 
for preproduction and production ground and ship- 
board electronic equipment. It requires a relia - 
bility assurance plan, calculation of MTBF per 
NAVSHIPS-93820, and reliability analyses with pro - 
posals for redesign a s  necessary. Tests of several 
classes a re  covered, plus production reliability in- 
spections and failure reporting systems. Content, 
timing and format of numerous reports require defia- 
itization. 
Auxiliary Reliability Specifications 
Next in order of significance, and probably the 
documents that create more argument than any others 
a r e  the "How To Do It" back-ups for the major relia- 
bility specifications. Such publications a s  MIL -R - 
26667 (USAF) and MIL-STD-756 (WEPS) a re  included 
in this group which covers monitoring methods, 
organization, demonstration requirements, defini- 
tions and prediction -assurance -measurement tech- 
niques in considerable detail. Several cf these docu- 
ments were originally resisted vigorously by some 
aerospace contractors because of their definity and 
their requirement for particular types of organiza- 
tions and methods. As educational and guidance 
material they provide a splendid source of informa- 
tion, even when not contractually required. 
The three "levels" of reliability specifications 
discussed briefly above represent seventeen active 
documents, plus the Naval Weapon Systems document 
which had not been coordinated at time of this writ- 
ing. It is instructive to note that most of these spec- 
ifications a r e  aimed at electronic systems, With 
few exceptions, all of the techniques employed in 
current reliability technology were developed around 
electronic systems requirements. 
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In addition to the pure reliability documents there 
are dozens of other specifications, each important 
in its own right. These "support" documents 
(Figure 1) are often key specifications in other fields, 
but are related to reliability efforts in many ways. 
For example, it is not possible to develop and de- 
liver reliable equipment without taking into full 
account such auxiliary disciplines as maintainability, 
human factors, training, quality control practices, 
and proven packaging techniques. Also, some of the 
system specifications themselves contain reliability 
sections. 
Reference Documents 
Among the most interesting of what we have 
chosen to call the "support" documehts a re  the 
"reference" publications, some of which are even 
good reading! They cover a melange of things, and 
are  in some cases mutually contradictory. It is in- 
formative to note that several are actually re-writes 
of each other, to suit the purposes of individual 
services. Also, the term "reference document" 
may be misleading, since some of these are often 
called out in contracts. In many ways, these publi- 
cations provide both a history of reliability engi- 
neering and an indication of its current status. 
Three having the most general significance are 
discussed in succeedingparagraphs. 
Giant among these publications is the report of 
the Advisory Group on Reliability of Electronic 
Equipment (AGREE). This document was issued in 
June of 1957, and is often considered to be the foun- 
tain head of our modern reliability specifications. 
The nine task groups of AGREE expanded on the 
work of the older Research and Development Board's 
"Ad Hoc Group on Reliability of Electronic Equip- 
ment" and really formalized and correlated the 
manifold disciplines of reliability engineering for 
the first time. Implementation of the AGREE test 
procedures has had excellent results in the develop- 
ment and production of reliable electronic equipment. 
Another publication of fundamental significance is 
the report of the Ad Hoc study group on Parts Speci- 
fications Management for Reliability (PSMR-1). This 
is a two-volume document issued in July of 1960 
(since the 40 man group was headed by Paul Darnel1 
of the Bell Telephone Laboratories it is often re -  
ferred to a s  "The Darnel1 Report"). The task was 
an outgrowth of recommendations from AGREE Task 
Group V. The report confines itself to electronic 
parts and recommends basic changes in Government 
organization in the parts specifications area plus 
fundamental changes in methods of preparing parts 
specifications to include reliability requireme~ts and 
demonstration methods. 
The sweeping recommendations of PSMR-1 will 
take considerable time for full implementation. 
Significant initial reactions are: 
1. Changes are  being made in Chapter V of 
Standardization Manual M-200 (a guide on how 
to write specifications). These are being 
promulgated rapidly to provide a body of 
instructions on how to write reliability speci- 
fications for parts in general accordance with 
PSMR -1. 
2. The Quality Control and Reliability Division 
of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Installations and Logistics) has pre- 
pared and is currently coordinating a manual 
to supplement Chapter V of M-200. It is . 
called "Manual of Instructions for Incorpo- 
rating Multi-level Reliability Requirements 
into Parts Specifications". 
3. The Armed Services Electro Standards 
Agency (ASESA) has been moved organiza - 
tionally and physically to report to the Defense 
Supply Agency in Dayton, Ohio. 
4. The Space Parts Working Group, under Air 
Force guidance, is doing an excellent job in 
coordination of contractor approaches to 
reliable parts specifications and procure - 
ment. 
5. Many aerospace companies and their vendors 
are currently preparing specifications and 
procuring and producing hardware to the 
PSMR-1 conditions. It is already apparent 
that the military-industry teamwork ex- 
hibited by this particular adventure is show- 
ing big bonuses for reliability and for the 
nation. 
The Interservice Data Exchange Program docu- 
ments, IDEP-1 and IDEP-2, are currently highly 
important to all of us. This system is  a growing 
monster, but a benevolent and useful one. Emi- 
nently practical, IDEP's key job of exchanging 
relevent parts test information between contractors 
engaged in ballistic missile programs is based on 
two elements: a simple yet complete summary 
format and a rapid-response handling and distri- 
bution system. Current efforts to firmly tie this 
program into all contracts must be very carefully 
examined. As a matter of firm policy we participate 
actively in IDEP across the Martin Company. 
Naturally, we would not object vigorously to con- 
tractual coverage for this program but we would like 
to be assured such coverage will not complicate the 
system and slow its response by treatment in com- 
mon with other contractual data requirements --- 
DD-250 forms and Government representative review 
functions, for example, might seriously reduce the 
current efficiency of IDEP. 
A Few Words on Contracts 
On 15 March of this year, the eighth revision to 
the Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR) 
was issued affecting the contracts section. It is 
clear from this revision that there is  a definite move 
towards cost -plus -incentive -fee and fixed-price - 
incentive-fee contracts in our business. 
It is also clear that reliability engineers must 
examine this situation in detail. A significant 
portion of the postulated incentive fees (which can be 
either positive or negative) will be based on the dem - 
onstrated reliability of delivered hardware. 
The following are significant quotes from ASPR, 
Revision 8: 
1. "The objective (of incentive contracts) should 
be to insure that outstandingly effective and 
economical performance is met by high pro- 
fits, mediocre performance by mediocre 
profits, and poor performance by low profits 
or losses". 
2. "--- the contract type selected should pro- 
vide for a profit factor that will tie profits 
to the contractor's efficiency in controlling 
costs and meeting desired standards of per- 
formance, reliability, quality, and delivery. " 
3. "The introduction of incentives into develop- 
ment is of such compelling importance that, 
to the extent practical, firms not willing to 
negotiate appropriate incentive provisions 
may be excluded from consideration for the 
award of development contracts . " 
4. (Under cost -plus -incentive -fee contract 
description) "The provision for increase or 
decrease in the fee is designed to provide 
incentive for maximum effort on the part of 
the contractor to manage the contract effec- 
tively" (underlining is the author's). 
Reliability engineers will be compelled to work 
directly with contracts, legal, and financial person- 
nel. Therefore, i t  behooves reliability personnel 
to learn the language and special problems of the 
people with whom they must deal. There is no 
longer a place, if there ever was, for the reliability 
man who is continually unhappy because other ele- 
ments of an organization do not understand him and 
refuse to learn h i s  language; now, reliability people 
must learn the language of management and join the 
team. 
With sub-systems or components, when design 
and utilization is relatively simple, it is sometimes 
economically feasible to develop reliability demon- 
stration programs that will provide statistically and 
legally valid proof of goal achievement within a 
narrow confidence band. However, when it becomes 
necessary to combine probability information from 
sub-system tests to provide, for example, reliability 
"numbers" for a large weapon system, the techni- 
ques for arrivipg at confidence intervals are so 
controversial that non-technical people could be- 
come very confused. 
It seems, then, that the necessary approach for 
large missile systems will be one of developing 
contractually acceptable demonstration plans based 
on "yes or no" situations to complement, not replace, 
the engineering statistics approach. Such situations 
might be --- a date met or not, a review held or not, 
a test passed or not, a countdown sequence completed 
with no more than a "par value" number of holds, 
successful mission completion --- in short, the kinds 
of data that will hold up (if needs be) in a court of 
law. Probabilistic numbers or gambling odds do not 
seem to fit here; too many people have heard of the 
book by Darrel Huff and Irving Deis titled "How to 
Lie with Statistics"! Accomplishment of the intended 
mission is  the real concern of the customer, and 
decisions on degree of accomplishment will not be 
limited to engineering reviews alone when incentive 
fees are involved. 
Management Considerations 
Fundamental to the establishment of any 
channelized type of activity is detailed organization, 
not only of people and facilities, but also of concepts. 
The climate induced by reliability specifications 
constantly reinforces this statement. 
In a broad field such a s  reliability engineering, 
i t  is essential that strong interest and leadership 
be evidenced by top management in an organization. 
The necessity for this becomes clear when i t  is 
realized that, while reliability is fundamentally an 
engineering discipline, its span of influence cuts 
across all departmental functions. 
In multi -division multi -customer companies it is 
basic that operating methods be mutually compatible 
to facilitate inter -division assistance on major pro- 
grams. Reliability policies and practices must be 
in reasonable accord, and this generates a require- 
ment for corporate staff direction in this a.-ea. 
Within the boundary conditions of customer 're - 
quirements and company policies and procedures, 
an individual project must be allowed to organize 
its reliability effort for, greatest effectiveness om 
its particular product. The working relation&ips. 
of the project reliability or&nization relative to 
engineering, manufacturing, quality control, 
material, and logistics support functions must be 
clearly defined by management directives, and 
monitored by a central reliability operation for 
effectiveness. 
While this i s  admittedly a very much simplified 
treatment of a complex subject, the following points 
a r e  salient: 
1. Leadership and guidance, in written directive 
form, must be provided a t  company executive 
level, and repeated in particularized form by 
successive echelons of management. 
2. Directive documents must cover not only the 
obvious engineering responsibilities for 
reliability, but also the concomitant respon- 
sibilities of the other industrial functions. 
3 .  Audit and review activities for the measure- 
ment of reliability organizational system 
effectiveness must be continuous. 
4. The overall reliability plan must be kept 
sufficiently flexible to accommodate changes 
in customer direction or state-of-the-art on 
short notice. 
5 .  Management direction must be strong enough, 
and consistent enough, to assure that a 
mutually conformant reliability posture is 
assumed by all company elements. 
Martin Company Approach 
In giving emphasis to the subject of reliability, 
the Martin Company in common with other aero- 
space corporations has evolved specific manage- 
ment structures and philosophies. The task facing 
us is typical among the multi -division multi - 
customer aerospace corporations. Our solution 
is somewhat unique in that we have become fairly 
well projectized within each operating Division, 
and are utilizing a variation of what the Harvard 
Business School calls the "bi-lateral line" type of 
organization, from Company headquarters down. 
Since some of the projects within each of our 
Divisions a re  organized very much a s  a small 
company is, our major tasks become (1) maintaining 
the inherent flexibility and discipline of a small 
company, while (2) realizing the benefits of the 
tremendous resources and technical cross fertili- 
zation influences that only a large company can pro- 
vide. We believe this has been effectively accom - 
plished in all areas, including reliability. 
Reliability Policy and Direction 
Reliability leadership and guidance in Martin 
begins a t  the "top" with a headquarters office staff 
function. Full written authority in the reliability 
area is granted by the President to the Vice Pres - 
ident-Engineering. A portion of the applicable 
section of this authority reads a s  follows: " --- the 
establishment of criteria for and control of reliability, 
maintainability, and training for use and service of 
aerospace division (Martin Company) products and 
the development of procedures and measures of per - 
formance concerning these activities --- is  hereby 
vested in the Vice President-Engineering." 
The relevant portion of this basic charter is 
implemented by the Director of Reliability, who 
serves on the staff of the Vice President-Engineering. 
He is responsible for generation of reliability policy 
and direction across the several divisions of the 
Martin Company, assisted by the company Manager 
of Reliability Systems. 
In addition to the general delegation from the 
President to the Vice President-Engineering, there 
is also a specific Policy Directive on product relia- 
bility issued by the President. Supporting this is a 
product reliability program Operating Instruction 
issued by the Vice President-Engineering which de- 
fines the scope of activity of the Director of Relia- 
bility and establishes requirements on the operating 
Divisions. Other headquarters Operating Instruction 
documents in this area cover such things as  the 
Interdivision Reliability Committee, across the board 
participation in the Interservice Data Exchange Pro- 
gram, and definitive procedures for establishing and 
conducting design reviews. Similar sets of operating 
instructions and policy documents cover the areas of 
standardization, maintainability, engineering facili- 
ties, etc . Utilizing these documents to establish 
boundary conditions, the operating Divisions, and the 
programs within the Divisions, establish their oper - 
ating instructions and organization structure, modi- 
fied if necessary to fit the special requirements of 
each customer. 
The Director of Reliability guides the preparation 
of reliability portions of major proposals and the 
establishment of reliability programs on projects 
within the Divisions. In maintaining active cogni - 
zance of the projects, the Director of Reliability 
assures that the policies of the Company are  imple- 
mented, and provides a direct channel of communi- 
cation to top management. 
Figure No. 2 shows an example of the overall 
reliability organization bridging from headquarters 
to an active project within the Space Systems Division 
of the Company (one of our Baltimore-area Divisions). 
The Director of Engineering of the Division acts for 
the Vice President/General Manager on all reliability 
matters. His authority is delegated to the Chief 
Reliability Engineer who is responsible for estab- 
lishing and implementing Space Systems Division 
reliability policy (within the framework of Martin 
Company policy), for adequacy of reliability portions 
of proposals, for adequacy of reliability programs on 
active projects, for the development of methods and 
procedures, and for acquiring and training reliability 
personnel to man the active projects. He also pro- 
vides cross -feeding of information and techniques 
between projects and a direct channel of communi- 
cation to Division management and the company 
Director of Reliability. 
Each active project within the Space Systems 
Division is headed by a Program Director who re-  
ports to the Division Vice President/General Manager. 
The project is staffed with personnel from functional 
departments, such a s  manufacturing, quality, and 
engineering. The project engineering activity is 
headed by an Engineering Technical Director, acting 
for the Division Director of Engineering on the pro- 
ject. In most cases we set up an Assistant Technical 
Director for reliability to manage the line reliability 
activities on the program. In special circumstances, 
such a s  on an integration program or a systems 
manager project, a special Reliability Program Office 
is established, under the direct supervision of the 
Program Director. 
Com~lementarv Activities 
There a re  a number of essential activities that 
complement those of a pure reliability engineering 
nature. Paramount among these a re  engineering 
standardization, specifications control, field support 
engineering, and data systems. 
Each of the noted functions is headed in Martin 
by company headquarters Directors who operate in 
much the same fashion a s  the Director of Reliability. 
When a great deal of detailed work must be 
accomplished, a s  in the engineering standardization 
area where sets of manuals a re  being developed, 
special overhead accounts a r e  established to plan 
and control the manpower support provided by the 
operating Divisions. (As a matter of interest, we 
are  budgeting more than $560,000 from overhead 
this year to support our engineering standardization 
effort). 
Overall Company coordination in such areas as  
the Interservice Data Exchange Program and the 
Battelle Electronic Component Reliability Center is  
accomplished by the office of the Director of Relia- 
bility. In the IDEP area, not only i s  the company's 
overall effort monitored but monthly status reports 
a re  handled on punched cards, tabed out and supplied 
to all of the operating Divisions to provide a month- 
to -month cumulative summary of parts tests planned, 
parts tests completed in each Division, and IDEP 
reports submitted. This provides both management 
and the IDEP Division Data Coordinators with full and 
complete information on a monthly basis to forestall 
duplication and to encourage interchange and com - 
bination of test plans between operating Divisions. 
Cost Elements 
It is implicit in specifying reliability that the 
customer also support the effort financially. This 
applies not only to analytical areas but also to ade- 
quate test facilities for product development and 
proofing and in the general support areas that r e -  
quire continued expansion and detailed coordination 
and development to provide a base for reliability 
progress. We no longer question whether a customer 
is  really serious when he includes a reliability r e -  
quirement in a request to bid; we h o w  he is. 
Especially on the larger programs, manpower 
support for reliability effort is no longer the pro- 
blem that it used to be, and percentages are ranging 
quite high for reliability work relative to overall 
engineering effort on a typical program today. 
Such items a s  the standards effort mentioned 
above contribute greatly to reliability. Unfortunately, 
because of the wide -spread application to many pro - 
grams, it i s  virtually impossible to direct-charge 
this type of effort to projects with any degree of 
integrity. Some means of handling this needs to be 
found. 
Historically, in many elements of the industry, 
computer machine centers a re  part of overhead. 
Now they must be expanded to provide complete data 
center controls for reliability purposes, for handling 
PERT and its variations, for handling CHAMPION, 
and other similar programs that a r e  relatively new. 
We understand that some contractors have a serious 
problem in the area of computer funding in support 
of such things a s  PERT; this apparent inequity 
warrants investigation. The situation is created by 
having some contracts "in the house" that do not allow 
this effort, and normal accounting systems cannot 
resolve the problem if these costs a re  carried in 
overhead. 
The total reliability process must be understood 
by all the people that are  concerned with it. Speci- 
fications establish boundary conditions but they do not 
create reliability of and by themselves, nor do nu- 
merical analyses. Reliability must be engineered 
into a product, then kept in it through intensive work 
in the manufacturing and use areas, and proofed so 
that non-technical people can believe it --- note 
"believe"; this is  an all-important factor too often 
shrugged-off by the technical sophisticate. 
Conclusions 
There is a need for continuing joint effort be- 
tween the Services, the Department of Defense, 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
and Industry to reduce the number of reliability 
documents extant. There is a strong trend in the 
direction of systems effectiveness requirements 
rather than reliability per se which will increase 
the bulk of documents in this area. There is need 
for more work on effectiveness measurement of 
reliability programs as  such; things in this area 
are still far too subjective. 
Incentive contracting inevitably gets down to the 
basic measurements of cost, schedules, and per - 
formance (which includes reliability). It requires 
attention to detail planning and a careful look at  the 
proportion of total program effort devoted to relia- 
bility. There is an obvious necessity for increased 
business maturity in contractor reliability organi- 
zations. Many reliability groups have difficulty 
operating "in-house" with a full awareness of their 
inter relationships with other departmental functions 
and fail to appreciate the effects of unilateral action 
on other elements of their organization. 
Engineers operating in inter -disciplinary areas 
such as  reliability and maintainability are growing 
closer to contract administration and contract 
structure due to the application of specifications with 
"teeth in them", and the current complexion of con- 
tracts. This requires cross -education beyond tra- 
ditional disciplines, and if possible, the reduction 
of some of the extreme specialization that exists in 
reliability organizations today. 
Methods of funding must be reviewed and revamped 
in those areas that create "blanket" reliability 
improvement, such as engineering standards, test 
facilities, and data centers. 
Finally, while reliability analytical techniques 
have been developed to a high state of maturity, 
methods for measuring the efficiency of reliability 
organizations have not. The time is ripe to launch 
a concerted effort to develop acceptable methods 
for evaluating organizational performance in, the 
reliability field without the necessity of waiting for 
final hardware deliveries. 
References 
1. H . L . Wuerffel, ' "Military Specifications Affecting 
Reliability," Proc. 7th National Symposium on 
Reliability and Quality Control, pp 56-83, 
Philadelphia, Pa. ; Jan. 1961. 
2. C. M. Ryerson, "The Reliability and Quality 
Control Field from Its Inception to the Present, " 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































RELIABILITY ANALYSIS AND PREDICTION 
G. Ronald Herd 
Booz, Allen Applied Research, Inc. 
Bethesda, Maryland 
Every  space program today is confronted 
with the dismaying problem of equipment failure. 
Despite al l  the effort and money devoted to  these 
programs,  our  resu l t s  consistently show inade- 
quate reliability. Management has not been 
sufficiently a l e r t  to make use  of a l l  the available 
means fo r  combating these problems. 
The  emphasis  on controlling schedules, 
while entirely proper  in itself, c r ea t e s  p re s su re  
throughout the program. Ca re  must  be taken to 
control the response to these pressures-- to 
a s su re  that performance i s  not always sacrif iced 
to promptness. One means of doing this  is by 
actually integrating reliability analysis and p re -  
diction techniques into our  programs. 
During the past 15 years ,  the emphasis  on 
reliability fo r  miss i le  and space applications has 
resulted in the formation of reliability engineer- 
ing groups in al l  organizations. During this  
period, numerous techniques have been developed 
and used by reliability specialists.  The  pr imary  
aim in developing these techniques has been to 
answer the question, "What i s  the reliability of a 
given system?".  Only recently have these tech- 
niques been forwarded a s  tools for  designers  and 
management. Some design engineers have 
learned to  use these analvtical techniaues. but 
A ,  
there has been universal failure to r e c o g n i z e h e  
value of these s ame  tools to management. The 
designer u se s  reliability analysis techniques to  
evaluate al ternate  concepts o r  designs. Manage- 
ment should use  these s ame  techniques to evaluate 
the trustworthiness of the design concept and the 
resultant design and to aid in the allocation of 
cost, engineering effort, and time. 
At present,  management i s  s o  engrossed 
in the application of PERT in controlling t ime 
schedules that performance is being permitted 
to disappear into a chaotic chasm of inadequacy. 
Meeting schedules has become so  important and 
understanding of possible time-cost-performance 
trade-offs i s  s o  limited that we will soon be 
meeting launch schedules but putting only use less  
piles of junk in orbit  overhead. 
Aspects of Reliability 
There  a r e  three  important aspects  of rel ia-  
bility: achievement, assessment ,  and maintenance. 
Achievement of high reliability depends 
upon the ability of the technical man to  determine 
the relations among basic physical parameters  
and the environments, to understand these rela-  
tions and know how to  apply them, and to  evaluate 
the degree of application. 
Assessing the degree of achievement of 
reliability is a measurement  problem and can be 
accomplished in a variety of s tages  in the de- 
velopment cycle of a system. It  is obvious to al l  
of us  that during the key development period of a 
system, classical  measurement  techniques a r e  
not applicable. It is only during the l a t t e r  stages, 
when hardware is available for  test ing that c lass -  
ical measurements  can be used. In the cr i t ical  
ear ly  period of development, however, rel ia-  
bility analysis and prediction can furnish us with 
a pr ior i  measurements  which a r e  extremely 
valuable when and if we know how to interpret  
them. 
Maintenance of reliability is another type 
of control problem--one with which we a r e  al l  
familiar.  The requirement here  is that we 
eliminate o r  reduce to a minimum the human 
e r r o r s  involved in assembly, diagnosis, and 
utilization of the system. 
Reliability analysis, then, can be described 
a s  "a wag of assess ing  the achievement of rel ia-  
bility before testing and use experience a r e  
available. " Management can use this  type of 
analysis to introduce the performance dimension 
into the P rog ram Evaluation and Review Tech- 
niques (PERT) programs current ly in use. 
Reliability Analysis 
Reliability analysis is the missing link in 
the control of system reliability. It furnishes a 
formalized method of evaluating the design 
during the research and development phase. 
Currently it is the only control technique that is 
sensitive to changes in reliability. It measures 
one of the performance characteristics--relia- 
bility--which is assumed to be integrated into 
PERT programs but actually is ignored rather 
than integrated under the pressures of PERT. 
How do we now make up the slack in our 
time schedules? Do we do it by speeding up our 
development? --No! We do i t  by lowering our 
performance requirements o r  by eliminating 
critical testing and evaluation phases which 
assure  the performance--reliability - -require - 
ments. Management is not evaluating trade - 
I offs - -merely trading away performance in favor 
of time and cost. 
All systems a r e  made up from basic com- 
ponents o r  elements. The procedure of computing 
loads o r  s t r e sses  and evaluating the effect of 
these s t resses  furnishes the framework for an 
analyst to determine the hazard associated with 
each element in i ts  expected operating environ- 
ment. It is the designer's task to insure that the 
total hazard obtained in assembly of a system be 
a t  a minimum. Hazard here is used in the sense 
of r i sk  and is usually measured by the failure 
rate. The assignment of quantitative values f o r  
failure r a tes  to elements of the system is an im- 
portant aspect of design analysis and is essential 
fo r  reliability analysis. 
An early s tep  in the qeliability analysis is 
the development of an abstract pattern of analysis 
o r  model which is representative of the physical 
system under consideration. The models a r e  
usually mathematical in nature and a r e  used to 
evaluate the relative worth of alternative designs 
and to predict the effects of questionable designs. 
The parameters for the models a r e  determined 
f rom past experimental evidence in laboratory 
testing programs and in field and test  experience 
on previous systems. The basic reason for  
bringing the mathematician into the picture a t  all 
is that the engineers face unknowns at  many 
points. Only through probabilistic treatment can 
these unknowns be quantitatively considered. 
A mathematical model furnishes a consis- 
tent se t  of ground rules and provides a numerical, 
rather than an intuitive, basis for evaluation and 
selection of designs f o r  components, assemblies, 
and systems. Manipulation of such models in- 
volves the mathkmatica~ techniques of probability 
theory. 
Assignment of quantitative values for  the 
parameters of our reliability model is an im- 
portant aspect of design analysis and is essential 
to reliability evaluation. The parameters a r e  
usually failure rates, and the values a r e  functions 
of the design (strength) of the elements, their 
interconnections, and the environmental condi- 
tions. The basic information applicable to many 
systems is the part failure rate. We must de- 
termine the failure rate the conditions for  
which the rate is applicable; make the translation 
to the se t  of conditions existing in the new system; 
and take into consideration the interface problems 
among parts  and among circuits in the same 
power o r  functional line, realizing that this 
interface is affected by the failure modes, en- 
vironment and past operating history. 
We have found from bitter experience that 
every individual must have objectives and mile- 
stones to enable him and his superiors to  eval- 
uate his progress. It is only through demonstra- 
tion that he is meeting these milestones that an 
individual will continue to make effective prog- 
ress .  The design of a system f o r  high relia- 
bility is an a rea  where we need to set up objec- 
tives and milestones f o r  ourselves. We must be 
able to evaluate our achievement of these without 
submitting to the 5- to 10-years' delay required 
fo r  operation of the current, lengthy feedback 
. loop. So this is one a rea  where we have failed 
to utilize the tools that we have available. 
If we review the industi-ial growth of our 
economy with i t s  emphasis on mechanization and 
automation, the evolution of reliability control 
programs is readily traceable. As a result of 
reliability problems, customer service functions 
were initiated. Then inspection procedures were 
introduced into manufacturing processes. Later, 
quality control became an integral part of the 
manufacturing process. Today, scientific con- ' 
t rol  in the form of reliability analysis is 
necessary in the design of our complex systems. 
A reliability program is a method of establishing 
effective management control over the design of 
complex systems. 
Weak Areas of the Analysis Techniques 
Where a r e  the a reas  of weakness in these 
analytical techniques? There a r e  two a reas  of 
major importance. These a r e  in establishing the 
basic failure rates from which to build the analy- 
sis and in considering the interactions within a 
functional ser ies  of elements. 
What is the failure-rate problem? It has 
its origin in our definition of failure, in s t r e ss -  
exposure variations, in the variation in observa- 
tion periods, reporting efficiency, and reporting 
accuracy. 
1. Definition of Failure- -In an operational 
system, each item is subject to a 
different definition of failure. F o r  . 
example, electronic parts  employed in 
circuits with different tolerances r e -  
quire different definitions of failure. 
almost universally accepted throughout industry, 
we can translate the basic failure ra tes  to the 
rates applicable to the particular system under 
consideration. 
The second major problem is the inter- 
action among elements of the system. This 
interaction problem is not a s  obvious a s  the 
failure rate problem. Drift of electrical charac- 
teristics, noise in a servoloop, tolerance changes 
due to wear, etc. ,  a r e  examples of this problem 
We know, a s  we build a complex circuit; that the 
larger  the number of circuit elements, the more 
2. Exposure of the item to s t resses--  difficult i t  is to understand al l  of the character- 
Each item employed in a circuit o r  istic variations within the circuit. If we under- 
group of circuits is subjected to stood all the cross  currents, transient effects, 
different levels of stress,  due to i ts  etc.,  and knew how to  isolate channels, ele- 
particular position in the circuit and ments, and functions, then it would be almost a s  
the position of the circuit in the system simple to design a 200-element circuit a s  a 2- 
and black box. element circuit. At present, we do not have this 
complete knowledge, and our inadequacies a r e  
3.  The time of observation--All observa- inevitably reflected in the reliability. 
tions on the system a r e  controlled by 
decisions which a r e  usually independent 
df the systems under observation. At 
times we s tar t  observing the system 
after it has been in operation for  some 
time and know nothing about i t s  pre- 
vious history. On other occasions we 
a r e  able to observe a system for  a 
fixed period of time during i ts  original 
employment. In both situations, the 
only information available is the infor- 
mation that was obtained during our 
period of observation. 
Now turning to your own experience, think 
of any number of problems you have experienced- 
intermittent malfunctions, the noise in servo- 
loops which has caused wandering, and the e r r o r s  
in digital computer operations. Many of these 
troubles can't be assigned to any particular 
part; however, the circuit o r  system failed. 
Our experience has been that about one time in 
three it is impossible to substantiate the ex- 
istence of a failure in a rejected system; and 
that nine out of ten part  replacements a r e  due 
to a change in part  characteristic rather than to 
an abrupt catastrophic-type failure. 
- - 
4. The efficiency of reporting--All 
failures a r e  not reported. This may be How do we consider the effect of element 
due to the pressures imposed upon'the 
staff, o r  it may be due to the differences 
in interpretation of the concepts of 
failure. 
5. Missing data--Not all pertinent infor- 
mation is available to the individual 
completing the malfunction reports at  
the time of the malfunction. F o r  this 
reason, and due to human error ,  some 
information will not be recorded. 
How do we resolve these apparent major 
obstacles in establishing basic failure ra tes?  
We do this by using a s  our basic inputs, experi- 
ence on parts  o r  components obtained in tes ts  s o  
designed that the above problems do not materi- 
ally affect the results. We must know the condi- 
tions under which the failure ra tes  a r e  deter- 
mined; then, using trade-off relations that a r e  
interaction o r  lack of independence in a relia- 
bility analysis? There a r e  no well established 
and rigorous techniques. This part of the analy- 
sis is more of an a r t  than any of the other phases. 
To  date we have established, on the basis of 
empirical evidence, that the average failure rate 
per part increases with the length of the 
functional string. This same empirical evidence 
has indicated that digital circuits and analog 
circuits have different amounts of interactions. 
This experience is compatible with our intuitive 
expectations and our general knowledge of c i r -  
cuits. Therefore, the technique that is current- 
ly being used is to determine those elements 
within a functional str ing which will ~ n t e r a c t  with 
each other and use this a s  the basic interaction 
building block in the reliability analysis. Within the 
interaction building block, the estimate of the 
effect of interaction is based upon the "active ele- 
ment group" a s  f i rs t  proposed by Task Group I in 
the AGREE report. Deciding how large the in- 
teraction building block should be is in the realm 
of a r t  at present. However, this technique has 
been repeatedly put to test, and to date I know of 
no better way of assessing the effects of depen- 
dence among electronic circuit parts o r  among 
moving mechanical parts. 
I recognize that, for  accurate reliability 
measurement and precise definition of reliability 
problems there is  no real  substitute for  opera- 
tional time on a given system. However, the 
reliability analysis permits some degree of 
measurement and problem definition in the design 
phase, before testing can be accomplished. In- 
formation derived from the analysis compensates 
for i ts  lack of precision by i ts  timeliness and 
the resultant savings obtained by eliminating 
problems before they a r e  built into the hardware. 
Our experience has been that problems can be 
identified and the relative magnitude of the 
problems can be assessed quite accurately. We 
have not been equally successful in establishing 
the accuracy of our time scale. The accuracy 
of the time scale will vary from system to 
system; but for large complex systems, the 
scaling on the time axis should not be in e r r o r  
by more  than a factor of two. 
Industry and Management Employment 
Industry and management have a number of 
problems in the utilization of reliability analy- 
sis. F r c m  our experience, I would conclude 
that the key problems a r e  the following: 
1.  Failure ra tes  a r e  not realistic. 
2.  Derating is not accurate, particularly 
in load-sharing redundant applications. 
3. Interactions a r e  not considered. 
4. The reliability of sensing and switch- 
ing devices in stand-by redundant 
applications is ignored. 
5.  The effects of transients a re  ignored. 
In one case at  least, a failure pattern 
reflected the dampening effect of 
transients through the circuits. 
We have the analytic tools to analyze the 
reliability of a design; we have demonstrated 
their application; we know their weaknesses-- 
now it is  time for all levels of management to 
apply reliability analysis and prediction to the 
difficult job confronting them- -controlling the 
design of a complex system. My plea i s  that 
we incorporate system reliability analysis into 
our PERT programs and begin to control per- 
formance rather than allow the deterioration of 
performance to resolve all of the scheduling 
obstacles identified by PERT. 
One other major problem is the tendency 
of people associated with a program to ration- 
alize rather than face up to unfavorable results 
obtained from an analysis o r  testing program. 
Such unwillingness to acknowledge unpleasant 
facts has disastrous effects on reliability, 
schedules, and costs. 
W. T. Sumerlin 
McDonnell Aircraft Corporation 3 
St. Louis, ~issobi 
Reliability measurement by data collection 
and evaluation is considered. Parameters are 
defined and restrictions established. Relia- 
bility estimation of sub-systems and parts as 
a preliminary to system estimation is reviewed, 
and rules are established. Confidence levels 
of sub-systems and parts versus combined system 
are analyzed. Estimation plaming is discussed. 
Tests planned for accept-reject reliability 
decision are very briefly considered. 
Introduction 
Measurement of the reliability of a favored 
product about to be released, or the confirmation 
of low reliability in a suspect new model has 
seemed to many of us for a long time to be an 
elusive technique. Not so for the item of long 
acclaim or for the item regularly requiring 
chronic maintenance. In the latter case, records 
provide inescapable or irrefutable data from 
which we all can make calculations that few will 
question. In the former case, we must create data 
not already available, run tests, experiments 
that perhaps are costly of tlicand money, and 
then we must be prepared to stand accused of 
designing the test or experiment to insure the 
kind of data that gives the desired result. In 
looking back to the fall of 1955 and the handful 
of men who gathered with the author to "develop.. 
tests..which will prove conclusively that the 
equipmen will meet the minimum..reliability estab 
lished*,' and were identified as AGREE Task Group 
3, it would seem that guidance was provided by 
Providence. For not until January of 1962, was 
proof established2 that certain statistical 
liberties, taken by Task Group 3 in ignorance, or 
rather perhaps because of engineering intuition, 
were more than justified in the interest of test- 
ing economy. In spite of this staunch 1957 
AGREE milestone for quantitative reliability 
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acceptance decisions, we still need to clear away 
. the haze that surrounds a suitable technique for 
estimating or measuring the quantitative relia- 
bility that is inherently contained in a product 
not yet mature enough to have acquired a per- 
fomnce reputation. It is the intention of this 
paper to apply an engineer's consideration to 
this clarification and to expose the statistical 
quirks to the light of day in such a way that no 
one needs suggest that "the numbers game" can 
prove anything. 
Reliability measurement occupies special 
attention in the engineering profession because 
it outwardly requires probability theory to 
estimate the frequency of performance failures 
that haven't taken place yet. Further, because 
we don't always determine the cause of all past 
or future failures, we need statistics to sub- 
stitute for the pertinent laws of physics which 
we haven't yet assigned. The first part of this 
paper will be confined to means for estimating 
the best quantitative figure for reliability 
from data obtained by tests of a sample. 
Sampling is required in the time dolnain where we 
examine behavior or performance for a restricted 
period of time or number of cycles and from this 
attempt to describe behavior or performance for 
the extended future. Sampling may also be - 
required in the population domain, where we I 
observe some but not all the items which are of 
interest to us, and from such observations, we 
make statements about other similar items which 
we did not observe. Not infrequently, we will 
be working with both kinds of sampling simul- 
taneously. 
Reliability Assessment 
If by the term reliability assessment we 
mean the assignment of quantitative reliability 
numbers to an item or product of interest, th& 
it must be noted that reliability prediction is 
concerned with the reliability assessment of a 
design without the benefit of hardware observa- 
tion. Reliability measurement, on the other hand, 
is concerned with the assignment of quantitative 
reliability numbers by virtue of insight from 
observation data acquired from representative 
hardware under representative conditions. In 
actual practice, there will be many occasions 
where it is expedient to develop quantitative 
assessment numbers for a complex system by a com- 
bination of both techniques. 
- - -  
. . 
Measurement Parameters 
It is regularly found that inconsistency in 
applying certain restrictions to the important 
reliability measurement parameters results in 
significant descrepancies in the results obtained. 
Accordingly, the important parameters must be 
identified, and then these restrictions discussed. 
, -:- 
subsequent similar fai lures are, i n  fact, pre- 
vented by virtue of the preventive maintenance 
routine. The fac t  that  a design change is made 
immediately following a fa i lure  which w i l l  
successfully prevent any recurrence of similar 
fai lures is  not sufficient reason t o  discount the 
fai lure while counting the accumulated time. 
The tested item may have thousands of different 
design shortcomings each of which w i l l  produce 
a future failure. Thus the reduction by one of 
the different ways a fai lure may take place gives 
no license t o  suggest the future fa i lure  f re-  
quency w i l l  be measurably decreased. Also, since 
repetition of a sampling t e s t  on the same kind 
of item violates a basic law of s t a t i s t i c s  
(which says that any desired outcome may be 
observed i f  sufficient repetitions of the t e s t  
are made), t e s t  time and related fai lures cannot 
both be ignored with immunity for  any reason 
save a proven i n i t i a l  failure. A new t e s t  or re- 
t e s t  must be preceded by significant design 
change or improvement. 
While a single fai lure may result i n  immedi- 
a t e  damage t o  several related parts of the tested 
unit, and the replacement of these several, parts 
need be counted only a s  a single failure, there 
w i l l  be other cases where more than one part w i l l  
appear t o  have fai led simultaneously with no 
reasonable explanation a s  t o  a relationship 
between or among the failed parts. If tested 
unit  perfOrmance is prevented by several unrelat- 
ed parts fai lures a l l  of which seemed t o  occur 
simultaneously, each unrelated part must be 
counted as  a separate fa i lure  and the simultane- 
ous time of occurrence classified as coincident. 
Conversely, there need be no l i m i t  t o  the 
analytical effort  applied t o  prove relationship 
between several simultaneous parts failures. 
Applicable Time. Hardware has frequently 
been shown t o  simultaneously possess more than 
a single characteristic mean time between fai lures 
(I~~TBF). For instance, many equipments do not 
have inf in i te  storage or shelf l i f e ,  and thus 
have a significant though high MTBF applicable t o  
storage or shelf conditions, and it may well vary 
with different such conditions. Observation of 
hardware under such conditions t o  permit measure- 
ment of storage MTBF is often complicated because 
we cannot establish fai lure (and thus, time of 
fai lure)  without putt3ng the item i n  operating 
condition, and th i s  change of s ta te  fo r  the item 
may well contaminate the observation. The point 
t o  be made is t o  emphasize an adeauate descrin- 
t ion of the coaditi&s under whicc a measure of 
the re l iabi l i ty  is desired, and then collect 
observation time only f o r  the time of exposure t o  
the applicable conditions. If certain time inter- 
vals are t o  be ignored because they are necessary 
t o  establish proper i n i t i a l  operation, or fo r  
other justifiable reasons, make sure they are 
thoroughly defined beforehand, so that  no option 
depending on fai lure observations i.s present. 
In planning the duration of a proposed test,  
it is well t o  be prepared t o  continue the t e s t  
long enough so that  with barely sub-marginal 
re l iabi l i ty  there w i l l  still be enough fai lures 
'pime , a i n  Rrrameters. Number of fai lures 
( f )  and -&able time interval ( t )  pemit  
calculati& of mean time between fai lures (MTBF), 
or its recipracal, fai lure rate (A). Either, 
when inserted i n  an appropriate distribution- 
function, permits calculation of the probability 
of occurrence (P) of any specified number of 
failures, a s  w e l l  as the confidence (c) with 
which certain statements can be made yoncerning 
the measured item or its counterparts. 
Population or Cyclic Domain Parameters. For 
the assessment of the re l iabi l i ty  of certain 
kinds of items where time duration of operation 
is not significant compared t o  the cycles of 
operation, such as i n  actuators, switches, fuses, 
and one shot devices, we need fai lures (f ), and 
cycles, and units(n from which t o  calculate 
unit r e l i a b i l i t y  (2 1 . The l a t t e r ,  when inserted 
i n  an appropriate distribution function, permits 
calculation of the probability of occurrence (P) 
of any specified number of fai lures i n  a given 
population, a s  well a s  the confidence (c) with 
which certain statements can be made concerning 
the measured items or their  counterparts. 
Failures. In basic re l iabi l i ty  theory, this 
author always identifies three kinds of failures, 
namely, i n i t i a l ,  wearout, and random. I n i t i a l  
fai lures are  those which result  when an item is 
not right t o  begin with, regardless of whether 
the fai lure t o  perform was present from the 
s t a r t  or appeared during the early fai lure period. 
Wearout fa i lures  are those whose time of occur- 
rence can be successfully predicted because of a 
constant mean time of occurrence and a small 
variance about th is  mean. Thus, wearout fai lures 
can be prevented by preventive maintenance which 
r e ~ l a c e s  a fa i l ing item economically just before 
&lure takes Random failures-are the 
fai lures tha t  support most or a l l  of our rel ia-  
b i l i t y  activity, and need be defined simply a s  
fai lures whose time of occurrence is random t o  
the extent tha t  it cannot be predicted sufficient- 
l y  t o  permit elimination by preventive mainten- 
ance techniques. Thus, random failures include 
those wearout fai lures which occur so infre- 
quently as  t b  prevent recognition, and they 
include those i n i t i a l  fai lures which cannot con- 
veniently be screened out by an economical burn- 
i n  or check-out period. In general, if the 
failures i n  the random category make up a suffi-  
ciently heterogeneous collection, randomness is 
guaranteed, and this is  most always the case. 
In  collecting fai lures by t e s t  from which 
t o  make measurement calculations, there are many 
temptations t o  aoit  certain fai lures from the 
count. No performance fai lures of the item i n  
test occasioned by a faul t  within the tested item 
(and this must be presumed unless an external 
faul t  is actually found) can be neglected u6t.ek.s 
it can be sham beyond question t o  be an i n i t i a l  
fai lure or a wearout failure. I f  an i n i t i a l  
failure, a l l  test time acquired up t o  the moment 
of such fai lure must be neglected i f  the fai lure 
is ignored. If a wearout failure, an acceptable 
preventive maintenance procedure must be applied, 
and then the fai lure m y  be ignored only if a l l  
observed t o  provide a start ing point f o r  considera- 
t ion  of design improvement. This factor was the 
basis for requiring observation fo r  a m i n i m u m  time 
period computed a s  three times the desired MTEF 
f o r  p i lo t  production equipment, A G m  Task 3, 
and thus a minimum of 12 failures,on the average, 
from which t o  s t a r t  design improvement on reject- 
ed equipment. 
Units and Cycles. I f  MTBF is constant i n  a 
given situation thus establishing the appro- 
priateness of the Poisson distribution fo r  mea- 
surement calculations, and such assumption i s  
reasonable i n  a majority of situation, (and cor- 
respondingly all units which are t o  be observed 
under t e s t  are beyond thei r  early fai lure pried), 
,then it makes no difference whether we accumulate 
unit hours of operating time and related fai lures 
from one unit  over a long period or from many 
units  over a short period. However, there is an 
important consideration. If our to ta l  future 
concern is confined t o  a single unit and that  is 
the unit  we w i l l  t es t ,  then our probability con- 
clusions w i l l  involve sampling only i n  the time 
domain, and the confidence we acquire by t e s t  
duration need only be sufficient fo r  the period 
of our concern f o r  future use (perhaps a "mission" 
time). If on the other hand, we expect t o  draw 
conclusiaas from the t e s t  of a few units which 
we w i l l  apply t o  a large population of units, 
then our observation must be extended sufficiently 
t o  give us desired confidence both as to future 
time period (mission) and a s  t o  population. A s  
an example, suppose from t e s t  data we conclude a 
missile has a 0.90 re l iabi l i ty  with 0.90 confi- 
dence. We have then stated that  nine times out 
of ten the missile w i l l  demonstrate 0.90 relia- 
b i l i ty .  In launching a hundred missiles a s  many 
as ten might be presumed t o  be unsuccessful, and 
this would prevail nine times out of ten. Thus 
if on nine af ten occasions t o  launch a hundred 
missiles there were never more than ten that  
failed, on one of the ten launching8 (of the hun- 
dred missile salvo) the re l iabi l i ty  might be less. 
From the same t e s t  data we could also calculate a 
new and lower value fo r  re l iabi l i ty  but with a 
higher (than 0.90) confidence. Accordingly, we 
a re  able t o  describe with specific l i m i t s  al l  
future trials, but we find that  our need t o  spread 
our expectations over many different units i n  a 
large population encourages us t o  extend our t e s t  
observation t o  yield higher confidence. It wauld 
seem obvious then t o  attempt t o  increase the num- 
ber of units i n  our t e s t  sample rather than t o  
extend the confidence solely by a longer test, 
f o r  th i s  gives us protection against unit  vari- 
ation. ' 
There are  many cases where it w i l l  be found 
tha t  the l i tera ture  urges that  t e s t s  be run on no 
fewer thaa two units  fo r  re l iabi l i ty  measuremeat. 
If t e s t  conclusions are t o  be applied t o  a large 
population of assumed identical units, a t e s t  ob- 
servation of no less  than two guarantees that  
t e s t  findings w i l l  not be based on a single un i t  
which is radically different from the res t  of the 
l o t .  
Probability and Conf'idence 
Distribution functions such a s  the Pbisson 
and the binomial permit us t o  calculate the prob- 
ab i l i ty  of observing any predetermined number of 
fai lures with a given re l iabi l i ty  (HTW or h fo r  
the Poisson, and number of units i n  t e s t  sample 
plus MTBF or A for  binomial), Thus we are also 
able t o  cwpute the probability of observing more 
fai lures than a given number, given a particular 
rel iabil i ty.  This i n  effect  says tha t  if the 
rel iabil i ty,  r, were so  bad that  there was P 
probability of observing more than f failures, 
then we have P = C confidence that  the re l iabi l i tv  
is at leas t  r, based on observing f failures. 
As an example, suppose 1000 unit-hours of 
t e s t  produced but one failure, and a statement of 
MTBF with confide ce was desired. Scrutiny of 1P Molina's Table 11 shows that  f o r  a = 3.9 ( and 
a = t / MTBF where t is the 1000 unit-hours of 
test) ,  and c = 2 ( where c is interpreted t o  mean 
two or. more failures), then P = 0.9008. Hence, 
if a figure for M T B  is chosen such that %/MTBF 
equals 3.9 then there is a probability of 0.9008 
of observing more than one failure. And thus fo r  
an MTBF 5 1000 / 3.9 = 256 hours, we have a gC$ 
confidence. 
A s  a second example, i n  one hundred trials of 
a unit  there were ten failures. hrw he Cumula- k t ive  Binomial Probability Distribution we find 
that  if the probability of fa i lure  fo r  a single 
unit, p, were a s  high a s  0.15 ( and hence its re- 
l i a b i l i t y  equal t o  1 - 0.15 = 0.85) then with 100 
units i n  the sample ( n = 100 ) and r = 11 (this 
table uses r equivalently to Molina's use of c, 
i n  t h i s  case meaning eleven or more failures), 
P = 0.90055. Hence if re l iabi l i ty  were as  l a w  a s  
0.85 there would be gOq6 probability of more than 
10 fai lures i n  100 trials and we have 90$ confi- 
dence that  re l iabi l i ty  is  0.85 or more from ob- 
serving 10 fai lures i n  100 trials. 
Assessment of Systems, Sub-systems, and Brts 
Measuring the re l iabi l i ty  of systems is often 
considered easier than measuring the re l iabi l i ty  
of the sub-systems or  parts that make it up, be- 
cause with the entire system under tes t ,  fai lures 
occur more frequently, and a shorter t e s t  builds 
up a higher level of confidence i n  the needed re- 
l iabi l i ty .  (such system testing also eliminates 
need for  considering application factors for  piece 
part  t e s t  data. ) For example, i f  we remember that 
a t e s t  which observes one fa i lure  permits us t o  
have confidence that  the MTB is at l eas t  1/4 
the value obtained by dividing the unit-hours of 
t e s t  by the one failure, then a 1000-unit-hour 
system t e s t  would permit us t o  say we had 9C$ con- 
fidence that  the MTBF were a t  l eas t  250 hours 
(accurately 256 hours, see ear l ier  example). If 
the system were i n  f ac t  made up of ten identical 
sub-systems, we could expect it t o  take ten times 
a s  long t o  produce one f d l u r e  on a sub-system, 
or 10,000 unit-hours t o  run a test that  would give 
us 9C$ confidence that  the sub-system MTBF were 
at l eas t  2,500 hours. And, anomslously, with such 
a %3$ confident conclusion we should have t o  ac- 
knowledge tha t  on the average one of every ten 
such sub-systems might be lower than 2,500 hours 
MTBF, and i f  t h i s  happened i n  the group of ten 
sub-systems making up the given system, then the 
l a t t e r  could not be expected t o  have 250 hours 
MTBF o r  more, I f  we had been unsure t ha t  a l l  ten 
sub-systems were ident ical  and had instead tested 
each of the ten  fo r  the 1000 hours which we would 
have given the system as  a whole, we could then 
claim 10  times 1000 hours or 10,000 unit-hours as 
before, and the same statement on confidence as 
before. But now we know tha t  our statement on 
confidence f o r  the whole system must a l so  apply. 
Because so  often we need t e s t  resu l t s  as ear ly  a s  
possible t o  allow time fo r  design improvement 
should the r e l i a b i l i t y  be insufficient,  we are  
often forced t o  make sub-system t e s t s  long before 
we a re  able t o  make system tes t s .  To bet ter  un- 
derstand these seeming paradoxes, l e t  us examine 
the way i n  which re l iab i l i ty ,  MTBF, A, and con- 
fidence combine i n  going from the par t s  t o  sub- 
system level, o r  from sub-system t o  system level.  
Combining Rel iab i l i t i es  
While fundamental r e l i ab i l i t y  t raining has 
taught us tha t  r e l i a b i l i t i e s  of se r ies  elements 
combine by product rule  (and thus unre l iab i l i t i es  
if very small a r e  approximately additive), f a i l u r e  
ra tes  under similar conditions a re  additive, and 
MTBF1s must be inverted t o  f a i l u r e  r a t e s  t o  be 
combined, t raining often f a i l s  t o  note t ha t  a l l  
such combinations a r e  t o  be performed with "best 
estimate" values. The s t a t i s t i c i an  may mootly 
consider values fo r  zero bias, values of maximum 
likelihood, and values which are  equally l i ke ly  
t o  be too  high as too low.  In  any case, the 
engineer should compute the best estimate by d i -  
viding the unit-hours of observation by the num- 
ber of f a i l u r e s  observed (unless the t e s t  was 
concluded upon occurrence of the l a s t  f a i l u r e  
which then can be ignored) f o r  a best estimate 
of MTBF. He should divide the number of succes- 
ses by the t o t a l  number of t r i a l s  (successes plus 
fa i lures )  f o r  a best estimate of single-shot o r  
cyclic r e l i ab i l i t y .  I f  he observes no fa i lures  
over a period (measured i n  time, cycles, or 
t r i a l s )  equal t o  or longer than t h a t  period which 
would apply were the t e s t  being applied t o  the 
overall  system, then he should assign in f in i t e  
MTBF or  unity r e l i ab i l i t y  t o  the sub-system. In  
any case the observation period should equal (or 
exceed) f o r  the sub-system tha t  which would have 
been chosen f o r  the complete system had it been 
possible t o  t e s t  the complete system instead. 
For example, i f  a system is composed of a single 
uni t  A, and three uni t  B's, and would be tested 
i f  available f o r  1000 hours t o  develop adequate 
confidence i n  the  desired re l iab i l i ty ,  then by 
sub-system t e s t  a minimum of 1000 unit-hours 
should be observed on uni t  A and 3000 unit-hours 
on uni t  B. I f  one f a i l u r e  were observed on uni t  
A during i ts  t e s t  period, and no fa i lures  were 
observed on uni t  B during its 3000 hours of t e s t ,  
then an MTBF of 1000 hours f o r  uni t  A should be 
employed i n  system r e l i a b i l i t y  computation, and 
an i n f i n i t e  MTBF fo r  each of the three uni t  B's. 
Thus the system computation would yield a 1000 
hour MTBF f o r  the complete system, a s  a best 
system estimate. 
Combining Confidences 
Suppose the fa i lure  r a t e  of a module con- 
s i s t i ng  of two parts was desired. Part A was 
known t o  have a fa i lure  r a t e  of 0.2$ per 1000 
hours with &$ confidence, and par t  B was known 
t o  have a f a i l u r e  ra te  of 0 . 0 m  per 1000 hours 
with 6C$ confidence. Is i.f, proper t o  add the 
f a i l u r e  rates, 0.2 + 0.092 = 0 . 2 ~ / 1 0 0 0  hours, 
and i f  so  i s  the confidence 6C$ on the t o t a l  thus 
obtained? 
Actually none of these f a i l u r e  ra tes  is a 
"best estimate" rate, a s  each is pessimistic i n  
order t o  permit added confidence. We do not have 
enough information i n  knowing only the f a i l u r e  
r a t e  a t  a single part icular  confidence t o  permit 
us t o  determine best estimates nor t o  permit us 
t o  determine resulting confidence i n  a summation. 
However, i f  we can obtain further  information, 
a l l  the desired parameters may be calculated. 
We find tha t  the f a i l u r e  r a t e s  a t  60$ con- 
fidence were obtained from observing one f a i l u r e  
during t e s t  of @art A and zero f a i l u r e s  during 
t e s t  of par t  B. Reference t o  Molina's Table I I ~  
shows a probability, P, of observing two or  more 
fa i lures  (observing more than one fai lure,  which 
i s  equal t o  a confidence of P f o r  one f a i l u r e )  
of 0.60 i f  a = ~~MTBF = t h  = 2.0. For zero 
fa i lures  we find P, the probability of observing 
one or. more fa i lures  (probability of observing 
more than zero fa i lures )  is 0.60 i f  a = 0.92. 
Simple arithmetic shows both par t s  were each 
tested f o r  one million part-hours. One f a i l u r e  
i n  one million part-hours or  pa r t  A gives a 
best estimate of 1.0 x lo-' o r  0.lC$/lOOO hours. 
Best estimate f o r  par t  B f o r  which zero fa i lures  
were observed i s  zero f a i l u r e  r a t e  provided no 
more than one million part-hours per end system 
are required per mission. I f  t h i s  res t r ic t ion  
is met, the best f a i l u r e  ra te  estimate f o r  the  
module i s  0.1@/1000 hours. 
I f  t e s t  of each part f o r  a million part-hours 
could be considered essent ial ly the same a s  a 
module t e s t  f o r  one million module-hours, with a 
single f a i l u r e  resulting from t h i s  module t e s t ,  
then we already know f o r  P = 0.60 and one f a i l u r e  
tha t  a = 2.0, so we have 60$ confidence tha t  the 
module f a i l u r e  r a t e  i s ' n o t  greater than 0.2@ 
per 1000 hours. Note t ha t  t h i s  is  signif icant ly 
l e s s  than the sum of the separate part f a i l u r e  
ra tes  a t  6C$ confidence ( 0.20 + 0.092 = 0.292 $ 
per 1000 hours). Further, reference t o  Molinats 
Table 113 fo r  az2.9 shows we have 7% confidence 
tha t  the module f a i l u r e  ra te  is  l e s s  than 0.2% 
per 1000 hours. These data  a r e  tabulated here- 
with f o r  comparison: 
fi05 From Test From Tables Best , 
C=&$ f t a Estimate 
Part A 0.2 1 10: 2.0 o.r d o - 5  
Part B -092 o 10 ,092 o 
Total 0 . 2 9 2 ~ 1 0 ~ ~  0.1 d o - 5  
Confidence 
fo r  related 
t o t a l  7% 
t o t a l  f o r  60$ c = 0.20 x 10'5 (2@) 
A second example which i l l u s t r a t e s  conf - 
dence calculations using the Binomial Tables k 
might be the following. Two uni t s  make a system, 
uni t  A and uni t  B. One hundred t r i a l s  of iinit A 
produce two fa i lures  f o r  a best r e l i a b i l i t y  
estimate of 0.98, while one hundred t r i a l s  of 
uni t  B produce ten fa i lures  f o r  a best  estimate 
of 0.90. The best  r e l i ab i l i t y  estimate fo r  the 
system, assuming fa i lures  a re  independent and a l l  
twelve would have occurred i n  100 system trials 
i s  0.88 and t h i s  figure can be obtained e i ther  
by computing system success t o  t r i a l  rat io,  
(100-12)/100 = 0.88, or by multiplying the best 
r e l i a b i l i t y  estimates of the two units  together, 
0.98 x 0.90 = 0.88. For g($ c nfidence cal-  8 culations, the b inmia l  tables  a re  searched fo r  
n = 100, P = 0.90, and r = 3 (more than 2 fa i lures  
fo r  uni t  A)  t o  find p (which i s  the  probability 
of f a i l u r e  of a single uni t  and equals one minus 
the single uni t  r e l i ab i l i t y )  equal t o  0.053 
(and hence R = 0.947 f o r  uni t  A). For r = 11 
(more than 10 f a i l u r e s )  p = 0.15 (and hence 
R = 0.85 f o r  un i t  B). For n=100, P-0.90, and 
r=l3 (more than 12 fa i lures  a s  applicable t o  the 
combined system) p = 0.17 t o  give a 9% confidence 
system r e l i a b i l i t y  of 0.83. I f  we combine the 
confidence values f o r  the separate units,  
0.947 x 0.85 = o.&, and look up n=100, r=13, 
and p=1-0.80=0.20, we f ind P = 0.97 t o  give 97% 
confidence i n  the 0.80 figure. These data  a re  
tabulated herewith fo r  comparison: 
Test Rel. Best Rel iabi l i ty  
Trials  Failures Estimate f o r  ~ = 9 @  
Unit A 100 2 0 . 8  0.947 
IJni tB 100 10 0.90 
-
0.850 
System 0.98x0.go 0.g47x0.850 
= 0.88 = 0.80 
Related Confidence 
For 9096 Confidence, System R = 0.83 97% 
A t h i rd  example may be useful i n  i l l u s t r a t i ng  
tha t  sometimes there is  considerable value i n  low 
confidence levels .  Suppose a system is composed 
of ten  d i f fe ren t  sub-systems, each of which co- 
incidentally has a best estimate MTBF of 1000 
hours t o  give a system best estimate of 100 hours. 
Now a system t e s t  of 1000 hours duration yield- 
ing ten fa i lures  is a f a i r l y  solid t e s t  a s  estab- 
lished by 9% confidence tha t  the MT F is at l ea s t  64.5 hours. ( ~ o l i n a ' s  Table II , P=0.90, 
c=l l ,  as15.5, and MTBF = 1000/15.5=64.5 hours. ) 
To make separate sub-system tes t s ,  1000 hours of 
tes t ing  f o r  each would yikld the same quantity of 
t o t a l  data, but on the average each sub-system 
would encounter but one fai lure.  The sub-system 
confidence applicable t o  a 645 hour lower l i m i t  
MTBF based on a one-failure 1000 hour t e s t ,  i s  
found t o  be 4% (a=1.55, c=2, ~=0.46). Thus no 
more .than 46$ ccanfideace on each of ten  sub-sys- 
tems is suf f ic ien t  t o  yield gC$ confidence i n  the 
combined system i n  t h i s  part icular  example. 
I n  general, a unit-hour tes t ing  or obser- 
vation period suf f ic ien t  t o  produce desired con- 
fidence i n  a system, is a l so  suf f ic ien t  t o  pro- 
duce adequate confidence i n  each sub-system pro- 
vided a l l  sub-systems are  tested f o r  t h i s  period. 
Had the l a s t  example been the same system but 
composed of ten  ident ical  sub-systems, then the 
l a t t e r ' s  t e s t  would have produced 10 times 1000 
or  10,000 sub-system unit-hours and ten  fai lures ,  
and would have established !3€Y$ confidence i n  645 
hours EITBF f o r  the sub-system, and it would not 
be suff icient  t o  t e s t  but one sub-system fo r  1000 
hours and observe one fai lure.  A s  many fai lures ,  
i n  general, must occur v ia  combined sub-system 
t e s t s  a s  would be expected during a system t e s t  
i n  order t ha t  the lower sub-system confidence be 
suff icient  f o r  a high system confidence. 
The examples f o r  confidence combination have 
i n  each above example prescribed sub-system o r  
component t e s t  or observation periods equal i n  
length t o  each other and t o  t ha t  f o r  the combined 
system. I f  t e s t  data a re  available f o r  the var- 
ious sub-systems but have been collected over 
periods of varying length, then common logic per- 
m i t s  us t o  reduce by interpolation a l l  data t o  
equivalent periods equal i n  length t o  the short- 
e s t  period represented. A somewhat more sophis- 
t icated technique than described herein f o r  
yielding a more optimistic laver confidence l i m i t  
f o r  system re l i ab i l i t y  from equal t e s t s  of sub- 
systems i s  desc ibed i n  recent l i t e r a tu re  by 
Garner and Yail?. This method i s  not considered 
applicable i n  view of the aforementioned rule  
t o  count separately independent fa i lures  even 
when occurring coincidentally. To t h i s  wri ter 's  
knowledge, equivalent work using subsystem data 
from t e s t s  of unequal duration has not ye t  been 
published. 
Planning Tests fo r  Estimation 
In planning t e s t s  or observation periods 
fo r  making r e l i ab i l i t y  estimates the  important 
factors  t o  consider a re  the following: 
1.Duplicate or simulate the environment 
(mechanical, e lec t r ica l ,  thermal, e tc . )  
under which the quantitative,reliability is 
desired. The accuracy of simulation may 
signif icant ly a f f ec t  the resul t .  
2.Duplicate or  simulate the interconnections 
(mechanical, e lec t r ica l ,  e tc .  ) between the 
unit  of in te res t  and associated items o r  
systems, parer sources, e tc .  The proba- 
b i l i t y  of fa i lure  fraa outside cause may be 
important i n  the result.  
3.Duplicate or  simulate the internal  environ- 
ment within the uni t  t o  be measured with 
kespect t o  level  of operation ( or  non- 
operation), duty cycle, and operator ac- 
t i v i t i e s  and adjustments. The effectiveness 
of t h i s  may importantly control fa i lures  
frcrm inside causes. Also, remember often- 
times a uni t  w i l l  have different  re l iab i l -  
ities fo r  different  modes of operation. 
4 .Wess  r e l i ab i l i t y  in teres t  is uonfined t o  
a specific hardware item and t h i s  is the 
item t o  be tested, carefully consider the 
advisabil i ty of s imtaneous ly  tes t ing  ( or  
observing) two or  more units s o  thst r i sk  
of findings based on a non-representative 
unit  is eliminated. The greater the number 
of items under observation the less elapsed 
calendar time required fo r  a given degree 
of confidence. 
5.Plan the total number of unit  hours of ob- 
servation needed, based on desired re l ia -  
b i l i t y  and confidence. See subheading 
"Probability and confidence". If the  results 
a re  l e s s  favorable o r  unfavorable there w i l l  
be even higher confidence i n  the unfavorable 
re l iab i l i ty .  I f  the tests o r  observations 
are  t o  be of a l l  of the separate pieces 
which w i l l  go together t o  make up a system, 
there need be no more observation separately 
than there would be col lect ively f o r  the 
assembled system, even though increased 
requirements fo r  the sub-systems o r  
par t s  appear t o  preclude high confidence 
with the assigned time f o r  observation. 
For example, a system presumed t o  have 1000 
hours MICBF, and with need t o  establ ish 500 
hours MTW at 90$ confidence is to be 
tested at  the  sub-system level.  Flrst, the 
number of fa i lures  ( f )  t o  be observed t o  
yield a best  estimate MTBF ( T ~ )  of 1000 
hours and a confidence HTBF ( T ~ ~ )  of 
500 hours needs determination. If 
t/f=l000 and t/a=500 where t is observation 
unit-hours and a s the exponent from 4 Molina's Table I1 f o r  W.90 when c=f+l, 
then a/f=2 and we find from the table: 
From t h i s  we see a 4-failure t e s t  c=5) is 
suf f ic ien t  f o r  90$ confidence i n  1 I 2 the 
best  estimate, and the observation period 
t o  be planned should be of 4000 system haurs. 
If the system is coanposed of one of sub- 
system A (est. MTBF 12,000 hr.), four ser ies  
sub-system B (est. MTBF 6000 hr. each), and 
one sub-system C (est. MTBF 4000 hr.), it 
w i l l  be necessary t o  acquire only 4000 unit- 
hours of observation of sub-systems A and C 
and 16,000 unit-hours f o r  sub-system B. 
Sub-system confidence from these observation 
periods, if fa i lures  a re  on the basis of 
estimated NT.EFqs are: 
Sub- Time Failures 
system u-h Confidence i n  )rlTBF 
Planning Tests for  Decision Making 
- 
The principal difference i n  the test ing 
rules when test ing for  decision making i s  tha t  
i n  addition t o  the aforementioned concern about 
t e s t  conditions with reference t o  external 
environment, interconnections, internal  environ- 
ment, number of units,  and duration, it i s  neces- 
sary t o  establish the maximum number of fa i lures  
allowed for  acceptable equipment. 
In the l a s t  example of a system producing 
4 fa i lures  i n  4000 system hours of t e s t  (or 
observation) for  a best estimate of 1000 hour 
MTBF, consider the system producer who might be 
told h is  system would be acceptable only i f  it 
produced no more than 4 fa i lures  i n  4000 hours 
of test .  Molina's Table I1 on page 5 shows tha t  
with a 3i4.0 and c= 5 there is 0.371163 probability 
of more than four fa i lures  i n  t h i s  test i f  MTBF = 
1000 hrs., and thus only 1 - ,371163 = 63% pro- 
babil i ty of passing the test. A conscientious 
producer should demand 90 - 95% probability of 
passing a test, so he would note tha t  "a" must 
equal 2.0 for  a 94.7% probability of passing, 
which means h is  system should,in real i ty,  have 
an WBF of 2000 hours. The 5.26% r isk  of still 
not passing i s  called the producer's r i s k ,  o( , 
and it i s  associated with 2000 hours MTBF or €3,. 
The confidence point of 500 hours relates  t o  
the 10$ user's r i s k ,  f l  , (of l e s s  than 500 hours 
MTW) and the 500 hour MTBF associated with 
is  usually identified as el. Thus, a 4 fa i lure  
t e s t  i s  seen t o  have a €30/€31 r a t io  of 4 for  
oC = 5$, /1= 1%. Correspondingly, other ra t ios  
of e0/8 for  other numbers of fa i lures  and for  
a = 54, 1 ~ ,  = 1% are  found t o  be: 
At this point, it may be observed that as in 
reliability estimating where two values of relia- 
bility and two associated levels of probability 
are needed to sufficiently identify a measure- 
ment (e.g. reliability for * confidence and 
reliability for best estimate), in reliability 
decision making there are also requirements for 
two values of reliability and two associated 
levels of probability or risk (8.g. reliability 
at producer's risk and reliability at user's 
risk), In each instance, the four paremeters 
tie down the quantity of data needed for the 
estimate or decision. 
However, for reliability decision making, 
the sequential test procedure has been exploited 
as a means for reaching decisions with the same 
levels of risks with less data on the average. 
This decision making technique is employed by 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2, Reliability Accept-Reject 
Criteria, of Military Specification MIL-R-26667 
(USAF), General Specification for Reliability 
and Longevity Requirements, Electronic Equipments. 
For Table 5+l, eo/61 = 2 and 6 = p = lo$. 
For Table 5.2, Qo/el = 1.5 and K = 1/3 = lo$. 
The average number of failures to reach a deci- 
sion in the Table 5.1 test, if the MTBF is that 
value which will most greatly proZi?ng the test,is 
10.2 failures (as compared with 13 in the common 
procedure) but will reduce greatly for values of 
WBF much higher or lower. Similarly, the 
average number of failures for a decision under 
the same conditions for the Table 5.2 test is 
30 failures. If a sequential test is designed 
for eo/el = 10 and K = P = lo$, then the 
average nwnber of failures to decision for the 
most prolonging MTBF is approximately one 
failure. 
where In represents log,, the natural logarithm. 
Other sequential test formulas are shown in 
Fig. 1. 
Early consideration resulted in the 
recammendation that procurement requirements 
always be specified in terms of the reliability 
associated with the producer's risk, and that 
design always be capable of tolerating the 
reliability associated with the user's risk. 
The continual desire to push the R and D frontier 
then forces ratios of 0,181 which are close to 
unity and which then require extended test or 
observation periods. Means are then sought to 
avoid the testing all together, or ignore the 
penalty associated with accepting large risks. 
Better understanding and publicizing of the 
complete set of parameters needed to specify 
reliability will perhaps force more of the 
engineering profession to recognize this problem 
and adopt greater discipline in the future. 
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SEQUENTIAL TEST FORMULAS 
SERVICE EVALUATION OF WEAPONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY 
Captain Mark W. Woods, U. S. Mavy 
Operational Test and Evaluation Force 
Norfolk 11, Virginia 
Quoting from Webster's Dictionary "~e l i ab l e  
is applied to a person o r  thing that can be 
counted upon to do what is, expected o r  required." 
This is precisely the attribute that the Navy and 
the other services look for  in a missile weapons 
system. Evaluation of a missile weapons system 
to determine reliability after it is delivered to 
the fleet is a very difficult problem. It is partic- 
ularly so these days when we a r e  trying to reduce 
lead times in the introduction of new equipments 
into service use. This process inevitably leads 
to shortcuts in testing all along the line. There 
is seldom time during development and produc- 
tion for enough repetitive testing of components, 
equipments, and assembled systems to get a real 
measure of reliability o r  to be certain all design 
problems have been solved. Consequently,when 
the first of a new ship class with a new missile 
system reports to Commander Operational Test 
and Evaluation Force (COMOPTEVFOR), it in 
many cases is not sufficiently debugged to be 
ready for comprehensive reliability testing. 
Nevertheless, the necessity for immediate 
commencement of some measure of reliability 
is essential. The reason is that follow-on ships 
will be joining the operational forces while COM- 
OPTEVFOR is still testing the first ship, and 
the tactical commanders must have some know- 
ledge of what performance to expect. This 
means that even during debugging and shake- 
down testing, the Navy must exert every effortto 
commence obtaining reliability data while 
identifying and correcting problems due to 
inadequate design, incorrect installations, 
insufficient personnel training o r  lack of docu- 
mentation and spare parts. As any statistician 
will vociferously testify, this is extremely 
difficult to do. 
The initial efforts then, to measure relia- 
bility of a new missile system at sea, 
commences with the first unit. The quality of 
these measurements improves a s  the ship pro- 
ceeds through the several types of tests and 
evaluations under COMOPTEVFOR and a s  the 
various problems are  solved. These tests, in 
the case of a surface-to-air missile system, 
might include a Development Assist Test, a 
Technical Evaluation, and finally an Operational 
Evaluation. In a Development Assist Test, COM- 
OPTEVFOR assists the Navy Bureau of Weapons 
(BUWEPS) in final isolation of, and correction 
of, design problems. The Bureau has technical 
direction of the project and COMOPTEVFOR 
controls and coordinates the operation of the 
fleet units and services involved. This type test 
normally has heavy participation aboard from the 
major equipment contractors. A Technical 
Evaluation is again a joint BUWEPS/COMOPTEV- 
FOR operation in which the objective is to satisfy 
both parties that the ship is ready for an Opera- 
tional Evaluation of the missile system. A 
mutually agreed upon test plan is used and again 
there is contractor representation aboard, but 
their participation is limited so a s  to determine 
the readiness of ship's company to maintain and 
operate the system. The final test  is an Opera- 
tional Evaluation planned and conducted by COM- 
OPTEVFOR. The ship is on its own with no 
Bureau o r  contractor help and is put through a 
rigorous test in the sea operational environment. 
The sequence of tests is not always in this 
order. Sometimes we start  with a Technical 
Evaluation and find it necessary to drop back to 
a Development Assist to correct unforeseenprob- 
lems. Other times something new turns up in  an 
Operational Eyaluation calling for a modification 
of proceedings. The important point is that 
BUWEPS, from the shore establishment, and 
COMOPTEVFOR, representing the fleet, a re  
jointly attempting to measure system reliability 
all through the test cycle. In the past we 
attempted to measure system reliability only in 
Operational Evaluations, when we weren't faced 
with the problem of sorting out reliability fac- 
tors from a large number of troubles due to de- 
bugging, design, etc. The current onrush of 
new ships, however, justifies an attempt to 
accumulate reliability data earlier in the se'rvice 
at-sea testing process. 
It is not meant to imply here that component 
reliability testing does not occur during develop- 
ment and production, o r  during BUWEPS testing 
on the firing ranges at  White Sands, at China 
Lake, and from the test ship NORTON SOUND. 
Since, however, the Navy has not been able to  
afford preliminary test of complete tactical 
systems ashore or  in R&D ships, all elements 
of the system ready for evaluation in the sea 
environment appear together for the first  time 
on the first new operational ship. It is the 
reliability of this combatant ship and its missile 
system that is of vital concern to the fleet. 
Before going into test program details, a 
few words a r e  in order on the sea environment. 
It is obvious. to you all that ships will roll, 
vibrate, stdam in all kinds of weather, and have 
almost a s  many sailors on board per sware  foot 
a s  colleke men in a telephone booth. These 
factors certainly affect operation and maintenance 
requirements. What may not be so obvious, how- 
ever, is how stack gases eat holes in plaptic 
coverings on pressurized wave guide, how the 
computer which worked fine on your factory floor 
at 85 degrees ambient temperature overheats in 
the same room temperature when jammed into 
the corner of a ship's compartment, how the 
working and heaving of a ship's structure affects 
alignment of radars, how the shock of a fighter 
aircraft landing on a carrier deck affects an air- 
to-air missile carried in the plane, and how 
cramped o r  exposed spaces restrict the number 
of men who can work on a piece of equipment. 
We always manage to solve these problems even* 
ually for a particular system, but what is f rus- 
trating is that in many cases we have to solve 
them all over again for new systems. Any con- 
tractor providing Navy equipment must be cog- 
nizant of how these elements of environment 
could effect the reliability of his equipment. 
This environment also affects our methods 
of measuring system performance. In the first 
place, there isn't much room on board so we 
can't carry large disinterested observing teams. 
The majority of the data must be recorded by 
ship's force. This means the requirements must 
be reasonable and not unduly interfere with other 
duties. It means there must be some cross 
checks built into the procedure to identify in- 
correct data. It means adequate instrumentation 
must be included to evaluate system and missile 
flight performance, And finally, it means that 
when we have an equipment breakdown, we must 
be able to make repairs in all types of weather 
and stormy seas, if possible, and with the bpares 
we can carry on board. 
In setting up an evaluation program for a new 
ship in the sea environment, we have many, objec- 
tives besides determining reliability. As men- 
tioned earlier the Development Assist Tests and 
the Technical Evaluation are primarily for de- 
bugging and certification of readiness for -the big 
test which is the Operational Evaluation. In a 
few words, the objective of the Operational 
Evaluation is to determine readiness of the sys- 
tem for war. Since this test is usually longer 
and involves more firings than previous tests, 
we often uncover additional design and installa- 
tion problems. Obviously, we continue to 
measure reliability. We also measure efficiency 
and adequacy of logistic support and of personnd 
training and manning levels. This includes not 
only firing exercises but non-firing tests of such 
things as resupply of missiles at sea from 
ammunition ships. Hundreds of hours are used 
in measuring radar detection capabilities and 
target processing time starting from single raids 
up to'and including mass saturation attacks. 
Missile firing tests are always limited by the 
availability of missiles. There a re  never enough 
missiles to optimize tests throughout the envelope 
strictly for reliability purposes. To do this 
requires several s h ~ t s  at a given target under 
almost identical performance conditions in order 
to be able to state reliability with a high level of 
statistical confidence. .. Remembering that this is 
the first ship of a class, there a re  still unexplor- 
ed areas of the performance envelope. During 
earlier RDT&E testing we are  usually restricted 
for safety considerations in what can be done on 
the land range. The R&D test ship normally'does 
not have the full tactical aystem. Consequently, 
of first priority will  be conduct of those tests 
which couldn't be done anywhere else. This not 
only includes several new missile flight trajec- 
tories, but conducting the shots with such added 
attractions as high ship speed, high roll* guns 
firing, etc. It also includes all the different 
possibilities of the target presentation in combat 
such as  varying speeds, altitudes, and rnaneuL 
vers. Every effort is made to eliminate 
unimportant variables and to combine tests so a s  
to contribute the maximum amount of data for 
statistical reliability purposes. The order of 
tests is also randomized as  much as possible in 
order to eliminate unpredicted effects of time. 
Throughout the entire test program we must 
be extremely careful that we don't identify un- 
reliability when in truth the problem is more due 
to inexperienced personnel, unavailable spare 
parts, improper documentation and procedures, 
or  just plain unrealistic requirements in the sea 
environment. But we have to be just a s  careful 
on the other side of the coin to resist the siren 
song of some contractors saying that if we will 
just train our men to the level of engineers and 
buy enough spares our problems will be solved. 
Obviously we will never be able to train all our 
men to be systems engineers. Nor will our 
logistics system support great quantities of 
spares. One reason the Navy insists on conduc* 
ing Operational Evaluations with fleet ships 
under COMOPTEVFOR is that fleet personnel 
have the most realistic appreciation for our 
reasonable capabilities in training and logistic 
support. 
As a final comment on the test program, it 
is important to understand that much of our 
support comes from fleet units and activities. 
This is true for a l l  our tests at  sea whether for a 
Development Assist Test o r  an Operational 
Evaluation. Since these units and activities do 
much more than support our test and evaluation 
operations, efficiency in the use of services is 
essential. These services must be scheduled 
months ahead of time and a re  not easily respon- 
sive to last minute changes. Let me urge then 
that any of you, whether service o r  contractor 
personnel, who find yourselves involved in tests- 
at sea do the very best advance planning you 
possibly can to take advantage of fleet services 
when scheduled. 
Let me now go into some detail on how the 
Navy measures reliability in the TALOS, 
TERRIER and TARTAR Surface-to-Air missile 
systems. As implied earlier, we don't stop 
measuring reliability on completion of OPTEV- 
FOR tests. We must continue to measure re- 
liability and readiness throughout the service life 
of the missile system on all ships. This requires 
that the measurement procedure be the same on 
all ships if we a r e  to get any meaningful statis- 
tics. The procedure must also be broad enough 
to  provide the needs of all  the interested activi- 
t ies such a s  COMOPTEVFOR, the Navy's Tech- 
nical Bureaus and the Fleet Commanders. The 
detailed methods we used a few years ago when 
we had only a small number of missile ships a r e  
not now equal to our needs. We have learned a 
lot from the many ships which commenced join- 
ing the fleet last year. As a result of a rather 
long study, with inputs from the many interested 
activities, the Bureau of Weapons and the Bureau 
of Ships have recently published a revised 
Standard Reporting Procedure for Surface-to-Air 
Missile System Operability and Maintenance. 
This procedure will  be used by all  surface-to-air 
missile ships whether in  the test and evaluation 
status o r  in fleet operations. Modifications to 
suit the needs of a particular activity will  be by 
addition and not deletion of any of the require- 
ments. 
The overall system includes reporting in the 
following categories: 
anything else in addition that the Commanding 
Officer feels is pertinent but must include a short 
summary of his operations, overall weapons - 
system appraisal, spare parts adequacy, system 
documentation adequacy, personnel status, out- 
side technical assistance requested and received, 
plus any recommendations. 
Component Failure and Missile Firing 
Reports a r e  filled out and mailed to prescribed 
activities when occurring. Although these a re  
officially compiled and analyzed by designated 
organizations, all appropriate contractors may 
receive copies of failure reports and all appro- 
priate missile ships and fleet commands receive 
direct copies of firing reports.. The System 
Material Operability and Maintenance reports on 
Missiles consist of results of periodic missile 
systems tests of the depot stockpile and ships 
magazine loads. These reports a re  compiled 
and analyzed by the same agency that analyzes 
flight tests. 
I would now like to go into some detail on the 
System Material Operability and Maintenance 
Reports of Non-Expendable Equipment. Here is 
where we get a feel for the readiness o r  relia- 
bility of the installed support equipments such as  
search and detection radars, fire control radars, 
computers, etc. The report makes use of the 
following formula: 
Pe = P a x  Pr 
where; 
Pe = System Material Effectiveness Factor 
expressed a s  a decimal o r  percent. 
Pa  = System Availability Factor. 
Pr = System Reliability Factor. 
The Pa, Availability Factor, is based on the 
scoring of a Daily Systems Operability Test 
(DSOT) and is the average score obtained over a 
month's period. The DSOT consists of a com- 
plete dynamic test of all major elements when 
operating together as  a system. It is the best 
test that can be devised which can be run in a 
reasonable period of time, say 112 hour, to give 
high assurance that the system is ready for use. 
The score is determined by a formalized proce- 
a. Component Failures. dure and is a function of how long it took the b. System Material Operability and Maintew 
ship to pass the test correcting any deficiencies 
ance. found. As many DSOTs can be run as  desired (I) Missiles. 
either on a planned o r  surprise basis, they all (2) Non- expendable Equipment. 
count on the monthly average score. 
c. Missile Firings. The Pr, Reliability Factor, takes, care of d. Commanding Officer's Quarterly Narra- 
what we might expect the system reliability to be! tive Reports. between DSOTs. It is a function of the mean * 
Items a through c a r e  reported on with forms time between breakdowns 'IT" anywhere in the 
provided to the ship. Item d, the Commanding system and the interval "I" between DSOTs. 
Officer's Narrative, is a letter report covering These a re  figured over a month's basis and the 
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ship computes a function ?/I. Using +/ I  and a 
graph provided by BUWEPS, a value is obtained 
for Pr. The graph is based on predicted failure 
rates of components with time. The longer the 
measured interval between breakdowns, the 
higher the Pr .  The shorter the interval between 
DSOTs, at which time the system is known to be 
operational, the higher the P r  score. The Pr 
value gives a direct measure of how equipment is 
performing on a particular ship being directly 
responsive to that ship's failure rates and testing 
frequency. 
One other important record is required by the 
ship in order to easily tell why the ship may have 
a high o r  low overall Pe, Material Effectiveness 
factor. The previously mentioned Component 
Failure Reports could provide this data with 
enough correlative effort. To have a ready refer- 
ence, however, another form called the Equip- 
ment Status Report is used. This form is kept 
on each major equipment such as  radar, launcher 
etc. and provides for filling in a status category 
for each hour of the day over a week's period. 
The various categories a re  as  follows: 
a. Operating at Full Capability. 
b. Operating at Reduced Capability. This 
might include some automatic functions 
being out of commission but the system 
is still operating by manual inputs 
although at reduced firing rate. 
c. Undergoing Systems Test. 
d. Standby - low voltages applied only. 
e. Shutoff. 
f. Non-Inte rruptive Preventive Maintenance, 
in progress - could still fire if needed. 
g. Inactive - ship in Navy Yard, etc. 
h. Interruptive Preventive Maintenance in 
progress. 
j. Undergoing Modification. 
k. Down - Undergoing Corrective Mainten- 
ance. 
1. Reduced Capability - Undergoing Preven- 
tive Maintenance. 
m. Down - Awaiting Spares. 
n. Down - Equipment Cannibalized. 
p. Down - Failure of Support Equipment - 
test equipment, ship's power supply, etc. 
q. Down - Require Outside Help. 
It may appear from what has just been dis- 
cussed that the Navy will have to man ships with 
mathematicians and stenographers to use the 
new Bureau reporting system. It's not quite a s  
bad as  it looks since all the forms are  provided 
and it is simply a matter of following instruc- 
tions. As can be seen, there a re  some cross 
checks built into the plan which should help iden- 
tify bad data. As mentioned before, the plan is 
based on earlier experiences and evaluations 
wherein we have, at times, had need for all the 
data now required. Certainly, the new procedure 
will require a serious and time consuming effort 
on the part of the ship's company. There isn't 
any doubt in our minds that our ship's personnel 
a re  equal to the task o r  that this effort is essen- 
tial to a valid prediction of combat capability. 
In conclusion, let me emphasize that the 
objective of testing, in the sea environment is to 
simulate in peacetime, all the requirements we 
can foresee during war, -- to give everthing a 
chance to happen that could happen. It is this 
requirement that dictates continuous efforts to 
record and analyze reliability data at every 
opportunity in the formal testing cycle of new 
systems as  well as  during subsequent operations 
of all fleet units, The real pay off and the tougb 
est part of the job comes in the analysis and for- 
mulation of conclusions. Decisions on how to 
improve reliability a re  usually the most diffi- 
cult to formulate in the marginal cases; that is, 
in those situations where any one of several 
feasible courses of action might suffice, such as  
more comprehensive personnel training, a 
larger stockpile of parts, o r  a redesign of some 
component. Obviously, pursuance of all three 
is the best solution. However, efficient use of 
manpower and funds usually dictates otherwise. 
The talents and brains, objectively used, of the 
whole Service and Industry team are required i f  
these decisions a re  going to be timely and 
correct. The best practice in Industry, of 
course, i s  to design and build reliability into 
equipment in the first place, to give reliability 
just as  high a priority as  performance. Highly 
reliable defense products not only promote in- 
dividual company reputations, but the greater 
welfare of our Nation as  well. In the Services 
we also have work to do in the continuous exarni- 
nation of our specifications, and the stating of 
our needs as  precisely as  possible. Only by 
such an enlightened, combined effort can we buy 
with out dollars the "BANG" we can count on 
when our sailors, soldiers, o r  airmen close the 
firing key. 
B. L. Lubelsky 
Lockheed Missiles and Space Conrpany .:a J1i" ii 
SunnyvaLe, California 
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When discussing "Reliabilityn activities, I 
am including all special funations devoted 
principally t o  enhancing t o t a l  product quality-- 
and those functions known as quality eontrol and/ 
or  inspection are, of course, of major imporbance 
i n  production areas. In addition, while the 
Reliability engineering activity has largely been 
identified with the design activit ies,  the pro- 
duction of reliable hardware i n  conformance d t h  
approved engineering designs i s  also a Reli- 
abi l i ty  engineering area of effort.  
Iksign Definition Review 
1. %is function can be classified as 
ei ther one of the end functions of the design 
phase or as  m e  of the start ing Functio~n of the 
production phase. 
2. The purpose is t o  make sure the 
designer's intent  is  ful ly  and campletely 
cmmnmicated t o  the technicians who will  convert 
it into haramre and t o  the inspectors who Ki l l  
t e s t  and inspect it. 
Manufacturing Paper Review 
&st people not closely connected with pro- 
duction activit ies,  and th i s  includes most 
designers, are under the i l lusion that  manufaa- 
turing people work directly and only fromthe 
engineering design. 
1. Production act iv i t ies  have thei r  own 
special "family" of planning and process paper 
which i s  used t o  convert the engineering desigu 
into the detailed instructions necessary for 
manufactuPing. This may include substituting 
"equivalentn standard manufacturing process 
specifications for  the design-produced process 
specifications. While these manufacturing specs 
may s t a r t  out a s  "equivalents: changes and 
necessity may soon cause significant differences. 
2. Reliability engineering review of the 
proauction planning and process paper t o  assure 
i t s  compatibility with the designer's intent i s  
one of the more important production re l iabi l i ty  
activi t ies.  This i s  done on a saapling basis 
v i th  unsatisfactory areas receiving further 
detailed investigation. 
lighting, and detailed requirements relat ing t o  
material flow, work station layout, process 
equipnraent and control, material handling, pack- 
iw, and many others. 
1. Reliability review of production plan- 
ning, while it i s  still  planning, often discloses 
conditions which are not favorable toward the 
consistent production of reliable hardware. Such 
unsatisfactory conditions, suuh as  fa i lure  t o  
provide for  a "clean roam" fo r  production of 
delicate electronics equipment, can be forced t o  
general management attention so that  the delete- 
rious effects on production re l iabi l i ty  axe 
appreciated and considered i n  reaching a f ina l  
decision. 
2. Continuing review of production practice 
changes i s  also necessary as  a chatige which m y  
appear t o  be desirable for  econolqy of time or  
money is often detriniental t o  re l iabi l i ty  and 
may, i n  f inal  balance, cause extra costs rather 
than achieving savings. 
3. Independent outside auait of chemical 
process specifications may solnetiraEts be required 
t o  ascertain whether or not the specified process 
~3.11, i n  fact, produce the plating, painting, 
anodizing, welding or  other result  required. 
Test and Inspection 
This is the big area of quality control-- 
the job s f  lneasuring h a r d m e  dimensional and 
functional characteristics, camparing them xith 
the design requirements and reeordlng the results. 
S ta t i s t ica l  tools such as  l o t  sampling and show- 
how process charts msy be of value i n  th i s  area-- 
particularly i f  volume is large and automatic 
test/inspection equipaent is not used. 
1. While "inspector" seems t o  be a depre- 
ciated word--this i s  the area of t e s t  and 
inspection by an "inspector!' Certain quality 
functions such a s  t e s t  and inspection planning 
are required t o  ass is t  the inspector and certain 
data handling techniques are useful i n  identify- 
ing trouble areas not inmediately apparent during 
normal inspection operations, 
2. As "check and balance" i s  one of the 
basic premises behind Reliability aotivities, an 
audit of quality control planning, procedures and 
act iv i t ies  is  required. 
- 
Wufacturing Pmduction Planning 
3. Failure diagnosis by engineering 
This Reliability area includes both general (design, re l iabi l i ty  and production) personnel 
requirements, such as cleanliness and good t o  detersine p fa i lure  causes on both 
factory a d  field failures w i l l  speed effective 
corrective action (&sign, production or procure- 
~ t sn t )  t o  prevent continuma recurrence of the 
failure nude. 
4. Participation ia Material Review 
activit ies ts assure against wnaaceptable 
l~aterslal getting used is also a very important 
production quality contrel function. 
I have juet &scribed t o  you some s f  the 
msjor product quality farnetions ia the pa8uctien 
portien of the design-preduee-use ch in .  Wnar 
tac t ica l  probction situations a repair/overhaul 
m l e  on field-returned laaterial is  a sewrate 
p k i o n  of the production activity which-nmet 
receive Bmecial attention ia all  o f t h e  previously 
mentioned- areas. As nine- hundred and nibty-nine- 
& p a r t m e  -the designer's intent w i l l  d e g W  
quality as compared t o  one or two which might 
improve it, the proBuetion product quality 
function is t o  insum and assure full aesign 
ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS OF RELIBILITY 
F. E. Wenger A/." 8 - - -  %= < 
AFSC, Andrews AFB, Md 2r?2 I - 
The subject of t h i s  presentation qtEconomic 
Considerations of Reliability" is l i ke  trying t o  
put a value on l i f e  or freedom, f o r  t h i s  is just  
what the r e l i a b i l i t y  of our systems means t o  us. 
The purpose of t h i s  speech is t o  stimulate think- 
ing and action, not t o  give a l l  the answers. The 
ba r r i e r  which I am trying t o  overcome is not heat 
or  sound but that of mind; t h i s  appears t o  be the 
only bar r ie r  man is confronted with anyhow. We 
must not be limited by mental blocks, such a s  -- 
we cannot use t h i s  rel iable part  because it costs 
15 cents more than a conventional one, and we 
cannot stand the extra cost. This statement, on 
a 50 million dollar  or 100 million dollar  pro- 
gram -- a part fa i lure  can cause an abort a t  the 
launching s i t e  a t  a cost of millions of dollars,  
plus an exhaustive search f o r  similar defective 
pa r t s  i n  other systems, which islmore cost ly 
than a l l  the parts  used i n  the equipment. 
Thousands of words have been written on 
reams of paper on how t o  increase r e l i ab i l i t y ,  
but  a l l  t h i s  has accomplished i s  t o  demonstrate 
t ha t  you cannot solve the r e l i a b i l i t y  problem by 
oratory, any more than you can clear a t r a f f i c  
jam by blowing a horn, and the best  r e l i a b i l i t y  
program i s  useless unless there is someone t o  
bundle up the r e l i ab i l i t y  requirements i n  the 
program and turn aver rel iable equipment t o  the 
customer. How good a job you, the producer, 
have done is determined when we, the customer, 
use it. 
We hear a great deal about the cost of Reli- 
ab i l i t y ,  but I would l i ke  t o  make a categorical 
statement t ha t  Reliabi l i ty does not increase 
cost,  but the achievement of r e a l i s t i c  re l iab i l i -  
t y  figures pays i n  dollars,  i n  time, and above 
a l l ,  i n  systems effectiveness or readiness. I 
would l i k e  t o  pose a question t o  you -- i f  you 
had a million dollar  metalworking machine that  
was  v i t a l  t o  your survival, and its r e l i a b i l i t y  
was 33% and its avai lab i l i ty  only 3 hours out of 
24, a t  a maintenance cost of $1,000 per day -- 
would you hesi tate  t o  spend another $250,000 t o  
achieve 90% re l i ab i l i t y  with an avai lab i l i ty  of 
20 out of 24 hours and a maintenance cost of $50 
per day -- your answer would be, l e t ' s  get on 
with the program. 
To stimulate your thinking and t o  i l l u s t r a t e  
the  savings that  can accrue i n  a t o t a l  re l iab i l i -  
t y  program, I have chosen a few representative 
examples of what can be achieved. 
Savings are  defined a s  money not spent for  
maintenance of a system due t o  increased r e l i -  
ab i l i ty .  I w i l l  a l so  i l l u s t r a t e  how t o t a l  cost 
reduction can be achieved through increased 
avai lab i l i ty  of a system. 
The tremendous savings of money that r e l i -  
a b i l i t y  (properly used) can achieve f o r  the 
h i l i t a r y  is almost unbelievable. The f i r s t  
example w i l l  be concerned with a simple electron 
tube -- not much chance f o r  cost reduction here 
-- well, l e t ' s  see. 
The 5 8 y  type electron tube is presently 
issued a t  the r a t e  of 800,000 per year t o  A i r  
Force operational forces. These are  replacement 
parts; each one represents a mintenance action 
and a l l  of.the logis t ics  actions associated wlth 
a maintenance action. A review of the cost t o  
the A i r  Force of remwing an equipment from an 
a i rcraf t ,  abd/or missile, checking of the equip- 
ment, removing and replacing the defective par t ,  
realigning the equipment, and reinstal l ing the 
equipment i n to  the systems, shows a cost of 
between 5 and 353 dollars.  
For the purpose of t h i s  i l lus t ra t ion ,  I w i l l  
use the lowest figure of $5.00 per maintenance 
action. Let us assume that we can buy th i s  tube 




1 .%/lo00 hrs  81 .00 present practice 
O.l%/lOOO hrs  $3 .OO (hypothetical f i g )  
0.01%/1000 hrs  $9 .OO ( (I 
0.001$.1000 hrs  $27.00 ( ) 
0.0005%/1000 hrs  $50.00 ( " 
0.0001%/1000 hrs  $100.00 ( fl 1 1 
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This s l ide  shows relationships between f a i l -  
ure rates ,  the number of tubes needed per year, 
maintenance cost at $5 .OO per maintenance action, 
t o t a l  tube cost a t  each f a i lu re  rate .  This cost 
is based on a hypothetical tube. A s  you know, 
tubes with such low fa i lure  ra tes  a re  not 
available a s  yet. 
The cost of buying t h i s  tube under present 
practices is @00,000 and the cost of maintenance 
act ion t o  replace t h i s  tube a t  $5.00 per mainte- 
nance action i s  $4 million (s ta r t l ing  i sn ' t  it!) 
so the t o t a l  cost t o  the A i r  Force i s  4.8 
million dollars.  
I am going t o  hold t h i s  s l ide  f o r  a few 
moments t o  give you time t o  digest its import. 
I stated a t  the beginning tha t  I wanted t o  
stimulate thinking. This should do it. but more 
important, r e l i ab i l i t y  techniques and procedures 
can be applied t o  show r e a l  progress i n  cutting 
expenditures. 
In  passing, it i s  worthy t o  note t h a t  we I n  considering the economies of the  program, 
could pay $'.1,995 f o r  a s ing le  tube having a however, many viewpoints may be taken with vary- 
f a i l u r e  r a t e  of 0.0005~/1,000 h r s  without ing advantages and r isks .  Three of these view- 
increasing present expenditures. points  w i l l  be discussed. 
The next example w i l l  be concerned with an 
equipment, spec i f i ca l ly  the  412L system. This 
system i s  composed of 1 3  subsystems ( A N / G P A - ~ ~ )  
whose p a r t s  complement, added together, t o t a l  
8 mill ion semiconductors and 30 mil l ion other 
e lectronic  par ts .  This i s  g rea te r  than the 
t o t a l  number of e lectronic  p a r t s  found i n  a 
modern c i t y  of one mil l ion inhabi tants ,  counting 
a l l  radios,  t e lev i s ion  se t s ,  transmitting 
s ta t ions ,  the telephone system, phonographs, 
amateur rad io  systems, radio operated garage 
door controls,  e tc .  I n  addition, the  basic  412L 
system i s  associated with da ta  acquis i t ion 
equipment which contains an addi t ional  estimated 
882,000 electronic  par t s ,  a communications Sub- 
system with an estimated 2 mil l ion p a r t s  and 
anc i l l a ry  equipment t o t a l i n g  an  estimated 
500,000 par ts .  This adds up t o  41,382,000 
electronic  p a r t s  i n  the  complete 412L system. 
The complexity of the  412L system poses a 
severe r e l i a b i l i t y  problem. I n  June 1959, the  
formula of paragraph 3.2 of MILR-26474 was 
u t i l i z e d  t o  compute the  r e l i a b i l i t y  of_ one 
AN/GPA-73, hereaf ter  cal led subsystem (without 
consideration of the  data acquis i t ion,  communi- 
cations or anc i l l a ry  equipments). This formula, 
which r e f l e c t s  t h e  s t a t e  of t h e  a r t  ( i  .e . , t h a t  
r e l i a b i l i t y  obtainable without the use of special  
par ts ,  extreme derating, e t c )  predicted t h a t  the  
system would experience 28,500 f a i l u r e s  f o r  each 
10,000 hours of elapsed time. 
I n  January 1960 another prediction was made 
which considered the derating and cooling which 
would be applied t o  t h e  par t s ,  and a prediction 
of 13,092 f a i l u r e s  per  10,000 elapsed time hours 
was made. This is, of course, s t i l l  greater  than 
one f a i l u r e  an hour. The contractor then embarked 
on an aggressive r e l i a b i l i t y  program which in- 
cluded the generation of specif icat ions  f o r  
special  high r e l i a b i l i t y  par ts .  
I n  January 1961, a Monte Carlo simulation of 
the  subsystem operation was made incorporating 
the l a t e s t  expected p a r t  f a i l u r e  r a t e s ,  and the 
r e s u l t s  indicated a reduction of the  f a i l u r e  r a t e  
t o  about 155 f a i l u r e s  per 10,000 hours of elapsed 
time. It should be noted, t h i s  prediction e1j.m- 
. inate3 par t  f a i l u r e s  which would not cause system 
!failureb This would cause t h e  improvement t o  ap- 
pear greater  than it r e a l l y  i s .  This was taken 
i n t o  consideration by allowing an adequate sa fe ty  
margin i n  our computations. The 412L system, 
(considering only the  13 A N / G P A - ~ ~ S )  w i l l  cost  an 
estimated t o t a l  of $5195,000,000. Government fur- 
nished equipment and s i t e  construction w i l l  double 
t h i s  f igure .  The r e l i a b i l i t y  program cost - 
$1.46 million. 
The f i r s t  economic viewpoint w i l l  consider 
monetary considerations exclusively, and w i l l  
assume a t e n  year equipment l i f e .  It was pre- 
viously shown t h a t  the  difference i n  the  1959 and 
1961 r e l i a b i l i t y  predictions i s  28,345 f a i l u r e s  
per  10,000 hours. Adding a sa fe ty  f a c t o r  t o  com- 
pensate f o r  the  f a c t  t h a t  the  1961 predict ion 
included only funct ional  f a i l u r e s ,  it i s  e s t i -  
mated t h a t  28,500 failures/10,000 hours would 
occur under the  1959 predictions and 500 fa i lu res /  
10,000 hours f o r  the  1961 predict ion with the  
sa fe ty  f a c t o r  previously mentioned. Using the  
$5.00 maintenance costs,  which i s  way low, the re  
would be a $140,000 savings per s e t  per 10,000 
hours. For the  10 year period using 13 se t s ,  
the re  would be a saving of $15,955,000 due t o  
improved r e l i a b i l i t y .  
Let us look a t  it another way, the  28,500 
f a i l u r e s  per 10,000 hours predicted i n  1959, when 
coupled with expected repa i r  r a t e s  of 12 minutes 
f o r  display portions and 6 minutes f o r  data 
processing portions of the  subsystem would have 
resu l ted  i n  a t o t a l  of 2,800 hours of downtime 
out of every 10,000 hours elapsed time. The f i g -  
ures  predicted i n  1961 with the  same repa i r  time 
would r e s u l t  i n  an expected downtime of only 
21.5 hours out of every 10,000 hours. This means 
the  subsystem envisioned i n  1959 would have been 
avai lable  f o r  duty about 72% of the  time. The 
system envisioned i n  1961 would be avai lable  over 
99% of the  time. Applying the sa fe ty  f a c t o r  f o r  
the  difference i n  prediction methods and using a 
90% a v a i l a b i l i t y  from the 1961 prediction, 
a v a i l a b i l i t y  w i l l  have jumped from 72% i n  1959 t o  
90% i n  1961. This occurred a t  a cost  of r e l i a -  
b i l i t y  of $1.46 million i n  a $295 mil l ion con- 
t r a c t ,  or about 3/4 of 1% of the system cost  
(not includnlng GFE or s i t e  construction).  A 
0.75% increase i n  program cost,  therefore,  bought 
a plus 18% increase i n  the  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of each 
subsystem. 
There i s  s t i l l  a t h i r d  method of f igur ing the 
economics of r e l i a b i l i t y .  This method is  concern- 
ed with put t ing a value on r e l i a b i l i t y  based on 
cost  per hour of operation, the  contractor reasons 
t h a t  the  cost of the  system i n  10 years would be 
295 mil l ion do l la r s  plus the  operating costs  of 
$40 mil l ion per year or a t o t a l  of 695 million. 
This es tabl ishes  a value f o r  the 13 s e t s  of about 
8,000 d o l l a r s  per hour over the  87,600 hours i n  
the  10 year period. A single subsystem would, 
theref ore, be worth $615 an hour. Theref ore, 
using t h e  1959 prediction, the  subsystem would be 
out of commission 28% of the  time or about 2800 
hours per  10,000 hours resul t ing i n  a cost of 
$1,722,000. Using the 1961 prediction, the  sub- 
system would be out of commission 10% of the  time 
or  1,000 hours per 10,000 hours, r esu l t ing  i n  a 
cos t  of $615,000 f o r  the  downtime period. 
Since there are a t o t a l  of 13 subsystems i n  a 
complete system, there  would be a do l la r  savings 
of $l2,840,000 i n  downtime f o r  an  investment of 
$1.46 mil l ion i n  r e l i a b i l i t y .  This s l i d e  sum- 
marizes the  th ree  methods of evaluating the  
economics of r e l i a b i l i t y .  
An example of simple r e l i a b i l i t y  pract ices  
providing comparatively l a rge  gains i n  both 
r e l i a b i l i t y  and operating economy i s  provided by 
a display system now i n  development. This system 
contains 34.00 indicator  l i g h t  bulbs. To maintain 
a required f a i l u r e  r a t e  of 1% per 1,000 hours, 
they must be replaced by preventative maintenance 
before the  wearout por t ion of t h e i r  l i f e  i s  
reached. Under normal conditions t h i s  would re- 
quire  the  replacement of each bulb a f t e r  about 
400 hours of operation. A t  t h i r t y  cents a bulb, 
t h i s  would cost  the  A i r  Force $1,020 every 400 
hours or an  operating cost f o r  bulb replacement 
alone, of about $22,000 each year. By derating 
the  bulbs t o  operate a t  12 v o l t s  ins tead of a t  
t h e  ra ted 14, the  replacement period w i l l  be in- 
creased by s i x  times. The bulbs would therefore,  
need replacement only every 2,400 hours, or l e s s  
than four  times a year, f o r  a year ly  cost of l e s s  
than $4,000. $18,000 w i l l  be saved each year. 
I think it i s  f i t t i n g  t o  close t h i s  paper 
with some f igures  from a program you have a l l  
heard about -- TACAN. 
The T-4CAN equipment, mi l i t a ry  nomenclature 
AN/ARN-21, has evolved through models A ,  B ,  and 
f i n a l l y  C. The A and B models were procured 
without r e l i a b i l i t y  a s  a specified requirement 
and were delivered with a mean time between 
f a i l u r e  (MTBF) of 17.5 hours. The C model was 
purchased with a 150 hour MTBF requirement. The 
contractor met the  requirement. 
The records of the  A i r  Force show t h a t  the  
average cost  per maintenance act ion of the  TACAN 
equipment i s  $347.00. A t  17.5 hr MTBF the cost/  
year f o r  l o g i s t i c  support i s  $8,400 per s e t .  
Approximately 16,000 s e t s  a r e  i n  use. The t o t a l  
l o g i s t i c  cost  per year i s  approximately $134.2 
million. The C model TACAN a t  150 MTJ3F cost  only 
$980/;year t o  support. The t o t a l  l o g i s t i c  support 
cost  is  approximately $15.7 mi l l ion /~ear .  
By enforcing the r e l i a b i l i t y  requirement f o r  
the  C model TACAN, the A i r  Force i s  real iz ing a 
yearly savings of approximately $118.5 million. 
This s l i d e  shows t h i s  support savings on a bas i s  
of r e l i a b i l i t y  vs.  per s e t  year. 
Incidentally,  the  C model s e t s  having 150 
hrs  MTBF cost $300 l e s s  than the A and B model 
17.5 MBF s e t s ,  and has higher performance 
character is t ics .  
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RELIABILITY RESEARCH NEEDS 
%'L E. J. Nucci tz / 4  $1 Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering 
Washington, D. C. 
Experience in the application of techniques 
developed through research in reliability has re-  
vealed gaps in the technology and areas in which 
present techniques should be refined or  the tech- 
nology, extended. These deficiencies, repre- 
senting needs in reliability research, are  enu- 
merated, and priorities a r e  suggested for some. 
In the past decade, much effort has been 
expended in attempts to gain--or improve-- 
reliability in military weapon systems. The 
most formally organized and probably the most 
intensive efforts along this line have be.en in elec- 
tronics. I will not confine my remarks, however, 
to electronics o r  missiles o r  any other specific 
area; I want to talk about weapon-system relia- 
bility a s  a whole. 
All past efforts might be considered as  fal- 
ling into three categories: (1) the development of 
new, improved parts and materials designed to 
be used in extreme environments and to have 
longer life; (2) the development of techniques for 
designing reliability into the end product and for 
measuring reliability and the improvement of 
engineering practices; and (3) the application of 
the new parts, materials and techniques. 
Although there have been many gratifying 
successes in the effort to apply new developments, 
experience has proved how much remains to be 
done; we have only scratched the surface. Cer- 
tain techniques must be refined; there a r e  definite 
gaps in the technology; and there a r e  areas in 
which the technology must be extended to cover 
more extreme situations. These deficiences 
represent our needs in reliability research. Im- 
portant as  they immediately appear, these ob- 
jectives gain even greater significance when con- 
sidered in the light of requirements for advanced 
systems now being planned- -especially those 
intended for space operatiob . 
Research Needs in Reliability 
Categorized in the two major areas of (1) 
systems and equipment reliability and (2) parts 
reliability, here a re  some of the unfilled re-  
liability research needs: 
S y s t e m s m e n t  Reliability 
(1) Refined techniques for predicting 
reliability of electronic systems 
(2) Reliability-prediction methods for  
mechanical systems 
(3) Design methods to ensure specified 
life for mechanical and hydraulic 
parts 
(4) Self -healing design techniques, such 
a s  redundancy; self -organizing o r  
self -adapting systems; self -checking 
systems; fail-safe tehniques, etc. 
Techniques for demonstrating re -  
liability--especially for large, com- 
plex systems with long mean time 
between failures; for expendable sys- 
tems with a long time to failure, such 
a s  satellites; and for costly, expend- 
able systems with a low production 
base, such as  ballistic missiles 
(6) Accelerated testing techniques, with 
acceleration factors correlated to the 
life or reliability of circuits, assem- 
blies and systems, to reduce cost, 
sample size and test time in relia- 
bility-assurance testing 
Work in these six research areas is in addition 
to basic programs such a s  the following: 
(7) A research and measurement program 
aimed a t  gaining a better under- 
standing of the total space environ- 
ment and determining its effects on 
materials, component parts, circuits 
and assemblies 
(8) The improvement of techniques for 
isolating component parts and critical 
assemblies--possibly entire systems-- 
from extreme environmental conditions 
imposed by temperature cycling, radi- 
ation and acceleration 
(9) The development of techniques for 
sealing and lubrication in high vacuum 
(10) The expansion of efforts to develop 
parts and materials optimized for the 
space environment and with extremely 
long life fo r  missions of extended 
duration 
(11) Studies of the human factors in space 
operations 
Parts  Reliability 
In the area of research on parts reliability, 
the list of unsatisfied needs continues a s  follows: 
(1) Research into failure mechanisms of 
electronic, electrical, electrome- 
chanical and mechanical parts, with a 
view to developing analytical descrip- 
tions of parts characteristics and lLfe 
expectancy & a function of use and 
environment 
(2) Development of self -healing parts 
(3) Techniques for quantitative prediction 
of parts reliability--in contrast pre- 
dictions based on the results of mass 
testing; techniques for predicting 
future characteristics and life based 
upon (a) physical o r  electrical inspec- 
tion and short-term measurements 
and (b) analysis of the physics of 
materials 
(4) Accelerated testing techniques, with 
acceleration factors correlated f,a the 
parts ' life characteristics, the objec- 
tive being to reduce cost, sample s h e  
and test time in reliability-assurance 
testing 
(5) Practical, economical methods of 
proving compliance with requirements 
for  extremely low parts failure rates 
(such a s  0.001 percent per 1000 hours 
and lower). 
(6) Techniques for reliability-assurance 
testing of high-reliability items pro- 
cured in small lots 
Again, these six research needs a r e  con- 
sidered a s  supplementary to the basic progrslms 
for developing long-life parts and materials that 
a r e  suitable for the anticipated environments in 
which they will have to serve. Here let me 
emphasize that the job is not confined to the case 
of extending the life of conventional parts th& 
a r e  already available; it includes the development 
of new parts and materials such as those that 
solid-state electronics may offer. 
Analysis of Priority 
So far, in my attempt to identify the 
principal areas in which research is needea, I 
have indicated no priority ratings. The grouping 
was based on the two categories of reliability 
research, sys  tems and parts. Design-oriented 
items were listed first, followed by those related 
to the measurement o r  demonstration of relia- 
bility. From a management standpaint, these 
items should be analyzed with respect to their 
relative importance. Priority assignments for 
individual items, however, will differ from one 
program to another, depending on the criteria 
established in each for  detepmining urgency. 
For  illustration: 
(1) In a long-range program aimed a t  
developing systems that must operate over ex- 
tremely long periods of time, high priority is 
given to work on long-life components,. self- 
healing design techniques and the determination 
of failure mechanisms. 
(2) If the immediate job is to develop 
costly, complex, expendable systems for an 
extended mission period and only a few are to be 
built at a time, priority goes to the solution of 
problems involving small-lab reliabilfty assur- 
ance, reliability demonstration, refined predic- 
tion and other techniques for analytical design 
evaluation and self -healing design. 
(3) If our goal is to speed up development 1 
and cut costs but retain the assurance of relia- 
bility, priority falls to the development of ac- 
celerated testing techniques, prediction tech- 
niques and the shortest and most economical 
methods of test demonstration and reliability 
measurement o r  evaluation. 
(4) When the basic need is a formula for 
specifying reliability in contracts, possibly 
1 associated with provisions for  incentives o r  
/ penalties, first priority would be assigned to the development of methods by which reliability can 
be  quantitatively .specified and measured. 
We could establish still other sets of cri- 
teria, but those I have mentioned could be 
matched to the current situation in our missile 
' and space projects. In summary, we would 
, find ourselves facing the need for (1) developing 
complex, low-production, long-miss ion-time 
systems, (2) demonstrating reliability in com- 
plex, expendable systems and (3) cutting dosts 
and shortening development times to meet early 
operational dates. 
This leads me to suggest that the following 
areas should be given high priority: 




Assurance of reliability in small 
production lots 
And the effort in these technique areas is to be 
fully supported by the basic programs for 
developing new and Ionger lived parts and 
materials. 
Not everyone will agree with these sug- 
gested priorities, for needs vary with the situa- 
tion. 
I ask your assistance in letting us know 
about new reliability problems that a re  revealed 
from day to day. For our part, we a r e  most 
interested in your efforts, especially those that 
culminate in whole or  partial solutions on which 
data may be made generally available--to the 
benefit of the nation's defense program as  well 
as its industry. 
Conclusion 
Our weapon technology is growing a t  a 
tremendous rate, and there a r e  unprecedented 
demands for performance and fyr?ctional capa- 
bility. Moreover, in contrast to former reli- 
ability needs, the degree of reliability now 
required in many cases for sudcessful operation 
has been multiplied by a factor of 10--some- 
times a s  high a s  100. 
The very nature of many new systems 
denies us the use of such established procedures 
a s  product improvement and calls for a re-  
orientation of our design philosophy and manage- 
ment. In technical as well a s  management areas, 
techniques must advance in order to stay abreast 
of mission requirements and, at the same time, 
cope with time scales and allocated budgets. 
The successful pursuit of the research 
needs enumerated will go far toward gaining 
objectives that a re  vital to our national defense. 
A considerable part of this work is now in 
progress, sponsored by both industrial and 
government research activities. These pro- 
grams must be compatible and complementary. 
Their results should be documented and pub- 
lished for use by all interested agencies of 
government and industry. 
Reliability is the key to advanced weapon 
technology and success in space operations. In 
our defense, in our economy and in the prestige 
we enjoy among the world's nations, it is of the 
utmost significance that our systems of all kinds 
function dependably. And it will take the com- 
bined efforts of our government and our industry 
to achieve the required reliability. 
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THREE IJ3SSONS FROM THE RELIABILITY VERIYICATION PROGRAM 
David B. Christian 
Light Mili tary Electronics Department 
General Elect r ic  Company 
Utica, New York 
Introduction 
This paper discusses three important 
lessons tha t  resulted from a Re l iab i l i ty  
Verif icat ion Program. The General Elec- 
t r i c  Company builds Radio Guidance Equip- 
ment f o r  the Atlas Missile Program. The 
Mod I11 A/B equipment is one of the a i r -  
borne guidance systems t ha t  has been de- 
signed and b u i l t  a t  the Light Mili tary 
Electronics Department t o  be used with 
the ground system b u i l t  by the Defense 
Systems Department . The airborne sys tem 
consists  of two beacons and a decoder. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the equipment s e t  up 
f o r  vibrat ion tes t ing.  
The system operates by sending s ignals  
t o  the ground s ta t ion .  These s ignals  a re  
interpreted by the ground system and a 
message is  returned containing information 
f o r  missile-course correction. Such a 
system has two principal  advantages: It 
i s  precise.  It is highly re l i ab le .  
The question tha t  arose i n  1959 was, 
"How r e l i ab l e  i s  t h i s  system?" "What is  
the probabil i ty of a successful guided 
f l igh t?"  The minimum acceptable r e l i a -  
b i l i t y  f o r  such a system was 0.925 with 
95 percent confidence. From t h i s  require- 
ment, the Mod I11 A/B Rel iab i l i ty  Verif i-  
cat ion Program evolved. 
The concept of a t e s t  program t o  ver i fy  
the r e l i a b i l i t y  of such a system was not 
new. To design the program, we needed 
only t o  make the following assumptions: 
1. Assume tha t  repeated vibrat ion 
cycling of the equipment w i l l  not reduce 
i t s  l i f e .  
2 .  Assume tha t  i n  the laboratory you 
can simulate the vibrat ion environment of 
a missi le f l i g h t .  
3. Assume that  the sample used is 
representative sf the population of 
guidance s ys terns . 
On the baeris of these assumptions,the 
program could be designed, the r e l i a b i l i t y  
of the system could be determined, and 
the va l id i ty  of the assumptions could i n  
turn, be ver i f ied .  The method decided 
upon f o r  obtaining f a i l u r e  data was t o  
t e s t  s i x  systems t o  f a i l u r e  under simulated- 
f l i g h t  environmental conditions. I f  the 
system degrades markedly with continued 
electronic cycling, o r  vibration, or  both, 
the f i rst  assumption would not hold, and 
the contractor could be penalized severely. 
With a sample as  small as s ix ,  i t  is ex- 
tremely d i f f i c u l t  t o  demonstrate with a 
high degree of s t a t i s t i c a l  confidence 
whether the f a i l u r e  d i s t r ibu t ion  is  in-  
fluenced by vibrat ion fa t igue.  
The s ta ted  purpose of the Mod 111 A/B 
Rel iabi l i ty  Verif icat ion Program was to:  
1. Estimate the r e l i a b i l i t y  of the 
Mod I11 A h  airborne equipment during a 
countdown and f l i g h t  period. 
2.  Derive information from which the 
r e l i a b i l i t y  could be fu r the r  improved. 
3. VerTfy the f e a s i b i l i t y  of experi- 
mentally measuring r e l i a b i l i t y .  
A s  s ta ted  ea r l i e r ,  the customer wanted 
t o  be assured tha t  the r e l i a b i l i t y  of the 
airborne system was a t  l e a s t  0.925 with 
95 percent confidence . The Mod I11 B Re- 
l i a b i l i t y  Verif icat ion Program demonstrated: 
1. With 95 percent confidence, equip-. 
ment r e l i a b i l i t y  f o r  a countdown and 
f l i g h t  period is  no l e s s  than 0.994. 
2. The confidence l eve l  a t  which a 
0.925 probabil i ty of fa i lure-f ree  operation 
may be inferred is  greater  than 99.95 per- 
cent. 
The program was feas ible .  The r e l i a -  
b i l i t y  of the airborne equipment exceeded 
not only the minimum acceptable re l i ab i l i ty ,  
but a l so  the design objective of the Mod 
I11 A/B Program. 
The ver i f ica t ion program was con- 
current with ac tual  f l i g h t  t e s t  of the 
Mod 111 A system. Problem areas indicated 
by the ver i f i ca t ion  program agreed very 
well with those brought t o  l i g h t  by the 
ground and maintenance t e s t s  of the Mod 
I11 A equipment i n  the f i e l d .  This corr- 
espondence added confidence i n  the pro- 
gram and with it  a2 urgency and sense of 
need t o  eliminate the problems revealed. 
In  t h i s  sense, information w a s  obtained 
tha t  did a id  i n  improving the r e l i a b i l i t y  
of the guidance equipment. 
This paper presents three s ignif icant  
lessons learned from the Mod I11 A/B Re- 
l i a b i l i t y  Verif icat ion Program. It dis-  
cusses the significance of these lessons 
and how they have affected the planning 
of subsequent evaluation. It goes on t o  
discuss i n  a new l i gh t  what the program 
has added t o  our knowledge of the be- 
havior of complex electronic systems. 
Br ief ly  s ta ted ,  the lessons are: 
1. This type of Re l iab i l i ty  Verifica- 
t ion  Program can and should be a valid 
means f o r  demonstrating the r e l i a b i l i t y  of 
a system. 
2. There a re  relat ionships between 
time, cycling, and vibrat ion.  
3. The time required t o  perform such 
a program may l i m i t  i ts  value. 
F i r s t  Lesson: Validi ty of Test Program 
The t e s t  program was feas ible  and 
valid.  The program simulated two environ- 
ments: The first environment was tha t  of 
the equipment checkout and maintenance 
period. This environment is comparable 
t o  the ground environment before placement 
of the equipment on a missi le f o r  count- 
down and launch. The second environment 
is tha t  of missi le countdown, launch, and 
f l i g h t  operation. 
The f l i g h t  vibrat ion requirements were 
simulated i n  accordance with the t e le -  
metered data received f rom Atlas f l l gh t s  . 
Temperature was controlled so tha t  f o r  
each simulated f l i g h t  each system experi- 
enced flight-temperature conditions. 
Table I compared the f a i l u r e  ra tes  
from the Verif icat ion Progxamts first en- 
vironment with the actual  f i e l d  experience 
observed with General E lec t r i c ' s  Mod I11 A/B equipment. 
TABLE 1. 
Failure Rate Comparison 
FIELD 
Major & 




Rate Confidence Bands 
Pulse Beacon 0.0032 0.00184 - 0.00483 
Rate Beacon 0.0023 0.00144 - 0.00382 
Decoder 0 -0034 0 -00202 - 0.00502 
Sys tem 0.0089 0.0063 - 0.0113 
System Mean- 








Rate Confidence Bands 
Pulse Beacon 0.0044 0.00123 - 0.00985 
Rate Beacon 0.0023 0.00028 - 0.00636 
Decoder 0.0045 0.00122 - 0.00979 
Sys tem 0.0112 0.0043 - 0.0182 
System Mean- 
Time t o  
Failure 89 .O 
There ex i s t s  no s t a t i s t i c a l  s i gn i f i -  
cant difference between the ra tes  shown 
i n  the table .  From t h i s  we conclude tha t  
the  ver i f ica t ion program successfully s i m -  
ulated the f i e l d  environment. The r e l i a -  
b i l i t y  statements t ha t  could be made about 
f l i gh t s ,  assuming an exponential f a i l u r e  
d is t r ibut ion,  were s ta ted  e a r l i e r .  In  
ac tual  f l i g h t s  of Atlas Missiles guided 
by General Elect r ic  Mod I11 A/B equipment 
there have been no fa i lu res  of the a i r -  
borne equipment. This record is  consist-  
ent  with the resu l t s  of the Re l iab i l i ty  
Verif icat ion Program. One of the s i x  sys- 
tems used "flew" 450 simulated f l i g h t s  
without a f a i l u r e .  
Armed with knowledge of the va l i d i t y  
of the Mod 111 A/B Re l iab i l i ty  Verifica- 
t ion  Program, and faced with the task of 
evaluating the Mod I11 F/G guidance, range 
sa fe ty  and tracking systems, we s e t  about 
designing a program f a r  more complex and 
more d i f f i c u l t  t o  analyze s t a t i s t i c a l l y .  
For the Mod I11 F/G systems, the customer 
did not want t o  repeat a Verif icat ion Pro- 
gram. He wanted t o  know how r e l i ab l e  the 
systems were f o r  various vibrat ion l eve l s .  
This information was needed t o  r e f l e c t  the 
multipurpose use of the Mod I11 F I G  equip- 
m e n t ~  on more than one missi le.  Some of 
the levels  envisioned with t h i s  new t e s t  
program may even be beyond the vibrat ion 
design specif icat ions.  The successful 
performance of the e a r l i e r  Re l iab i l i ty  
Verif icat ion Program permitted General 
Elect r ic  t o  accept t h i s  challenge. 
The new program d i f f e r s  from the Veri- 
f i c a t i on  Program i n  a number of respects .  
Instead of simulating the f l i g h t s  of s i x  
systems a t  one vibrat ion level ,  we a re  
simulating the f l i g h t s  of the four systems 
a t  a t  l e a s t  four d i f ferent  l eve l s .  A s e t  
of decision rules  have been s e t  down t o  
determine the character is t ics  of the f a i l -  
ure d i s t r ibu t ion .  In  t h i s  manner as  soon 
as  the f a i l u r e  d i s t r ibu t ion  appears a s  
recognizable, t e s t ing  can be halted.  By 
replacement of fatigued components and 
modules o r  both, t e s t ing  can be resumed 
a t  another l eve l .  
The projected cost of the program 
seemed excessive a t  f i r s t ;  however, i n  
reviewing the experience gained from the ear 
l i e r  ve r i f i ca t ion  program, the author decide 
tha t  i f  time f o r  countdowns were eliminated 
and f l i g h t s  were substi tuted,  the number 
of f l i g h t s  could be more than t r i p l ed .  By 
sac r i f i c ing  the beauty of t i gh t  confidence 
bands, which a r e  only obtained with large 
samples, a maximum liklihood estimate tha t  
was qui te  re l i ab le  could be obtained.Also, 
knowing some character is t ics  of vibrat ion 
obtained from the Verif icat ion Program 
(discussed fu r the r  on i n  t h i s  paper), 
the author f e l t  he should be able t o  
corre la te  the d i f fe ren t  vibrat ion level  
e f fec t s  on the equipment. 
The Mod I11 F/G Vibration Evaluation 
Program is  s t i l l  i n  progress. One stage 
i s  complete, Four hundred successive 
fa i lure-f ree  f l i g h t s  have been simulated 
a t  a vibrat ion level  comparable t o  those 
l eve l s  used i n  the Mod 111 A/B Program. 
 his r e su l t  is as good as,  i f  not be t t e r  
than, what the Verif icat ion Program dem- 
ons t ra ted  . 
Comparing the previbrat ion experience 
of the Mod I11 F/G Vibration Evaluation 
Program with the data  obtained from com- 
parable f i e l d  experience f o r  the Mod I11 
F/G equipment, one w i l l  f ind  tha t  the com- 
parison is  about the same as  t ha t  f o r  the 
Mod I11 B Rel iab i l i ty  Verif icat ion Pro- 
gram  a able I) .  Such a performance 
pa t t e rn  should be expected. 
One additional comment is  appropriate. 
The s t a t i s t i c i a n  knowingly sacr i f iced the 
beauty of t igh t  confidence bands when 
planning the Mod I11 F/G Program. Origi- 
na l ly  he wanted about t h i r t y  f a i l u r e s  f o r  
each system vibrat ion so tha t  he could 
estimate the fa i lure-dis t r ibut ion func- 
t i o n  f o r  each vibrat ion level  with a re-  
spectable confidence. This requirement 
was s e t  aside by t ransferr ing the empha- 
sis from a confidence level  t o  a best  es- 
timate of the d i s t r ibu t ion  mean. Generally 
speaking, the width of a probabil i ty con- 
fidence region i s  re la ted  t o  the s ize  of 
the  sample. The l a rge r  the sample, tha t  
is, the more f l i g h t s  observed; the t i gh t e r  
w i l l  be the confidence band. But t h i s  
t ightening of the confidence band w i l l  
have very l i t t l e  e f fec t  on the estimation 
of the d i s t r ibu t ion  parameters unless 
there  ex i s t s  a b ias  tha t  is inversely re-  
l a ted  t o  the sample s i z e .  Thus, by de- 
emphasizing confidence statement, and by 
concentrating on estimation of the maxi- 
mum likelihood estimators of the d i s -  
t r ibu t ion  parameters, i t  i s  possible t o  
reduce the sample s ize  considerably. 
Table I1 i l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s  point .  
TABLE I1 
Comparison of Failure-Free 
Flights Required a t  Two Levels of 
Re l iab i l i ty  
Lower Failure- Lower Failure - 
Bound Free Bound Free 
$Con- Flights $ Con- Flights 
f idence Required f idence Required 
$econd Lesson - Relation Betweeq 
Time, Vibration, and Cycling 
The debate between Production Environ- 
mental Testing (PET) exponents and d i s -  
senters  has been going on f o r  a number of 
years.  PET, pr incipal ly  i n  terms of vi-  
bration, was debated a t  some length during m 
the Sixth Military-Industry Missile Re- 
l i a b i l i t y  Symposium a t  F!rt Bl iss  i n  1960. 
The simplest presentation of the issue of 
t h i s  controversy is, "Does vibrat ion t e s t -  
ing eliminate f a i l u r e s  or does i t  cause 
them? " 
One of the principal  proponents f o r  
PET was Robert L. Stal lard.* The rat ion- 
a l e  f o r  PET is  based on the f a c t  tha t  with 
compressed time schedules i n  complex 
missi le systems, it becomes impossible t o  
go through the i dea l  eight  steps of pro- 
duc tion: 
"1. Definition of the requirements. 
"2. Production and t e s t  of the  bread- 
board models . 
" 3 .  Production of a prototype, which 
i s  subjected t o  environmental t e s t s .  
"4. Redesign of the component, a s  dic-  
ta ted  by the r e su l t s  of the prototype 
t e s t s .  
"5. Production of several prototypes 
with production tooling and production 
techniques. 
"6. Ful l  scale qual i f ica t ion t es t ing  
of a l l  these prototypes produced by pro- 
duction methods. 
"7. Redesign and r e t e s t  of the pro- 
duction prototypes, as necessary. 
"8. Final  production." 
Essential ly PET replaces the above 
steps with production hardware. Stal lacd 
s ta ted  the following levels   able 111) 
tha t  h i s  company used f o r  PET t e s t s .  
TABLF, I11 
PET Levels f o r  Vibration Testing 
Percent Percent of Design 
Components Specifications 
100 
50 - 100 
Below 50 
Sta l lard  does not f e e l  tha t  the PET 
programs shortens the l i f e  of the equip- 
ment. He has calculated tha t  the maximum 
amount of design l i f e  consumed by PET f o r  
any component t o  be 4 percent.* 
Q. A .  Henderson, i n  h i s  paper,  he 
Fallacy of PET as  a Quali ty Control Tech- 
nique," ppesented a t  t h i s  symposium along 
with S ta l l a rd ' s ,  gave a well documented 
argument i n  opposition t o  the PET concept. 
He quoted extensively from D r .  W .  R .  
Pabst 's paper, "S t a t i s t i c a l  Planning f o r  
Ordnance Proof Testing. " This paper 
* Stal lard ,  R .  L., "The Value of P.E.T. A s  
A Quali ty Control Function" Sixth Military- 
Industry Missile Re l iab i l i ty  Symposium, 
Fort Bliss  1960, Volume I, Pages 303-324 
argued t h a t  successfu l  completion of a  
t e s t  run was i n  no way a  guarantee t h a t  
a  torpedo would be more r e l i a b l e .  An ex- 
periment was devised u t i l i z i n g  two groups 
of f i v e  torpedos: Group A, which had 
passed a  water run; and Group B which had 
not been water t e s t e d .  Both groups were 
then water t e s t e d .  The s t a t i s t i c a l  anal-  
y s i s  ind ica ted  t h a t  there  was no s i g n i f i -  
cant  d i f fe rence  between the two groups. 
I n  f a c t ,  t he  untested group empir ical ly  
performed be t te r ,  although the  d i f f e r -  
ence was not  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t .  
Such an experience i s  not  unique. Similar  
r e s u l t s  have been obtained from other  
programs. 
Henderson, r e f e r r i n g  t o  a  guided 
mis s i l e  program u t i l i z i n g  100 percent v i -  
b ra t ion  t e s t i n g  sa id :  
I t . . .  the  con t r ac to r  l i s t s  the  follow- 
ing  items a s  the kind of f a i l u r e s  o r  de- 
f e c t s  he i s  f ind ing:  loose nuts  and b o l t s ;  
cold so lde r  j o in t s ;  i n su l a t ion  wearing 
through from rubbing, broken capac i tor  
leads;  capac i tor  short ing;  microphonics 
on trimpots;  microphonic t r a n s i s t o r s ;  in -  
t e rmi t t en t  re lays ;  broken wires; broken 
mountings; cracked t r a n s i s t o r s ;  loose con- 
t a c t s ;  microsyn gear  r e t a i n e r  f a i l u r e s ;  
poor mechanical f i t  and looseness; defec- 
t i v e  pot wipers; snap-ring f a i l u r e s . "  
The cont rac tor  concluded t h a t  these de- 
f e c t s  "would not have been discovered 
during normal manufacturing inspec t ion .  " 
He a l s o  made the  "rediscovery" t h a t  "Man- 
ufac tur ing  f a i l u r e s  appeared t o  be com- 
p l e t e l y  random." 
"I th ink  we can assume saf  ely,"He&erson 
continued, " t h a t  i f  the cont rac tor  s t a t e s  
t h a t  these f a i l u r e s  and de fec t s  would not 
have been discovered during normal manu- 
f ac tu r ing  inspect ion,  e i t h e r  h i s  normal 
inspec t ion  is  no good, o r  e l s e  these de- 
f e c t s  were not  present  a t  the time of 
inspect ion,  and were therefore ,  the d i -  
r e c t  r e s u l t  of the  PET." 
This w r i t e r  was f a m i l i a r  with a  
mi s s i l e  program i n  which he demonstrated 
t h a t  the f a i l u r e  r a t e  under v ib ra t ion  
t e s t s  was the  same a s  with t e s t s  not 
using v ibra t ion ,  and t h a t  t h i s  f a i l u r e  
r a t e  was e s s e n t i a l l y  cons tan t .  The v i -  
b ra t ion  t e s t i n g  a s  performed d id  not 
cause any increase  o r  decrease i n  f a i l u r e s .  
Over the years I have observed many 
f a i l u r e s  such a s  unsoldered jo in t s ,  broken 
welds i n  pot ted  assemblies,  t h a t  a r e  
supposedly v ib ra t ion  f a i l u r e s  but  t h a t  
have been detected,  not  during v ibra t ion ,  
but  a t  some l a t e r  t ime. The incidence of 
t h i s  type of f a i l u r e ,  although not very 
high, i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  merely i n  the f a c t  
t h a t  i t  e x i s t s .  
During the  1300 f l i g h t s  of the Mod 
I11 B R e l i a b i l i t y  Ver i f i ca t ion  Program, 
four  f a i l u r e s  were observed. These f a i l -  
u res  were of k lys t rons ,  magnetrons, and 
thyra t rons .  These components have been 
considered by some a s  possessing a  l imi ted  
l i f e .  Cycling, time, v ibra t ion ,  o r  com- 
b ina t ion  of these var iab les ,  could have 
been responsible  f o r  these f a i l u r e s .  
Figure 3 shows a  p l o t  on Weibull prob- 
a b i l i t y  paper of the fou r  f a i l u r e s  ob- 
served during the simulated f l i g h t s .  
Notice how well  the Weibull d i s t r ibu . t ion  
f i t s  the da t a  i n  comparison with the ex- 
ponent ial  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  The Weibull d i s -  
t r i b u t i o n  ind ica t e s  t h a t  time, cycles ,  o r  
v ib ra t ion  d id  a f f e c t  the  l i f e  of the sys- 
tem. 
It is  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  compare the 
e a r l i e r  statement made about t he  r e l i a -  
b i l i t y  of the Mod 111 B equipment with 
the statement t h a t  would be made with 
t h i s  bes t  es t imate of a  Weibull f i t .  
1. Assuming an  exponent ial  d i s t r i b u -  
t i on :  With 95 percent confidence, equip- 
ment r e l i a b i l i t y  f o r  a  countdown and 
f l i g h t  per iod i s  no l e s s  than 0.994. 
2 .  Assuming the Weibull d i s t r i b u t i o n :  
With 95 percent  confidence, equipment re -  
l i a b i l i t y  f o r  a  countdown and f l i g h t  
per iod i s  no l e s s  than 0.999. 
The second statement implies  t h a t  re -  
peated cycl ing,  time, o r  v i b r a t i o n  does 
have an e f f e c t  on r e l i a b i l i t y .  The r e -  
l i a b i l i t y  on a  s ing le  f l i g h t  would be 
higher  under a  Weibull assumption than 
under the exponential  assumption. Figure 
4 shows the  r e l a t i onsh ip  of t he  cumulative 
condi t iona l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  func t ions  of the 
two d i s t r i b u t i o n s .  This shows the  ex- 
pected number of f a i l u r e s  t h a t  one would 
observe from time zero t o  time t .  
The Mod I11 B Ver i f i ca t ion  Program 
was not  designed t o  separa te  the  e f f e c t s  
of v ibra t ion ,  cycles ,  and time. Upon 
completion of the  f l i g h t  po r t ion  of t h i s  
program, a  l i f e  t e s t  was p a r t i a l l y  per-  
formed on two systems. The equipment was 
subjected t o  few on/off cycles  and t o  no 
v ib ra t ion .  The r e s u l t  of t h i s  incompleted 
t e s t  ind ica ted  t h a t  with s teady  operat ion 
the equipments operated f o r  3600 hours 
wi th  a  MITBF of 350 hours a s  opposed t o  
100 hours f o r  the  f l i g h t  per iod .  
These r e s u l t s  s t i l l  do not  revea l  the 
r e l a t i o n  between time, v ibra t ion ,  and 
cyc l ing .  We have t o  look t o  our Mod I11 
F/G Vibrat ion Evaluation Program and t o  an 
add i t i ona l  experiment. The Vibrat ion 
Evaluation Program as  i t  s tands  today i s  
inconclusive.  It would appear t h a t  vibra-  
t i o n  l e v e l s  do have an  e f f e c t .  One system 
completed 400 cycles a t  low-level vibra-  
t i o n  without a  r a i l u r e .  Another system, 
a t  a  l e v e l  th ree  times a s  high, had a  
f a i l u r e  a f t e r  92 cyc le s .  The eva lua t ion  
program, however, i s  designed s o  t h a t  upon 
completion we should be ab le  t o  give a  
b e t t e r  answer t o  the quest ion of the e f f e c t  
of v ib ra t ion .  
The o ther  important experiment is  the 
l i f e  t e s t  t h a t  we have been performing on 
the Mod I11 F/G k lys t rons .  In  t h i s  t e s t ,  
t h e  k lys t rons  a r e  cycled onceevery hour 
of the day i n  a  manner t h a t  simulates the 
normal t e s t  f o r  the beacon. Each cycle 
reproduces the temperature and s igna l  
p a t t e r n  t h a t  would be observed during a  
normal beacon t e s t .  The r e s u l t s  of the 
t e s t  t o  da te  a r e  shown i n  Table I V .  The 
p r inc ipa l  d i f fe rence  between the two kly- 
s t rons  is  the power mode. The MISTRAM 
k lys t ron  should have a  longer l i f e  than 
the  Mod I11 F/G k lys t ron .  
TABLE I V  
Klystron Life-Test Resul ts  
hours 




1 1300 f a i l e d  
2 1453 f a i l e d  
3 1613 
The l i f e  expectancy of the k lys t ron  
i s  qu i t e  a  b i t  more than  had been ex- 
pected.  It was genera l ly  believed t h a t  
a k lys t ron  a f t e r  one hundred hours was a  
r e l i a b i l i t y  r i s k .  Very l i t t l e  change i n  
the operat ing c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of the kly- 
s t r o n  has been observed during t h i s  l i f e  
t e s t .  Although these k lys t rons  a r e  not 
the same a s  those of the  Mod I11 B, they 
a r e  comparable t o  the u n i t s  used i n  the 
Mod I11 F/G Vibrat ion Evaluation. I f  the 
performance under v ib ra t ion  is not the 
same a s  the s t a t i c  performance, the in -  
f luence of the  v ib ra t ion  environment on 
l i f e  w i l l  have been demonstrated more 
d e f i n i t e l y  than i n  the  p a s t .  
An i n t e r e s t i n g  observation about the 
two f a i l e d  k lys t rons  i s  t h a t  both show a  
general  over -a l l  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  of the 
cathode. Those t h a t  have f a i l e d  i n  the 
f i e l d  because of d e t e r i o r a t i o n  of the 
cathode, which would be considered normal 
end of l i f e ,  have de t e r io ra t ed  only i n  a  
loca l ized  spot  near  the cen te r .  
The r e s u l t s  of t h e  Mod I11 B Relia- 
b i l i t y  Ver i f i ca t ion  Program, the Mod I11 
F/G Vibration Evaluation Program, and the 
Klystron Life  Test t o  da t e  tend t o  support 
the t h e s i s  t h a t  v ib ra t ion  does have an 
e f f e c t  on the l i f e  of e l ec t ron ic  equip- 
ment. The next quest ion t o  ask i s ,  "How 
much?" The Ver i f i ca t ion  Program was per- 
formed a t  operat ional  f  l i g h t  v ibra t ion  
l e v e l s .  Vibrat ion t e s t i n g  a t  these l eve l s ,  
within reason, may have only a  minor 
e f f e c t  on the l i f e  of the equipment. 
When completed, the  Mod I11 F/G Vibra- 
t i o n  Evaluation Program w i l l  t e l l  us more 
* Retune k lys t ron  a f t e r  35 hours.  
about the inf luence of v ib ra t ion  l e v e l s  
on the l i f e  of the airborne equipment. 
A t  t h i s  po in t  it can be sa id  t h a t  
repeated v ib ra t ion  a t  high l e v e l s  w i l l  
a f f ec t  the r e l i a b i l i t y  of a  system. Thus, 
i f  a  system was vibrated,  f a i l e d  and then 
v ibra ted  again a t  a  high l e v e l ,  i t s  r e -  
l i a b i l i t y  could be a f fec ted  adverse ly  by 
f a t i g u e .  One way t o  avoid such f a t i g u e  
would be by designing the equipment with 
a  g r e a t e r  s a f e t y  margin. Another method 
t o  avoid f a t i g u e  would be t o  sho r t en  the 
v ib ra t ion - t e s t  time. A v ib ra t ion  expert  
t o ld  t h i s  w r i t e r  t h a t  a  one-minute random 
v ib ra t ion  i s  a l l  t h a t  i s  required t o  ex- 
c i t e  a l l  poss ib le  resonances i n  the  f r e -  
quency spectrum under t e s t .  A l l  v ib ra t ion  
beyond t h a t  po in t  only f a t igues  the  u n i t .  
The Mod I11 B R e l i a b i l i t y  Ver i f i ca t ion  
Program has ind ica ted  t h a t  v ib ra t ion  a t  
the simulated f l i g h t  l e v e l s  had a  s l i g h t  
e f f e c t  on the l i f e  of the  equipment. V i -  
b r a t ion  a t  some higher l e v e l  would prob- 
ab ly  have introduced more f a t i g u e .  This 
has been apparent with the Mod 111 F/G 
Vibrat ion Evaluation Program. 
This w r i t e r ' s  personal pos i t i on  i n  
the controversy surrounding PET is t h a t  
i t  i s  not  a  panacea f o r  de t ec t ing  loose 
b o l t s  and nuts ,  cold so lde r  j o in t s ,  and 
s o  on. Af te r  v ibra t ion  t e s t s ,  these de- 
f e c t s  do appear.  If the v ib ra t ion  t e s t  
i s  not e f f ec t ive ,  one would expect t o  ob- 
serve these f a i l u r e s  with about t he  same 
frequency a s  before .  I f  the t e s t  i s  
e f f e c t i v e  these f a i l u r e s  should no t  e x i s t .  
This presupposes t h a t  the  f a i l u r e s  a r e  not  
due t o  f a t i gue  but  t h a t  marginal condi- 
t i o n s  a r e  being de tec ted .  What i s  r e -  
quired then is  an e f f e c t i v e  s h o r t  vibra-  
t i o n  t e s t .  The problem usua l ly  is  t h a t  
the length  of a v ib ra t ion  t e s t  i s  de t e r -  
mined by the time required f o r  e l e c t r i c a l  
performance t e s t ,  and not by the requi re -  
ments f o r  an e f f e c t i v e  v ib ra t ion  t e s t .  If 
the v ib ra t ion - t e s t  time i s  not determined 
by e l e c t r i c a l - t e s t  time, i t  i s  usua l ly  
determined by custom; ac tua l  requirements 
a r e  not taken i n t o  account, o r  more s e r i -  
ously, a r e  not  even known. 
If we approached our designs with the 
same conservative s a f e t y  approach a s  a 
bridge designer,  we would not  have t o  be 
concerned a s  much with the degrading 
e f f e c t  of v ib ra t ion .  It is  unfortunate  
t h a t  i n  our missile-space age d e f i n i t e  
t radeoffs  of s i z e  and weight, and thus 
sa fe ty ,  must be made. 
S t r i c t l y  speaking, I would l i k e  t o  be 
completely on Henderson's s i d e  because I 
f e e l  t h a t  PET is  being used t o  de t ec t  our 
human f a i l i n g s  and care lessness .  I a l s o  
f e e l  t h a t  time spent on proper evaluat ions 
of design and manufacturing processes 
would be more e f f e c t i v e  i n  producing re -  
l i a b l e  equipment than time spent on PET 
inspec t ions .  The answer i s  not PET o r  
no PET. It is  the r a t i o n a l  development 
of design, manufacture, and t e s t  equipment. 
If we a r e  t o  use PET t o  de t ec t  our human 
f a i l i n g s ,  we a r e  not  t r e a t i n g  the cause of 
our i l l n e s s .  Fundamentally, workers want 
t o  do a good job and take p r ide  i n  t h e i r  
work. But i f  they work from chaos and 
panic, change one th ing  a f t e r  another  be- 
cause of our engineers1 e r r o r s ,  a r e  rushed 
by foremen s o  t h a t  they meet schedules, 
t h e i r  morale, and with i t  the  q u a l i t y  of 
t h e i r  product, w i l l  s l i p .  If our de- 
s igners  must rush  a design i n t o  production 
because of con t r ac t  requirements, the  de- 
s ign  w i l l  soon have t o  be changed and the  
chain r e a c t i o n  leading t o  poor q u a l i t y  
w i l l  be s t a r t e d .  
The L i t t l e  Prince upon v i s i t i n g  the  
e a r t h  and our c i t i e s  wisely observed: "Men 
s e t  out on t h e i r  way i n  express t r a i n s ,  
but they  do not  know what they a r e  look- 
ing  f o r .  Then they  rush about, and g e t  
exci ted,  and t u r n  round and round. . ." 
( ~ n t o i n e  deSaint Exupery, The L i t t l e  
Prince, Reynal and Hitchcock, New ~ o r k )  
Perhaps our chain events a r e  described 
by the  meeting of the  L i t t l e  Prince and 
the t i p p l e r .  
"What a r e  you doing there?",  He s a i d  
"I a m  drinking" r ep l i ed  the  t i p p l e r  
"Why a r e  you drinking?" 
"So t h a t  I may f o r g e t  .I1  
"Forget what?" 
"Forget t h a t  I amll ashamed. " 
"Ashamed of what? 
"Ashamed of dr inking .  " 
Third Lesson: Time 
The Mod I11 B R e l i a b i l i t y  Ver i f i ca t ion  
Program was use fu l  because: 
1. It a t t a ined  i ts  object ive:  v e r i f i -  
ca t ion  of the  r e l i a b i l i t y  of the  Mod I11 A/B ai rborne  system. 
2.  It yielded valuable information on 
the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of f a i l u r e .  
3. It pointed out design and component 
weaknesses, e i t h e r  independently o r  i n  
conjunction with the  f i e l d  experience of 
the  Mod 111 A / B  equipment. 
4 .  It gave us  an engineering "confi-  
dence" i n  the v a l i d i t y  of our t e s t i n g  
procedures. Not only with the  procedures 
of the  t e s t  program, but  more important, 
with those used f o r  production and f o r  
f i e l d  t e s t i n g .  The test-program r e s u l t s  
were a l s o  instrumental  i n  making two 
changes i n  the  manufacturing and inspec- 
t i o n  procedures.  
5. It f a c i l i t a t e d  a rap id  formulation 
of new eva lua t ion  methods u t i l i z i n g  the  
knowledge a t t a i n e d .  
But a l l  of t h i s  is not  enough. The 
timing and time s c a l e  of the program was 
such t h a t  a major p a r t  of i ts p o t e n t i a l  
value w a s  l o s t .  There is  a need t o  have 
known yesterday what we hope t o  l e a r n  
tomorrow. The time t o  perform such a 
program is o f t en  too  g r e a t .  The time t o  
negot ia te  such a program is  o f t e n  too  g r e a t .  
The time t o  analyze the r e s u l t s  and make 
the  answers known is  of ten  too  g r e a t .  - 
Time is  involved because evaluat ion 
programs cos t  money. This w r i t e r  a s  a 
s t a t i s t i c i a n  who has taken an  ac t ive  p a r t  
i n  planning many eva lua t ion  programs is 
well  aware of the  time problem. He i s  
aware of t he  neces s i ty  of having a meeting 
of t he  minds s o  t h a t  t he re  is  a complete 
understanding among a l l  p a r t i e s .  Each pro- 
gram t h a t  I have been involved i n  proved 
valuable ,  But i n  each case time has de- 
t r ac t ed  from the  value of t he  outcome. 
There is  too  much t h a t  is unknown i n  
our indus t ry  today t o  permit our running 
around without a purposeful p lan .  Each new 
evaluat ion must not be j u s t  a repea t  of 
something t h a t  has been done before,  but  
one t h a t  is  designed t o  y i e l d  new infor -  
mation i n  an order ly  fash ion .  It i s  
e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  each p lan  be c a r e f u l l y  l a i d  
and u t i l i z e  a l l  t he  knowledge ava i l ab l e .  
It would be convenient if we could or- 
ganize one grand and g lor ious  program t o  
t e l l  u s  a l l .  This is not  poss ib l e .  We 
must th ink  ins tead  of an over -a l l  concept, 
and f i t  i n t o  this concept t e s t  programs 
a s  p a r t s  of the  f u l f i l l m e n t  of t h a t  con- 
cept .  The problem of PET o r  nonPET is 
not  what w e  need t o  reso lve .  We need t o  
know t h a t  we have developed the  c r i t e r i a  
required t o  assure t h a t  we have a r e l i a b l e  
product.  This problem doesn ' t  involve 
only t e s t i n g .  It involves manufacturing. 
It involves design. 
" . . .Fai lure  da t a  i nd ica t e s  t h a t  the 
p r inc ipa l  reasons f o r  f a i l u r e  a r e  
human. The l a r g e s t  s i n g l e  source of 
u n r e l i a b i l i t y  is workmanship. The 
second l a r g e s t  source is  design and man- 
ufac tur ing  engineering. These two 
sources combined a r e  responsible  f o r  
70 percent t o  90 percent  of t h e  fa i l -  
u re s  reported.  Both sources could be 
ca l l ed  workmanship. The first is  work- 
manship of the  hand and the  mind. The 
second is  workmanship of t he  mind and 
the  hand. They both e x i s t  because of 
t he  a t t i t u d e s  of human beings .I1* 
The proponents of PET are ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  
admitting t h a t  they requi re  such tech- 
niques because they have poor assurance 
of the  manufacturing and design.  
The opponents of PET i n s i s t  t h a t ,  
"Contractors determine appropriate  environ- 
mental conditions,  t e s t  t o  f a i l u r e  ade- 
quate samples of R&D (and l a t e r  production) 
hardware i n  these environments, and dem- 
ons t r a t e  the exis tence of adequate s a f e t y  
margins . " ** 
*Christian,D.B.,"Human At t i tudes  and Re- 
l i a b i l i t y , " l 9 5 9  Northeast E lec t ronics  Re- 
search and Engineering Meeting 
**Henderson, George A .,  he Fal lacy  of PET 
A s  a Qua l i t y  Control Technique," S ix th  
J o i n t  Mil i tary-Industry Guided Missi le  Re- 
l i a b i l i t y  Symposium, 1960 
This wri ter  i s  of the opinion that  
the  evaluation must be performed ear ly  i n  
the  program. In  the words of Alexander 
Mood, "The heart  of a r e l i a b i l i t y  program 
f o r  a complex mechanism is  ear ly  detection 
of design weaknesses by the performance 
and analysis  of environmental t e s t  experi- 
ments on prototype o r  p i l o t  models of 
major pa r t s  of the mechanism. Such a pro- 
gram must be carried out jo int ly  by de- 
s ign  engineers, experts i n  environmental 
t e s t i ng  and s t a t i s t i c i a n s  thoroughly 
versed i n  the practice of experimental de- 
sign; it must be completed before the on- 
s e t  of the scheduled production."* 
It has been shown over and over tha t  
the  problems observed i n  most evaluation 
programs a re  the same ones observed dur- 
ing  production. Three years ago I said, 
"If design and environmental t e s t ing  a re  
not performed i n  the ear ly  prototype phase 
of a program, the design problems w i l l  
confront production personnel throughout 
the  program. Temporary f i xe s  or  l iv ing  
with the problems w i l l  not solve them. We 
cannot close our eyes and hope f o r  design 
f a u l t s  t o  s i l e n t l y  fade away."** 
Time appears as the c r i t i c a l  parameter 
because of the accelerat ion of our complex 
missi le programs. I am famil iar  with one 
program i n  which s t a t i s t i c a l  evaluation 
w a s  u t i l i z ed  i n  the design phase. This 
evaluation did pay off . 
Time has been used i n  that  we have, i n  
the Mod 111 F/G Vibration Evaluation Pro- 
gram, made use of what was learned from 
the Verif icat ion Program. But t o  be more 
effect ive  we must reduce the time delays. 
The planners must be completely aware,not 
only of what t h e i r  objectives are, but of 
what has been done i n  the f i e l d  and of 
what the major questions tha t  ex i s t  a re .  
And they must plan so  t ha t  we can get  
c loser  t o  the answers. It is then t h e i r  
responsibi l i ty  t o  make known t h e i r  re-  
s u l t s  whether success o r  f a i l u r e .  
Every system-evaluation program tha t  
I have been re la ted  t o  o r  have observed 
has shown def in i t e  character is t ics .  The 
f a i l u r e s  t ha t  exist are  s imi lar  to the 
ones tha t  w i l l  o r  have plagued you i n  pro- 
duction. They a l l  stem from the same be- 
havior pattern.  It i a  essen t ia l  t o  de- 
termine t h i s  pa t t e rn  i n  a new equipment 
program as  ea r ly  a s  possible. What Mood 
sa id  above is t rue .  If we are  t o  g.et off 
our merry-go-round, our evaluations must 
ex i s t  and must s t a r t  as soon as  possible. 
Their scope must be determined, not by 
custom, blindness, o r  naive planning, but 
by intel l igence,  ingenuity, and daring. 
* Northeast Electronics Research and En- 
gineering Meeting, ( ~ o o d  see footnote as 
quoted by D. B. ~ h r i s t i a n )  
** Ibid 

THE SUCCESSFUL APPLICATION OF A REPEATED TEST-TO-FAILURE PROGRAM 
ON SERGEANT MISSILE ASSEMBLIES 
The purpose of this pape tion. This test program was desig 
Sperry Utah Company test philosophy and the re- into effect to assess the capabilities of the 
sults of a reliability test program, which led to Engineering Model to meet its expected environ- 
the achievement of many of the reliability goals ment, including allowance for variations in 
of the Sergeant System, .environmental extremes. The program included re- 
liability tests as well as type approval envi- 
The tests discussed are the results of the ronmental tests. The Sperry Utah approach to 
practical application of a test-to-failure pro- reliability testing utilizes a repeated test-to- 
gram based upon Latin square and regression failure model to verify quantitatively the 
analysis models, The statistical theory was pre- ability to the system to satisfy the number one 
sented in a Sperry Utah paper by Dave White at military characteristic, reliability. The type 
the Sixth Joint Military-Industry Guided Missile approval tests determine assembly design limita- 
Reliability Symposium at El Paso in 1960~1 tions. 
Early in the R & D program the reliability The test program is discussed in three 
efforts were directed primarily to component parts, Part I discusses the testing aspects 
evaluation, As the R & D program progressed and whereas Part I1 discusses the mathematical anal- 
production hardware became available the emphasis ysis aspects, and Part I11 discusses the con- 
was placed on assembly and subassembly evalua- clusion and recommendation, 
PART I. THE DESIGN, APPLICATION, AND RESULTS OF THE COMBINED OPERATING TEMPERATURE 0 
VIBRATION TEST FOR MISSILE ASSEMBLIES RELIABILITY 
&st Philosovhv 
Richard H. Brashear Jr., Principal Engineer 
Sperry Utah Company 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Sperry Utah's reliability test program in- 
corporates repeated tests-to-failure in addition 
to the type-approval tests. Sperry Utah defines 
type-approval tests as being environmental tests 
to a specified level whereas reliability tests 
extend to several environmental levels and in- 
volve sample sizes large enough to ensure statis- 
tical confidence. Type approval tests are con- 
ducted for non-cumulative types of environments 
with respect to reliability degradation* Non- 
cumulative environments ar,e defined as those 
which occur in the normal course of use and which 
can be offset by proper design, i.e., transporta- 
tion and operation altitude, sand and dust, salt 
spray, rain, storage, temperature, humidity, 
fungus, and static acceleration, Repeated tests- 
to failure are conducted for environments con- 
sidered to be cumulative, i.e,, those attendant 
on normal use and which result in wearout or 
aging of the equipment. Examples of cumulative 
environments are transportation vibrations, shock 
due to bench handling and drops, hot and cold 
operating temperature, and operating vibration, 
Test Proqram 
The repeated test-to-failure program was de- 
signed to facilitiate from a minimum sample size 
a statistical analysis of mean-life data to pros 
duce such flight reliability parameters as 90- 
percent confidence limits, maximum safe operating 
level (MSOL), and average strength. Consequent- 
ly, a simulated flight environment consisting of 
ambient temperature and random vibratiqn was im- 
posed concurrently upon each of three test sam- 
ples. Each missile assembly type was tested at 
three different vibration levels and in three 
mutually perpendicular vibration planes. 
The general plan was to test each of the 
three test assemblies until six failures were 
observed on each assembly (a total of two fail- 
ures per test level) or until each assembly was 
subjected to 90 minutes of vibration. (10 
minutes per plane for each of three discrete 
vibration levels), The sequence of planes, 
stress levels, and test environments is discuss- 
ed below. 
Table 1-1 shows a typical Latin square de- 
sign used with each type of assembly. The three 
vibration tape levels, V1, V2, and Vg, are 
applied to the three assemblies in the order in- 
dicated in the table. During the test, the 
assemblies are operating and their performances 
are monitored. If a failure occurs, a repair is 
effected and the test resumed. In practice, 
three test patterns occurred: two failures; one 
failure and survival to the time limit; and no 
failure and survival to the time limit, The X Y Z  
notation under V1 denotes the vibration plane 
(corresponding to the missile roll, yaw, and 
pitch axes) ordering for the application of Table 1-2 shows the temperatures both re- 
uibratian. For example, assembly NQ. 1 at the V1 corded and selected for the reliability test. 
level was vibrated for 10 minutes in the X' plane, 
10 minutes in the Y plane, and 10 minutes in the 
Z plane, ,provided no failures occurred. Table 1-2 
I. 
Table 1-1 
Latin Square Test Design 
Assembly No. Vibration Level Temperature 
1 v1 v2 v3 T1 " 
X Y Z  m MY 
2 "2 v3 Vl T1 
MY xn mx 
3 "3 Vl "2 T1 
M[ ZXY xn 
The procedure for assemblies Nos. 2 and 3 is 
essentially the same except that the order of vi- 
bration differs. The test levels are proportional 
to the flight levels specified for each missile 
assembly. 
Program limitations for the Sergeant dic- 
tated testing at one temperature level only, T1, 
therefore, the temperature level selected was 
biased high to ensure a conservative reliability 
estimate. 
One advantage of the Latin square design 
selected is that wearout effects in the equip- 
ment can be isolated. Significantly, the test 
results indicated that equipment wearout was 
negligible for Sergeant missile assemblies. 
Test E n v i r d  
The selection of critical temperature and 
vibration test levels was based on a study of the 
prescribed Military Characteristics (MC's), field 
operation tests, and an analysis of R & D missile 
firings of the Sergeant. This evaluation showed 
that the critioal missile temperature environment 
resulted from desert conditions encountered dur- 
ing checkout and countdown. Consequently, during 
an actual flight missile cooling rather than 
heating occurred. 
The assembly ambient temperature was deter- 
mined from controlled environmental tests made on 
the Sergeant at Jet Propulsion Laboratory and at 
Sperry ~tah. During the tests the missile was 
subjected to the high temperature MC requirement 
of 125OF ambient plus solar radiation of 360 
~n]/ft*/hr for 4 hours a day with the assemblies 




Missile Assembly Tests ( F) Temperature 
Guidance Platform 137 145 
Control Assembly 131 140 
Guidance Computer 134 145 
Akming Computer 130 140 
Arming Platform 130 140 
Frequency Regulator 151 160 
Motor-Generator 156 165 
Control Surface 180 180 
Actuator 
Antenna Assembly 180 180 
Interconnecting Box 180 180 
Cable Assembly 180 180 
J 
The most severe actual vibration environment 
of the missile in flight results from the drag- 
brakes being extended into the air stream. For 
some assemblies this vibration is quite severe. 
Formerly, the mean extreme vibration environment 
of the missile was defined by the random vibra- 
tion (noise) as measured at the Standard location 
(a monitoring point located on the primary 
structure at the root of the dragbrake). How- 
ever, each missile assembly experiences different 
vibration inputs during flight caused by differ- 
ences in mounting and local resonance of the 
guidance section structure. Thus it was apparent 
that use of a standard tape was imposing un- 
necessary design restrictions on some assemblies 
as well as biasing reliability estimates too con- 
servatively. As a result, Sperry Utah instituted 
a program to determine the in-flight vibration 
environment of the guidance assemblies and 
synthesize a realistic test for each assembly. 
Because the test philosophy1 dictated a con- 
stant rms vibration level all pertinent vibration 
parameters, i.e. bandwidth, peak level, and rms 
level were easily controlled. Random noise with 
the desired power-spectral-density shape was re- 
corded on magnetic tape which was then used to 
provide input excitation for the test. The 
desired vibration level was maintained at the 
shaker by a gain control in the shaker control 
consoleo Thus, vibration level was independent 
of the noise level recorded on the test tape. 

The noise was shaped by passing "whitee noise 
through the  peak-notch equalizing c i rcu i t ry  i n  
the shaker control console. The t ransfer  func- 
t ion  of the  a i r cu i t ry  was adjusted u n t i l  the  out- 
put power-spectral-density shape agreed with 
measured in-flight vibration. [In Par t  I1 of 
t h i s  paper, several figures a r e  presented showing 
plots  of f l i g h t  vibration and time.) The output 
power-spectral-density from the  equalization 
c i rcu i t ry  is equal t o  the  product of the  input 
power-spectral-density and the  square of the 
system transfer  function. Since the input power- 
spectral-density was constant with respect t o  
frequency (white noise), the  shape of the output 
power-spectral-density was proportional t o  w e  
square of t he  t ransfer  function. 
pffect ina the  Test  
All t e s t  assemblies were mounted i n  t h e i r  
appropriate shaker tab le  adapting f ixtures  and 
then given an 8 hour pre-$oak a t  t e s t  temperature. 
The t e s t  equipment .consisted of an MB Mfg. Co. 
C-200 vibration exci ter  (20,000 k b  n s  force 
class)  used i n  conjunction with a 90 kilowatt 
power amplifier and control console capable of 
generating t he  random voltages required. Two 
planes of shake (Y and 2 )  a lso  required the  use 
of a Wylie Model WM-450 o i l  f i lm table. Tem- 
peratures were mkintained by a Wylie Model 
TC-10% temperature control ler  used i n  conjunc- 
t i on  with a Sperry Utah b u i l t  portable tem- 
perature hood. Before the  t e s t  was s e t  up, an 
o i l  fi lm tab le  was pre-heated under a temperature 
hood fo r  30 t o  45 minutes. When the  temperature 
soak was completed, t he  t e s t  assembly and f ix ture  
were removed from the  temperature chamber and 
mounted on t he  o i l  f i lm table  i n  a s  short a time 
as  possible (2 t o  3 min). The temperature hood 
with t he  specimen inside was mounted again on the 
o i l  fi lm tab le  and the required cabeling and t e s t  
accelerometers were connected t o  the assembly. 
See f igure r-1. To eliminate f i x tu r e  effects ,  
t he  t e s t  accelerometers were mounted on the t e s t  
specimen rather  than on the fixture. The system 
acceleration voltage t ransfer  function between 
the  specimen and the exci ter  power supply was 
equalized over t he  desired frequency band. This 
process took from 20 minutes t o  1 hour and allow- 
ed enough time f o r  the  t e s t  assembly t o  reach 
temperature equilibrium before t he  shake t e s t  
began. After equalization, the  t e s t  specimens 
were subjected t o  random vibration levels,  a s  
specified i n  t he  Latin square process, f o r  the 
prescribed times o r  un t i l  a f a i l u r e  was indicated. 
&p&& Failure u e a  and Corrective Act iw 
Four typical  fa i lu res  a re  discussed t o  
i l l u s t r a t e  t he  types of fa i lu re  modes and areas 
of corrective act ion encountered i n  t he  tests .  
The fa i lu res  discussed represent an engineering 
design fai lure ,  a vendor component quality con- 
t r o l  deficiency, a vendor component design 
deficiency, and a workmanship defecto 
Fresuency Regulator (Enaineerincl desiqn 
f a i l u r e L  Of greatest  importance was t he  re- 
peated f a i l u r e  of two ident ical  capacitors i n  the 
motor-f i e l d  drive subassembly of t he  f requency 
regulator. The capacitors a re  60 mfd, 30 vo l t  
tantalum capacitors. This component alone 
accounted fo r  f i ve  assembly fa i lu res  and ten  com- 
ponent failures.  The principle modes of f a i l u r e  
dere ei ther  f ractur ing of the  tantalum lead be- 
tween the  tantalum slug and t he  sea l  washer o r  a 
seal breakage resul t ing i n  the loss  of elec- 
t rolyte .  See figures 1-2 and 1-3. 
One of the  main causes of t h i s  f a i l u r e  was 
the  packaging design. It was shown t h a t  the  re- 
sonant frequency and the subsequent exci tat ion 
amplification a t  the f a i l u r e  location occurred a t  
the same frequency, see figure 1-4, Consequently 
the  capacitors were subjected t o  a sever-ely in- 
creased vibration environment. It is possible 
t h a t  with 15 g rms of vibration excitation, cap- 
aci tor  environment was i n  excess of 58 g rms gwer 
the  frequency spectrum with instantaneous peaks 
of 200 g occurring infrequently. Because these 
s t r e s s  levels  exceed the f a l l i ng  component's 
environmental specification a design modification 
was required. 
Sperry Utah redesigned the c i r c u i t  board t o  
reduce the  t o t a l  resonance condition and suggest- 
ed further component redesign changes t o  the  
vendor. 
Guidance Platform (Vendor component qual i ty  
control deficiency). A different  mode of 
f a i l u r e  occurred a f t e r  20 seconds of o ~ e r a t i o n  of 
a guidance platform a t  5 g rms vibration. A 1 
mfd tef lon aapacitor i n  the  yaw preampl i f ie r  in- 
tegrator  had fa i led  because of insuff icient  
d i e l ec t r i c  terminal wrapping. Analysis of the 
component revealed t h a t  an inserted t ab  lead had 
pierced the  te f lon  d ie lec t r ic  and shorted one 
winding, It was also found t h a t  the two 0.5 mfd 
windings were insuff icient ly restrained i n  the  
"bathtubn case by te f lon  waste thus allowing 
excessive l a t e r a l  movement. The f a i l u r e  mode was 
classed as. vendor quality control defect since 
considerable e f fo r t  was expended with t he  vendor 
ear ly i n  the  program t o  e f fec t  a capacitor design 
consistent with Sergeant environmental require- 
ments. See figures 1-5 and 1-6. 
Control Surface Actuator (Vendor component 
desian). The Sergeant" control surface actua- 
t o r  assembly was vibrated i n  the X plane a t  20 g 
nns. After 36 seconds of vibration a 10 kilohm 
telemetry potentiometer wiper intermit tent ly 
l i f t e d  off t he  pot and caused a noisy output. An 
investigation showed tha t  the wiper support s l i p -  
ped l a t e r a l l y  on the control shaft. The support 
was positioned on the  shaft by bonding. The 
vendor has since improved t he  potentiometer de- 
sign by adding spacers between the three wiper 
assemblies t o  preclude slippage of the  wipers. 
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occurred on a non-tactical component the failure compared against the standard performance times. 
was not considered pertinent in the statistical The test philosophy dictates 30 minutes of vibra- 
evaluation of the reliability indice for this tion per test level if no failures occur, To 
assembly. utilize existing test equipment the assembly was 
subjected to repeated simulated flights of 90 
seconds. The computer was rezeroed and the para- 
ly meters were reinserted between flights, until a 
of the missile consists of two DOVAP antennas* failure occurred or the testing time was com- 
The receiving antenna (36.9 mc) detects ground- pleted. The control assembly tests were conduct- 
transmitted signals which are then amplified, ed in a similar manner. Satisfactory test re- 
doubled in frequency, and retransmitted to the sults were obtained but the test setup time was 
ground by means of the transmitting antenna excessive, 
(73.8 mc), The function of the DOVAP 15 t o  aid 
in establishing velocity and position information Determination of Failures. The determina- 
of the missile during flight. Two of the three tion of catastrophic failures during the flight 
NE quadrant antenna assemblies failed because the mode was not difficult but the determination of 
36.9 mc and 73.8 mc terminating capacitors were non-catastrophic failures in some cases presented 
short-circuited in their mounting block assembly, problems, For example, the Bell Accelerometer 
See figures 1-9 and 1-10, utilized in the Sergeant guidance platform is de- 
signed with a noise threshold limitiation of 
These failures occurred because poor in- approximately 15 g. When this noise threshold 
stallation forced one of the capacitor leads to was reached, usually within one second of vibra- 
short against the capacitor case, The corrective tion at 15.9, the accelerometer outputs which 
action taken was to instruct the assembly person- were monitored as a pertinent performance para- 
nel in the proper assembly techniques and to in- meter saturated. The initial reaction from test 
scribe caution notes on drawings and operation personnel was that a platform failure had occurr- 
sheets, Most of the failure modes encountered ed, Although the problem was basically simple, a 
as a result of the combined operating temperature certain amount of analysis and discussion was re- 
vibration environment were failure modes that had quired within the Engineering groups to validate 
not been observed on earlier type-approval and the classification of the failure and its treat- 
flight acceptance tests, ment during the rest of the tests. The treat- 
ment was to ignore the accelerometer performance 
Test Problems at the higher vibration level test, It is in- 
teresting to note that Sergeant guidance plat- 
Four problems are discussed to illustrate form performance at the higher vibration levels 
the type of test problems encountered in effect- exceeded expectations. This performance led 
ing the program for the first time, Engineering to conclude that after quality con- 
trol type defects, (i.e., the capacitor construc- 
Esuipment (beratins Mode, The Sergeant tion failure previously discussed) have been re- 
missile is designed for maximum-flight time of solved the guidance platform is quite reliable 
approximately 200 seconds. During this time, relative to its complexity, 
the guidance computer, an analog computer, per- 
forms the following functions: No-Failure Problem, The test philosophy 
was based on the assumption that failures would 
(lj Computes missile deviations from the occur during tests. Prior to testing Engineer- 
programmed trajectory during the initial ing did not assume that any missile assemblies 
period of flight and provides correc- would show no failures. This *failure will 
tion signals to maintain the missile on occurn view was held not because of pessimism or 
the correct trajectory, lack of confidence in the equipment design but 
rather from the consideration that the tempera- 
(2) Computes missile deviations from the ture-vibration environment over the limit was 
standard range position during the extreme. Because some missile assemblies did not 
flight and provides signals for drag- fail during the tests a different statistical 
brake closure commands for vernier model had to be developed to replace the Latin 
range control, and the final phase Square repeated test-to-failure philosophy to 
maneuver. preclude biasing the reliability indices too con- 
servatively, The extension of this statistical 
(3) Provides a warhead arming permit theory is discussed in Part I1 of this paper, 
command when the missile is within pre- 
scribed range and azimuth bounds. Ooerations Problems. In evaluating the test 
program itself, major difficulties were apparent 
To test the guidance computer functionally, in obtaining and maintaining the test equipment, 
a standard trajectory is simulated by test equalizing the vibration system for the parituclar 
equipment but the standard flight time is com- noise tapes, and changing equipment to conform 
pressed to a 90 second period, During this sim- with the randomization pattern for test specimens 
ulated flight, functional parameters such as in- and vibration planes imposed by the Latin Square 
tegration and cross-over time are monitored and design. However the tests were facitilated 

through scheduling environmental tests only when 
three working assemblies of each type were avail- 
able and utilizing the pre-soak temperature 
chamber to condition the assemblies. The in- 
stitution of the pre-soak chamker effected a con- 
siderable reduction in environmental test time 
and the number of shaker plane changes. It was 
generally concluded that the test and vibration 
equipment itself had more reliability limitations 
than did the Sergeant hardware under test. 
In a test program of this magnitude, provid- 
ing an adequate supply of spare parts for failed 
assemblies in a time frame consistent with the 
schedule requirements constitutes a significant 
problem. Sperry Utah attempted to resolve this 
difficulty by predicting in advance failure modes, 
using production parts for repairs and by re- 
stocking parts as they were used. Typically, 
many predioted failures: did not occur while many 
non-predi cted minor component f ailuies did occur 
thus causing repair part pro'curement problems. 
The author has no particular recommendation for 
improvement here as replacement parts coverage 
for a reliability test program should be evaluat- 
ed with respect to overall program cost and 
schedule limitations. 

PART IT. STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES APPLIED TO THE SERGEANT REPEATED TEST-TO-FAILURE PROGRAM 
Larry Blundell ,  Research Engineer 
Sperry Utah Company 
S a l t  Lake Ci ty ,  Utah 
Lat in  Square 
The design of t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  t e s t  program Table 11-2 Lat in  Square - Control Surface Actuatur 
and t h e  ana lys i s  is based upon t h e  following 
s t a t i s t i c a l  model. Three u n i t s  were t e s t e d  a t  
each of t h r e e  d i f f e r e n t  v ib ra t ion  s t r e s s  l e v e l s  
f o r  a period of 30 minutes unless  a f a i l u r e  
occurred p r i o r  t o  30 minutes. I f  a f a i l u r e  oc- 
curred,  t h e  f a u l t y  u n i t  was repai red  and r e t e s t e d  
f o r  another 30 minutes under t h e  same qua l i f i ca -  
t i on .  I f  no f a i l u r e  occurred during t h e  second 
30-minute t e s t  period, a conservative es t imate  of 
t ime t o  f a i l u r e  was assumed t o  be 30 minutes. 
The order i n  which t h e  s t r e s s  l eve l s ,  (g )  
were applied t o  t h e  items is  shown i n  t h e  3 x 3 
Lat in  Square i n  t a b l e s  IT-1, 2, and 3. An es- 
t ima te  f o r  t h e  mean l i f e ,  which i s  d i f f e r e n t  f o r  
each s t r e s s  l eve l  a t  which t h e  u n i t  is t e s t ed ,  is  








Order of S t r e s s  Application 






T$ = t o t a l  time f o r  which t h e  J t h  u n i t  has 
been s t r e s sed  a t  t h e  9 t h  s t r e s s  
l eve l  applied,  and a t  a l l  previous 
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K = p o s i t i v e  in t ege r  
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Order of S t r e s s  Application 
Estimates f o r  t h e  mean l i f e  a r e  shown i n  minutes 
i n  t h e  Lat in  square i n  t a b l e s  11-1, 2, and 3, 
Table 11-1. Lat in  Square - Frequency Regulator 
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1 5  g 
7.5 min 








To t e s t  f o r  t h e  exis tence  of wearout e f f ec t s ,  
it is necessary t o  ad jus t  t he  mean l i f e  by vary- 
ing K. I f  t h e  mean l i f e  i s  estimated c o r r e c t l y  
f o r  each s t r e s s  l eve l ,  then t h e  estimated mean 
l i f e  f o r  a given s t r e s s  l eve l  w i l l  be approx- 
imately t h e  same whether or  not  t h e  u n i t  had been 
t e s t e d  previously. Where wearout e f f e c t s ,  o r  age 
e f f e c t s ,  a r e  successful ly  compensated fo r ,  t he re  
w i l l  be no s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f ferences  between t h e  
average values f o r  each of t h e  columns i n  the  
Latin square, I f  K is too l a rge  ( too much in- 
f luence given t o  age), then each mean l i f e  w i l l  
be overestimated. Since t h e  magnitude of t h e  
e r r o r  i s  r e l a t e d  t o  wearout, t he  columns t o  t h e  
r i g h t  i n  t h e  Lat in  square should be progressively 
larger .  I f  K i s  too small, ( too  l i t t l e  influence 
Assembly 
Number 
Order of S t r e s s  Application 
1 






15  g 
8 min 
10 g 
1 5  m i m  






given t o  age), then each mean l i f e  w i l l  be under- 
estimated. A s  before, t he  e r ror  is  related t o  
age, but now the  estimates, and hence the column 
averages, w i l l  be progressively smaller. 
The proper value of K was determined by an 
analysis of variance ( table  11-43 i n  which the 
natural logarithm of the  mean l i f e  was used i n  
the  square. From the  information shown i n  tab le  
11-5, a value of uni ty is the  best  estimate for  K. 
Table I14 h a l y s i s  of Variance 
An average of the  three estimates for  the mean 
l i f e  a t  each s t r e s s  level  was computed. These 
values were substituted in to  equation (2), which 
was expanded i n  a Taylor's se r ies  about i n i t i a l  
estimates f o r  A and B. The resul t ing values f o r  
A and B were used as  new estimates i n  the Taylor's 
expansion. The i te ra t ion  was continued un t i l  t he  
desired accuracy was obtained. Values fo r  A and 
B determined by t h i s  method a re  shown i n  tab le  
IT-4, column 2. 
Source of Variation 
SS due t o  age e f f ec t  
=A 
SS due t o  s t r e s s  e f fec t s  
sss 
SS due t o  d i f fe ren t  un i t s  
ssu 
Error SS - S!+ 
Total SS - S% 
A second estimate fo r  A and B was obtained 
by taking the natural logarithin of Yhe average .of 
the  mean l i f e  f o r  a given s t r e s s  level  and f i t t -  
ing a curve by standard l inear  regression anal- 
ysis. These values a re  shown i n  column 1 of 
table  11-6. 





































-TK E- (AS + B )  
r e l i a b i l i t y  n E 
Column 1 
The average strength i s  defined a s  t ha t  s t r e s s  
level f o r  which the  r e l i a b i l i t y  of the item i s  
0.50 when tes ted  for  a time period T. Si- 
s t i t u t i ng  0.50 for  the r e l i a b i l i t y  i n  equation 
(3), we have the  following expression fo r  t he  
















The r e l i a b i l i t y  boundary, F, i s  the  extreme 
s t r e s s  leve l  sustained by the equipment under 
service conditions. The safety margin, defined 
as  the  number of standard deviations which 
separate the average strength from the  r e l i ab i l -  


























AS +sit where 8 = E  (2) 
,2 = residual variance a r i s ing  from the  
where estimates of A and B. 
S = vibrat ion s t r e s s  level  
A,B = constants 
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If  the  r e l i a b i l i t y  i n  equation (31 i s  0,95, 
t h e  corresponding s t r e s s ,  S, i s  defined a s  the  
maximum s a f e  operating l eve l  (NISOL). The 95- 
percent lower confidence bound f o r  the  MSOL is 
given by 1 
1T 
where 
= i s  the  value i n  the  "V t ab les  a t  
t h e  95 percent l eve l  with one 
degree of freedom, and 
- 
2 
H = [a? (Co + C1 SL + C2 sf;/ 
Graphs of the  average strength,  sa fe ty  mar- 
gin, and MSOL fo r  the  frequency regulator  used i n  
the  Sergeant miss i l e  a re  shown i n  f igures  11-1, 
11-2, and 11-3, respectively.  Corresponding 
graphs f o r  t h e  control surface actuator  and the  
arming computer a r e  shown i n  f igures  11-4 through 
11-9 
F l i a h t  R e l i a b i l i t v  
I f  t h e  s t r e s s e s  during f l i g h t , q ,  a r e  ex- 
pressed a s  a functionLof time, then 
where 
T = time of f l i g h t  
A graph showing t h e  in-f l ight  s t r esses , tp ,  f o r  
the  c r i t i c a l  v ibrat ion ax i s  of the  frequency re- 
gula tor  i s  shown i n  f igure  11-10. Corresponding 
graphs f o r  the  control surface actuator  and the  
arming computer a r e  shown i n  f igures  11-11 and 
11-12, respectively.  The f l i g h t  r e l i a b i l i t y  was 
determined by integrat ing equation (7) with the 
s t r e s s  a s  shown i n  f igures  11-10, 11, and 12. 
The f l i g h t  r e l i a b i l i t y  corresponding t o  the  two 
d i f f e r e n t  estimates f o r  A and B is  shown i n  t a b l e  
11-7. 
Table 11-7 Fl ight  R e l i a b i l i t y  
Fl ight  R e l i a b i l i t y  
Assembly 
( A  and B a re  taken from tab le  11-6) 
Column 1 Column 2 
Frequency 0.9916 0.9915 
Regulator 
Control 0.9867 0.9876 
Surf ace 
Actuator 
Arming 0.9862 0.9812 
Computer 
Assemblies Havinq No Fai lures  
The motor-generator, interconnecting box, 
cable assembly, and antenna were t e s t e d  t o  the 
Latin square design. The v ib ra t ion  l eve l s  f o r  
the motor-generator were 5, 10, and 15 g. The 
interconnecting box, cable assembly, and antenna 
were t e s ted  a t  10, 15, and 20 g. 
Because there  were no f a i l u r e s  a t  any of the  
s t r e s s  applications,  t h e  Lat in  square model could 
not be used. In  view of t h i s  f a c t ,  the  f l i g h t  
r e l i a b i l i t y  was determined a s  follows: 
Let t h e  probabi l i ty  of success be E, where x 
is equally l i k e l y  t o  have any of the  values 0, 1, 
2, 3 ... m. The chance t h a t  the  f i r s t  n t r i a l s  
should a l l  be successful is 
When the  event described by equation (8) has 
taken place, then x # 0. The respect ive  pro- 
b a b i l i t i e s  t h a t  x has the  values 1, 2, ... m 
become 
and the  chance of success a t  t h e  (n + 1 ) t h  t r i a l  
i s  
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When the  numerator and denominator of equation 
(11) a re  divided by m, the  denominator can be 
m i t t e n  a s  
S t a t i s t i c a l  Limitation 
The 95-percent upper and lower confidence 
bounds f o r  the  MSOL form a hyperbola whose 
asymptotes i n t e r s e c t  a t  the  means f o r  t h e  time 
and s t ress .  Only the  95-percent lower confidence 
bounds a re  shown i n  the  f igures  f o r  the  MSOL. A s  
the  sample s i z e  increases,  t h e  s lopes  of the  
a'symptotes approach the  slope of t h e  regression 
l ine .  In  f a c t ,  f o r  large samples the  confidence 
bounds a re  approximately p a r a l l e l  with the  re- 
gression l ine .  
where B1, Bp. . . = Bernoul l ies  numbers. For small samples the  hyperbolic nature of 
t h e  confidence bounds is  grea t ly  exaggerated, 
r e f l e c t i n g  the  lack of confidence a t  t h e  ends of 
Equation (12) can be rewri t ten a s  t h e  s t r e s s  in tervals .  For the previously dis-  
cussed assemblies t h i s  l imi ta t ion  i s  apparent. 
1 
- + terms involving negative (13) 
+ powers of m 
Therefore, i f  m is  increased without bound, 
Expanding the  numerator of equation (10) i n  the  
same manner and l e t t i n g  m increase without bound 
gives 
Hence the  chance of success a t  t h e  Cn + 1 ) t h  
n + l  
t r i a l  is -
n + 2  
A t  the  95-percent level ,  t h e  value of n i s  18. 
Each item was t e s ted  f o r  a t o t a l  time of 90 
minutes; hence an extimate fo r  t h e  mean time t o  
f a i l u r e  is 95 minuteso 
The f l i g h t  environments f o r  the  motor- 
generator, interconnecting box, cable assembly, 
and antenna a r e  shown i n  figuresI3-13 through 
11-16, respectively.  Based upon t h e  Poisson dis- 
t r ibu t ion  and an expectation of 0.003, t h e  f l i g h t  
r e l i a b i l i t y  is approximately 0.997. (see  f igure  
11-17 f o r  se lected values from the  Poisson dis- 
tr ibution.)  
FNRT I 11. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The basic statistical test philosophy prwed 
to be readily adaptable to practical test applica- 
tion on Sergeant missile assemblies. - 1 1 -  
I 1  
To preclude biasing reliability indices too 
conservatively for 'ho-failure* type assemblies 
it was necessary to develop a new statistical 
analysis. 
Results of the test indicated that Sergeant 
missile assemblies are not subject to wearout 
effects from the environmental tests. 
The repeated test-to-failure program iden- 
tified design, component, and quality control 
type defects that were not discovered by previous 
type-approval and flight acceptance test pro- 
gramso 
The computed in-flight reliability calculated 
from the repeated test-to-failure program agreed 
with the reliability as demonstrated in the R 8 D 
missile flight test program* 
lo Mite, D., Operational?' Reliability and 
Maximum Safe Operating Levels for Expensive 
Equipment, Rooeedinq Sixth Joint 
Milftary-Industry Guided Missile Reliability 
Symposium, presented February 15-17, 1960, 
El. Faso, Texas. 
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David E. Van Tijn 
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Summary 
Cost predictions for weapons systems 
are based on the same general principles, 
and developed by the same general tech- 
niques, as reliability predictions for 
equipments. Theref ore, the step-by-step 
procedure for developing a mathematical 
model for cost allocation -- on which the 
cost predictions are based -- is analogous 
to the well-established procedures for 
developing reliability allocation models, 
This paper presents a sequential set of 
rules for establishing a cost model, ex- 
emplified by application to an actual Air 
Force weapons system. 
The model developed for a particular 
support system will allocate the various 
expenditures for the equipment being sup- 
ported. Expenditures fall within the cat- 
egories of Investment, Manpower, Supplies, 
and Time. 
A discussion of the theory behind 
cost allocation and predictions precedes 
the presentation of the rules for develop- 
ment of a cost model. 
Introduction 
Cost predictions for the support of 
weapons systems are evolved in much the 
same manner as reliability predictions for 
equipments. The three basic data-inputs 
to each are of the same general nature. A 
reliability prediction considers (a) char- 
acteristics of parts, (b) the collective 
functioning of parts, and (c) the effects 
of part variations on the equipment as a 
whole. A cost prediction considers (a) 
actions of individual personnel, (b ) f ea- 
tures of the weapons system support organ- 
ization, and (c) the skill of support per- 
sonnel, as reflected in organizational 
efficiency. 
This analogy does not suggest that 
support costs are independent of equipment 
characteristi'cs, any more than reliability 
is independent of the properties of metals 
or of the dielectric behavior of insula- 
tors. However, just as failures occur 
when some basic quality of a material is 
changed out of tolerance, so costs are in- 
curred when someone performs an action -- 
fixes an equipment, purchases a part, etc. 
The analogy can be carried further. Major 
contributions of any reliability predic- 
tion (in the course of its development) 
are the detection of design features which 
may tend to make the equipment prone to 
failure, and the location of areas in. . 
which redundancy can be employed to advan- 
tage. Similarly, cost studies will bring 
out improved methods of organizational 
controls. Evaluation of the cost of each 
support action will focus attention upon 
those organizational features and standard 
operating procedures which incur more than 
their fair share of costs. 
A final parallel between reliability 
and cost is in the methodology one employs 
in the study process. The reliability of 
an equipment depends upon its detailed 
structurej for this reason, the related 
prediction theory consists of a series of 
instructions which, for a given equipment, 
will outline how to construct its relia- 
bility model. Likewise, one can follow a 
documented procedure for constructing a 
cost function for a given. support organi- 
zation. The inputs to a cost prediction 
are the costs of actione, materials,. and 
personnel, and the frequency with which 
the equipment forces support action. 
At this point, the cost analyst di- 
verges from the reliability engineer. The 
actions of men which the former must ob- 
serve are carried out in the open, and 
sophisticated systems exist for keeping 
track of relevant events. Therefore, cost 
analysis is more a problem of handling 
of the information generated in the oper- 
ation of a support organization than a 
problem of conducting basic research. For 
the reliability engineer this situation 
would be analogous to having an oscillo- 
scope hooked up to every wire, a micro- 
meter to every wearing surface, etc. From 
this point of view, a cost analyst is in- 
deed in a fortuna;te situation. 
From another point of view he is not 
so fortunate. Although certain phases of 
the support organization can be observed 
in isolation, the only way in which the 
cost of the time which materials spend in 
the system can be accounted for is by ob- 
serving the system as a whole. 
The cost analyst has two further dis- 
advantages vis-a-vis the reliability engi- 
neer: 
(1) The data concerning on-the-job 
performance of personnel are 
also used by their superiors to 
evaluabe this performance, Hence the 
complete objectivity (and accuracy) 
of such data is dubious, at best] 
such data must always be investigated, 
and inaccuracies accounted for in the 
final results, 
( 2 )  Among the factors inflating the 
size of a supply system are the 
delay-times which occur between the 
different stages of the system. These 
delay-times must be assigned a cost, 
charged to the activity responsible 
for them. One way of doing this is 
by counting the flow of new purchases 
at critical points. However, the 
cost analysis may be complicated by a 
considerable amount of interdependence 
between the different parts of the 
support system, again postponing the 
full usefulness of the cost model. 
In the third section of this paper 
are listed some of the rules for con- 
structing cost models, exemplified by ap- 
plication to an actual Air Force support 
system. This presentation is preceded by 
a short identification of costs, and a 
discussion of the limitations of the pre- 
sent methodology. 
In the final section is given a brief 
review of the manner in which cost infor- 
mation developed by these rules can be 
useful in the decision-making processes 
of the services. 
Expenditure Headings 
A model developed for a particular 
support system will allocate the various 
expenditures for the equipment being sup- 
ported. The following paragraphs discuss 
what these expenditures are. 
Investment 
The ''~nvestment" category includes 
most of the fixed expenditures for bases 
and maintenance and supply facilities; 
and for the first cost of weapons and 
their initial stocks of supplies. In the 
new DOD costing procedure, this category 
does not include operating expenses. 
Therefore, no rules are given herein for 
allocating Investment expenses. 
Manpower 
This heading is important for two 
reasons: support personnel are in chron- 
ically short supply, and their pay and 
allowances constitute an expenditure 
equivalent to that for supplies and for 
the weapons themselves. 
-- direct, supervisory, managerial, and 
administrative -- within the support 
organizations. The men themselves have a 
support system that provides them with 
training, subsistence, re-enlistment bo- 
nuses, and retirement pay. This secondary 
support system will be reflected in the 
cost model as an increase in the cost of a 
man-hour's labor. The methods of computing 
this increase, and its size, will be left 
out of this account; the cost of a man- 
hourss labor in the different organiza- 
tions, ranks, and grades will be regarded 
as a parameter of the model. 
Supplies are the first source of ex* 
penditure coming to mind in the considera- 
tion of support costs. Supply costs form 
the third visible source of expenditure. 
Time 
-
Time-delays act to inflate the supply 
system. They contribute an invisible 
source of expenditure that must be charged 
to the responsible activity. 
Procedure for Constructing 
An Allocation Model 
A step-by-step procedure for develop- 
ing a cost-allocation model is presented 
in the following section. Application of 
the sequential see of rules will yield a 
model for making monthly estimates of the 
cost of supporting a particular weapon 
system. The cost will be distributed 
among the various units* of the system, 
with a residue left over for assignment to 
parts which cannot be rationally distrib- 
uted back to any particular units. The 
allocation takes the form, 
Total cost = Cost of unallocated 
parts + 1 (cost of 
units) (1 
The costs of units are further sub- 
divided into costs at different echelons; 
at each echelon, 
Cost of unit = Cost of equipment + 
Cost of maintenance 
+ Cost of supply. (2) 
The connection between echelons is 
made at two points: (1) the cost charged 
the lower echelon is dependent upon events 
at higher echelon: (2) some of the costs 
at the higher echelon arise from units 
charged back from lower echelons to cover 
--- - 
tion which allbcate all types of manpower EyaE:E ~~W~:~e~~'tem Or any of its iaentl- 
inventory inflation caused by increased 
lags in deliveries from the higher eche- 
lon. 
At each echelon, continuing from Equa- 
tion ( 2 ) ,  maintenance and supply costs 
are made up of manpower and material ex- 
penditures: 
Cost of maintenance = Cost of man- 
power f Cost 
of parts used 
in maintenance 
+ Cost of new 
units charged 
to maintenance. 
( 3  
Finally, the manpower cost has been 
derived in such a way that the contribu- 
tion of different organizational features 
and subdivisions to overhead is clearly 
established$ 
Manpower cost  overhead factors 
from different 
sources) (4)  
where the function, F, includes the organ- 
izational structure, and the f'actors 
represent the extent of overhead incurred 
in the overhead sources established by 
this organization. 
Allocation Rules 
As previously stated, the rules pre- 
sented in this section can be used to 
construct a cost allocation model which 
will account for most of the costs incur- 
red in the support of weapon systems. 
The rules are designed for piece-wise 
construction of a model, i.e., different 
parts of the support organization at dif- 
ferent echelons will be represented by 
different terms, The way the pieces are 
developed ensures maximum sensitivity to 
actual events, procedures, and organiza- 
tional features. 
Rule 1 
Every weapon system support organiza- 
tion will contain maintenance and supply 
systems, and usually several echelons of 
each. 
Draw a flow diagram representing the 
flow of parts and spares, and of repaira- 
ble and serviceable items between the 
various maintenance and supply organiza- 
tions. Be sure to note the time delays. 
Exampler The gross flow of 
parts and units on an Air 
Base is diagrammed in Figure 1. 
From the flow diagram, derive a for- 
mula which will have the form: 
Total Charge per echelon = Equip- 
ment charge + Maintenance 
charge + Supply charge (1) 
Note that Total Charge includes all units 
and parts, and all maintenance actions. 
The equipment charge represents, for ex- 
ample, the cost of condemned equipment, 
which cannot be ascribed to either organi- 
zation. With the aid of the diagram write 
for each term in each echelon an equation 
of the following form, where the terms and 
time-delays are identified with organiza- 
tions on the diagram. 
Maintenance Charge = Manpower charge 
+ Materials charge + Charge for 
time delays in the maintenance 
system. (2)  
and 
Supply Charge = Manpower charge 
+ Materials charge + Charge 
for time delays in supply 
system. (3 1 
Example (cont Id) : (a) In Figure 1, 
the delay in the base repair of 
units is marked (I), the delay in 
delivery of NRTS units to base 
supply is marked ( 2 ) . *  (b) The 
time  delay^ chargeable to supply 
in the example are the ones mark- 
ed (3), delivery of bad units, 
and (4) and (5) ,  which are delays 
in the ordering of new parts and 
units from depot. 
Rule 2 
Step 2.1 
Break down the manpower charges among 
the different units of the weapon system. 
This step represents a major effort 
for each term representing organizations. 
It has been accomplished for the mainte- 
nance manpower at air bases. A detailed 
description of the procedure is contained 
in References 2 and 3, A guide to per- 
forming this task is presented below. 
*The method of computing charges for 
time-delays is described in Rule 3. 
Step 2.1.1 
Obtain a detailed organlzation 'chart. 
Draw the flow of work assignment. Estab- 
lish which organizations support each 
unit, and which overhead functions support 
the direct labor in each sub-organization. 
Example (contld)r Figure 2 is a 
diagram of paat of a base mainte- 
nance organization. Figure 3 
diagrams the flow of men, materials, 
and control doc~ents at an Air 
Base. 
Step 2.1.2 
Estimate the amount of direct labor 
spent each month in each subdividion of 
the organization on each type unit (and 
type part, if it is a supply organiza- 
tion), Estimate the number of actions 
per month taken in support of each type 
unit. 
Bample (cont'd)? At an Air 
Base, the values mentioned in 
Step 2.1-2 are obtained from 
the AFM 664. Maintenance Data 
Card Sys tems . * 
Step 2.1.3 
Divide the overhead labor into two 
classes: (1) Administrative, which is 
incurred for each action, (2) Managerial, 
which is incurred for each man. 
Compute in each subdivision a per- 
action and per-manhour overhead time 
charge, as well as an overhead cost charge, 
using the information from Step 2.1 as to 
which actions benefit from particular 
overhead centers. 
Step 2.2 
Figure in the dollar-cost of man- 
-x At an Air 
Base these quantities are 
obtained from the AFM 66-1 
Exception Time Card System. 
Step 2.2.2 
Estimate the cost of an hour's labor 
in each category in each subdivision of 
the organization. 
Example (conttd)t A weighted 
average of the actual hourly 
pay in each Air Force work- 
center is available from the 
base records. 
Step 2.3 
Combine into manpower and dollar- 
charge s. 
Step 2.3.1 
After accumulating administrative- 
type charges between management levels, a 
series of overhead time and cost factors, 
representing the overhead incurred at dif- 
ferent levels for that subdivision, can 
be produced for each subdivision of the 
organization. This procedure yields, 
after accumulation, a listing for two 
levels of management, of the form 
Subdivision Admin. Mgmt . Admin, Mgmt . 
Time Time Time Time 
Identity a m at m' 
subdivision Admin. Mgmt. Admin, Mgmt. 
Oost Cost Cost Cost 
Identity c a cm car 
Subdivision Direct Labor 
Cost 
power. Identity 1 
Step 2.2.1 
Estimate the amount of overhead labor 
spent each month in each payclass and 
overhead labor category, in each subdivi- 
sion of the organization 
Example (conttd): At an Air 
Base, scheduling and motor 
vehicle time would be adrnin- 
istrative type charges, and 
management would *be a mana- 
gerial type charge. 
An example of cost-f ac tor 
listing is given below. 
*In principle, these two systems 
give all the information needed; (they do Workcenter N ~ .  a m at mt 
seem to provide 100% coverage). ARINC 
Research Corporation is currently inves- 26350 1.62 0.107 0.60 0.036 tigating their accuracy. A test of the 
sensitiSity of costs to tee type and de- 
'a c c c gree of inaccuracies found will be a' m' L 
instituted. 2.55 2.70 1.64 4.01 1.21 
(Nwnbers are obtained from 
Febkuary 1962 Data for Walker 
AFB. ) 
Step 2.3.2 
Compute the per-action time and cost 
charges, by the follovring formulas r 
where t = time per action, 
1 = direct time on this action; 
and 
where C = cost per action. 
Hence, P, Q, Cp and CQ contain the 
overhead time and cost charges for the sub- 
division by.which the action was performed. 
If these are a, a', ca, ca for administra- 
tive charges, and m, ml, cm, cml for mana- 
gement charges, for two levels of manage- 
ment, then: 
Step 3.1 
(a) Obtain a count of the number of 
serviceables for each type of unit de- 
livered to the, supply organization of an 
echelon, and the cost per unit (for cost 
per unit, see Rule 4). 
(b) Obtaie a count of the number of 
each type of part delivered to the supply 
organization at each echelon, and their 
costs. 
( c )  Obtain a count of the average 
monthly backlog for each type unit in the 
maintenance orgfnization, diviied into an 
"awaiting pfrts class and an awaiting 
maintenance class. 
(d) Obtain a count of the number of 
each type unit condemned by the mainte- 
nance organization. 
(e) Obtain a count of the number of 
each type unit returned to a higher eche- 
lon for maintenance. If necessary, dis- 
tinguish between those returned for legit- 
imate reasons, those returned for specious 
reasons, and those returned for lack of 
parts. 
(f) If there is a parts stockroom 
serving maintenance directly, obtain the 
cost of parts delivered to this stockroom 
during the month. 
(g) Obtain the number of units and 
parts of each type on back order. 
C = C1 + Cm0m + Cn,ml(l+m) Q (9) (h) Obtain the cost of parts used 
to repair each type of unit during the 
Add the per-action costs and times over all month, distinguishing between those which 
similar units for the month considered. came from a maintenance stockroom, and 
Compute average figures for the cost, time, those which came from 
and direct labor. Only units and parts received from supply 
are charged. 
Example (cont'd): Part of such 
a listing is given in Table 1. 
The first column identifies the 
units. The succeeding columns 
are,in order: time (with over- 
head), cost, direct labor, number 
of units handled, average time, 
average cost, average direct 
labor. 
Rule 3 
Allocate the monthly material costs 
to units, and compute the charges for time 
delays. By the setting up of check points 
where delays may result in the accumula- 
tion of stock, new acquisitions can be 
charged to stock accumulation on arrival. 
This procedure automatically charges tlme- 
delays to the responsible activity. The 
appropriate procedure is as follows: 
Units are charged by the following 
procedure : 
(a) Units received are charged 
against equipment, up to the number that 
are either condemned or sent for mainte- 
nance to higher echelon for legitimate 
reasons. 
(b) If any units are left, they are 
charged in the following sequence: 
(i) Against maintenance, up 
to the number returned for 
maintenance to higher echelons 
for specious reasons. 
(ii) Against supply, up to the 
number returned for maintenance 
to higher echelon because of 
lack of pa r t s ,  provided the 
p a r t s  have been on back order  
more than a month. 
( i i i )  Against maintenance, up 
t o  the  average monthly backlog 
awaiting maintenance. 
( i v )  Against supply, up t o  the  
number which a r e  awaiting par t s ,  
f o r  which the p a r t s  have been 
back-ordered f o r  l e s s  than a 
month. 
( v )  Against the higher  echelon 
supply, up t o  the  number t h a t  
have been e i t h e r  
( i )  on back order,  o r  
( i i )  awaiting maintenance 
f o r  p a r t s  o r  s en t  f o r  r e p a i r  
f o r  lack  of pa r t s ,  with the 
p a r t s  back ordered a month 
o r  more. 
( v i  ) Against supply. 
Example: Suppose on a n  A i r  EEtse, 
f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  month, f i f t e e n  
u n i t s  cost ing $1000 apiece a r e  
received from the depot, and 
counts a r e  a s  follows: 
( a )  Three a r e  condemned and two 
returned t o  depot because r e p a i r  
was not  authorized. 
( b )  Two a r e  re turned  f o r  r e p a i r  
t o  depot because of an excessive 
work backlog, 
( c )  None a r e  s en t  t o  depot f o r  
repa i rs ,  because of lack  of pa r t s .  
( d )  The average monthly backlog 
awaiting maintenance i s  three.  
( e )  Two a r e  i n  maintenance back- 
log awaiting pa r t s ,  bu t  f o r  one 
u n i t  the p a r t s  have been on back- 
order  f o r  more than a month. 
( f )  Two u n i t s  had been on back 
order  when the f i f t e e n  a r r ived .  
Then by Rule ( a ) ,  f i v e  a r e  charged 
t o  equipments; 
by Rule (b ) ,  two of the  t en  
remaining a r e  
charged t o  
maintenance; 
Rule [ c )  does not  apply; 
by Rule d ) ,  t h r ee  of the 
e igh t  remaining 
a r e  charged t o  
maintenance; 
by Rule ( e ) ,  one of t h e  f i v e  
remaining i s  
charged t o  supply; 
by Rule ( f ) ,  th ree  of the fou r  
remaining a r e  
charged back t o  
the depot; 
by Rule (g ) ,  the  one remaining 
i s  charged t o  
supply 
Hence the  t o t a l  charges a r e :  
To Equipment $ 5,000 
To Maintenance 5,000 
To Supply 2,000 
To Depot 3,000 
Total  Charge $15,000. . . 
... which was the  expenditure made 
by the  base. 
The base s tock of the  u n i t  has  r i s e n  
by ten, of Which three  a r e  needed because 
of delays a t  depot (two back-ordered, and 
one awaiting p a r t s  which a r e  back-ordered), 
and the o the r  seven a r e  needed t o  cover 
delays i n  maintenance and supply. 
Step 3.2 
Pa r t s  a r e  charged a s  follows: 
( a )  Pa r t s  used i n  equipment r e p a i r  
a r e  charged aga ins t  equipment. Dis t in-  
guish f o r  each p a r t  type between those 
which came from a maintenance stockroom 
and those which came from supply. 
( b )  Maintenance i s  charged with p a r t s  
del ivered t o  the maintenance stockroom, 
l e s s  p a r t s  from the stockroom charged t o  
equipment. 
( c )  Supply i s  charged with the re -  
maining pa r t s ,  l e s s  those (1 )  charged t o  
the maintenance stockroom, (2 )  charged t o  
equipment which came from sugply, and (3) 
on back orders  f o r  a month o r  more. 
( d )  Depot i s  charged with p a r t s  on 
back-order f o r  a month o r  more. 
( e )  Charge a s  much a s  poss ib le  of 
the p a r t s  cos t s  aga ins t  p a r t i c u l a r  un i t s .  
Example: Suppose twelve p a r t s  of 
a type a r r i v e  during the month, of 
which s i x  a r e  del ivered t o  bench 
stock. Then suppose s i x  a r e  used, 
fou r  from bench stock, and two from 
base supply, one of which had been 
on order  f o r  s i x  weeks. If the 
p a r t s  cos t  $10 each, then the  f o l -  
lowing charges a r e  made: 
................ To Equipment $ 60 
To Maintenance ........$ 60-40= 20 
TO Supply.. .... $120-60-20-lo= 30 
To Depot.. ................,.. 10 
-
Total.. ............ ,. ..... $120 
Again, the equation balances, for 
the base stock has risen by six 
items, of which two augment the 
maintenance stock, three the base- 
supply, and one covers the increas- 
ed time-lag in delivery from depot. 
Add the per-unit materials and delay 
costs obtained from Step 3.1 to the costs 
obtained by Step 3.2, which is chargeable 
to units, to obtain a total per-month 
cost of the unit on the particular station. 
Not all the parts costs obtained by 
Step 3.2 will in general be chargeable to 
units; some will often have to go as an 
overhead charge against the support 
system. 
Rule 4 
To find the per unit cost of units 
arriving at a supply point, proceed as 
follows : 
At the lowest echelon, only units 
arriving from outside are assigned a 
price. Units put back into stock after 
repair are not priced, nor are those units 
counted in charging materials costs to 
activities. 
Step 4.2 
At higher echelons, only units leav- 
ing for other supply points are assigned 
a price. Where units arrive from still 
higher echelons, or from maintenance at 
the same echelon, the price assigned will 
be a weighted average of the price charg- 
ed for new units, and the cost of mainte- 
nance performed at that echelon on re- 
paired units. The cost of maintenance 
includes handling and delays, as describ- 
ed in Rule 3. 
Example: If during one month, 
100 new units arrive at a depot 
from a manufacturer at $1000 
apiece, and 50 from de ot mainte- 
nance which have cost $400 apiece, 
then, for that month, 
Total Cost of Units = 
Future Development and Present Use 
Present Status of Model Development 
In the Introduction, a parallel was 
drawn between reliability theory and cost 
analysis. The rules in the preceding 
section are of the same form as the rules 
for constructing reliability models. 
Several distinctions, however, can be 
noted between the present statzs of the 
two arts. A reliability text, after 
stating rules for modeling, will discuss 
statistical distributions which failures 
may follow, and mathematical methods of 
finding the failure distributions of more 
complicated systems from simpler ones. 
Due emphasis is given to the increase in 
reiiability which may be obtained by 
introducing redundancy. For cost analyses, 
however, historical information on costs, 
distributed into the categories described 
in the foregoing rules, is very difficult 
to obtain. On the other hand, the build- 
ing up of the costs of more complicated 
systems from the costs of its constitu- 
ents is primarily an additive process, 
which is much less complicated than the 
combinatorial processes for reliability 
models. Finally redundancy, which intro- 
duces many of the difficulties in relia- 
bility analysis, is not a recommended 
method of cost reduction. 
Present Use of Model Parts 
The rationale from which the alloca- 
tionruleswere derived was to view cost 
information as indispensible to management 
control and decision-making. Consequently, 
at each level of management, the cost- 
information obtained will be sensitive to 
the actions controlled by management, and 
to its decisions. The higher the level of 
management, the greater the scope of the 
organization controlled and the decisions 
to be made. Correspondingly less detailed 
information will be needed. However, 
implicit in the use of aggregated infor- 
mation for making large-scale decisions 
is the assumption that the costs which 
have been aggregated are optimum and that 
lower-level decisions will be made from 
more detailed information. 
The type of model described herein 
does two things: it develops cost data 
sensitive to the smallest piece of equip- 
ment and the lowest management level that 
can be distinguished in the data, then 
gives rules for aggregating these costs to 
successively larger pieces of equipment 
and higher levels of management. Each 
*See, for example, Reference 4. 
major piece of the model, as it is develop- 
ed, will serve the control and information 
IS. needs of a major management level. Thus, 
the model which distributes maintenance 
manpower at an airbase exhibits overhead 
costs and workloads at all lower levels 
of management. If introduced as a routine 
method in the digestion of base mainte- 
nance data, the model will furnish the 
cost part for any comparison of the cost- 
versus-effectiveness of identical organi- 
zations on different bases, and of dif- 
ferent organizations on the same base. 
Use of The Complete Model 
Once the complete model has been 
developed and historical costs in the 
various categories accumulated, informa- 
tion will be provided at all levels of 
management of support systems. For cur* 
rent systems, the model will aid in the 
following functions. 
Management of Current System The 
model will provide: 
(1) Comparative cost data on the 
operation of major subordinate organiza- 
tions. 
(2) The complete cost of the present 
support of units, to ascertain which units 
might repay engineering changes. 
(3 )  Factors which measure the elas- 
ticity of support costs to the frequency 
of unit failures, and the direct labor 
time required for repair. These can be 
used to evaluate the savings to be obtain- 
ed from projected engineering changes. 
(4) Information needed to compare 
the cqsts of maintenance at different 
echelons; e.g., which repairs are made 
cheaper at depot, and which at base level. 
(5) Information needed to trade off 
possible support savings against increases 
in fixed investment, e.g., the introduc- 
tion of new test equipment. 
(6) A simulation tool with which 
suggested changes in the support organi- 
zation can be evaluated before they are 
put into effect. 
Of course, many of the tradeoffs 
listed above are now made, and made every 
day. However, the cost part of the equa- 
tion is usually obtained with great trou- 
ble on an ad hot basis, and used long 
after the circumstances on which it was 
based have changed. The kind of model 
described would automatically provide the 
information needed. It would therefore 
be more often used than circumvented, and 
would be current. The model would provide, 
on a routine basis, the information which 
management needs. 
Planning Good current information 
is necessary for good planning. From 
sufficient support-cost information -- 
sensitive to equipment characteristics, 
organizational features, and the charac- 
teristics of manpower -- it will be possi- 
ble to derive equations to predict support 
costs of future systems. If derived in 
this way, the equations will depend on 
parameters which will change with new 
weapons systems; hence, the equations 
will be easy to adjust to radically new 
concepts. 
In this area perhaps the biggest 
payoff will come. With the new planning 
concept* which depends upon estimating 
the long-term costs of programs, good 
equations for future costs have become 
indispensable to bringing a concept to 
frhition. The best, as well as the easi- 
est, procedure is to base such predic- 
tions on a routinely-provided series of 
data, which are both sensitive and cur- 
rent. 
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RESULTS OF A 'EST-TO-FADRE PROORAM ON ELECTRLlNIC PARTS 
1oUj.s M. St. Martin 
S h f f  Engineer 
Army Weapon *stems Management Reliability 
General Qmmmics/~omona 3 / d F O  
Pomona, California 
General Dynamics/Pomona. as the prime 
contractor for  the MAULER Weapon System is con- 
ducting a strong re l i ab i l i ty  program according 
t o  policy established by AOMC. One of the 
requirements of this policy is  t h a t r e l i a b i l i t y  
test ing of components t o  fai lure be conducted 
i n  order to determine safety margins. The safety 
margin is a s t a t i s t i c a l  relationship between the 
strength of the component and its use environment. 
The USAOMC policy was implemented by a 
MAULER Weapon System Test-to-Failure Plan. This 
plan established the objectives and scope of the 
t e s t  program, the basis  fo r  selection of candi- 
dates and test environments, a list of the 
candidates and environments, unif om test-to- 
fai lure language, uniform t e s t  method, c r i t e r i a  
for judgment of t e s t  results, ini t iat ion of 
corrective action on fai led items, tes$ reports, 
and t e s t  schedules. 
Forty-two t e s t s  on twenty-three parts  and 
seven assemblies have been completed3 some items 
were tested in more than a single environment. 
The environments were high and low temperature, 
vibration, shock, and acoustic noise. Twenty- 
six of the t e s t s  disclosed adequate safety 
margins. The other sixteen tests resulted in 
corrective action ranging from mducing the 
.stress on the item to replacing the item with 
one of adequate strength. 
The lead t h e  gained by th i s  program on the 
potential problems has been a direct  benefit of 
this program. Of indirect  benefit has been the 
increased confidence the designer has i n  the 
items passing the t e s t  which allows him t o  dis- 
m i s s  doubts and concentrate on other unknowns. 
The author recommends the use of test-to- 
fai lure by designers in selecting and evaluating 
components, determining the failure modes of 
parts, materials and assemblies, and identifying 
"weak links" in a system. It is a discriminating 
t e s t  of subtle changes i n  design or materiala 
and as  such the author considers it useful as a 
quality control tool or, i n  non-destructive 
configurations, a powerful screening test.  He 
recommends it a s  a prelude t o  the design of a 
l i f e  t e s t  a s  it provides data on the behavior of 
the t e s t  specimen which eliminates much of the 
necessary guesswork. 
Backmound 
The MAULER Reliability Problem 
MAULEX is a f a s t  reacting, compact, high 
accuracy a i r  defense system for forward bat t le  
areas. The challenges t o  the re l i ab i l i ty  of 
MAULER are manifold and the U. S. A w  expects 
these challenges t o  be identified and treated 
i n  the early research and development phases 
during which the tax  payer's dollar could buy 
the maxinun of trouble-free l i f e  in the field. 
The MAULER Reliability Promam 
Two major MAULER re l iabi l i ly  ac t iv i t ies  
are required by Arngr Ordnance Missile Command; 
a detemnination of the environmental stress or 
design level (Reliability Boundary) which shall  
be used a s  the basis for selection or develop- 
ment of parts, sub-assemblies, asssmblies and 
equipments, and an intensive laboratory test-  
to-failure program of c r i t i c a l  parts, sub- 
assemblies, assemblies and equipments selected 
for intagratLon into the systan. 
General Dynamics/~omona, i n  agreement with 
the oustomer, evolved a broad re l i ab i l i ty  
program which would u t i l i ze  a l l  the re l i ab i l i ty  
techniques pertinent t o  the problem commensurate 
with a balance betwen the objectives, the 
AOMC requirements, and the economic resources. 
This program includes a prediction of the 
f i e ld  re l i ab i l i ty  t o  identi@ and correot 
major weaknesses, an estimate of the f ie ld  
maintenance required t o  keep the system i n  
operation, establishment of r e l i ab i l i ty  goals 
to be achieved i n  & s i p ,  a comprehensive 
analysis of the environnents and conditions of 
use, tests  of the susceptibility of the elements 
of the system t o  failure i n  these environments 
and conditions, a continuous review of design 
paper, guidance i n  selection and application 
of parts and materials, a demonstration of the 
degree t o  which the re l iabi l i ty  objectives 
have been met i n  early models, and f inal ly  an 
assessment of r e l i ab i l i ty  i n  prototype and 
tac t ica l  hardware with appropriate correction 
of the remaining problems. Coupled with these 
tasks, there is  the re l iabi l i ty  engineer's 
obligation t o  ass is t  the designer in  identify- 
ing and eliminating problems as they arise. 
The Analysis of Envlrorments 
The analysis of  environments was divided 
into three phases. First, a research in to  a l l  
available data on natural environments was 
made. Data on vibration, shock and noise were 
obtained during road and f i e l d  tes ts  of vehicles 
similar  t o  the MAULER car r ie r .  The r e su l t s  of 
these s tudies  were incorporated in the specifi-  
cations f o r  trhe various subsystems; radars, 
computers, power generators, missiles, communica- 
tions, launchers, etc.  Next, t he  Indus t r ia l  
Team Membf s (Burroughs Corporation, FMC Corp- 
oration, General Dynamics/~lectronics General 
Dynamic s/~omona, and Raytheon ~ompany j performed 
an analysis i n  which the external  environments 
of the specifications were combined with the 
environments generated within the individual sub- 
system. Finally, the subsystem analyses were 
combined i n  an analysis of weapon system environ- 
ments i n  which interactions between subsystems 
were identified. These analyses give r e l i a b i l i t y  
and design personnel high v i s i b i l i t y  i n to  the 
problems created by the environments and help 
ident i fy areas of c r i t i c a l  weaknesses fo r  use i n  
the r e l i a b i l i t y  predictions and suggest potent ial  
corrective actions. The analyses a re  updated as 
signif icant  changes in hardware occur o r  accuracy 
of environmental data is improved. 
With the analyses of subsystem and system 
environments in hand, the Industr ia l  Team 
Members were able t o  compare the capabi l i t i es  of 
the pa r t s  and assemblies they would be using 
with the conditions of use, iden t i fy  those items 
which appeared t o  lack the necessary capability, 
and t r e a t  the ant icipated problem. 
Major Features of the MAULER Test-to-Failure 
Program 
Tests-to-Failure i n  the MAULER program are 
performed by the Industr ia l  Team Members. These 
team members are responsible for select ing item- 
environment combinations f o r  t e s t ,  performing 
t e s t s  and analyzing data, making decisions on 
the acceptabi l i ty  of the tested pa r t s  and 
reporting the r e su l t s  of each t e s t  and any 
ensuing correct ive action. The Army Weapon 
Systems Management Department of General Dynamics/ 
Pomona i s  responsible for administering the  
program. The administrative de t a i l s  a r e  contained 
i n  a Weapon System Test-to-Failure Plan. 
A p a r t  i s  selected for  t e s t  i f  it is  a high 
population i t e m ,  a new or non-standard item, i f  
it has an unknown response to an environment, or 
a his tory of fa i lu re .  A t e s t  is  defined a s  
fa i lu re  of a l l  pa r t s  of a sample i n  a single 
environment. Fai lure  can be any change i n  pa r t  
character is t ics  of in te res t  to the t e s t  designer 
and it i s  not l imited to a permanent change. In 
the e a r l i e s t  phase of MAULER development, 
tes t ing was concentrated on piece parts.  I n  
l a t e r  phases increased emphasis i s  being placed 
on tes t ing  sub-assemblies. 
Results of Tests 
Table 1 summarizes the r e s u l t s  of the forty- 
two item-environment combinations tested t o  date, 
sixteen of which revealed combinations unfavorable 
t o  the desired r e l i a b i l i t y  goals. Tests typical 
of each pa r t  type category a r e  discussed below, 
Logic Modules 
The mode of fa i lu re  i n  the t e s t s  of Gate- 
Emitter Follower and F l ip  Flop moclules was 
cracking of the glass envelope of computer 
diodes during and a f te r  exposure of the encap- 
sulated modules t o  high Lemperatures, The 
defect was corrected by replacing the diode 
with one of another manufacturer which had not 
exhibited t h i s  mode of f a i l u r e  in other tes t s -  
to-failure. No f a i l u r e s  occurred during 
exposure of the modules t o  four times the end- 
use leve l  o f  vibration. 
The Buffer module demonstrated an adequate 
safety margin in high temperature. One sample 
fai led catastrophically when the t e s t  s ignal  
was not propagated through the c i rcu i t .  This 
was a t t r ibu ted  t o  a t rans i s tor  short  a t  203,S0C. 
Six samples f a i l ed  f o r  degraded performance 
when s igna l  propagation time exceeded tolerances 
and one c i r c u i t  f a i l ed  when output l eve l  
d r i f ted  outside of the f a i l u r e  c r i t e r i a  for  
this at t r ibute .  The remaining three samples 
were a rb i t r a r i l y  classed a s  fa i lu res  when the 
t e s t  equipment cables fa i led  a t  248'C. The 
effects  of high temperature on output l eve l  and 
waveform are shown i n  Figures 1 and 2. 
TOP - INPUT 
BOTTOM -OUTPUT AT 248 OC 
Figure I 
BOTTOM- INPUT 
TOP-OUTPUT AT 248OC 
Figure 2 
TABLE 1 
RESULTS OF MAULER ENGINEERING MODEL PHASE TEST-TO-FAILURE PROGRAM 
TABLE 1 






















































































NO FAILURES TO 25G'S 
FROM 5-200CPS 
NO FAILURES TO 240°C 
(TEST CHAMBER LIMIT) 
NO FAILURES TO 260°C 
(TEST CHAMBER LIMIT) 
NO FAILURES TO: 40 G'S 
FROM 10- 142 CPS, 60 6's 
FROM 142- 2000CPS 
257OC 23.5OC 
NO FAILURES AT 250°C 
NO FAILURES TO 25G'S 
< 142CPS 
NO FAILURES TO 45 G'S 
> 142 CPS 
184OC 8.4OC 
103OC 23.8OC 
NO FAILURES AT 250°C 
NO FAILURES TO 25G'S 
> 142 CPS 
NO FAILURES TO 45G'S 

































Table 1 shows three testa on relay8 on 
which carrective action has not been determined 
a t  the t h  of preparing th i s  paper. The study 
referred to in the table ie an evaluation of the 
possibil i t ies of replacing electro-raechanical 
relays with semi-conductor amita hes. The trade- 
offs under consideration here are weight, space, 
"open-circuita leakage, cost, and of course, 
the relat ive re l i ab i l i t i e s  of the original 
r e l a p  and the proposed switches. 
Resistors 
The first t e s t  on a half-watt carbon compo- 
s i t ion  resistor showed an inadequate safety 
margin i n  high temperatare a t  a r e l i ab i l i ty  
boundary of 100°C. The variabil i ty was halved 
and safety margin doubled when the power dissi- 
pated in the resistors was cut  in half. This is 
compatible with the recommendations i n  1 to  
derate the par t  5 s  a t  100°C. 
The high temperature t e s t s  on the tenth 
watt resistor revealed an unexpected mode of 
fai lure (see Figure 3). The part  demonstrated 
an average temperature coefficient of approx- 
imately one p a r t  per million per degree centi- 
grade below 225°C~ above this temperature the 
coefficient reversed and increased to  a negative 




The mica capacitor t e s t  revealed a tempera- 
ture coefficient of capacitance seven t h e 8  a s  
high a s  the part  specification, M I L 4 6 ,  allows 
and a safety margin much too inadequate for 
MAULERts needs. This par t  was replaced by one 
with l e s s  susceptibility to high temperature. 
The value of these results  was questioned when 
consideration was given t o  the high re l iabi l i ty  
rating given this par t  i n  2. No comparison of 
the test results and Ref. can be made because 
in the above t e s t  the failure cri terion wae one 
of a transitory performance degradation and i n  
~ e f . 2  it is permanent and catastrophic. 
Solid tantalum capacitors came under 
scrutiny in  this program. Three fai lure c r i t e r i a  
were used when the capacitors were exposed t o  
high temperature; capacity drif t ,  leakage 
current less  than one milliampere and less  than 
one microampere, a t  two levels of applied 
direct  voltage. The f i r s t  t e s t  a t  f u l l  rated 
voltage gave a mean of 155°C and a safety 
margin of 3.7 above the operating temperature 
of 90°C, for the one milliampere leakage l i m i t .  
A small improvement i n  safety margin was 
realized in the second t e s t  a t  8 6  of rated 
voltage, but 5.1 was still too small t o  meet 
the MJUJLER definition of an adequate margin. 
The one microampere leakage safety margin was 
l e s s  than one i n  both tests. No capaoitors 
failed ei ther t e s t  fo r  a capacity ahange. The 
Industcial Team Member has elected t o  use high 
re l iabi l i ty  tantalum capacitors of the 
"Minutemanw type. 
Semi-Conduc tors 
The tests on the Type C transistor demon- 
strated an inadequate safety marg-rn i n  high 
temperature using a mininnrm current gain of ten 
as the cri terion of failure. An interesting 
a s ~ e c t  of this t e s t  was that the low aafety 
d g i n  resulting from the t e s t  was explained by 
the   art vendor on the basis the transistors i n  
the bst were %ngineering samples1I and had not 
come under "normal quality controln, so a 
repeat t e s t  on a simple selected by the vendor 
was begun. The early failurea in the second 
test were enough t o  convince the Industrial 
Team Member the tr&sistor was indeed undesirably 
unstable and the item was deleted &om the 
MAULER cirouits. T h i s  step necessitated rather 
extensive redesign as the replacement device, 
2N706, does not s t r i c t l y  replace the Qpe C. 
Test-to-Failure a s  a Reliability Tool; 
It is the opinion of General Dynamics/ 
Pomona the cost of this program w i l l  be returned 
many times over. An example of th is  ultimate 
savings t o  the custmer is i l lustrated by the 
experienoe on the Type C transistor. If these 
t e s t s  had not been conducted, the need to 
replace this i t e m  and redesign the c i rcui ts  to  
accomnodate the more stable 2N706 would not 
have become apparent un t i l  two years l a t e r  
when the subsystem involved entered environ- 
mental testing. If the system environmental 
test sample 3.8 small and test conditions 
abbreviated in the interests of development 
program economy, as is  frequently the case, 
test-to-failure w i l l  identify failures tha t  
would occur a f t e r  delivery when production 
hardware is exposed t o  the extremes of end-use 
conditions. Redesign on the basis of test-to- 
failure results  incorporates a contingenoy for 
errors in estimating the end-use conditions and 
degradation in  the strength of the par t  tested. 
An example where MA- test-to-failure 
eliminated a problem a t  subsystem qualification 
t e s t  and end-use is seen in the case of the mica 
capacitor, 22% of the 200 mica capacitors in a 
c r i t i c a l  subsystem would have fa i led  when 
subjected t o  the specification high temperature 
l i m i t .  With a fa i lure  percentage this high, 
the small sample of subsystems currently planned 
for qualification tes t ing  would have disclosed 
this problem. However, it is doubtful i f  the 
qualification t e s t  would have revealed anything 
wrong in the 1300 mica capacitor applioations 
in  other subsystems but performance of one 
MNLER out of f ive could be degraded when 
exposed to  the high temperature end-use environ- 
ment. A crash program of fa i lure  diagnosis, 
corrective action and r e t r o f i t  a t  the subsystem 
level  would have cost  more than the t o t a l  cost 
of the e n t i r e  test-to-failure program on a l l  
items a t  a l l  Industr ial  Team Members. 
A comparison of the var iab i l i ty  of par t  
strength with the conditions the par t  would 
experience i n  use is the object of the program 
and th is  comparison is  being made. Test-to- 
fa i lure  furnishes data on behavior of parts  
under s t ress  of great value t o  the designer 
which is not available by any other means. This 
information and its application i n  design 
improves the chances of delivering re l iab le  
hardware, These same data can be useful  in 
seducing cost by replacing unnecessarily strong 
and expensive parts  where adequate strength is 
available i n  a lower cost  item, Another cost 
reduction can resul t  from recogni~ing  and 
eliminating cos t ly  environmental protective 
features wbich test-to-failure reveals a s  unnec- 
essary. 
Mopt tests generated the normal distr ibut ion 
of fa i lures  assumed by the method, however, 
instances of distributions other than normal 
have been noted, Assuming f a i lu re  of the un- 
fai led items in  a sample when a test is termin- 
ated prematurely reduces the sample deviation 
and mean. This e f fec t  should be considered in 
judging the t e s t  resul ts ,  
The t h i n g  of these t e s t s  is important, i f  
the maximum benefit is t o  be derived from them. 
The MAULER t e s t s  are being run concurrent with 
that  period when the designer is deciding what 
parts  and assemblies he should use, Having the 
resul t s  available to a s s i s t  in these decisions 
has eliminated the cos t  and delay involved in  
making the changes a f t e r  the design begins to 
freeze up. 
Test-to-failure provides the answer t o  the 
question, 'What happens i f  the s t ress  on the 
system is r a i ~ e d ? ~  Taking the test-to-failure 
resu l t s  and plugging in the new s t ress  leve l  a s  
a new Reliabi l i ty Boundary i n  the calculations 
gives a quick estimate of the new safety margins. 
No additional test ing is  required and the calcu- 
la t ion  i s  made i n  seconds. This s tresses the 
importance of keeping the t e s t  data on hand for  
ready use a t  any time. General ~ynamics/Pamona 
is doing just  this; a summary of the t e s t  and 
its re su l t s  is  included in the MAULER Standard 
Parts List  catalog and a complete f i l e  of t e s t  
reparts is available for  use. Incidentally, 
the Industr ial  Team Members are submitting 
copies of these reports for  inclusion i n  the 
In ts rService  Data Exchange Program (IDEP), 
Corrective Action 
Every t e s t  which revealed an incompatibility 
of part  capability with the conditions of use 
resulted i n  s teps taken to increase the margin 
between pa r t  strength and the c r i t i c a l  stress. 
No problem was dismissed with the excuse tha t  
the unsatisfactory item-environment combination 
was inevitable and MAULER was stuck with it. 
Positive Correction - I f  a par t ' s  safety 
margin was inadequate and stronger par t s  were 
available a t  a low penalty t o  cost, size, 
standardization, etc., corrective action con- 
s i s ted  of a simple substitution of parts  i n  
the design. When the penalt ies  of a par t  
change appeared high, the al ternate corrective 
actions were evaluated with great care, Wn 
instance of a decision with a high penalty was 
the substitution of the 2N706 for  the Type C 
transistor,  This action scrapped the design 
of a large portion of the MAULER computing 
system. The r e l i ab i l i t y  people involved 
weighed the problem and i t s  solutions carefully 
before recamanding a change of such import. 
A s i tua t ion  which also resulted i n  a major re-  
design was the decision to replace germanium 
with s i l icon  semi-conductors, 
State-of-the-Art Problems - Not a l l  the 
problems disclosed by the tests had solutions 
a s  clear  out  as  finding a bet ter  p a r t  and using 
it. The t e s t s  on relays demonstrated the 
desired compactness and r e l i a b i l i t y  are not ye t  
available in a single relay. The designer was 
instructed t o  examine a l l  re lay  applications 
and evaluate each against  the c r i t e r i a  of 
fai lure used i n  the vibration test-to-failure 
and in those instances where the requirements 
of the application and the pa r t ' s  W c t e r -  
i s t i c s  were compatible, the re lay  would be 
used. In other instances, a sligh'c modifioa- 
t ion of the environment by isolat ion or 
relocation of the re lay  might suffice. In the 
remaining cases, Ff they are  few, the price of 
a larger relay may be within reason. An 
al ternate solution now under consideration is 
replacing relays of the familiar electro- 
mechanical type with semi-conductor switchesr 
Tantalum capacitors have not submitted 
readily t o  simple solutions. The un i t s  tested 
were the penultimate of the re l iab le  types, 
The decision t o  replace them with the higher 
r e l i a b i l i t y  flMinutemanN types was made a f t e r  a 
comparison of increased MAULER delivery cost 
with costs of f i e ld  fai lures and repairs  showed 
an appreciable decrease i n  over-all cost to 
the Army. 
An ugnecessary l imitat ion t o  the usefulness 
of this method as  a r e l i ab i l i t y  design a id  i n  
t h i s  program was over -f ormalization of the tes t .  
This was imposed by the prime contractor i n  
establishing it as a major s tep  i n  demonstrating 
r e l i a b i l i t y ,  Since then both the  A r z  and the 
MAULER prime contractor have come t o  rea l ize  
t ha t  an arb i t ra ry  safety margin ooommn t o  a l l  
ftem-environment combinations is not the answer 
and may r e s u l t  in r e l i a b i l i t y  measures whose 
cost  is  out of proportion to the protection 
needed, This revelation has resul ted i n  elimin- 
at ion of the universal safety margin and the 
determination of the  protection required was 
l e f t  up to the designer's analyses of the prob- 
lems and t he i r  trade-offs, ~ e f  .4. 
In summary, General Dynanics/Pomona has 
concluded test-to-failure f i l l s  a wide gap in 
our knowledge of i t e m  behavior, It: 
( a )  Provides a measui .? of i t e m  strength 
i n  aqr  environmen; of in te res t .  
(b)  Estimates the portion of the popula- 
t ion  of the item tha t  w i l l  f a i l  a t  
an-y l eve l  of t he  environment. 
( o ) Reveals modes of non-catastrophic 
fa i lu re  a t  any l eve l  o f  the 
environment. 
(d)  Reveals modes of f a i l u r e  a t  the 
catastrophic f a i l u r e  l e v e l  of the 
environment, 
(e )  Provides clues t o  fa i lu re  mechanisms 
i n  assemblies and systems. 
( f )  Provides fai led hardware f o r  analysis 
t o  strengthen the p a r t  or reduce 
environmental s t ress .  
(g )  Provides knowledge fo r  determining 
e f f ec t s  of design changes of load, 
location, environment level, etc.  
(h )  Ident i f ies  abnormal items in a l o t  
when used as a non-destructive 
screening tes t .  
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Appendix A 
The prime contractor used the test-to- 
failure method in designing an accelerated l i f e  
test. General Dynamics/Pomona as a result of 
re l iabi l i ty  prediction studies had concluded an 
improvement of l&Z in over-all system re l i ab i l i ty  
wdu14 .res'ult if  a recently developed resistor 
replaced one of older vintage. The only basis 
for t h i s  conclusion was data generated i n  tests 
by the-vendor. GD/P wanted t o  make a quick 
aomparition between the re l i ab i l i t i e s  of the two 
resistors. In the interests of efficiency and 
econog, an estimate of the stress levels which 
would precipitate resistor failures i n  a t e s t  of 
reasonable dui.ation was desirable. A test-to- 
failure was performed which generated failures 
i n  a few.seoonds. The stress (power dissipated 
in the resistors) was raised a t  three second 
intervals un t i l  failure (a permanent change of 
5% of nomihal resistance) had ocaurred i n  the 
entire sample of both resistor m e s .  T h i s  
developed the' data for the curves shown a t  A 1  
and B 1  in Figure Ir. A second se t  of curves, 
A2 and Bp was generated by applyingincreasing 
power for six second steps for  a to ta l  of 
0.1 hour. 
Fixed s t ress  levels for the accelerated 
l i f e  tests could now be estimated s w h  that the. 
t e s t s  would be oanpleted in about ten hours a t  
the lowest streaa level on the stronger part. 
The levels selected were 2.5 and 4 watts. The 
failure ra te  of resistor B in this t e s t  was 
approximatsly one hplndred times that  of resistor 
A, as is  seen by comparing A3 with Bg and A4 
with B4. 
The candidates for the t e s t  were selected 
on the basis of their  odverti8,ed rating, "1/2 
wattw. Resistor A is eighteen times the volume 
of resistor B. This t e s t  revealed that  fai lure 
ra te  of the parts m q  be a function of resistor 
volume. Shoe resistor A is too large t o  use 
without compromising electronic package size$ 
another l i f e  t e s t  on samples of resistor A of 
nearly identical volume ("1/8 wattn) was per- 
formed. A third level of power, 1.5 mtts, was 
run on both the *1/8 wattn resistor A and 
111/2 wattn resistor B. The results  of the 
added tes ts  can be evaluated by comparing A5 
with B3, A6 with B4, and A7 with Bs. The 
primary conclusion is  obvious, even the "1/8 
watt" resistor A has a lower failure r a t e  than 
the "1/2 watt" resistor B. Other conclusions 
which may be drawn tentatively from this  test 
aret Resistor volume may be a better index of 
re l iabi l i ty  than rating, and wide di f  f erencea 
in resistor construction methods may not result 
i n  wide difference8 i n  reliability. 
k.Bl 
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Appendix B 
Authorls Reflections on Test-to-Failure 
Test-to-failure has made a contribution t o  
the MAULER re l iabi l i ty  program beyond what would 
be expected in l i g h t  of its limited acceptance 
in the industry. Saine of the reasons for 
rejecting the method advanced during the MAULER 
program are  discussed below. 
Test-to-failure has been criticized by some 
for the reason that  it is of l i t t l e  use t o  
estimating part  l i f e ;  the method of applying 
stress-level-to-failure data t o  a prediction of 
time-to-failure has not been established. An 
item which demonstrates an adequate test-to- 
fai lure safety margin may deteriorate rapidly i n  
actual use. This i s  possible but an item which 
exhibits an inadequate safety margin a t  zero 
time wiyi have a high ra te  of fai lure in use. 
A meaningf'ul l i f e  test involves accumulation of 
several thousand part  hours, ei ther with a large 
sample of parts  fo r  a few thousand hours or a 
small sample for  several thousand hours. Test- 
to-failure on the other hand requires a much 
smaller sanrple fo r  tens of hours and it does 
develop a s t a t i s t i ca l ly  sound estimate of the 
proportion of pa r t  population that  w i l l  f a i l  a t  
any level of the applied stress. The information 
obtained i n  test-to-failure is of value in  
designing a l i f e  test (see Appendix A). 
Another criticism leveled a t  test-to-failure 
is it is  not as good as  a qualification test-to- 
apeoified-level because it measures strength i n  
only one environment and is excessively expensive. 
There is no limitation inherent i n  test-to- 
failure against using any and a l l  emrirorments 
desired, combinations included. (Ref. 3) 
Like qualifioation testing, the sample s i se  can 
be any economically or physically convenient 
quantity, a l i t t l e  additional time is  required 
t o  increase the s t ress  and f a i l  a l l  parts i n  the 
sample, and the added data analysis can be per- 
formed i n  mhutes. What is added is an increase 
i n  r i sk  of finding the part u n s a t i s f a c t s t  via., 
sane parts  rejected by this  program met the 
applicable procurement epecification. Tests to 
specified levels such as qualification t e s t s  are 
aimed a t  getting the parts  through without 
failure, ntests-to-success~. Any test which se ts  
out to  avoid fai lure is not a re l iabi l i ty  tes t ;  
r e l i ab i l i ty  testing must generate failures i f  a 
statement about the probabilitg of failure is t o  
result. On this  premise the author submits 
test-to-failure is a superior re l iabi l i ty  t e s t  
t o  the present qualification test. 
Test-to-failure c r i t i c s  claim it is not as  
good a s  qualification tests-to-specified-le-1 
because it is only performed once and therefore 
gives no protection against a degrading change 
in parts production. There is no reason for not 
using test-to-failure t o  requalify. In fact, 
because it yields more information than a test- 
to-speoif ied-level about pa r t  strength, it is 
more sensitive t o  subtle changes in part  design, 
materials, and processing. A semi-conductor 
manufacturer interviewed by the author stated 
he used the method to  compare new versions of 
parts  with old to assure continuation or 
improvement of par t  strength. T h i s  suggests 
the possibility of using test-to-failure for 
quick assesament of changes i n  re l iabi l i ty  of 
YDarnellll and other high re l i ab i l i ty  parts. 
A rather interesting criticism against 
test-to-failure is that  it destroys the sample 
for l a t e r  use i n  experimental hardware. T h i s  . 
is true of destructive tests-to-failure; non- 
destructive t e s t s  w i l l  leave samples suitable 
for  experimental hardware. The fa i led  parts  
are usefil,  particularly i f  the part  demon- 
s t ra tes  an inadequate safety margin. In  these 
fa i led  parts reside the clues t o  improving 
them, or reducing the c r i t i c a l  stress and - 
achieving an adequate margin. Specimens from I 
a t e s t  which demonsbated adequate margin 
should not be arbitrari ly discarded either. 
Exminabion of these may reveal fa i lure  mechan- 
isms which cculd i d e n t m  potential problems 
not anticipated. These failed parts  can also 
disclose fa i lure  mechanisms which can resul t  . 
in  secondarg fai lures i n  other parts. An 
example of this is the negative temperature 
coefficient above 225°C on the tenth-watt 
resistor tested in th i s  program. This inforn- 
ation w i l l  help the designer i n  protecting 
parts  associated with these resistors from 
overload. It w i l l  also help explain ww 
res is tors  i n  a system have dropped i n  value 
and provide the clues to  a fix. Failed diodes 
removed from the Gate-bit ter  Follower and 
Flip-Flop modules were returned to the vendor 
who upon examination of the fai led parts was 
able t o  pin-point the defect i n  his manufactur- 
ing processes and effect  a change t o  eliminate 
the fai lure mechanism. Individual circumstances 
dictate whather the information gained from a 
destructive test-to-failure is of more or l e s s  
value than the cost of providing additional 
parts for experimental hardware. 
The author recommends test-to-failure for  use: 
As an Aid i n  Selecting Parts for  a New 
Design 
A s  a design aid, test-to-failure has no 
equal i n  furnishing data about the behavior of 
the i t e m  i n  a c r i t i c a l  environment. The item's 
ab i l i ty  t o  work a t  the design stress level  and 
above can be assessed. I t s  behavior as  the 
f a m e  level  is approached, how it behaves i n  
failing, the shape and parameters of the fai lure 
distribution are revealed for  the inquisitive. 
And the wonders of failed hardware are there 
fo r  study; i f  the item is too weak f o r  use as 
it stands, clues t o  i t s  improvement m a y  be 
found in its remains. 
To Evaluate the Effect  of Enviroment Level 
Once a test-to-failure has been performed, 
there is no need t o  run another t e s t  t o  determine 
the response of the item a t  a d i f fe ren t  leve l  of 
the environment. Compare the dis tr ibut ion of the 
part  fa i lures  s i t h  the new level  and the answer 
i s  available. This is not true of t e s t s  to 
specified level3 i f  the new environment leve l  is 
higher, a new t e s t  must be performed. 
Use it to  Qualify and Requalify Material 
and Parts 
The sens i t iv i ty  of t h i s  test and the inform- 
at ion it reveals about the s trength of hardware 
make i t  a powerful and economic method t o  estab- 
l i s h  a desired r e l i a b i l i t y  l eve l  and maintain it 
i n  production. The qual i ty  of s m e  items can be 
e f fec t ive ly  controlled by using non-destructive 
f a i l u r e  c r i t e r i a ,  thus test-to-failure can be 
used t o  screen out the weak items i n  a lo t .  
Use it as  an Aid i n  Life Test Design 
The example given in Appendix A demonstrates 
the method's usefulness i n  planning a l i f e  test ,  
par t icu lar ly  i n  select ing the s t ress  leve ls  t o  
be employed i n  accelerating the tes t .  Life tests  
for  comparing the r e l i a b i l i t y  of two o r  more 
similar items are  not necessary i f  comparative 
tests-to-failure are run. The l i f e  of a par t  is  
improved by making it stronger or reducing the 
s t r e s s  on i t  and this t e s t  w i l l  f ind  the answer 
quicker and a t  l e s s  cost  than a comparative l i f e  
test .  
THE HUMAN AS A MISSILE SYSTEM COMPONENT 
R. F. Chaillet & A. Steinberg 
Army Ordnance Missile Command 
Redstone Arsenal, Alabama 
The Army Ordnance Missile Command (AOMC) ap- 
proach to missile system reliability achievement 
is through strong design control during develop- 
ment. Human engineering is one of the principal 
controls over design. As the missile system 
development phase progresses, design weaknesses 
should be uncovered by design review, laboratory 
environmental tests, and complementary investiga- 
tion and analysis prior to field tests of the 
system. System tests, then, is presumed to be a 
demonstration of design achievement. 
A study was made of approximately 1,000 
flight tests of Army missiles at various test 
sites. These were system tests which are usually 
conducted under optimal conditions. The weather 
is ideal, the target position is generally known, 
and the operator(s) is aware of the firing sched- 
ule. Thus, test failures are probably less fre- 
quent than might occur in a tactical environment 
where, in addition to degraded conditions, emo- 
tional factors are multiplied. However, due to 
the lack of realistic tactical situations for 
testing, we are obliged to use the test results 
available for information concerning system de- 
sign achievement. These tests present little 
data regarding ground support equipment, for the 
test is principally one of missile achievement. 
In this context then, identifiable human errors 
were studied and an analysis of the cause of fail- 
ure attempted. A word of caution however, due to 
the paucity of reported data on missile flights, 
at best, our ability to localize each failure to 
a specific malfunctioning part or human error is 
questionable. 
Human Engineering and Design 
Unfortunately, our system tests have shown 
us that often the design was inadequate. Design 
inadequacy is not due to incompetency of design 
personnel but to their inability to be specialists 
in all design areas. For example, the designer 
may be told that his design must operate in a 
cold environment of -650F. His concept of the 
operational environment may not extend beyond the 
work bench in front of him and the relatively 
comfortable flow of conditioned air around him. 
In this aura of job satisfaction, he designs and 
constructs equipment that can operate and main- 
: tain very effectively. When necessary, he can 
make all system adjustments with ease. His bare 
hand fits into each area and, with a minimum of 
equipment to save space" and in so doing, make 
adjustment of the equipment at cold temperatures 
impossible. Somewhere in the design process, the 
interaction between the equipment and the operator 
becomes lost and our design engineer begins to 
view his portion of the system as if it were the 
total system. 
It has been stated that "Machines do not 
operate by themselves". This is extremely impor- 
tant to remember as our systems tend toward auto- 
mation. Automation does not eliminate the man it 
simply changes the nature of the task he performs. 
So constant serious consideration should be given 
to the human's task as we automate in system 
design, at least until such time as man himself 
is completely replaced by machines. 
The popular concept of human engineering is 
that of tinkering with "knobs and dials". Cer- 
tainly this is a portion of Human Engineering, 
but only a very small portion. You may have heard 
the phrase "man-machine relationships" spoken as 
though it were some witch doctor's mumbo-jumbo, 
that when uttered, will mystically eliminate your 
problems. Human engineering is nothing more than 
an application of the scientific method to systems 
design to achieve the best feasible assignment of 
system task responsibilities to the human and/or 
the equipment. The human engineer wants to study 
the design, to relate the design to human behavior 
data, and to recommend changes, if necessary, that 
will permit his component, the human, to perform 
effectively. His goal is to educate the design 
engineer in terms of the capability and limita- 
tions of the human component. 
Human Engineering provides distinctive gains 
in system reliability because the completed de- 
sign will reflect reasonable demands on the human 
in terms of system operation and maintenance. 
For example, there are systems in use today that 
place the guidance and control responsibility 
squarely on the human operator. This is an un- 
realistic assignment when one considers the human 
parameters of response time, eye-hand coordination 
under stress situations, and the tendency to over- 
compensate when correcting previous errors, to 
mention but a few. From a design viewpoint, 
though, humans are very inexpensively mass pro- 
duced guidance and control systems requiring no 
unique production tools. 
effort, he can replace parts. He is not in any At AOMC we prefer to see the contractor's 
hurry to escape his environment to a warmer, cool- Human Engineers in an organizational position to 
er, or safer one as might be the case for a sol- assure acceptance of their design recommendations. 
dier in the field. The designer may reason "these In this way, the human engineers can work with all 
adjustments and repairs can be made so easily that organizational elements on a variety of projects, 
with so little effort, I can miniaturize the cross indoctrinating and educating as they work. 
Cause of System Failure During Test 
UnrQliability can be introduced into Missile 
Systems a t  the time of  manufacture o r  during f ie ld  
operations. Quality control should detect manu- 
facturing defects, however, we have had si tuat ions 
where the qual i ty  of soldered connections went 
"out of control" and remained undetected until 
f ie ld  testing. In  t h i s  instance, a l l  missiles 
were recalled by the manufacturer for  a secondary 
review of workmanship. Except for t h i s  isolated 
s i tuat ion,  the human contributions during manu- 
facturing processes relat ing t o  fa i lures  i n  sys- 
tems test ing have been d i f f i c u l t  t o  detect. 
Therefore, they w i l l  not be considered i n  the re- 
mainder of t h i s  paper. We are  not minimizing 
t h i s  aspect. On the contrary, t h i s  en t i re  area 
should be studied thoroughly a s  a possible means 
of improving r e l i ab i l i t y  and reducing the number 
of l ine  re jec ts  i n  production. 
Flight t e s t s  t ha t  have fai led i n  f i e ld  opera- 
tions a s  a resu l t  of human er ror  can be at t r ibuted 
to  one of three principal causes: 
1. Maintenance errors.  
The objective of f i r ing  a missile i s  to  des- 
troy a target. A l l  t e s t s  that  f a l l  short of t h i s  
objective are graded a s  fai lures .  Should the 
missile not: contain a warhead, a success i s  re- 
corded i f  the m i s s  distance is  within the le tha l  
range of the warhead scheduled for use with the 
missile undergoing tes t s .  In the case of Ground 
t o  A i r  Missiles Circular Probable Error (CPE) i n  
the conventional a r t i l l e r y  sense is not considered 
an adequate c r i t e r i a  for  r e l i ab i l i t y  scorekeeping 
since the problem i s  a three rather than two di- 
mensional one. 
Table 1 
Missile System Flight Failures 
Human Nike 
Error Hawk Hercules SS-11 
Improper 
Maintenance 11 5 0 
Preflight 
Maladiustments 13 1 0 
2. Pre-firing adjustment errors.  
3. Operator error  introduced at  o r  a f t e r  
launch. 
The number of readily identifiable human errors  
i n  a system t e s t i f i e s  to  the design inadequacy of 
that  system. Training i n  system operating proce- 
dures, when used a s  a substitute for  effect ive 
design, highlights the human errors  thereby ra i s -  
ing the hue and cry "Pilot Error" and thus ab- 
solving the system of any blame. 
Types of Guidance 
Before analysing the f l i gh t  data, some know- 
ledge of the types of guidance techniques must be 
available. With respect to  human ef fec ts  on 
f l i gh t  t e s t s ,  AOMC missile systems may be consid- 
ered a s  automatic, semi-automatic, o r  manual dur- 
ing missile f l ight .  By t h i s  c r i t e r i a ,  b a l l i s t i c  
missiles are  considered fu l ly  automatic since the 
course cannot be altered during f l igh t .  Hawk, 
Nike Hercules, and Lacrosse display various de- 
grees of automation. The anti-tank missiles, SS- 
10, SS-11, and Entac, are  manual and the operator 
is  a v i t a l  part  of the guidance loop during 
f l ight .  As  may be suspected, the manual systems 
have the highest recorded percent of system fa i l -  
ures a s  a resu l t  of human error.  
Electronic devices i n  the semi-automated sys- 
tems generally replace what would otherwise have 
been a manual guidance system. Such devices, 
whether radar, infrared, etc. ,  are  complex to  con- 
s t ruc t ,  adjust, and test .  For such semi-automated 
systems, the major human error  contribution t o  
f l igh t  fa i lure  appears to be introduced during 
checkout o r  alignment. 
Operator 
Error 2 1 7 
Total 26 7 7 
A l l  Failures 
Analyzed 270 303 
Human Error to  
A l l  Failures 




The Hawk is the AOMC system with the largest  
missile parts  population, and therefore, with the 
greatest missile complexity. It is also the most 
automated i n  f l i gh t  operations, excluding ba l l i s -  
t i c  missiles. 
Of the 26 ident if ied human errors  causing 
f l igh t  fai lure,  2 rounds were R&D tes t s ,  7 were 
Engineering tes t s ,  and 17 were Troop f i r ings.  Al-  
most every conceivable error  occurred within 
these 26 failures. Some of these errors  were: 
1. Reversed voltage because of inter-  
changed leads. 
2. Complete sub-system not instal led.  
3. Maladjustments of synchros, potenti- 
ometers, and antennae. 
4. Switches l e f t  i n  the 'off '  position. 
5. Plugs and screws not secured. , 
Another odd problem was where damage resulted i n  
connectors because of  heavy probing with t e s t  
equipment by maintenance personnel. 
Nike Hercules 
The relat ively small number of human gener- 
ated fa i lures  on the Nike Hercules t e s t i f i e s  more 
to  our longer experience with the system than to  
a greater  inherent re l iab i l i ty .  The Hercules was 
developed from the Nike Ajax and operator and 
maintenance functions were carried over i n  the 
orderly evolution. Unfortunately, many of the 
human engineering deficiencies of the Nike Ajax 
were redesigned into the Hercules system. The 7 
denoted fa i lures  represent the usual gamet of neg- 
ligence such as: 
I 
1. Safety leads not removed. 
2. Switch i n  ' t e s t '  rather than 'oper- 
a t e  ' position. 
3. Disconnected leads. 
4. Comaand destruct activated prema- 
turely. 
The ser ies  of Anti-Tank missiles tested to  
date use similar guidance techniques. These in- 
volved an opt ical  system and require the operator 
t o  manually acquire and control the missile a f t e r  
launch. For these systems, fai lures  may be inad- 
vertant ly at t r ibuted to  operator e r ror  when actu- 
a l l y  functional fai lure may be the malfactor. For 
example, t e s t  resu l t s  indicate the missile impact- 
ed the ground well short of the target.  The oper- 
a to r  s t a t e s  he was giving an up command a t  the 
time. The operator is judged to  have been com- 
pensating for  previously given commands. A re- 
corder attached to  the operators control would 
have permitted a more thorough analysis of the 
operator '8" contribution, i f  any, t o  the f l igh t  
f a i l u r e  rather than accepting subjective judge- 
ment of evaluating personnel. A t  any rate ,  it 
is apparent, from the resu l t s  i n  Table 1, tha t  
functional r e l i ab i l i t y  of the system is  consider- 
ably greater than operator re l iab i l i ty .  
SS-11 t e s t s  analyzed were those of a particu- 
l a r  se r ies  conducted a t  Redstone Arsenal. 
System Failure - General 
I n  general, there a re  human errors  contribut- 
ing t o  missile fa i lu te  i n  every system. On a La- 
crosse round, the operator improperly s e t  a com- 
puter. On Redeye, f ins  were inserted backwards, 
igni t ion leads were cut improperly, and fa i lure  
t o  uncage a gimboled component prevented the pos- 
s i b i l i t y  of success. The l a t t e r  type resulted 
from the inabi l i ty  to perform correctly a simul- 
taneous two hand coordination function. This oc- 
curred i n  an ideal  environment. 
In  the broad sense, every fa i lure  might be 
traced back to  the human. In our fai lure analysis 
undefined fa i lure  causes are presumed to be mater- 
ial deficiencies. Obviously, many of the-unde- 
fined fai lures  of Hawk and Hercules may be human - 
errors ,  so our conclusion must be that  our r a t i o  
o f  ident if iable human er rors  to  t o t a l  fai lures  is 
very conservative for  these systems. 
Conclusions 
1. The design should be simple with a mini- 
mum of t e s t  requirements and a maximum of modular 
sub-system items tha t  a r e  replaced but not repair- 
able i n  the f ield.  It i s  axiomatic that  a soldier 
w i l l  t e s t  i f  allowed t o  and w i l l  improvise i f  pos- 
s ible .  
2. The.opportunity for human error  i s  great- 
e r  i n  the 'prepare t o  launch' phase of complex 
and/or automated missile systems a s  indicated i n  
Table 1. 
3. Training should be an adjunct to  effect- 
ive system design not a subst i tute  for it. I 
In closing, we would l ike  t o  emphasize the 
d i f f i cu l t i e s  inherent i n  obtaining data to  sub- 
s tan t ia te  the hman er ror  contribution t o  the 
various ident if iable fa i lure  areas mentioned ear- 
l i e r .  W e  fee l  tha t  a more rigorous analysis of 
each missile f l i gh t  fa i lure  should be made. This 
is not an unreasonable recommendation, and i f  
done, would benefit  future designs. We have only 
to  witness the detailed reconstruction of each 
commercial a i r c r a f t  accident and the resultant 
improvement i n  e i ther  equipment o r  procedures to  
real ize that  the e f fo r t  expended would re f lec t  
large gains i n  future systems. 
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17 SUMMARY 
It is  important to recognize that the overall re- 
liability of equipment is  not only a function of the com- 
ponents of which it is comprised but also of the individ- 
uals who produce it. Consequently, increasing the 
reliability of the production workers' performance will 
also increase the reliability of the finished product. 
This paper has concerned itself both with the role which 
human performance plays in white room manufacturing 
reliability and the techniques for optimizing this per- 
formance within a controlled environmental work setting. 
Consideration has been given to the effect of selection, 
training, motivation and morale, and the special re- 
quirements for glove-handed operations upon the re- 
liability of the white room workers. 
In general, all of these factors have been found 
to be inextricably interwoven. Recommendations for 




10. personnel cleaning chambers 
11, dust preventative clothing, etc. 
In addition, such a specification also calls out 
the special regulations and procedures which white 
room personnel a r e  required to observe. Examples of 
some of these a re  as  follows: 
1. Excessive coughing or  sneezing is not per- 
mitted. 
2. Smoking or eating is  prohibited in all work 
areas. 
3. Personal articles normally carried in the 
pockets such as keys, watches, coins, handkerchiefs, 
kleenex, cosmetics, etc., are  not permitted. 
INTRODUCTION 4. Special dust-preventative clothing including 
boots, caps, and gloves must be worn. 
In recent years the use of highly controlled en- 
vironmental work settings has become more frequent. 5. Special procedures must be observed in 
This is undoubtedly due to the fact that government and cleaning shoes and utilizing the air  shower. 
industry have become considerably more aware of the 
role which cleanliness plays in the fabrication of reli- 6.  Finger nails must be scrubbed and cos- 
able equipment. metics removed. 
If we briefly examine a typical white room 7. Eyeglasses, if worn, must be washed and 
specification, 1 we find that it contains special require- dried with lint f ree tissue prior to entering the white 




This list of white room requirements and 
regulations is, of course, by no means complete. 
Nevertheless, it serves to indicate the peculiar nature 
of the white room environment and the working condi- 
tions which prevail within it. 
4. dust control It should be fairly obvious from a review of 
these requirements that for the uninitiated, this is  a 
5, the interior finish of the walls and ceilings Strange, ~nusually restrictive place to work. It is for 
this reason that special indoctrination programs pre- 
6.  furniture paring new employees to meet the demands of this 
totally unfamiliar setting have been developed wherever 
7. utilities white rooms exist. 
Unfortunately, management ve* often naively 
assumes that' the unfamiliarity of the white room situa- 
tion chn be rihdily overcome by deans of these indoc- 
trination sessions alone. 
Experience has sho,wn that this ass&nPtion is 
erroneous, although such programs can do much to pre- 
pare the new employees for their white room jobs. A 
major reason for this is the fact that the behavioral re- 
quirements of a particular job are  different inside the 
white room than they are outside of it. Consider, for 
example, the nature of an electronic module assem- 
bler's job outside the white room. In this setting, he 
usually assembles the small parts, dressed in his nor- 
mal work clothing, with the use of his bare fingers and 
a number of personalized tools a s  aids. When he em 
ters the white room, however, he is expected to ac- 
complish the same task wearing his white room uni- 
form, gloves, and deprived of any of the special tools 
which have already been integrated into a well-devel- 
oped, smooth and successful operation. By virtue of 
these seemingly minor changes imposed by the white 
room environment, we have nevertheless changed the 
behavioral demands of the job. Glove-handed finger 
dexterity is different from bare-handed dexterity and 
t - the absence-of fadliar-ids maEes it n e c e a w  f o ~ f l i e  
'assembler I _- to change - his - activity - in order to acmm- 
- 
plish the same task without them. Unfortunately, the 
subtleties of such differences makes them difficult to 
anticipate and their adverse effects on the finished 
product are often attributed to wrong causes. 
The aim of the present paper is therefore to 
describe techniques and procedures which the writer 
has employed in studying human factors white room 
problems and to present the results of these studies 
along with general recommendations for maximizing 
human pefiormance in white room settings. The dis- 
cussion which follows wi l l  therefore concern itself 
with a number of critical factors which singly and com- 
bined affect workers' performance. Four factors will 
be discussed-namely, selection, glove-handed as- 
sembly, training, and morale and motivation. 
Since a white room environment is in many 
respects alien to anything which most workers are ac- 
customed to, it is only natural to consider the possibil- 
ity that the standard selection practices, usually em- 
ployed .in choosing production personnel for the con- 
ventional production job, are  inadequate or  inappropr- 
ate for the purposes of white room selection. That this 1s so, has already been alluded to inthe introductorysec- 
tion of this paper and, in order not to belabor the point, 
we will assume that the matter is at least worthy of in- 
vestigation. Two aspects of selection must be consider- 
ed in such an investigation. These are skill factors and 
personality factors. The former refer to those aspects 
of the worker's behavior which constitute his technical 
proficiency, while the latter concern his psychological 
adjustment to his work, his co-workers and hi$ physical 
surroundings. These two aspects of selection are  
equally important in choosing individuals who will per- 
form their  job^ reliably. It is therefore essential that 
valid selection criteria be developed for each of them in 
order to permit us to predict reliable job performance 
prior to placing a worker on the job. 
In a recent study performed by the writer, the 
following steps were used in developing - -- the skill cri- 
teria for white room personnel, /working on highly com- 
plex electronic communications equipment with a very 
high reliability requirement. 
First, a job analysis was performed on each 
critical white room job. This involved a complete re- 
view of all of the basic tasks of each job. A detailed 
description of each job reviewed was wyitten, and 
served as basic data for making tentative determinations 
of the types of aptitudes necessary for successful work 
performance. 
Second, aptitude tests were administered to each 
white room employee. More specifically, the General 
Aptitude Test Battery, developed by the United States 
EmploymentiService' and consisting of twelve individual 
tests was administered. These twelve tests measure 
the following nine distinct aptitudes: 
1. general intelligence 
2. ability to comprehend the meaning of words 
3, ability to perform arithmetic operations 
quickly and accurately 
4. ability to think visually about geometric 
forms and to comprehend two-dimensional objects 
5, ability to perceive pertinent details in 
objects or in pictorial or graphic material 
6. ability to perceive pertinent details in 
verbal and/or tabular material. 
7. ability to coordinate eyes and hands or 
fingers rapidly and accurately in making precise 
movements with speed. 
8. ability to move the fingers and manipu- 
late small objects with the fingers rapidly and accu- 
rately. 
9. ability to move the hands easily and 
skillfully. 
This test battery was administered in order 
to determine the specific combination of aptitudes 
(specific battery) predictive of success for each dis- 
tinct job under investigation. Once such specific 
test batteries were developed for each white room 
job, they could be compared with the specific bat- 
teries already employed to select workers for sim- 
ilar jobs outside the white room. If these batteries 
were identical (i. e. consisting of identical aptitudes) 
then we could deduce that at least the skills neces- 
sary for success on these jobs were identical inside 
and outside of the white room. If the specific bat- 
teries were different, however, the new specific 
batteries developed would serve as selection devices 
for the white room jobs. 
It has been noted above that skill factors rep- 
resent only one facet of white room selection. The 
other factor is the personality make-up of the worker. 
Consequently, the development of suitable selection 
criteria must also take into account personality 
traits. The Thurstone Temperament Schedule, a 
personality test measuring seven distinct personality 
traits was administered to each white room employee. 
The traits measured were as follows: 
1. Active (A). A person scoring high on 
this trait usually works and moves rapidly. He is  
restless whenever he has to be quiet. He likeq to be 
Iton the goT1 and tends to hurry. He usually walks, 
writes, drives, and works rapidly even when these 
activities do not demand speed. 
2. Vigorous (V). A person with a high 
score in this trait participates in physical sports, 
work requiring his hands and the use of tools, and 
outdoor occupations. This trait indicates an empha- 
sis on physical activity using large muscle groups 
and great expenditure of energy. This trait is often 
described as ~ r n a s ~ u l i n e ~ ~  but many women and girls 
will score high in this area. 
3. Impulsive (I). High scores in this trait 
indicate a happy-go-lucky, daredevil, carefree, act- 
ing-on-the-spur-of-the-moment disposition. These 
people make decisions quickly, enjoy competition, and 
change easily from one task to another. The decision 
to act or  change is  quick regardless of whether the 
person moves slowly or rapidly (Active), or enjoys or  
dislikes strenuous projects (Vigorous). A person who 
doggedly "hangs onw when acting or  thinking is  typical- 
ly low in this area. 
4. Dominant (D). People scoring high on this 
factor think of themselves as leaders, capable of 
taking initiative and responsibility. They are not 
domineering, even though they have leadership abil- 
ity. They enjoy public speaking, organizing social 
activities, promoting new projects, and persuading 
others. They are the ones who would probably take 
charge of the situation in case of an accident. 
5. Stable (E for emotionally stable), Persons 
who have high scores in this trait usually are  cheer- 
ful and have an even disposition. They can relax in a 
noisy room, and they remain calm in a crisis. They 
claim that they can disregard distractions while work- 
ing. They are not irritated if interrupted when con- 
centrating, and they do not fret about daily chores. 
They are not annoyed by leaving a task unfinished or by 
having to finish it by a deadline. 
6. Sociable (S). Persons high in this trait 
enjoy the company of others, make friends easily, are 
sympathetic, cooperative, agreeable in their rela: 
tions with people. Strangers readily tell them about 
personal troubles. 
7. Reflective (R). Persons high in this trait 
like meditative and reflective thinking. They enjoy 
theory rather than practice. These people are usually 
quiet, like to work alone, and enjoy tasks which re- 
quire accuracy and fine detail. They often take on 
more than they can realistically accomplish and 
would rather plan a job than actually carry it out 
themselves. 
The third and final phase of the program for 
developing selection criteria for white room personnel 
involved the validation of the aptitude and personality 
test scores against actual work performance. In other 
words, by correlating test performance with work 
performance, using appropriate statistical techniques, 
we were able to determine which tests were predictive 
of success for a particular job. To perform such val- 
idation studies, however, it was necessary to have a 
measure of work performance. Two such measures 
were utilized. One was in the form of objective pro- 
duction records indicating quantities produced, number 
of items rejected, number of items produced per unit 
time, etc. The other was in the form of supervisors1 
ratings consisting of a numerical appraisal of the 
worker's performance on a number of distinct work 
performance factors. 
Although no attempt will be made in this paper 
to present the specific test batteries or personality 
profiles associated with success on the white room 
jobs studied, a number of general findings are worthy 
of mention. Perhaps the most significant finding is the 
fact that the nature of most jobs actually change when 
they are performed in a white room setting. This was 
evident both from the job analyses performed, and 
from the fact that the specific test batteries predictive 
of success in performing jobs in the white room were 
different from those predictive of success in perform- 
ing the same jobs in conventional factory settings. Of 
special importance in this connection was the data ob- 
tained from the job analyses. These clearly reveded 
the impact which the special white room requirements 
impose on the jobs performed. For example, the em- 
phasis on quality rather than quanitity completely 
changed the relative importance assigned to such fac- 
tors as speed, accuracy, visual acuity, manual dex- 
terity, motor coordination, etc. In other words, each 
job changed as  a function of the changes in the skills 
required, and the degree to which these skills were 
needed for a particular job. So far as personality fac- 
tors are concerned, i t  was found that in general, the 
individuals best suited for white room work generally 
obtain scores which ranged as follows on the seven 
factors of the Thurstone Temperament Schedule: 
1. High in (E) Stable 
2. Average in (A) Action, (V) Vigorous, (S) 
Sociable 
3. Low in (I) Impulsive, (D) Dominant, (R) 
Reflective 
Individuals whose scores do not fall within these 
broad ranges would generally find the adjustment dif- 
ficult and the atmosphere oppressive. 
The recommendations for white room selection 
generated by the study are as  follows: 
1. Special selection criteria for skill must be 
developed for choosing white room personnel. This is 
so since white room procedures materially alter the 
skill requirements of similar jobs performed outside 
the white room. The paradigm for developing these 
skill criteria have been described above. It basically 
consists of: 
a) performing a job analysis of the criti- 
cal white room functions 
b) administering a wide range of aptitude 
tests to white room incumbents 
c) correlating the aptitude test scores 
against white room performance measures such as  
production records and supervisorst ratings 
d) deriving special aptitude test batteries 
predictive of success for each of the critical white 
room jobs 
It should be noted that the specific white room 
aptitude test batteries which the writer derived are 
not presented here simply because the nature of these 
jobs will generally be different for each facility. This 
i s  so because the specific reliability requirements of 
each project differs and, as such, are  reflected in the 
manufacturing process, production/procedures, and 
ultimately in the jobs to be performed. The need for 
a test development program in each case, however, is 
generated by the fact that high reliability equipment 
can only be produced by workers whose performance 
i s  highly reliable. 
2, Even if a worker has the requisite skills to 
perform reliably in a white room setting, there is no 
guarantee that he will unless he possesses the neces- 
sary personality traits for making a suitable adjust- 
ment to this type of environment. For this reason, 
skill criteria must be supplemented with appropriate 
personality criteria for valid selection. Here, how- 
ever, the writer feels that he can be more specific in 
making recommendations. This is due to the fact that 
there are strong similarities in the general character- 
istics of most white rooms regardless of the specific 
jobs performed therein, which make the requirements 
for personal adjustment highly similar. Accordingly, 
the ideal white room personality seems to be an indi- 
vidual who has a high degree of emotional stability, a 
moderate need for general activity, physical activity 
and sociability, and a relatively low need to act impul- 
sively, lead others, or engage in meditative or  reflec- 
tive activity. The Thurstone Temperament Schedule, 
mentioned earlier, appears to be ideally suited to 
measure these traits especially in view of the fact that 
its items are couched in language which is well within 
the reading level of the average white room production 
worker. 
3, A minimum of two years of high school 
should be required of white room employees since there 
is a strong emphasis in most cases on understanding 
written and verbal instructions, both during training and 
on the job. 
4, Some white room jobs a re  better performed 
by one sex than the other. Generally, the writer has 
found females better suited for fine assembly tasks 
involving small parts, while males seem to perform 
better on large assemblies. 
While it is  theoretically true that both sexes can 
be trained to perform each job equally well, the normal 
cultural influences provide differential experience for 
men and women. It is therefore wise to take advantage 
of these differences in staffing the white room. 
SPECIAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED 
WITH GLOVE-HANDED 
WHITE ROOM ASSEMBLY TASIG 
In most white room production facilities which 
have a requirement to produce very sensitive, highly 
reliability missile and space equipment, assemblers 
are  required to wear sheer, lightweight gloves while 
performing their jobs. These gloves a re  worn in order 
to reduce the probability of contaminating the equip- 
ment with dust particles and organic substances which 
adhere to or  are generated by bare skin. The need for 
these gloves poses a number of questions, however, 
for production management. The questions posed are 
as follows: 
1, What effect do gloves have on finger 
dexterity? 
2. In what way is production output affected 
by the use of gloves ? 
3, Are gloves with plastic palms and fingers 
better than all-nylon gloves? 
4. Are special aptitude tests or procedures 
required for measuring glove-handed finger dexterity? 
An experiment was therefore designed to provide 
answers to some of these questions. 
The experiment compared the performance of 
two groups of individuals having identical aptitude for 
bare-handed finger dexterity on a test for this aptitude 
where one of the groups took the test with gloves and 
the other without them. Consequently, the difference 
in performance of the groups if any, could be attrib- 
uted only to the effect of wearing gloves. 
The results of the experiment clearly indicated 
a significant loss in finger dexterity and a consequent 
decrease in output when gloves were used. Further- 
more there was a predicted loss of 30% in output for 
tasks of an assembly nature. 
An experiment identical to the one described 
above but comparing all-nylon gloves with gloves having 
plastic palms and fingers was also performed. The re- 
sults of this experiment showed that the plastic material 
does not facilitate finger dexterity and is  in no way ,su- 
perior to 60 denier nylon. 
This study therefore leads to the following rec- 
ommendations: 
1, Since even sheer, lightweight gloves sig- 
nificantly reduce finger dexterity, a very careful analysis 
should be made to determine whether o r  not their use by 
white room personnel is absolutely essential for the pur- 
pose of reliability. If the deeision to use gloves is  made, 
a decrement in the output by assemblers is to be expected. 
2. Althoughthereisnosignificant difference 
between all-nylon gloves and gloves with plastic palms 
and fingers, the former type of glove is preferred be- 
cause it is easier to launder and does not peel or dis- 
integrate as do the plastic ones. 
3, Since a strong aptitude for glove-handed 
finger dexterity is essential in white rooms where 
wearing gloves is a requirement, the conventional finger 
dexterity tests used for selection purposes should be 
administered with the testee wearing gloves. This 
will provide a more direct measure of aptitude tor glove- 
handed activities. 
TRAINING WHITE ROOM PERSONNEL 
It has already been pointed out elsewhere that 
white room management often naively assumes that most 
of the problems inherent in working in a white room 
environment can be solved in a number of training ses- 
sions. The preceding discussion, however, should serve 
to emphasize the fact that some individuals, regardless 
of training, would not qualify for white room work by 
reason of aptitude, personality, or both. Training should 
therefore be thought of as  useful in preparing the qualified 
worker for his job in the white room rather than for qual- 
ifying an unqualified individual. In other words, training 
cannot serve as a substitute for a good screening and 
selection program. 
It is only after suitable selection criteria have 
been used to choose the future white room occupants 
that a sound training program can be developed. Broadly 
speaking, such a program, to be effective, should con- 
sist of two phases--namely orientation training and tech- 
nical training. Orientation training should provide: 
1. A thorough explanation of the special rules, 
regulations, and procedures each worker is required 
to follow and, 
2, the rationale for requiring strict adherence 
to these regulations. 
The importance of this phase of white room train- 
ing cannot be overemphasized because it provides the 
very basis for each worker's future attitude toward con- 
forming both to apparently rigid standards of behavior 
and to a strange,unfamiliar physical setting. Conse- 
quently, it is only by providing him with a clear under- 
standing of the reasons for these standards and their 
implications for reliability that he can develop positive 
attitude toward strict adherence to white room procedure. 
Technical training, on the other hand, should 
be primarily concerned with teaching each white room 
employee the specific technical skills and knowledge 
which he will need to perform his job adequately. Em- 
phasis should be given during this phase of training to 
those aspects of the job which are made unique due to 
the special white room requirements imposed upon them. 
Here again, every opportunity should be taken to pro- 
vide the worker with the rationale for employing the 
special techniques and procedures which he will be re- 
quired to adopt. Such explanations a re  essential if white 
room personnel are to develop a genuine willingness to 
relinquish old, familiar work habits for unfamiliar, new 
ones. 
Ideally, training should take place in an environ- 
ment as nearly similar as possible to the one in which 
the actual work will be performed. Simulating the 
white room conditions during training is therefore of 
special importance in effecting a suitable transition 
from training:to the real work situation. Such simula- 
tion can, of course, be easily accomplished if a special 
area of the white room is set aside for training purposes 
only, and if the trainees are required to dress and behave 
according to white room procedure. Where the aim of 
training is to teach the trainee to use special tools or 
to use a tool in a special way, the tools and the units 
upon which they are to be used should, if possible, be 
identical with those to be found on the job. 
It should be noted that on-the-job training is 
recommended as a part of white room training since 
this technique permits the worker to learn his job on 
equipment which is being produced for operational use. 
Such procedure is antithetical to high reliability and 
should be avoided. Instead, formal training, under 
simulated conditions, should be employed to bring each 
worker to the point where he can take his place as a 
reliable contributor to the manufacturing process. 
Since it is not always obvious, it is necessary to 
point out that training not only has an effect upon the 
reliability of human performance but also upon condi- 
tions of morale and motivation. The reason for this 
becomes clear when we consider the fact that a worker 
who is insufficiently prepared,% his job cannot hold 
a very favorable attitude toward his work or his em- 
ployer. In fact, because he recognizes this depriva- 
tion, he is very likely to resent management for failing 
to provide him with the necessary wherewithal to under- 
stand and perform his job to the best of his capacity. 
As a consequence, he is often prone not to put forth his 
best effort. 
A sound training program is therefore essential 
to human reliability since it has a profound effect both 
upon worker skills and attitudes. 
WHITE ROOM MORALE AND MOTIVATION 
The level of white room morale and motivation 
is  a function of so many factors that it is often amusing 
to find a superficial attempt to control it by means of 
"pep talks", newsletters, posters, special badges, and 
bulletin boards. While such techniques can be benefi- 
cial, they are inadequate to materially affect the basic 
psychology of the white room workers. Much more in- 
fluential in this respect are the selection and training 
programs which, if adequate, go a long way toward 
eliminating the white room "misfit1* and his demoral- 
izing effect upon those around him. 
To best describe the complexity of factors 
which contribute to conditions of poor morale and mo- 
tivation, a specific example will belcited from the au- 
thor's experience as a white room consultant. Con- 
sider for example the following complaints made to the 
writer by male assembly workers scheduled for white 
room employment, whose morale and motivation were 
at an extremely low ebb in anticipation of their new as- 
signment. They complained that: 
1. Dressing and undressing was a nuisance 
and that the procedure was extremely cumbersome. 
2. Adherence to the.strict procedures was too 
much of a strain. 
3. The nature of the work was tedious and 
monotonous. 
4. The chances for advancement were either 
absent or extremely limited. 
5. The pay scale did not seem to be commen- 
surate with the special work requirements imposed by 
the facility. 
6. The requirement to eat lunch in a special 
area within the white room itself would generate a 
feeling of being in captivity. 
7. The sterile condition of the white room was 
a health hazard. 
8. The protective hood would cause the hair to 
fall out. 
9. The restrictions upon mobility within the 
white room were too confining. 
10. The requirement to work with gloves made 
the job more difficult. 
11. The prohibition against bringing personal 
tools into the white room increased the difficulty of the 
job. 
12. The extreme lighting conditions caused 
eyestrain. 
A careful analysis of the situation revealed that 
these individuals had not been chosen for their jobs on 
the basis of valid selection criteria. As a matter of 
fact, high intelligence and strong ambition were the 
principal criteria used for selection. That these stand- 
ards were inappropriate can be gleamed from the work- 
ers' concern with .the monotony of the work, the limit- 
ed chances'for advancement, and the desire for higher 
Pay. 
The situation was further complicated by an in- 
adequate training program which failed to provide the 
men with a suitable rationale for the special white room 
procedures. This partially accounts for their unaccept- 
ing attitude toward the reguirements for special white 
room clothing, the use of gloves, the prohibition a- 
gainst using personal tools, and the strictness of white 
room regulations. 
It will be noted that some concern was express- 
ed with respect to health factors. Here again, a good 
indoctrination program could have helped dissipate much 
of the fears associated with excessively sterile white 
room conditions, falling hair, and eyestrain. 
The requirement to eat a lunch in a special 
area within the white room itself was an unnecessary 
restriction. Although this requirement is not uncom- 
mon, it could not be easily justified to the workers on 
the basis of reliability. Consequently, the feeling of 
being a "captive employee" had some basis in fact, 
with the result that a good deal of resentment was gen- 
erated because of it. 
During the course of the analysis it was dis- 
covered that one of the employees possessed a morbid 
fear of enclosed places (claustrophobia). This individ- 
ual, obviously unsuited for white room employment, 
may have conveyed his fear to others around him. Per- 
haps this accounts for the unusual preoccupation of a 
number of employes with the confining nature of the 
work environment. 
If we review the factors which contributed to 
poor morale and motivation in our example, we find 
the following: 
1. The use of inappropriate selection criteria. 
2. The failure of the training program to prop- 
erly indoctrinate white room trainees. 
3. The placement of an undesirable restric- 
tion on employee mobility during the lunch hour. 
4. The failure to screen applicants for emo- 
tional disturbances which are detrimental to effective 
white room performance. 
Because it is typical, the specific example 
cited in this section has been used to illustrate the 
principal determinants of white room morale and mo- 
tivation. It will therefore serve to concretize the gen- 
eral recommendations which follow 
1. Valid selection criteria and effective train- 
ing are critical to the development and maintenance of 
favorable morale and motivation conditions. Their 
importance has already been fully discussed. 
3. Techniques and procedures should be de: 
veloped for reducing the monotony produced by work-' ' 
ing continilously in a homogeneous environment. One 
such technique would be to permit white rooin 'employ2 
ees to eat lunch outside the white room. I ,  
4. All persons considered for white room work 
work should be screened by the plant physician to in- 
sure the absence of severe emotional problems. Es- 
pecially harmful to white room morale are individ- 
uals who possess strong tendencies toward claustro- 
phobia (fear of enclosed or confined places) and hypo- 
chondria (preoccupation with health). The personal- 
ity tests used during selection should also serve to ' 
eliminate emotionally unstable applicants. 
In conclusion, the writer would like to point out 
that he has dealt in this section with factors which he 
considers to be intrinsic to morale and motivation. 
If these are optimized there may be very little need to 
rely on anything else. 
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This paper describes a procedure fo r  estima- 
t ing direct  maintenance personnel requirements. 
A model i s  presented f o r  gathering information. 
A sample problem is used t o  describe manipula- 
t ion  of the information t o  derive a manning 
document. 
INTRODUCTION 
Needs fo r  early support requirement estimates 
a re  well known. Personnel plans must be made 
well i n  advance of weapon system acquisition 
t o  ge t  the  necessary budget approval; develop 
and construct training procedures, equipment 
and f ac i l i t i e s ;  select,  recrui t  and t r a i n  
personnel; and determine the requirements for  
and construct housing and other personnel f ac i l -  
i t i e s .  Some i n i t i a l  estimates of t o t a l  manning 
numbers generally m u s t  be made a t  leas t  three 
o r  more years before system acquisition, and 
the additional de ta i l s  of s k i l l  types and 
levels  a t  l ea s t  two years i n  advance. 
An objective s tated explici t ly i n  many person- 
ne l  requirement estimates growing out of GORs, 
SORs, manufacturer's proposals and the l ike,  
is t o  minimize personnel requirements. This 
objecfive is  considered wrong. The objective 
advanced here i s  t o  increase an effectiveness- 
to-cost rat io.  
Assumptions 
A decentralized missile force with a central 
maintenance area w i l l  be used as an example 
when i l lus t ra t ing  the  effectiveness-to-cost 
rat io,  but a subtender with subs is  equally 
appropriate. A series  of assumptions are  made. 
a. hunch capability can be increased by 
ei ther  placing more maintenance capabil- 
i t y  a t  the origin of demands (buying 
more maintenance capability) o r  buying 
more missiles. 
b. Centralization of resources so they 
serve multiple locations provides 
greater opportunity f o r  resource u t i l i -  
zation but the t rave l  time reduces 
weapon responsiveness and increases mis - 
s i l e  downtime. 
c. Missile system a r e  quick reaction 
weapons. Maintenance capability at a 
central support area is  useless a f t e r  
the s t a r t  of hos t i l i t i e s .  
d. Resources may be ranked by potential 
ra te  of ca l l ,  as  a guidance technician 
may have a higher expected r a t e  of c a l l  
than an air-frame repairman. In  th i s  
case, the value of each additional man 
placed at the origin of requirements 
diminishes with each successive assign- 
ment. Eventually the manning of an 
additional position, and its potential  
re-t;wn i n  launch capability, costs more 
than a comparable return from purchase 
of another missile. A t  t h i s  point the 
cost of manning an additional position 
is  considered greater than i ts  potential 
return through increased launch capa- 
b i l i t y .  Purchase of more missiles be- 
comes the eff icient  approach t o  increase 
i n  launch capability. 
Procedure 
A l l  resources a re  tentat ively located a t  the 
central area and made available through spe- 
c i a l i s t  dispatch t o  the source of demands. To 
compute the expected a l e r t  levels with non- 
manned launch complexes, the expected demands 
are  multiplied by the  times required t o  meet 
them plus the t rave l  time from the central 
maintenance area, and t h i s  product is sub- 
tracted from the t o t a l  missile time available. 
&is residual number, divided by the  t o t a l  mis- 
s i l e  time available, yields the percentage of 
missiles normally on a l e r t  i f  the number of 


of minteaance men assigned t o  the launch com- 
plex is  zero. (This is convertable t o  expected 
hunch success by multiplying the a l e r t  per- 
centage by missile launch r e l i ab i l i t y .  For 
exanple, i f  expected a l e r t  is  70$ and launch 
re1ia.bility i s  50$6, w e c t e d  launch success i s  
35% 1 
The f i r s t  position f i l l e d  at the source of de- 
mands is  tha t  which makes the  greatest contri- 
bution t o  launch capability ( the  criterion). The 
cost of manning t h i s  position, including the 
requirements fo r  crew rotation, equipment, Ebnd 
additional f ac i l i t i e s ,  is compared t o  the cost 
of an equivalent increase through pwl-chase of 
another missile. When manning the  position is  a 
more eff icient  approach, the assignment is 
accomplished. 
The residual of tasks is  reaggregated t o  form 
new positions and tha t  position a t  the source 
of denands which would make the  second greatest 
contribution i s  f i l l ed .  The cost of manning 
t h i s  position i s  compared t o  the  cost of an 
equivalent increase through purchase of another 
missile. When manning the  position i s  a more 
eff icient  approach, the assignment is  accom- 
plished. The i te ra t ion  is continued, manning 
positions a t  the  source of demands u n t i l  the 
cost of an equivalent increase through purchase 
of another missile i s  the  more eff icient  approach. 
This approach t o  resource allocation, this trade- 
off between cost of a man and h i s  contribution 
t o  launch capability, i s  aa insurance alloca- 
t ion  procedure. It i n  no way reflects  the 
common objectives of minimizing manpower re- 
quirements o r  maximizing manpower ut i l izat ion.  
Maintenance manning f o r  the  central  support 
area i s  determined by f i r s t  estimating t o t a l  
workload expected f o r  t he  organization and 
assigning as much of it as  possible t o  insur- 
ance resources already allocated at the source 
of demands. Then the  additional men required 
t o  accomplish the  residual workload are  assigned 
t o  the centralized maini.enance area. To 
i l l u s t r a t e  the  procedure we now would l i k e  t o  
work through an example problem with you. 
How mmy of what kinds of resources a re  needed 
where and when t o  support a missile o r  a man- 
machine system? This i s  an example support 
allocation problem. Look at  Table 1. This 
presents a time phasing of the  l i f e  of a system. 
Zuagine yourself a t  point A. A word picture of 
need fo r  a new system has been presented i n  
such nebulous terms as "We need a missile tyye 
of weapon." The ideas a t  point B, (we need an 
I(=f3PI, perhaps several per target),  of a system 
t o  meet these needs provide a highly abstract  
picture of system composition. h g i n e  your- 
se l f  being asked, a t  t h i s  point i n  system 
development, t o  specify the resources, the 
personnel, spare parts, and equipment f o r  
support of t he  system. 
Imagine youxself a t  point D, and being asked 
the  same questions, Now a ssuqple system is 
available. You can be f a r  more accurate i n  
your description of support needs i f  you accu- 
mulate the r ight  kinds of information. 
This paper describes an infonnation model f o r  
use at  the point D stage when estimating re- 
sources t o  support a system. The inputs can 
be identif ied within exhibits and requirements 
present i n  today's Air Force contracting 
structure. 
Resource requirements w i l l  be computed fo r  a 
sample problem. The model assumes availabil- 
i t y  of information from s a r l i e r  stages such a s  
A, B, and C i n  Table 1. Inforination i n  the 
model has been generalized f o r  application t o  
these other stages of system l i f e .  
AN INEQRMATION MODEL 
Table 2 is  a schematic iUust ra t ion  of the 
information model o r  basic data package. The 
numbers and location of resources t o  support 
a system can be determined by analyzing the 
characteristics of t he  support uni t .  The 
support uni t  is a lowest ccumnon denominator f o r  
support at a given location. Call t h i s  one a 
s table platform i n  the guidance system. 
Support U n i t  
You must identify support requirements a t  the  
module, component, or  uni t  leve l  tha t  support 
w i l l  occur. This leve l  of d e t a i l  w i l l  vary 
with location; limiters w i l l  be introduced 
l a t e r .  
Describe the system-oriented, functional 
characteristics of the unit.  I f  its uncor- 
rrected f a i lu re  would abort the missile, there 
is  need f o r  immediate corrective maintenance. 
This kind of demand imposes a high time s t r e s s  
on the resource structure. Identify these 
cr i t ical- task characteristics. How frequently 
wi l l  the  demands f o r  resources a r i se?  
Identify resource requirements imposed by each 

















separation in to  corrective (malfunction-generated) 
and preventive mintenance tasks. 
Preventive Maintenance. The preventive main- 
tenance tasks generally a re  not pursued during 
a bat t le .  The-time when resources w i l l  meet 
these demnds can be controlled by management 
without a change i n  missile readiness, without 
an additional loss  i n  missile a l e r t  time. 
Location of resources t o  meet these require- 
ments is  determined by workload, a resource 
u t i l iza t ion  cri ter ion.  The category includes 
, a symptom-seeking ac t  frequently 
accomplished f o r  a group of support units a t  
a given moment, scheduled calibration or  peri- 
odic alignment t o  desired standards, a servicing 
cluster  which includes cleaning and lubrication, 
and scheduled removal of items f o r  overhaul o r  
condemnation. 
Corrective Maintenance. The time tha t  mal- 
functions t r i l l  occur is  generally not controll- 
able by management. The resul t  of malfunctions 
is a loss i n  missi le  a le r t ,  missile readiness. 
Identify resources and time required fo r  cor- 
rective maintenance of the support un i t .  
Mechanical equipment isolates  ml- 
functions o r t  uni ts .  Identify the  
manual a s s i s t s  t ha t  a r e  required. Identify 
the appropriate corrective action and resources 
necessary. The support uni t  per s e  may be 
removed and replaced a t  the using location or  
--
it may be an i n t e  rt of a higher assembly. 
When within-unit is  appropriate, identify 
the environmental and resource requirements. 
Calibration o r  alignment following the corrective 
action also requires resources f o r  a given 
length of time. Table 3 is  the same model i n  
tabular form, and presents another important 
consideration. 
Some support units a re  c r i t i ca l ;  correction of 
malfunctions i n  these support units would in- 
crease the number of missiles launched. Failure 
of support uni ts  1, 3 or 4 would cause an abort 
of the  missile. Their corrective maintenance 
tasks a re  marked with asterisks. Resources t o  
accamplish these c r i t i c a l  tasks which would in- 
crease the  number of missiles launched i n  time 
of c r i s i s ,  a re  described with greater de t a i l  i n  
Table 4. If support uni t  number 1 malfunctions, 
a special is t  027 is needed f o r  2 units of time 
t o  i so la te  the f au l t .  The 02 code represents 
an engine mechanic; the  7 is h is  s k i l l  level. 
!he time units  a r e  15-minute periods i n  t h i s  
problem. Special is t  2x5 spends 30 minutes i n  
removing and replacing the malfunctioning unit .  
An 027 spends 45 minutes realigning the system. 
The use of different  special is ts  i n  support of 
a single unit  directs  attention t o  possible 
use of the model as a car r ie r  of task  data 
and l a t e r  aggregating it in to  positions. The 
column lists the 
number of times this uni t  is expected t o  f a i l  
and generate requirements f o r  each of these 
tasks. To summarize, the tab le  describes: 
( a )  q e c t e d  frequency each sappork unit f a i l s  
during a launch program, (b) kind of action 
necessary, (c )  kind of resource t o  perform it, 
and (d) time necessary t o  acccunlplish the task. 
WhEbt resources a re  needed t o  support these 
possible demands? The resource information 
i s  fragmented by support uni t  and needs aggre- 
gation by kina of resource. 
Kinds of Resources Required t o  Accomplish Tasks 
Table 5 presents a re-sorting and aggregation 
by kind of resource. A l l  tasks i n  the  launch 
cri ter ion category t o  be accomplished by a 
spec ia l i s t  kind O27 are  l i s t e d  here. Their 
sum is presented at  the base of the  column. 
Only seven tasks may call. f o r  t he  services of 
spec ia l i s t  027. The chance of c a l l  during 
t h i s  kind of program, launch preparation, i s  
.0166. Most of the time these resources would 
be idle.  Yet there i s  a chance of two or  more 
ca l l s  f o r  a spec ia l i s t  t o  occur simultaneously. 
Resources a re  assigned tentat ively f o r  these 
c r i t i c a l  tasks which, by definition, they can 
meet. These launch c r i t i c a l  or  time-stress 
tasks a re  the c r i t e r i a  f o r  placing resources 
a t  the  source of demands. A corollary prob- 
l e m  is  accomplishment of non-critical day-to- 
day tasks. These are  assigned u n t i l  e i ther  
the  resources' available time or  t h e  task 
pool is  exhausted. 
AN APPLICATION 
This model was used in a simulated ICBM 
set t ing i n  the RAND Logistics Systems Iab- 
oratory t o :  (a )  yield resource allocation 
(man and support equipment), (b) estimate the  
degree they were utilized, and (c)  show the 
relat ion between increasing Launch crew s i ze  
and operational a l e r t  and launch success. We 
plan t o  use the model i n  estimating maintenance 
requirements for  Skybolt,a Douglas ALBM f o r  
SAC and Bri t ish Aircraft . 
ON THE APPLICATION OF LINEAR PROGRAMMING TECHNIQUES TO WfiTMAN FACTORS IN SPACE kr,,.RAMS 
Paul A. Young 
Sperry Utah Company 
S a l t  Lake Ci ty ,  Utah 
This paper presents  a mathematical model 
which provides opt ional  crew t a s k  scheduling. 
The model employs l i n e a r  programming techniques 
t o  def ine  an ob jec t ive  funct ion t o  be optimized 
based upon individual  t a s k  prof ic iencies .  A dis-  
cussion of t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  and evaluat ion of pro- 
f i c i ency  ind ices  preceeds the  presenta t ion of the  
assignment model. The methods used t o  solve  t h e  
proposed model a r e  not  discussed because they a r e  
f e l t  t o  be beyond t h e  scope of t h i s  paper. 
The funct ional  representa t ion of t h e  prob- 
a b i l i t y  of mission success, o r  r e l i a b i l i t y  of a 
space veh ic l e  i s  defined i n  terms of two impl i c i t  
r e l i a b i l i t y  funct ions* ( 1 )  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  of t h e  
equipment and (2) t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  o r  proficiency 
of man. In  general  t hese  two functions a r e  not  
independent, but  a r e  i n  turn ,  funct ions  of each 
other.  Estimates of equipment r e l i a b i l i t y  can be 
made through t h e  use  of t e s t i n g  procedures on t h e  
equipment and s t a t i s t i c a l  models t o  evaluate t h e  
data  from t h e  t e s t s .  The evaluat ion of human 
p ro f i c i enc ies  can be made i n  much t h e  same way, 
Tes t ing procedures cons i s t an t  with object ives  can 
be devised and s t a t i s t i c a l  models consis tant  with 
t h e  t e s t s  applied. 
Once these  r e l i a b i l i t i e s  o r  prof ic iencies  
have been es tabl ished it is poss ib le  t o  optimize 
t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  of the  mission. One aspect  of 
t h i s  optimization i s  t o  optimize crew se lec t ion,  
scheduling, and t a s k  assignment. 
Prof ic iencv Indices 
The f i r s t  s t e p  i n  optimizing human prof i -  
ciency is  t h e  assignment of a proficiency index 
f o r  each crew candidate f o r  each expected task,  
The prof ic iency index i s  defined as  a number Ci 
a e  j t h  task,  This number would be assigned 
2 which i s  a measure of t h e  i t h  man's capab i l i ty  n 
according t o  t h e  r e s u l t s  of s p e c i f i c  t e s t s  per- 
formed, 
The processes involved i n  t h e  t e s t i n g  re-  
qu i re  c e r t a i n  observations t o  be made according 
t o  some s t a t i s t i c a l  model and t h a t  t h e  data  be 
reduced t o  provide summary statements appropriate 
t o  the  inves t igat ion.  The r e s u l t s  of such data 
o f t en  conform t o  one o r  two d i s t i n c t  but  r e l a t e d  
typesz those pe r t a in ing  t o  t h e  d i f ferences  and 
those per ta in ing t o  t h e  consis tancies  between 
variables.  The form of t h e  s t a t i s t i c s  is  
genera l ly  t h e  r a t i o  of two variance est imates,  
one per ta in ing t o  the  con t ro l l ed  va r i a t ion  i n  t h e  
t e s t s  and the  o the r  t o  t h e  uncontrolled,  sr 
sampling, e r ro r s ,  Two s t a t i s t i c s  which a r e  
commonly used i n  connection with these  var iance  
es t imates  a r e  Snedecor9s t e s t - s t a t i s t i c  (F) and 
t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t  of i n t e r c l a s s  co r re l a t ion  (R), 
Each of these  s t a t i s t i c s  i s  used t o  answer a 
d i f f e r e n t  ques t ionr  F i s  r e l a t e d  t o  questions of 
d i f ference  while R is r e l a t e d  t o  questions of 
consistency* 
Pursuing t h i s  reasoning i n  more d e t a i l ,  t h e  
ana lys i s  of var iance  model f o r  a double o r  two- 
way c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  i s  shown below. Suppose t h e  
scores f o r  individuals  a r e  c l a s s i f i e d  i n t o  A 
groups on t h e  b a s i s  of one c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  and in- 
t o  B groups on t h e  bas i s  of another. Three com- 
ponent-of-variance models a r e  considered2 com- 
ponents of variance model (both c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  
A and B involve sampling from a normal popula- 
t i o n ) ,  f ixed components model (both c l a s s i f  ica- 
t i o n s  A and B involve no sampling), and mixed 
model ( c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  A involves sampling while 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  B involves no sampling). 
Each model requires  t h e  same breakdown of 
t h e  sum of squares and degrees of freedom, giving 
t h e  same var iance  estimates. The fundamental 
d i f ferences  between t h e  ana lys i s  of t h e  models i s  
i n  t h e  choice of t h e  proper var iance  es t imate  to 
be used with t h e  F s t a t i s t i c .  It  i s  important t o  
note t h a t  t h e  choice of one crew member i n  pre- 
ference t o  another reduces t o  t h e  same kind of 
problem i n  t h e  analys is  of variance a s  t h e  choice 
of one t r a n s i s t o r  i n  preference t o  another. I f  
t h e  analys is  of variance model has t h r e e  c l a s s i -  
f i c a t i o n s  ins tead of two then s imi la r  techniques 
may be used. For example, i f  t he re  is  no in t e r -  
ac t ion,  t h e  model becomes t h a t  of the  Latin 
Square. 
One e s s e n t i a l  d i f f e rence  t h a t  e x i s t s  be- 
tween t h e  physical  and t h e  behavioral  sciences 
(namely, t h e  question of l eve l  of measurement) 
makes it neceRsary t o  extend t he  evaluation 
techniques f o r  t he  human fac tors  area. Many 
measurements, especially i n  personality s tudies  
do not reach t h e  leve l  t h a t  is necessary i n  order 
t o  j u s t i f y  t he  use of t he  F s t a t i s t i c .  Members 
a r e  arranged only i n  t e r m  of t he  order of mag- 
nitude of an a t t r i b u t e  and i n  some cases i n  groups 
without regard t o  order within t he  group* In 
e i ther  case, t h e  analysis of variance techniques 
based rtpon t h e  F s t a t i s t i c  cannot be used. Fim 
such studies,  use  oan be made of non-parametric 
t e s t s  such a s  t he  chi-square o-: Kolmogorav- 
%mow distributions. Although these t e s t s  a r e  
sot a s  sens i t ive  a s  t he  parametric ones, they 
w i l l  serwe a s  a sa t i s fac tory  bas i s  i n  many oases 
f o r  detecting differences among members. 
fFased upon the  differences shown ia the  
models, each crew candidate can then be assigneel 
a proficiency index f o r  eaoh task. This index 
w i l l  r e f l e c t  h i s  capability i n  t h a t  task and h i s  
standing with respect  t o  t he  other  candidates 
perfomaqces. Using these indices t he  problem is 
to optimize crew select ion and assignment s o  a s  
to optimize t he  probability of mission success. 
Linear Proqramins Modei 
Linear programing could be defined a s  a 
methodology f o r  optimizing a given l inear  func- 
t ion  is terns of given l inear  constraints,  and 
the  variables in the  fklnction t o  be optimized are 
usually constrained t o  be non-negative, Consider 
t he  system of m l inear  equations i n  k unknowns 
where xi, x2, ... , xk are  unknown and the  other  
quantit  es a r e  constants, Suppose t he  equations 
a r e  consistant but  not suf f ic iep t  t o  determine 
t he  xi  uniquely, This indeterminacy w i l l  occur 
i f  k >  m, i f  k = m and the  system is lirfearly 
dependent; o r  i f  k c  m t he  indeterminacy may a l so  
exist. If the  additional conditions 
a r e  imposed, where c l ,  w. ... , ck a r e  given 
constants, then t he  problem is $0 s e l w t ,  out e f  
t h e  i n f i n i t e  number of solutions of the  system 
of l inear  equations (11, the  solution which con- 
t a in s  only non-negitive variables and for  which 
I 
t he  l inear  form (3) is an extreme. 
The general l inear  programming problem 
shown above is  given i n  the standard form where 
a l l  the constraint conditions a r e  s tated as  
equations, and t he  variables a r e  required t o  be 
non-negative. This need not be t he  case gen- 
erally. Linear programming applies equally well 
t o  problems where the constraints  a r e  inequal- 
i t i e s  o r  a mixture of equations and inequalities,  
and some of the variables can be negative. 
I f  a constraint is defined a s  a less-than 
condition so t ha t  
then t h i s  constraint can be written i n  the form 
of an equation by adding a non-negative variable 
si t o  the  l e f t  hand s ide and writing 
The variable si is called a slack variable be- 
cause it measures the  slack i n  the  or iginal  in- 
equality. If the constraint i s  written as a 
greater-than condition then by subtracting a non- 
negative slack variable t h i s  can be written as  
an equation, 
The objective function (3) is  i n  standard 
form when it is t o  be minimized. I f  i n  f ac t  an 
objective function is t o  be maximized 
then t h i s  can be put in to  standard form by 
writing- 
-kil x1 * ki2 x2 - ... -kin xn = minimum 
The standard form is  usual1y.a necessity fo r  
Bany of t he  solution techniques t o  converge. 
The Assianment Model 
Using the general l inear  programming model 
the assignment model can now be formulated. 
Assume k candidates a re  t o  be assigned t o  k 
tasks, Let x i  be the fract ion of time the i t h  
man spends on {he j t h  task and, again, l e t  c i j  
be the proficiency o r  effectiveness the i t h  man 
has for  the j t h  task, Then 
if each man is to be fully occupied. And 
if each task is to be filled. The constraints 
can be written in more compact form as 
The objective function would become 
+ 6.. + ckk xkk = maximum (12) 
First Second 
Candidate Candidate Candidate 
Task A 
I Task B I 6 5 1 I Task C 1 4 4 1 
Table I 
Proficiencies of Three Candidates 
for Three Tasks 
The equations of constraint for this exanple 
would be 
or '13 + .x23 + '3 ' 
cij xij = maximum (13) And the objective function would be 
j=l 
where the double summation indicates the values 
are to be summed over all indices i, j. (Hovi- 
ously, the xi are constrained to be non-negative 
since negativJ values would have no physical 
meaning. 
This model has one interesting property that 
other linear programming models do not,have. 
Since the right hand terms of the constraint 
equations are integral it can be shown that the 
values of the variables must also be integral. 
Further, since the constant terms are unity, the 
variables cannot exceed unity and hence, in view 
of the non-negative condition, the xi3 can take 
only the values zero or one. This means any 
optimum solution would assign one man full time 
to one task during any finite schedule time. TO 
illustrate the model consider the following 
simple example. Suppose three men'are to be 
assigned to three tasks. The proficiency indices 
of each man for each of the tasks are given in 
the table below. 
Table TI 
Possible Assignments of Three 
Candidates for Three Tasks 
. l  
For this example there are 3f combinations of 
assignments. The possibilities are shown below 






























where yl, y2, and y3 refer to the first, second, 
and third candidates respectively, Clearly, the 
fifth possibility would be the optimum, 
It should be clear from this example that as 
the number of candidates and tasks increases, a 
listing of all possibilities to choose an optimum 
would not be practical, 
We now have a suitable model for assigning 
candidates to tasks based upon each candidates 
proficiency for each task, For a time interval 
of arbitrary length the smae model would be a 
schedule of task assignments. The collection of 
models, for the total mission time, would repre- 
sent an optimum schedule. 
Suppose it is desired to select a crew for a 
particular mission, Assume the tasks necessary 
for successful completion of the mission are well 
defined (as they usually will be) and that the 
number of crew members needed is known, Suppose 
further that the proficiency index (cij)of each 
candidate for each task is also known, Let the 
number of tasks to be assigned be N and the 
number of candidates be K where K 7N. Again, 
xij would be the fraction of time the ith man 
spends at the jth task. The constraint equations 
and the objective function would be in the 
following form 
C C ci xij = maximum (17) 
The system (15) is in standard form, but the 
system (16) is not, Then as in equation (5), K 
non-negative slack variables may be added to (16) 
to transform it to standard form, as 
inary tasks* The proficiency indices related to 
these tasks are obviously zero since an un- 
assigned candidate could have no effect on the 




C c j + cij si)= maximum 
j=l j*+1 (19) 
where the second term in the parentheses is 
identically zero. The constraint matrix for the 
above example would take the form 
It should be noted that only N of the xij would 
have values different from zero upon solution, 
and K-N of the si would have non-zero value. A l l  
of the remaining variables would be zero, The 
non-zero xij would represent the crew chosen. 
Much has been written concerning the opti- 
mization 6f time cycles and work/rest ratios. It 
is important to establish the individual work/ 
rest cycles for crew candidates such that crew 
effeciency can be maintained for the complete 
mission. In addition, the proportion of crew 
members required for relief purposes must be 
found. For space missions, this latter considera- 
tion will, of course, be very severly limited due 
to weight, thrust, and cabin size limitations. 
The consideration of such work/rest cycles 
may be reflected in the model by constraining 
the variables as follows 
0 5  xqj 6Mij ( ~ ~ ~ d  1) for some i, j (21) 
that is, by not allowing one man to be assigned 
full time to one task. The upper bound Mi in 
expression (21) is the fraction of the t a d  
duration for which the ith man is capable of 
performing without any appreciable loss in 
effectiveness* Thus the extension of the model 
can be summarized as, using (lo), (ll), and (13) 
The slack variables would correspond to the un- 
assigned candidates and take the form of imag- 
/(22) 
i i cij xij = maximum 
i=l j=l 
where (22) is the original system and (22) plus 
(23) is the extended system, which includes the 
upper bounds on the variables. 
In general, all of the variables will be 
constrained for the sake of consistancy. How- 
ever, in practice, some of the Mij may be made so 
large they have no effect upon the solution. 
Network Rearesentation 
In recent years PERT-PEP management infor- 
mation techniques have become increasingly pop- 
ular. The use of these networking techniques 
have been excellent aids to management personnel 
for scheduling and identifying troublesome areas 
in the schedule. The use of network techniques 
may also be an aid in assigning crew members for 
space missions. The network in figure I 
illustrates the possible assignments of three 
candidates for three tasks. 
Figure P 
Network Illustrating the Possible Assignment 
of Three Candidates for Three Tasks 
Tasks 
- 
- ' ? J  ,,' P,h" 
The use of the solid or dotted lines is a 
graphic representation of the condition that all 
tasks be filled and all candidates be assigned. 
For example, if the first candidate is assigned 
task B, then the only decision to be made is 
whether path BAC or BCA is to be.followed to com- 
plete the assignments. Of course, this decision 
is based on the relative proficiencies associated 
with each path, The above network is actually a 
combination of two networks, one overlayed on the 
other, each of which gives three of the possible 
assignments. The dotted constraints are one net- 
work, and the solid constraints are another. 
First Second Third 
Candidate Candidate Candidate 
The use of a network would be very limited, 
however, since an increase in crew candidates 
and/or tasks greatly increases the complexity of 
the network. Since a network illustrating the 
assignment of l? candidates to N tasks Pas Nf 
possible assignments, the number of constraint 
lines tend to confuse the network as N increases. 
For the network shown there are 12 constraint 
lines and, in general, for the assignment of N 
candidates to N tasks the network would have 
N(N-1)2 constraint lines. 
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Introduction 
High reliability requirements of today's aero- 
dynamic and space flight control systems have 
generated many new concepts. In recent years, 
the role of the automatic flight control system 
has changed. Originally considered an accessory 
item, it has reached the point where success of 
the intended mission depends upon its satisfactory 
operation. Present-day high-speed aircraft, for 
instance, exhibit poor stability characteristics at 
certain flight conditions, making .it very difficult 
for  the pilot to control the craft, much less per- 
form his intended mission, without stability aug- 
mentation system. 
In manned space vehicles the need is even 
greater. During the critical periods of launch 
and exit from, and re-entry into the earth's at- 
mosphere, vehicle flight path and attitude will 
have to be maintained within very close limits, 
not only to maintain the desired course but also 
to prevent the vehicle's destruction from exces- 
sive heating rates and aerodynamic forces. The 
required tight control, coupled with poor vehicle 
stability, presents a control problem which is 
beyond a human pilot's capabilities. 
Naturally, this growing dependence on the 
automatic control system has focused greatly in- 
creased attention on its reliability. While per- 
formance demands upon future systems are great, 
reliability requirements are  the most difficult to 
meet. In comparison with present capabilities, 
it is perhaps the single area in which the great- 
est  improvement over existing techniques must 
be made to satisfy projected future control system 
requirements. 
Methods To Improve Reliability 
System complexity has increased by leaps 
and bounds due to the high performance charac- 
teristics of new vehicles and the greater demands 
to perform more functions automatically. At- 
tempts to simplify control systems have resulted 
in minor improvements in reliability. 
Improving reliability through the develop- 
ment of highly reliable parts has not been ade- 
quate to meet the demands of flight control sys- 
tems for space vehicles. The reliability of pres- 
ent flight control systems for aerodynamic con- 
trolled vehicles ranges from 100 to 500 hours 
mean-time-between failures. 
These systems may be improved by a factor 
of 4 or 5 through the use of high reliability parts. 
Much emphasis has been given to'electronic part 
improvement on programs such as  Minuteman. 
In mild environmental applications these parts 
may exhibit improved reliability by an order of 
magnitude o r  more. 
However, this improvement cannot be achiev- 
ed in the more severe spacg environments. To 
meet space reliability requirements, systems 
must be improved by 2 or 3 orders of magnitude. 
At the present state-of-the-art, the required 
degree of reliability improvement can be achieved 
through the use of redundancy. 
With redundancy comes the consideration of 
weight, volume, cost, and performance. Thus, 
the objective is to maximize reliability and per- 
formance while minimizing weight, volume, and 
cost. 
To achieve this objective with a conventional 
control system requires a triple redundant mech- 
anization. The operation may be the voting 
scheme, which results in dropping out the one , 
channel that is in disagreement. The dual redun- ' 
dant adaptive control system with monitors has 
achieved high reliability without degradation of 
performance. 
Adaptive Flight Control System 
Let us compare the operation of a conven- 
tional control system and an adaptive control 
system. 
Consider the block diagram of Figure 1, 
which depicts a conventional approach to the con- 
trol problem. Note the ai  frame transfer func- d tion. The parameters wa . a, Ta, and K are. 
in general, functions of the airframe aerodynamic 
characteristics, the flight speed and altitude. 
These parameters might have variations as high 
as 50 to 1 through the flight envelope of a super- 
sonic vehicle. Hence, to provide satisfactory 
damping augmentation to a vehicle with such 
widely varying dynamic characteristics, it is 
normally necessary to program the feedback gain 
K i, with air  data information such as dynamic 
pressure, Mach number and altitude. In some 
cases it may even be necessary to program the 


































































reliability of this simple type control system is  
dependent upon the reliability of the a i r  data com- 
puter system, the motor gear-train repeaters, 
and the non-linearly wound potentiometers used he self -adaptive system previously des - 
to  program the feedback parameters. d is capable of adjusting its operation, 
gh the gain changer, to compensate for  com- A major step in improving reliability is to ponent deterioration. Obviously the gain com- 
eliminate the need for  a i r  data information. In puter, sensing the performance of the ent i rea i r -  
1954, Honeywell s e t  out to eliminate gain sched- craft-control system loop, cannot detect whether 
uling without compromising performance. The changes in this performance a r e  caused by chan- idea was to devise a system which could effec- ges in aircraft  characteristics or  changes in tively evaluate i ts  own performance and al ter  i t s  component performance. H ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  i t  cornpen sates feedback gain tomaintain a desired performance accordingly for variations in gain or dynamic level. This was named  he Self-Adaptive Con- response occurring anywhere in the loop. This t ro l  Systemu. feature makes the system extremely tolerant of 
component variations and in a sense  tends t o  up- 
As indicated Figure '* a is used to grade component re1iabiliti.e~. In a conventional 
shape vehicle response to the desired response system, for  example, a 50 per cent decreasein 
characteristics f o r  al l  commands. The vehicle gain of a particular amplifier might result  in un- is made to the of the model by main- satisfactory operation of the system and would 
taining a high-gain control loop following the be  considered a failure of the amplifier. In the 
model commands. The model is an electrical adaptive system such a loss would be  compen- 
analog simulating the desired dynamic charac- sated for by the gain computer. terist ics of the vehicle. In other words, when 
an electrical signal is fed to the model network, 
the output of the network is an electrical signal 
representing the desired output response of the Approach to  the Adaptive Control System 
vehicle. By comparing the vehicle response with *
the model response and feeding the e r r o r  signal 
to  an authoritative controller, it is possible to At the outset of this program, the single 
enforce correspondence of the vehicle response adaptive control system was evaluated fo r  use in 
t o  the model response. This control loop (in- the X-15 vehicle. The reliability analysis in- 
cluding a ra te  gyro, amplifier, variable gain, dicated a reliability factor of 0. 995 for a one 
servo, surface actuator, and aircraft)  must have hour mission. 
a bandwidth at  least three  times the bandwidth 
of the model to prevent further shaping of the This system proved t o  be  unsatisfactory fo r  
command due t o  the controller dynamics. This two reasons. Fi rs t ,  the single system config- 
wide bandwidth is obtained primarily through uration offered no failsafety. One of the prime 
automatic gain control, which continuously seeks requirements of automatic flight control systems 
the maximum gain operating condition. This gain f o r  hypersonic or  space vehicles is that they be  
level is called critical gain, and it is detected by failsafe. This r e w i r e s  that the flight control 
means of a small-amplitude limit cycle. The system be designed such that no failure cancause 
amplitude of this limit cycle (for the F-101 sys- vehicle destruction. Second, even though the 
tem this amounted to 0. 1 degree of surface de- reliability factor was reasonable fo r  the speci- 
flection) is compared to  a reference amplitude fied mission, the system to be  developed requir-  
se t  point and tightly controlled to this reference ed high reliability for an extended mission period. 
amplitude by the gain computer. Any tendency 
fo r  the limit cycle to become larger  results in an To accomplish both of these requirements, 
immediate gain reduction, while loss of the limit tr iple redundant systems were studied. Figure 
cycle initiates an immediate gain increase. 3 is a simplified reliability mode showing the 
tr iple redundant component summing mechaniza- 
This adaptive technique therefore provides tion. Several complications which a rose  in iso- 
uniform aircraft  response to commands through- lating the components led to  the redundant chan- 
out the flight envelope by varying the flight con- nel summing mechanization shown in  Figure 4. 
t rol  system gain a s  an inverse function of the a i r -  
craft  surface  effectiveness through the operation However, due to  other limiting factors in 
of the self-contained gain computer. Thus, the the system, principally the reliability of the 
adaptive concept is independent of a i r  data inputs servos, i t  was decided to  provide a dual redun- 
from a central a i r  data computer. dant system with "automatic decision devices". 
This configuration provided for  failsaf ety and 
The adaptive system differs from the con- continuous operation for any failure. The block 
ventional system in that a model and an auto- diagram of this system is shown in Figure 5. 
matic gain computer have been added and the a i r  The block diagram shows a single axis augmen- 
data scheduling have been deleted. The Honeywell tation configuration with pilot commands. ~ l l  
self-adaptive concept was f i rs t  successfully de- elements a r e  redundant, except for  the servo. 















































(MTBF) of the complete nonredundant augmenta- system. To prevent complete loss  of vehicle 
tion system (excluding servos) wag 340 hours. cobtrol, this  section of the system was surroun- 
The corresponding redundant augmenthtion sys- d,ed bp.fixed gain loops. In case  of a hardover 
tern had a predicted MTBF in excess of 100,000 f + i l u ~ q  of this element the system would function 
hours based on a one-hour mission. ili low fixed gain mode, thereby providing at 
least minimum damping.for +he pilot. The pro- 
Additional electronics not shown in Figure 5 bability of this type fa i lwe  Occurring was ex- 
were included in the system. These electronics tremely small, yet failsafety was mandatory. 
were provided for  the pilot to  select operational ' .1 
modes and hold modes. Redundancy was not Early labordtory te% of this system using 
used in the pilot flight system because these ele- a dual redundant simulator proved very success- 
ment s were  not flight essential. ful . The m echanization w:as thoroughly tested 
by removing portions of the circuits mounted on 
plug-in type circuit boards, thereby creating open 
Dual Redundant System type signals o r  no-signal conditions. By moni- 
toring the gain changer output, the analysis was 
The adaptive flight control system, such a s  , proven,to be correct: loop gain was maintained 
the one being flight tested in the No. 3 X-15 , at normal coedition by the remaining functional 
vehicle, lends itself exceptionally well t o  r e -  channel. Tiq ereate hardover commands, ex- 
dundant mechanization and provides failsafety. , traneoue poltages were  induced at various points 
After analysis, it was evident that a@proximately in the system. All hardover monitors were test- 
90 per cent of the  failures which would occur in ed repeategly to  assure  proper operation. 
the system would result in a no-signal condition. -. 
Since the system was adaptive, this type failure The entire system wag put into a test cham- 
posed no problem because a no-signal condition ber  and operated for 300 eours. Chamber tem- 
in one channel simply meant that the gain of the perature, pressure, an$'bumidity were varied 
other channel would double t o  compensate for over a two-hour period in..a~cordance with the 
the signal loss.' Therefore, 90 per cent of the 
, 
expected mission profile. . The cycling was re -  
problems were  solved. Yet t o  ensure failsafety % peated throughout the 30O3hours. During the test  
the other 10 per cent of the failures, i. e., of a six malfunctions were  ex~erienced.  Two were 
hardover orcfull output type, had to  be  elimina- -' associated with a pilot operated solenoid-held 
ted. This was done by installing hardover moni- switch; three with the aw .position transmitter 
to r s  a t  strategic,points in the system, thereby . (control by yaw and one with the normal 
cdnverting hardaver failures t o  open circuit o?? . ' accelerometer cornparato$; These failures were 
n ~ ~ s i g n a l  conditzon. al l  associated with the  pilot flight system. 
. . 
Analysis pointed out a major deficiency in Necessary remedial a -tion wgs taken and 
provisions for  continuous control after  a single .; field tes ts  to  date have s4 wn no recurrencei of 
failure. TAhardover failure of a particular ele- these problems.- 
8 
ment (lead network amplifier) would result in an - I f 
ineffective system because the channel containing Flight testing of this system is now bei& 
the defective element would be balanced by the . conducted in the No. 3 X-15~at  Edwards Air orce  F surviving channek, leaving no range f o r  control . Base, California. Thig eehicle has  made fo  r 
authority. These elements could not b e  monii . flights to date, a l l  highly-successful. After 'the 
tored for hardovers, since their outputs were first  three flights, o r  a td-tal flying t ime of $2 
required to'reach maximum under normal opera- minutes, the autopilot wag completely qualified 
ting conditions, in the aerodynamic regions. The fourth flight, 
" conducted on April 20, 19v2, reached a mt~rjmum 
study df the  problem resulted in  placing ; speed of 3,818 miles p e r r o q r  and an altitude of 
comparaten type monitor between the outputs of , 207,000 feet. Damping with, the reaction col;ltrols 
the redupdant channels and setting it t o  t r ip  at , at high altitude was just as good as with aergdy- 
140 per cent -of the output of one element. This ' '' namie controls at lower altitudes. Future flFghts 
meant, then, that both elements could go t o  sat- will be for pilot indoctrination o r  for completely 
uration in the same direction and not t r ip  the ' - qualifying-the system in a l l  flight regimes. 
monitor:---If a haydover failure should occur in . - -. I 
one of the,components, i t s  output would go to  a . i 1 
m a x i h u g  in one direction. ~ h i k  would begin t o  : Flight Control )Sys&ms f $r O t k e ~  $picecqafts 
. ' 
, , 1 * .  .- : &. - -  c command' the vehicle,, which would result in a i - 
gyro outputf of opposite polarity &nd thereby drive The -eerieice gained 'on th; X - l b  adaitive ion-  
the nonfailed channel in the opposite direction. tr'ol &system ?ill b e  utilized to  a d v a n ~ e  the stpte- 
The difference between the outputs of the two ele- of-the-art. The control sys,tem beidg deyel9ped 
ments would ver"' rapidly excee8140 per cent of i for another Bpacecraft will Be designed t o  eltmin- 
either output wit 3: only slight qircraft motion. : , ate  the low fixed gain moee. This configqration 
' is shown in-Figure 6. This sg$em proviae~j ;.OP 
Since this type monitor could'not distinguish '1 , failsafe opetdkion and con inuoys adaptivej dbndol 
which channel,wa$ in error ,  the pqly alternative " 1 for any single {ailure. i . '. > !  
was t o  effectively remove both elements fromthe ' i ,  . .-- i 
Space vehicles having a mission period well 
in excess of 100 hours will utilize al l  methods of 
achieving high reliability, such a s  simplification, 
derating, redundancy, etc. One of the principal 
means of achieving high reliability will be in-  
flight maintenance. Studies made on the redun- 
dant channel adaptive simulator have proven the 
feasibility of this  concept. As  mentioned earl ier ,  
entire circuits were  removed without degradation 
of vehicle control. Accepting this approach, 
ultra-reliability of the adaptive control system 
can be  achieved by short periods between inspec- 
tion and providing a reasonable quantity of spare  
circuits. 
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The re l i ab i l i ty  of nuclear power systems This is  further related t o  SNAP 10A, 2, and 8 
f o r  space applications i s  one of the important uses i n  Figure 3. You w i l l  note how these 
factors thatr.siU make this energy source nuclear auxiliary power packages are w e l l  suited 
practical. The study of environmental effects for the forthcoming systems made practical by 
on the re l i ab i l i ty  of these space systems and the larger boosters.3 The space p m r  require- 
thei r  electronic payloads involves not only the ments are expcted t o  reach the megawatt range 
usual conditions of space but adds t o  it the by the 70's. 
requirements fo r  long term endurance and 
radiation resistance. The study of these Endurance time requirements during this 
effects can be expensive and time consuming. A period w i l l  increase from one t o  f ive years of 
simplified analytical technique has been unattended operation, 
developed a t  Atomics International which uses 
available t e s t  and performance data and requires These requirements for  nuclear power in 
limited additiondl testing. T h i s  program should space must be sa t is f ied  by highly reliable 
provide reliable systems for nuclear auxiliary systems, engineered t o  withstand the many 
power (SNAP) tha t  trill be suitable fo r  the environments encounteredr The additional effect  
space payload and electr ical  propulsion of nuclear parer on systems and electronic 
requirements of the larger systems of the l a t e  payloads ut i l iz ing this power must be 
601s and 70's. quantitatively determined and used i n  the 
selection of long l i f e  components, Also, the 
Introduction associated environments of long term endurance, 
hard vacuum, high %emperatwe, micrometeorite 
The application of nuclear technology t o  flux, electron and proton bombardment must be 
the problem of providing long lived energy integrated with this reactor environment. 
sources for space uti l izat ion i s  a natural 
outgrow-th of this reactor technology, This More experimental effort  i s  needed in 
application has reached practicality nar as studying the effect  of the combination of 
represented by the SIIU 3 isotopic power radiation and extreme (high and low) temperatures 
package and is soon to  be tested i n  the AEC and ultra-high vacuum, and further studies are 
program for the SIJAP 10A (Figure I ) ,  SNAP 2 and required t o  determine the effects of high energy 
SNAP 8 nuclear reactor power packages, particles found in space on materials, Basic 
research t o  determine the mechanism of radiation 
The electr ical  energy requirement for space effects is  also needed i n  order t o  develop 
payloads and propulsion 1dll soon fa r  outstrip suitable methods f o r  predicting l i f e  of materials 
a l l  energy devices except fo r  the nucleax and components in a radiation field. 
reactor type, I n  Figure 2 we see the growth of 
payload and electr ical  propulsion requirements The work a t  Atomics International i s  
a s  the booster parer capabilities are increased. directed toward testing and data accmnulation 
under these combined environments. The program 
w i l l  use the lrimited data available on radiation 
and space effect from many outside sources and 
X- TbJorlc being conducted under AEC Contract from this testing a t  Atomics International, 
~T(l1-1) -GEN-8. These data are being related t o  the re l iabi l i ty  
performance of the system by simplified analyti- 
ca l  techniques. 
The Reliability F'roblen 
The fundamental problem facing the 
reliab5lity analyst is one of obtaining good 
data on the effect of radiation, heat and vacuum 
cm electronic components and electrical materials 
and relating them t o  the reliable Life of the 
sy&m While a great number of special tes ts  
have been performed, i n  almost every case the 
data taken do not prwide s tat is t ical  infornation 
on these environmental factors. Statistical data 
a m  lacking in terms of insufficient sample size, 
unsystematic variation of components (rating, 
manufacturing, similarity, and type), and 
sucessjf ajlure criteria, Gross effects, of 
course, are known; and if assumptions axe made 
abaat unincluded factor effects, qqantitative 
v&ues can be desoribed. 
The need t o  prepare reliabili ty analyses on 
equipment exposed to, these new combined 
ermironments requires consideration of new 
techniques and a re-examination of present 
metbds, Yhe exponential fd lu re  lm 
(R r e -At) is dependent upon, f i rs t ,  the 
requirement that a l l  pasts i n  electronic systems 
introduce independent sources of rapid 
catastrophio failures; second, the mean time 
betiween failure is dependent upon replacemnt of 
failed parts w i t h  new parts as soon as failure 
ocuurs; and, finally, the failures are random in 
tiw and, in general, representative of the 
sustained failure rate for the system. 
Most of these conditions are not met and, 
m n  i f  they were, the use of this formula as 
the exclusive measure of survival probability is 
highlyunconsemtive since only a fraction of 
the .total failure potential is considered. The 
\ remajnder of the failures are those resulting 
from the degrading influences of nuclear and 
temperature environment. Both of these 
categories of failure mst be integrated in some 
manner so that a probabilistic estimate can be 
made of the l i f e  and performance of an electronic 
component exposed to this  space-radiation- 
temperature environment. 
Reliability analpis  of equipmnt exposed 
to radiation, high temperature, and vacuum is 
dspendeKb upon data properly taken under these 
environments. The data-producing test  mst be 
designed so that factor effects can be isolated 
or can be combined w i t h  other factors, and the 
conibined effect deternrined. Sufficient levels 
of each factor should be selected in order that 
more general use of the data can be made without 
recourse t o  extrapolation, Many industrial 
contractors have or w i l l  have specific Cest 
requirements; and i f  these requirements were 
adjusted i n  terms of sample size, environmental 
levels, or inclusion of an additional environ- 
mental factor, it would be possible to satisfy 
mr-all data requirements. 
The Battelle &nor ia l  Institute a t  
Columbus, 0hi0,l has compiled and edited the 
tes t  results on electronic coxnponents and systems 
that have been exposed to  nuclear radiation. 
These tes t s  were conducted by a mltituae of 
contractors who perfomaed them to  satisfg special 
tgchnlcal requirenents. These r sults have been f published i n  a series of reports and, since they 
describe the majority of t e s t  effort in tens of 
radiation environment today, they form the basic 
data for initial reliabili ty analyses. It is, 
therefore, of interest t o  examine these data t o  
determine their suitability for reliabili ty 
purposes, 
An examination of the contents reveals that 
engineering data predominate rather than 
stat is t ical  or reliabili ty data. This means 
that failure rates are not available for 
insertion into a. reliabili ty formula. Further- 
mre, sample sizes are insufficient in most 
cases t o  establish confidence in the values of 
the parameters measured. 
The problem, therefore, is t o  find a means 
of making nmdnmn use of the available data in 
the reliabili ty analysis, The reliabili ty 
approach presented herein makes naximm use of 
published data and results from limited testing. 
The Reliability Approach 
Figure 4 illustrates generally an approach 
for including the radiation environment into the 
reliabili ty prediction analysis. 
Woss effects i n  terms of percent ahange 3x1 
parameters due t o  radiation dose &ve been 
&%ermined for certain types of components 
(Figure ha). These values are inserted into 
each circuit formulae and the change i n  oircuit 
output calculated (Figure hb). T h i s  value is  
then compared with the oircuit failure/success 
criteria for a determination of category. 
Repetitive selection of sets of component values 
from en assumed rectangular distribution of 
values is made, and i n  each case the circuit 
uutput calculated, This output is then 
compared with the circuit fa.ilure/success 
criteria. A t  least  1000 such sets are computed. 
The result i s  a ratio of success to  to ta l  t r ia l s  
for each circuit for a specified operating time 
(t). The system radiation reliabili ty is then 
determined by a series d t i p l i c a t i o n  of the 
inc2i.dual circuit reliabilities. In turn, the 
standard reliabili ty analysis values are then 
rrmltiplied by the radiation reliabili ty for  a 
combined system reliabili ty (Figure 4). A I 
general example of the above i s  worked out in 
detail i n  Appendix A. 
Combined Environmental Testing 
SNAF' testing is now under way leading to  
information on the radiation effects for use i n  
the reliabili ty approach described. Reactor 
control systems and associated devices located 
in the pqload dosage plane and adjacent to  the 
reactor are being tested in combined environ- 
ments, which should produce data useful i n  
reliabili ty analyses. 
Table I tabulates the results of pre- 
tes t s  conducted on high bqxra ture  components 
developed during the HOTELECQ program. These 
tests  were conducted to  exambe the temperature 
exhems characteristics. 
Tests on components operat- norma3ly a t  
the conclusion of 1800 hours were continued for 
an additional 2184 hours for  a to ta l  of 3984 
hours. Rssults indicated normal operation. 
Since these tests  were t o  establish prelimbaq 
capability, no radiation flux was included. 
Further testing, which includes the radiation 
environment, is divided into two major divisions 
of environment: (1) low flxx - low temperature; 
and, (2) high flwt - high temperature. (see 
Table 11.) 
The f i r s t  environment represents the 
conditions existing in the sha. of the 
radiation and heat shield; and the second 
represents the environment on or immediately 
adjacent to-the reactor. 
Low flux - low temperahre, Transi&ors, 
resistors, diodes, capacitors, and magnetic 
cores have been chosen jointly with the 
controller supplier and will be tested Sn i l e  3 at expected operating temperaeUres and LO 
Torr vacuum t o  determine pararaeter drift as a 
function of integrated neutron dose and gamma 
dose. An d y s i s  w i l l  then be conducted, 
utiEs5ng the d r i f t  rates obtained, and circuit 
designs will be modified as necessary as a 
result of this  analysis. 
Breadboard eqpipment, containing a number 
of typical operating logic modules utilising 
parts similar to the ones that have been 
previously irradiated and the assoaiated wir-, 
mounting hsrdware, and encapsulate, are also 
being irradiated t o  isolate circuit problems. 
High flux - high temperature. Tests are in 
progress on encapsulating materials, electrical 
cabling, magnet wires, actuators, position 
Lndicators, temperature switch and temperature 
sensors. 
In  each case insulation resistance t o  
ground w i l l  be checked versus core rate with 
temperature of 900°F t o  1000°F. 
Determination of electrical jnsulating , 
resistors and physical strei-gth are being 
checked in the case of the e n c a p s u l a ~  
materia3.s. 
Components to be irradiated are as follows: 
1. Electronics parts. 
a. Transistors. 200 transistors will 
be mounted on one or more cards. 
b. Diodes. 30 diodes w i l l  be mounted 
on one or &re cards. 
c. Resistors. 20 resistors will be 
mounted on a card or rack. 
d. 20 capanitors will be mounted on a. 
rack (possib on rack w i t h  @o&& 
and resistorS. 
e. Magnetic core. 5 encapsulated 
magnetic cores will be mounted on 
2. Module breadboards 
a. &ansistori.~ed modules, 18 circuit 
boards, each aontaining 5 typical 
mocbles. 
b, Magnetic core mochiles. 6 circuLti 
boards identical t o  the abwe bu-b 
using magnetic core logic, w i l l  be 
mounted with the transistorized 
boa~ds. 
Design for Reliability 
The results of testing and analysis i n  many 
cases indicate that alternative means must be 
taken t o  provide for the long-life reliabili ty 
of the components and sub-systems. The 
alternatives available are in terms of pruviding 
heat barriers, radiation shidding, and 
utiUzation of devices that are tolerant' of heat 
and radiation. 
The use of shielding in all terrestrial  ' 
reactor installations to protect personnel is 
well known. The dose levels achi.eved in  these 
installations are not only satisfactory for " 
personnel but also for eleckr0nl.c M c e s .  - 
However, the weight of this shielding i s  great 
and can not be used for protection of space 
equiprnentto the same dose level. A comprondse 
systan of shielding, called a shadm shield, i s  
used on the SNAP reactor units and W t s  the 
r3diation dose a t  the electronic payload plane 
to  a conservative value i n  terms of present 
equipment radiation tolerance levels. For the 
present, this shielding might is satisfactory 
but, with increased mr, the influence of , 
this shielding i n  terms of increased satel l i te  
weight with increased reactor power will become 
progressively c r i t i d .  Figure 5 XUustrates ' 
this situation, Maintaining a fjxed radiation 
dose a t  the equipment plane with appsoxima26l.y . 
the same shadow shield concept, the weight of 
the shielding will increase exponentially with 
logarithmi.~ increase in reactor thermal power. 
Radiation tolerant devices. Various 
devices which, by virtue of their construction 
and material selection are tolerant of heat and 
radiation, axe under study for  reactor 
applications a t  Atomics International. Some of 
these devices are ceramic vacuum tubes, 
wire-wound resistors, ar)a %hemionic moUar  
elec%ronic units. The m a u n b  and integration 
of these units fo r  useful application is also 
being pursued. Much work needs t o  be done in 
this asea, and a strong recommendation is 
tenderedto electronics systems engineers t o  
'seriousw concern themselves with circuits  
uti l izing these devices for  basic aotuation, 
sensoxs and control systems. , 
Drift tolerant circuits. The net effect  of 
nuclear radiation on electronic components is 
predominantly that  of parameter drift with dose 
rate. The tolerance of a circuit  t o  that 
characteristic is of fundamental importance 
since many circuits  are dependent upon precise 
values for  each component. Certain circuits, 
however, oan be chosen which w d d  &ow a 
broad band of component values arid stiU operate 
 success^. Nevertheless, a sufficiently 
broad a m c a t i o n  of tws approach is highly 
uiUe ly .  
In *he t h e e  alternatives described, the 
underlying requir6mnt i n  each is the exact 
know1edge of the nature of the radiation effect. 
This is true not only for the designer but also 
fo r  the re l iabi l i ty  analyst. 
Conclusion 
F'redic~ion' of the 3i fe  capability and 
flmctioning uharacteristics during the component 
l i f e ,  a s  well as failure probalglity, l i e s  
within the technical framework of the 
rel iabi3ity analyst; and it is in this area that  
the usefuhess of the statisticsllmethod can be 
demonstrated. Binominally or  wonen t ia l ly  
based demonstsation plans f o r  long lived reactor 
power equLpment are simply not reasonable in 
terms of time 'and money, Therefore, new 
techniques are required both in analysis and in 
demonstration. b e  analysis and testing 
procedures in use a t  Atomics bternational 
represent one approach. Others are undoubtedly 
available. In any event, it is believed that 
the solution w i l l  constitute a joining of 
engineering design analyses and s ta t i s t i ca l  
hypothesis. 
Detail. Method fd?%?$%ability Approach 
' 
An approach t o  re l iabi l i ty  analysis has 
been selected by Atomics International which 
makes use of presently. available data and data 
frdm Limited tests. To i l lus t ra te  this 
approach, a simp1e circuit  with resistive, 
i n ~ c t i v e ,  aqd aapacitive loads is used; and the 
time dependent effect of radiation oi-~ the 
c i rcui t  current flaw w i l l  be calculated. 
4 0 
Wiring Diagram 
Description: The function of this circuit  is t o  
modify the input voltage by means of electronic 
components contained i n  the circuit. This 
modification results in a certain output 
current i . When is  greater than'a certain ' 
+due A, ?his function is satisfactorily 
performsd. However, when i is l e s s  than a 
certain value By the functi8n is  not performed 
and a fai lure has occurred. 
The purpose now is t o  examine 'this circuit  
in a way that  a prediction can be made in terms 
of the probability of operation after time I ~ t " .  
There are two effects vrhich must be examined: 
(1) sudden failures due t o  electrical  
mechanical and thermal stress, and (2 j  degrada- 
t ion failures due t o  the same stresses but in 
combination with radiation. The main difference 
i n  the two effects i a  due t o  the radiation dose 
which, by virtue of the a c d a t i v e  effect, is 
time dependent. 
Circuit values are selected nominally t o  
the operating rating established i n  accordance 
%ith design re l iabi l i ty  goals. This circuit, 
therefore, has a probability of successful 
operation equal t o  n = n -A it. The 
r. 
n = i e i  ( 
2. R. F. CHOKE -L 
3. ELECTROLYTIC 
CAPACITOR -C  
circuit  is now exposed t o  a nuclear flux af \ 
(109n/m*/sec). After 103 sesonds, the circuit 
has accumulated approx3mtely 1012mot neutrons 
of a broad energy band. The effect on each 
component can be estimated from the data 
contained i n  R.E.I.C. reportsl, in terns of 
percent change in parantater vs. radiation dose 
(sometimes temperature effect  is included). See 
Figure 6 for  example. Limiting boundaries are 
noted between the curves a t  a certain radiation 













I n  each case, (tl, t , t t ) the boundary 2 3' 4 
values are changing, The time factor is  intro- 
duced because of the l i f e  prediction requirement; 
and since the effect  of neutrons i s  accumulative, 
the f lux rate data in Figme 6 can be multiplied 
by time in seconds and the total damage a t  time 
( t )  determjned, 
Since many considerations are intermeshed 
in these results, the boundaries are considered 
range values f o r  a stochastic vaxiable; and, 
without ass-iming a normal distribution, values 
are selected between these boundaries using a 
rectangular random table. Each cirau-it 
component is  e d u a t e d  i n  this manner and a t  
time "t," a s e t  of component values i s  obtained 
and insgrted in to  the circuit  analysis. The 
circuit  values are computed, and output value 
obtained. T h i s  output value is then compared 
with c i rcui t  success or fai lure based upon 
previously established cri teria.  A t  leas t  1000 
repetitions of these selections axe made. I n  
each case the calculated o u t p t  is compared 
with this success/failure cri teria.  The 
frequency distribution of these t o t a l  values is  
then examined and a probability of success 
statement made for time "tiff. The effect of 
integrated f lux  dosages for additional times 
(tl, t2, t3,.tL, . . . tn)  is  also determined, 
and p r o b a b a t y  estimates fo r  these time 
intervals established, (See Table 111.) 
In order t o  handle the random catastrophic 
failure prediction, it is necessary t o  examine 
the circuit  s tress variation i n  terms of change 
i n  operating t o  rated stresses with a c d a t i v e  
flux dosage  a able IV). For example, circuit  
current i s  governed by the res is t iv i ty  load; 
therefore, changes t o  the resist ive elements 
due t o  radiation a t  each time interval can be 
noted as an increase or  a decrease in operating 
circuit  current stress. Failure ra te  values 
can, theref ore, be adjusted, using presently 
available curves for an estimate of the random 
catastrophic failure probability. Both 
probability calculations can be programmed on a 
digi ta l  computer and the results multiplied for  
an estinlitte of the probability of success, For 
each time interval, the adjusted random failure 
rate is  obtaned by noting the average value 
forr the circuit  current (average over 1000 
t r i a l s )  and using this value as the numerator 
in the operating/sated ra t io  in fai lure rate 
curves. 
I n  estimating the t o t a l  probability of 
success (R) of the circuit,  the probability of 
functioning success (Table 111) for  each time 
( t )  i s  considered independently of the random 
catastrophic fa i lure  events; however, system 
sumrival. is dependent a t  any time " t l l  on the 
success of each event; therefore, Rf is  
multiplied by Rr. 
The usefulness of an approach of this type 
is dependent upon substantial data gathered in 
a systematic manner whereby individual factors 
can be isolated and the interactions determined. 
T h i s  problem, however, i s  very complex since so 
many factors are involved. The complexity can 
be visualized by considering the fac tor ia l  
design of Table V for  determining the 
significant factor effects for  a single class of 
resistors, Table V I  i l lus t ra tes  the additional 
possible combinations of resistors and other 
components which make th i s  type of solution so 
complex, On the other hand, s m a l l  changes in 
test ing techniques can provide substant;idl 
increases in data that  would be useful f o r  
r e l i ab i l i ty  analyses. For example, consider 
Figure 7 as  r e  roduced fromR, El I. C. 
Report No, lo.? This figure describes the 
f lux for diodes, Pat No. 4 ~ ~ 6 0 ~  (G.E.) a t  two 
temperatures. The curves are i n  se ts  and 
represent boundary values f o r  the four diodes 
checked a t  and the t ~ i o  a t  150°C. The 
usefulness could have been enhanced markedly 
by increasing the sample size a t  each temperature 
t o  a t  l eas t  30 and by adding one additional 
temperature point, I n  so doing, it would be 
possible t o  handle the data i n  such a manner 
that  the degree of certainty in the values 
obtained in the t e s t s  could be established. The 
additional t e s t  point also allows accurate 
cross plotting because of the increased sample 
size. Therefore, in each t e s t  contemplated, 
adequate sample size and number of points should 
be included so that a broader application of the 
results  can be accomplished. 
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REDUNDANCY AS APPLIED TO ANALOG CIRCUITRY FOR PROJECT RELAY 
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R. A. Smith 
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Summary 
--. 
The use of redundancy i n  analog circui t-  
r y  should be carefully weighed t o  detemnine 
the su i t ab i l i t y  of the leve l  of application 
within a system. Cri ter ias  dictating t h i s  
leve l  are c i r cu i t  w e l i a b i l i t y ,  c i rcu i t  c r i t -  
i c a l i t y  t o  system's operation, weight, space 
and cost. The use of redundancy, standby 
operabing w i l l  r esu l t  i n  larger  net gains i n  
r e l i ab i l i t y  over the standby inoperative 
technique when automatic switching of the 
l a t t e r  is required. When earth controlled 
switching i s  provided, the l a t t e r  technique is 
desirable, especially at the function level. 
The incorporation of redundancy i n  Project 
Relay resul t s  i n  a predicted r e l i ab i l i t y  of 
.9508 increasing the r e l i a b i l i t y  by a factor  
of 1.5 over t ha t  of a non-redundant system. 
Introduction 
When it is required tha t  a system be de- 
signed t o  a quantitative r e l i ab i l i t y  figure, 
it is  not enough tha t  parts  and stresses be 
kept t o  a minimum. During various stages of 
design, i n  a systems development, it frequent- 
l y  becomes apparent t ha t  r e l i a b i l i t y  design 
goals must be met by means other than parts 
and e lec t r ica l  s t r e s s  minimi~ing. Where such 
leve ls  can not be met by minimizing tech- 
nigues, then additional effort ,  usually 
through the use of redundancy, may achieve or 
surpass the required levels. 
Redundancy when applied has as  its ob- 
jective the improvement of the systems r e l i -  
a b i l i t y  and effectiveness. I f  very high r e l i -  
ab i l i t i e s  are required, redundancy may encom- 
pass duplication, t r ipl icat ion,  or wi even 
higher usuagetqf parts ,  c i rcu i t s  or systems. 
The combination is not limited t o  merely 
duplication, t ha t  is, one out of two, or t r ip-  
l icat ion,  one out e, but may be on a 
basis of two out o e, or  three out of f i v e  
or whatever combin is most suitable for  
the part icular  s i  a t  hand, This may 
apply a t  any system level.  It may encompass 
whole systems or functions, c i rcu i t s  or even 
parts. Factors which w i l l  involve the leve l  
a t  which redundancy can best be applied are 
weight, e lec t r ica l  performance, matching, 
switching, sensing, and etc., as  well a s  the 
actual gain i n  r e l i ab i l i t y  tha t  can be achieved. I 
Redundancy, when consideration is given 
t o  its application i n  analog circuitry, has a s  
i ts goals the same objectives as  when it is 
applied elsewhere. The actual application, 
however, may yield something more than the 
paralleling of functions, c i rcu i t s ,  etc. For 
an i l l u s t r a t ion  l e t  us take one l eg  of the 
bridge r e c t i f i e r  of a power supply a s  shown i n  
Figure 1. 
The string, shown i n  de ta i l ,  encompasses 
diodes i n  series ,  with each diode shunted by a 
capacitor and resis tor .  I f  we examine the 
r e l i a b i l i t y  aspects of t h i s  configuration i n  
de t a i l  it becomes apparent t ha t  the r e l i a b i l i t y  
of the s t r ing  is increased above t h a t  of a 
single diode i f  the diode dominant mode of 
fa i lure  is  "short". In  examining the s t r ing  i n  
detai l ,  the following assumptions are made. 
Part selection has been such tha t  a single 
diode is rated at the expected maximum PIV 
across the ent i re  string. The diode shunting 
resistance i s  of such a magnitude and wattage 
tha t  it is  not overstressed i f  exposed to  the 
maximum PIV across the ent i re  s t r ing  and its 
shunting ef fec t  across the diode i n  the for- 
ward direction is negligible; and the capac- 
i t o r  can individually withstand the maximum 
t o t a l  expected PIV. With the diode fa i l ing  
predominantly short, then a l l  three diode-re- 
sistors-capacitors combination would have t o  
f a i l  before the s tr ing would completely f a i l .  
A r e l i a b i l i t y  model for  the s t r ing  would show 
the following probabilistic configuration. 

Where Pu, P2AI and P3A are the probabili- 
ties sasociated with all three surviving when 
a l l  three are operable, QIA, 628 and Q3A are 
the associated fa i lure  probabilities, PIB, PpB, 
and P3B the probabil i t ies  associated with two 
surviving a f t e r  one has fai led.  I n  the case 
of the  diode string, the fa i lure  r a t e  would 
change a s  fa i lures  occur. The individual 
diode combination fa i lure  ra te  increase would 
be a function of the inverse voltage and not 
the forward voltage since the forward dissi-  
pation or  s t ress  change during conduction 
would be negligible. For a single diode instead 
of the ser ies  diode combinations, the expo- 
nential  fa i lure  l a w  would apply. 
That is 
Ps = e  - At 
The ser ies  combination, i f  non-redundant 
would still  follow the exponential fa i lure  law. 
However, since there is redundancy, and although 
the individual par t s  still follow the exponent- 
ial fa i lu re  law, the  resul tant  is  not a t  all 
exponential i n  nature. It assumes a charactpr- 
i s t i c  approaching tha t  of a normal distribution. 
The probability of survival is given by the 
relation. 
It is  apparent from t h i s  i l l u s t r a t ion  
t h a t  r e l i a b i l i t y  can be enhanced by t h i s  
arrangement. In the i l l u s t r a t ion  the sub- 
numerics l A ,  2A, and 3A re fer  t o  the probabili- 
t y  and f a i lu re  r a t e s  when all three diode com- 
binations are operable; l B ,  2B, and 3B re fer  
t o  the probability and fai lure ra tes  when two 
out of three are  operable; and l C ,  2C, and 3C. 
r e fe r  t o  the probability and fai lure r a t e s  when 
one out of three is operable. I f  we assume 
f o r  i l l u s t r a t ive  purposes tha t  a single diode 
has a Ps, f o r  time t, of 0.9, and again assume 
a Ps fo r  the diode-resistor-combination of 
0.85 when all three are operable, 0.80 when 
only two are operable and 0.75 when only one - - - 
is operable, the P of the s t r ing  of three is  
0.97b. The reliab!lity improvement is evident 
even though the levels  of Ps are pessimistic, 
a s  compared with the 0.9 figure fo r  the single 
diode. In practice, the Ps of the para l le l  
- '4 
combination of each ser ies  element would be 
very nearly the same a s  the individual diode. 
The subsequent s tr ing improvement is then 
immediatel@ipparent. + -:,A. 
The use of c i r cu i t  redundancy, from the 
r e l i ab i l i t y  standpoint, has two c r i t e r i a5  fo r  
revi,ew prior t o  application. The unrel iabi l i ty 
of i&1~-6&puit under consideration should be 
consId&Pably worse than the remaining associ- 
ated c i rcui t s  of an equipment or a system's 
function an@/,or the c i rcu i t ' s  c r i t i c a l i t y  t o  
the s y s t g ~ ~ - f f e c t i v e n e s s  should be a t  a high 
level.  9-eduction of par t  application 
tendency t o  negate the first cr i te r ia .  How- ;:.: 
ever, the c i rcu i t ' s  c r i t i c a l i t y  (defined here - 
as  the degree of curtailment of the system's 
operational output resulting from the c i rcu i t  
f a i l i ng )  is usually very evident and can be 
r ea l i s t i ca l ly  coped with, An example of t h i s  
c i r cu i t  redundancy is discussed l a t e r  i n  the 
command control circuitry. 
The next area of redundancy is a t  the 
function or equipment level.  Here, the 
c r i t e r i a  for  use depends on the equality of 
the unrel iabi l i ty of the individual circuits,  
the cost of isolat ion and combining fo r  
c i r cu i t  redundancy vs equipment re dun dam^ 
and the effect  on weight and space. A s  an 
i l lus t ra t ion  of t h i s  application, the re- 
ceiver from the command control c i rcu i t ry  w i l l  
be used. 
Because of the derating policies  en- 
voked on parts  application and since par t  com- 
plexi ty levels  are nearly identical,  the un- 
r e l i ab i l i t y  of the c i rcu i t s  are very nearly 
equal ( in t h i s  example approximately 0.00111). 
The addition of a redundant c i r cu i t  would i n  
e f fec t  reduce the unrel iabi l i ty associated 
with a one out of two situation, by a factor  
of 1000 or if discussion is translated in to  
terms of an effective fa i lure  r a t e  it would 
change from 0.154 %/lo00 hrs. t o  0.001sb $/ 
1000 hrs. However, t o  accomplish such an 
arrangement, isolat ion and combining c i rcui t s  
would have t o  be incorporated, as a minimal. 
ef for t ,  t o  have continuity of operation. 
The cost of isolat ion and combining 
would be a minimum fa i lure  r a t e  of 0.020 $/ 
1000 hrs. (assuming a single diode would ac- 
complish these functions ) . Since thir teen (U ) 
circuLts are involved, it would reqGre at 
l e a s t  twelve (12) such networks a l l  which would 
have t o  be considered as ser ies  r e l i a b i l i t y  
elements. The r e l i ab i l i t y  of such a configu- 
rat ion would be depicted by the following: 
where the subscript u M r e p r ~ s e n t  c i rcu i t  
thru 912 represents the isolat ion and combining 
"-es. rr 
The r 'e l iabi l i ty of the command receiver ( then is  bounded by a maximum value asqociated 
j w i t h  these isolat ion and combining c i rcui t s  
and approaches 0.9983. 
I f  two receivers are operated i n  para l le l  
redundancy, isolat ion is required a t  the in- # puts and isolat ion and combining may be re- 
quired at the output.. The input isolat ion w i l l  
e any e lec t r ica l  component par t s  but 
i t he r  coaxial i n  nature or a printed 
. Either o ~ m I . 1  'exhibit a negligible 
e r a t e  contribution. However, the 
isolat ion and combining of the out u t  may con- 
a f a i lu re  r a t e  of 0.040 % L O  hrs. 
rall r e l i a b i l i t y  of t h i s  configuration 
the product of the redundant 
receivers r e l i a b i l i t y  (0.999893 based on a 
fa i lure  r a t e  2.012 %/lo00 hrs/each) and the 
isolat ion and combinie r e l i a b i l i t y  (0.99972 ) 
g i d h g  a value of 0.999613 a s  opposed t o  
0.9983 for  the c i r cu i t  redundant condition. 
- 
Such are the redundancy techniques ap- 
pl ied t o  analog c i rcui t ry  of the NASA Relay 
spacdcraft e l ec t r i ca l  system design. The areas 
of application are discussed i n  the subsequent 
paragraphs. 
NASA's Relay 
The system described is NASA's Relay, 
being designed and fabricated by the Astro- 
Electronics Division of RCA. For the purpose 
of t h i s  paper, it has been broken down in to  
four major areas; a )  the system power supply; 
b )  the wide-band repeaters, c )  the command 
control circuitry; and d)  the telemetry cir- 
cuitry. Each area w i l l  be broken down t o  il- 
lus t r a t e  the redundancy incorporated i n  the 
design and the ef fec ts  of this redundancy on 
r e l i a b i l i t y  numerics. I 
System Power Supply I 
Solar Cells and Diodes - Conversion solar  
energy t o  e lec t r ica l  energy. 
Voltage Limiter - Limit voltage t o  vol- 
tage regulators fo r  satisfactory regulation. 
Charge Controller and Limiter - For 1Mt- 
ing charging-discharge ra te  t o  batteries. 
Voltage Regulators (I3igh and Low power)- 
Tightpvo&t&ge-control fo r  critical_circults.  - 
Batteries - Storage f o r  peak power re- 
quirements. 
Wideband Repeaters 
Receiver - Receives 1725 MCS amplifies 
and converts t o  hl70 MC for  drive power t o  
TWT Amplifier. Contains both wideband and 
narrowband c i r cu i t s  t o  accomodate television 
and telephone signals, respectively. Also in- 
cludes a LO80 beacon t o  aid i n  ground tracking 
of t he  wideband antenna. 
T.W.T Amplifier - Power Amplifier 4050- 
4250 MCS 11 w a t t s  output, 33db gain at 5.5 mw 
input from receiver. 
T.W .T Power Supply - Voltage developed 
fo r  the T.W.T Amplifier. 
Command Control Circuitry 
Command Receiver - Reception of VHF sig- 
nal  fo r  commands translate  t o  an audio out- 
put. 
Demodulator - Detection of pulse-duration- 
modulated 5.451 KC tone and regenerate a noise- 
f ree  PDM signal. 
Decoder - Translates PDM pulses i n to  lrO1l, 
"l*, and sync pulses which operate a magnetic 
sh i f t  reg is te r  decoder providing 20 output com- 
mands. 
Control Box - Accepts decoded commands 
and performs the function. 
Telemetry Circuitry 
Encoder - Acceptance of telemetry and 
special experiment data conversion in to  
d i g i t a l  data fo r  transmission. 
Transmitter - Provided necessary RF power 
for  tracking and transmission of encoder or 
horizon scanner data. 
Modulator Switch - Acceptance of horiaon 
scanner F'M subcarrier or encoder output for  
modulating transmitter RF power. 
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Wide-band Repeater ,. 
indication of spacecraft at t i tude t o  horizon. 
Sun Sensor (GFE) - Provide output pulse 
indicating attitude t o  sun. 
Magnetic Torque Coil - When provided with 
current flow develop magnetic f i e ld  for a t t i -  
tude control. 
Wecession Damper - Provide dampening t o  
prevent tumbqing of spacecraft i n  orbit. 
The equipment l i s ted  above when integrated 
i n t o  a system is capable of receiving and re- 
transmitting ei ther video information and 
voice i n  one direction or two-way voice by the 
wideband subsystem and telemetry, special 
experiment' and attitude control data by the 
telemetry subsystem. The block diagram il- 
lustrat ing systems operation i s  s h m  as  
Figure 2. 
Systems Power Supply 
Figure 3 i l lus t ra tes  the block diagram 
of the systems power supply. Four areas of 
redundancy are incorporated i n  th i s  design; 
the solar cells, the battery charge and con- 
t r o l ,  the high power regulators and the l o w  
voltage sensor. There are two power output 
points provided f o r  the equipment. The reg- 
ulated output i s  fed by both the solar ce l ls  
and the battery sources. Whereas the unreg- 
ulated output is fed nominally from the bat- 
t e ry  sources alone. Howe+r, when the 
battery voltage is l o w  an emergency path has 
been provided between the f i r s t  and second 
outputs. 
For redundancy i* the solar ce l l  area, a 
series-parelel  wiring scheme allws failures 
t o  occur, either shorts or opens, without 
seriously jeopardizing the capability of pro- 
viding the necessary system power. Figure 4 
i I lus t ra tes  the inter-connection wiring of 
these ce l ls  on a panel basis. Normally three 
(3) elements of four (b) parallel  ce l ls  are 
connected i n  series i n  each block of cells. 
There are five (5) blocks of ce l ls  for  
each leg-and fif teen 115) legs on the solar 
c e l l  system. The following numerical calcu- 
lat ions shows the benefit of using such a de- 
sign. Looking a t  Figure h, t o  a ce l l  block, 
the loss  of any individual c e l l  can have one 
of two effects. If the c e l l  shorts then the 
voltage contribution of tha t  c e l l  block is 
lost .  I f  ,the ce l l  opens the current contri- 
bution of that  ce l l  is lost. Since the 
system configuration delivers a nominal 35 
volts  when only 28 volts is required, the 
voltage loss w i l l  be insignificant and w i l l  
remain insignificant due to  the parallel  legs. 
Likewise the current contribution will,  i f  an 
open occurs, be l o s t  but since a maximum loss 
of power from 2050 cel ls  can be accepted, the 
eighty ce l ls  that  are being treated are like- 
wise insignificant t o  the system. Acceptable 
system operation then is defined as only one 
fai lure per ce l l  block w i l l  be acceptable 
fo r  satisfactor~r operation. On the basis of 
this, then eleven (11) out of twelve (12) 
ce l ls  i n  every block must survive the operation- 
al mode. This aan be adequately described by 
the binomial expression 
or 0.998128 + 0.001584 = 0.999712 where P 
S 
of each solar c e l l  is 0.99825. 
Now consider the design t o  incorporate 
no additional power delivery capabilities 
but designed t o  provide the exact power re- 
quirements. The failure then of any c e l l  be- 
gins t o  reduce the current delivery-capabili- 
t ies.  Under these conditions, then a single 
fa i lure  would be classified as a system failure 
and the probability of survivd. of the solar 
ca l ls  would be directly reflected by the sum- 
mation of the individual c e l l  fai lure rates. 
The second area of redundancg is  a com- 
plete functional one fo r  one redundancy i n  the 
battery charge and c o d r o l  circuitry. Here' 
three (3) c i rcui ts  have been provided where 
any two of the three wi l l  provide sufficient 
operation proviqed the spacecraft i s  not re- 
quired t o  operate extensively during a dark 
period. The ciFcuitry,consist of a comparator 
and series regulator network which controls 
the charging ra te  t o  the battery packs. . When 
the battery voltage is 25 or above and with 
normal input voltage applied the chargilig r a te  
is b6%ween 0.5, t o  0.65 amperes. With voltage 
under 25 volts and normal input the charging 
ra te  is controlled t o  a t r i c a e  ra te  of .05 t o  
.07 amperes. Since two out of three are 
necessary, a direct  comparison can be made t o  
indicate the re l i ab i l i ty  gain of t h i s  redun- 
dancy. Again the applicable expression for  
determining the numerics is the binomial ex- 
pression which gives a value for  the 2 out of 
3 condition of 0.9993 and the value of 0.9854 
for  2 out of 2. 
The final point of redundancy i n  the 
system power supply consists of two high power 
voltage regulators, one each for the wide-band 
repeater stages. This is not a one for one 
redundancy but each regulator i s  a series 
element i n  the repeater stages where complete 
subsystems are provided on a one t o  one basis. 
This is i l lustrated i n  Figure 5. 
Wide-band Repeaters 
The wide-band repeater is a complete 
subsystem composed of the receiver and the 
high power transmitter fo r  handling either 
TV tranmission between continents or for  
handling two way voice or telegraphy trans- 
mission. Figure 5 shows the system operation- 
Multiplier 
Wideband Receiver 
a1  block diagram i l l u s t r a t ing  the complete one 
fo r  one redundancy on a subsystem basis. It is 
controlled i n  such a manner tha t  any short 
occurring a f t e r  the ser ies  regulator network 
can be eliminated by an off-command. 
Other redundancy aspects are i n  evidence 
i n  the wideband receiver (see Figure 61. An 
IF switch i n  the receiver allows the unit  t o  
process e i ther  the single way TV and voice 
transmission or the two way voice. The two 
receivers provide, from the I F  switch t o  the 
adder c i rcu i t ,  additional reduced modes of 
operation. The probability of having a t  l ea s t  
single way TV and voice transmission or two way 
voice transmission i s  associated with having 
1 out of 4 of these c i r cu i t s  working plus the 
remaining portions of the receiver a s  ser ies  
elements. The possibi l i ty of having both 
single way TV and voice transmission and two 
way voice transmission become 1 out of 2 fo r  
each type of c i rcu i t  plus the remaining 
portions of the receiver a s  ser ies  elements. 
One other area of pa r t  redundancy is in- 
corporated i n  the TWT power supply high voltage 
r e c t i f i e r  elements. Here the r ec t i f i e r  diodes 
were purchased i n  such a manner t o  obtain ad- 
di t ional  ser ies  diodes fo r  redundancy. 
The high-voltage diode r ec t i f i e r s  are com- 
posed of series  elements t o  withstand the peak 
inverse voltages of such circui ts .  In  order t o  
assure adequate performance from these units, 
the higher PIV rated units have been used. The 
uni t s  selected are rated a t  4000 and 5000 PIV. 
To obtain a r ea l i s t i c  f a i lu re  r a t e  for  these 
diodes, the e f fec t  of the redundant series  
elements was considered. Analyzing the smaller, 
4000 vol t  unit,  there a re  ten  diodes i n  the 
series  s tr ing,  each rated a t  400 PIV. The 
operating reverse voltage of the c i rcu i t  in- 
volved is  1650 volts,  which requires 9 d y  5 
ser ies  elements. The second f ive  are  redundant. 
However, t o  keep a voltage derating factor on 
the PIV, seven diodes are considered t o  be re- 
quired. Then three (3) diodes can f a i l  due t o  
shorting, without reducing the peak inverse 
capabil i t ies  t o  t he  derating level. The 
r e l i a b i l i t y  then can be described i n  terms of 
the probability t ha t  three of the series  
elements wi l l  f a i l .  This i s  described by the 
sum of the probabilities of 0, 1, 2, or 3 f a i l -  
ures occurring and can be calculated by using 
the binomial expression. I f  it is assumed that  
the probability of fa i lure  for  each diode re- 
mains the same, then the t o t a l  probability of 
getting three or l e s s  fa i lures  is 0.99977. Then 
** the effective fa i lure  r a t e  associated with each 
leg  of the r ec t i f i e r  c i r cu i t  is -0026 $/lo00 
hrs. or 0.003 percent. This is the fa i lure  
r a t e  used t o  describe the  redundant diodes. 
Command Control Circuitry 
s.77 The command control is  a complete sub- 
system of Project RELAY whose function is the 
reception, demodulation, and decoding of com- 
mand signals. This is accomplished i n  the 
block diagram shown i n  Figure 7. This diagram - 
is a complete two-redundant configuration of the 
subsystem ut i l ized  i n  t h i s  project. The redun- 
dancy u t i l ized  is  standby active. Tfiough the 
basic r e l i a b i l i t y  gain i s  l e s s  than tha t  with 
standby inactive, the net  gain is greater since 
the standby active negates the need fo r  sensing 
and switching and the i r  additional unreliabili- 
t i e s  a s  would be required i n  a atandby inactive 
redundancy configuration. 
For r e l i ab i l i t y  comparison purposes a 
non-redundant subsystem is shown i n  Figure 8. 
Utilizing the same functional building block 
a s  i n  the two-redundant configuration, the 
r e l i a b i l i t y  gain or  reduction of unrel iabi l i ty 
can be eas i ly  ascertained. 
Consider first the block diagram of 
Figure 8. From t h i s  figure, the r e l i a b i l i t y  
diagram of Figure 9 has been constructed. I n  
t h i s  configuration, the r e l i a b i l i t y  of the sub- 
system is dependent upon the product of the 
individual function r e l i ab i l i t i e s .  Thus, fo r  
t h i s  configuration, the r e l i a b i l i t y  is  no 
be t te r  than the most unreliable function and is 
substantially l e s s  than t h i s  i n  practice since 
no function has a r e l i ab i l i t y  of unity. The 
subsystem mathematical model takes on the 
form 
P = P( t )  . P( t )  . ~ ( t )  . 
Non-Redundant W L.O. Mixer 
Comand Control 
P ( t )  . P (6) . P ( t )  
IF St r ip  Demodulator Decoder 
where Pm(t). pL!fi). Pd;ir . P ( t )  P 
IF St r ip  
p ( t )  
Rcvr 
The probabilities of survival for  30 days 
(tl= 720 hours) were determined fo r  those control 
functions required t o  operate continuously. 
These are shown where tl appears a s  the in- 
dependent variable. For those functions on 
a cyclic basis, a 10% duty factor has been 
estimated as being applicable. Those functions 
are shown by the time function t Thus t2 , 2' 
t l / lO.  
The non-redundant control configuration 
u t i l ized  these times. The probability of sur- 
vival fo r  the cormnand control receiver function 
up t o  and including the IF stages was estimated 
a t  99.79% for  30 days. The demodulator function 
was estimated a t  98.60% probability of survival 
for  30 days and the decoder at 97.21% for  30 
days a t  the 1% duty factor. The probability of 
survival of the non-reduidant command control 
through the decoder function (not including "OR 
gates") then is 95.588%. 
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Block 3 represents the input gates t o  a single command channel. Ten such elements 
are required f o r  completing the r e l i a b i l i t y  diagram. 
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Consider now the command control subsystem, 
t h e  two redundant configuration, as  depicted 
i n  Figure 7. This subsystem incorporates re- 
dundant receive and demodulate functions and 
redundant decode functions. Also each of the 
t e n  decoded outputs is channeled through a 
redundant pair  of "OR gates". The r e l i a b i l i t y  
diagram fo r  t h i s  subsystem is shown i n  Figure 
10. In  order t o  eliminate sensing and switch- 
ing functions tha t  are generally necessary 
f o r  redundant configuration, an antenna coupler 
has been u t i l ized  t o  i so la te  the inputs from 
each other, yet  allow each receiver t o  be 
indepently operable from a common antenna. The 
demodulated receiver outputs are fed through 
appropriate isolat ion t o  both decoders giving 
a both-either-or redundant arrangement. 
Similarly, the decoded outputs are also both- 
either-or through paired OR gates. With t h i s  
arrangement, a l l  functions operate simulta- 
neously and there ex i s t s  no requirembnt fo r  
sensing or switching. A fai lure along one 
channel or leg  is not reflected in to  the  
system because of the unidirectional character- 
i s t i c s  of the various forms of isolation. 
From the r e l i a b i l i t y  diagram i n  Figure 10, 
the  mathematical model takes on the form (not 
including the redundant OR gates): 
I- -. 
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The probability of survival of the redun- 
dant configuration yields a probability of 
approximately 99.86%. This consists of 
(1-4.u r x 100% for  the redundant 
receiver portion, 99.92% for  the redundant 
decoder portion and 99.94% for  the demodulator- 
decoder coupler. A s  can be noted, the 
probability of survival for  30 days has been 
increased from 95.588% t o  99.86%. This cor- 
responds t o  a 31.5 t o  one reduction i n  system 
unreliability. The antenna coupler has been 
considered t o  contribute negligibly t o  system 
unreliability. It is  of printed c i r cu i t  
construction and contains no active components 
and r e l i e s  principally upon its geometry 
which is r ig id ly  fixed fo r  its performance. 
A s  s tated ear l ie r ,  r e l i a b i l i t y  improve- 
ment can be gained through redundancy u t i l i z -  
ing the inoperative standby mode and activating 
the redundant unit only when required. Assuming 
i n i t i a l l y  a aero fa i lure  ra te  f o r  the sensing 
and switching mechanisms the r e l i a b i l i t y  model 
takes on the configuration shown i n  Figure 11 
and the mathematical relat ion a s  followsr 
P ( t  ) redundant, standby, inoperative = 
( t )  +(A .t)(P 
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Utilizing the probability of survival for  
the various command control functions gives 
the following: 
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The r e l i ab i l i t y  of Pt of the redundaniZ 
standby inoperative command control exclusive 
of the  sensing and switching is 99.999%. A l -  
lowing for  the necessary sensing and switching 
reducea the probability of survival fo r  t h i s  
subsystem t o  a leve l  subs t an t id ly  equal t o  
tha t  of the product of the probability of sur- 
vival of the required sensing and switching 
elements. Since the receiver demodulator and 
decoder functions have a probability approach- 
ing unity over the interval  of time ( t ) ,  it is  
apparent from the 3 cases i l lus t ra ted  tha t  the 
greatest net r e l i a b i l i t y  gain can be achieved 
using the operate standby redundancy. 
The outputs from the two decoders are fed 
t o  the command control box t o  performing com- 
mand functions. The most c r i t i c a l  c i r cu i t s  
i n  the control box are  the two voltage regula - 
t o r s  which are common t o  each control channel. 
A fa i lure  i n  e i ther  of these c i rcu i t s  causes 
the complete l o s s  of spacecraft control. 
Therefore complete para l le l  redundant regulators 
have been provided a s  i l lus t ra ted  i n  Figure 12. 
Review of the c i r cu i t  i l l u s t r a t e s  tha t  combina- 
Redundant Regulator Control Box 
Lions of part icular  fa i lure  modes are necessary 
t o  cause the regulator voltage t o  exceed i t s  
useful range. It w i l l  be noted tha t  the most 
c r i t i c a l  f a i l u r e  mode i n  the regulator i s  the 
open c i rcu i t .  Should a component par t  open 
i n  each regulator c i r cu i t  t h i s  would cause the 
l o s s  of the output voltage. However, the open 
f a i l u r e  i s  usually contributable t o  overload 
s t r e s s  conditions t ha t  occur as the r e su l t s  
of shorts occuring i n  other s e r i e s  elements 
or, i n  the case of the semi-conductor devices, 
a r e su l t  of t ransient  voltage conditions tha t  
exceed the mamimum ra t ings  of the  part.  Both 
overload conditions such as  t h i s  have been con- 
t ro l l ed  by careful select ion of component 
pa r t s  and the i r  application. 
Should Ql or Q7 f a i l  i n  a shorted condition 
col lector  to-emitter the load r e s i s to r s  are 
capable of absorbing the additional voltage 
drop without overloading. The 10  watt zener 
w i l l  absorb the additional current loading and 
still remain within i t s  zener voltage and 
power dissipation rating. Effective control 
of the voltage w i l l  be maintained under these 
conditions. Further analysis w i l l  indicate 
t h a t  it requires three components fa i lures  by 
short  i n  a single c i r cu i t  before the  regulator 
w i l l  cause a system malfunction. The re l iab i l -  
i t y  numerics fo r  the c i r cu i t  are based however 
on the  worse case condition of one component 
i n  each regulator w i l l  f a i l  due t o  opens. The 
redundancy decreases the probability of fa i lure  
from 3 .5  chances i n  1000 t o  2.0 chances i n  
10,000. 
Twenty command channels are provided by 
the control box which provides individual "ont1 
switching t o  each redundant and single element 
i n  the  system. The Itoffit commands, for  both 
wideband repeaters and telemetry transmitters 
a re  coupled together, primarily due t o  lack of 
command signals. Loss of e i ther  of these c i r -  
cuitswould a l l o w  the associated equipments t o  
remain i n  the "onn condition, This problem 
i s  not as severe a s  it f i r s t  looks since the 
telemetry transmitters only draw 250 milliwatts 
each and the wideband repeaters which draw 75 
watts each are provided with other cut-off 
means. This emergency cut-off is  the l o w  vol- 
tage sensing network, mentioned ea r l i e r  i n  the 
power supply, which generates and feeds a 
negative pulse through the "onu control c i r -  
cu i t ry  thus turning the ser ies  regulators t o  
the "off position. 
Telemetry Circuitry 
The telemetry subsystem includes the 
experimental and telemetry data encoder, the 
horizon scanner and two telemetry transmitters. 
One of the transmitters w i l l  be u t i l i zed  the 
majority of the time a s  a tracking beacon and 
the other w i l l  be u t i l i zed  t o  transmit e i ther  
the encoder or the horizon scanner data, This 
s e t  of transmitters have been considered a s  a 
redundancy configuration since as  long a s  one 
transmitter survives, the data and tracking 
function can be time shared. The time sharing 
programming can be accomplished from ground 
a t  the discretion of operating personnel. This 
does reduce the system's effectiveness but it 
does not cause complete abortion of the 
telemetry transmission. 
Conclusions 
The incorporation of redundancy within 
Project Relay improves the probability of 
mission success for  the complete communication 
system t o  0.9508. The wideband TV and telegra- 
phy transmission subsystem t o  0.9935 and the 
telemetry transmission subsystem t o  0.9534. 
These values represent gains of 1.5, 11.7, 
and 2.76, respectively over tha t  of the non- 
redundant counterpart. Table 1 i s  a tabulation 
of both the non-redundant and redundant areas 
t o  i l l u s t r a t e  the r e l i a b i l i t y  gain. 
I n  addition t o  t h i s ,  l o s s  of RF energy i n  
the nideband receiver generates an additional 
tu rn  "offu pulse t o  the s e r i e s  regulators. Loss 
of any of the other command c i rcu i t s  w i l l ,  of 
course, remove the associated equipment from 
use but due t o  the redundancy, t h i s  w i l l  only 
reduce the systems effectiveness. 
Table 1 
Circuit Non-Redundant Redundant 
System Power Supply 0.9814 0.9961 
Solar Panels 0.9997 0.9997 
Voltage Limiter 0.9972 0.9972 
Battery Charge and Control Circuit 0.9854 0.9993 
Series Diodes t o  Unregulated Bus 0.9991 0.9991 
Command Circuitry 
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miEDICTING SPACE MISSION SUCCESS !CHROUGR TIME-STRESS ANALYSIS 
I. Doshay and H.L. Shuken, 
Space-General Corporation, E l  Monte, California 
/7dY Abstract 
A technique of re l iabi l i ty  prediction i s  
introduced which encompasses the review of ve- 
hicle components, the i r  periods of active and 
passive performance, and the schedule of opera- 
t ional  stresses involved i n  the mission. This 
methodology i s  applied t o  Ablestar space program 
upper stage vehicles, where component rel iabil i-  
t i e s  are established from prior experience using 
ground t e s t  cri teria.  This i s  interpreted as 
the unity stress level, upon which basis the re- 
l i a b i l i t y  of the vehicle i s  constructed. It i s  
accomplished by tracing each significant vehicle 
function and accompanying operational time-stress 
through the progress of the intended vehicle mis- 
sion. After the vehicles are fabricated, com- 
parisons are made of the prior published predic- 
tions and subsequent t e s t s  on the actual vehicles. 
The results are seen t o  be very encouraging for 
further application of th i s  technique. 
The f l ight  proven propulsion re l iabi l i ty  
i s  found t o  correlate with predicted values with- 
i n  1$ differential.  The newly developed elec- 
tronic portions do not correlate as well, i .e. 
vary up t o  lo$. However, there are speci fk  
problems that point to.reasons these items are 
not within state-of-the-art range of expectancy. 
The detai ls  of the analysis of propulsion 
system and electronics portions of the vehicle 
are given. These include establishing fai lure 
rates, operational stresses and the resultant re- 
l i ab i l i ty  calculations for two pre-defined levels 
of mission success. An appendix i s  provided dis- 
closing the determination of confidence limits 
and the calculation of same. Twelve tables are 
included l i s t ing fai1ur.e expectancies of propul- 
sion and electronic components, duration of oper- 
ational time stresses, functional breakdown of 
Ablestar stage, l i s t  of c r i t i ca l  items and thei r  
fai lure rates, expected fai lure rates under non- 
f i r ing t e s t s  and fai lure rates of components ex- 
perienced i n  Ablestar systems produced subsequent 
t o  the pre-hardware prediction. 
Defining the Objectives 
An analysis was made of the re l iabi l i ty  
of the Ablestar stage based on the design para- 
meters and available time-related fai lure data 
on propulsion and airborne electronics component 
parts prior t o  assembly of the f i r s t  complete 
system i n  1960. 
Reliability was defined i n  accordance 
with AFl3M Exhibit 58-10, Reliability I?rogram for 
Ballistic Missile and Space Systems, which 
stated: 
" ~ e l i a b i l i t y  - The probability that  an 
item w i l l  operate within specified l imits  fo r  the 
time and operating conditions specified, u t i l i -  
zing support equipment and procedures. i n  the man- . 
ner intended. " 
The "specified limits" referred to  i n  
the above definition of re l iabi l i ty  are defined 
by the Model Specification or manufacturer's 
quoted specification limits. Use of supporting 
eguipment and procedures implies that  the ve- 
hicle wi l l  be i n  perfect functioning condition 
a t  the time of launch. Although performance out- 
side specification limits i s  construed herein as  
fa i lure  (unreliable), it should be noted that 
specifications generally allow considerable safe- 
t y  margin. Therefore, f l ight  abort w i l l  not nec- 
essarily be the result of operation outside of 
specified limits. 
For the purposes of th i s  analysis, the 
Ablestar stage i s  considered t o  be composed ,of 
two different major systems, the AJl0-104 pro- 
pulsion system and the Ablestar Forward section.* 
Since the coast times for  the Transit 2-B and 
Courier 1-B are different, a separate re l iabi l i ty  
estimate was made for  each. Also, it i s  of in- 
teres t  t o  find (1) the probability of all parts 
functioning i n  accordance with specifications, so 
that  the f l ight  may be called "perfect'!; and (2) 
of finding the probability ,of a l l  "essential" 
pasts functioni'ng i n  accordance with the spec$fi- 
cations for  the mission functions, so that  the . 
f l ight  may be called acceptable. Table A shows . 
the above mentioned re l iabi l i t ies  with 954 con- 
fidence limits. The calculation methodology and 
these estimates are described i n  deta i l  below, * 
and i n  the Appendix. Comparison of these predic- 
tions with re l iabi l i ty  calculations from ground 
t e s t  duty on the f i r s t  stage produced per Table B 
indicated the approach was valid fo r  prediction 
on a single vejxicle basis. Further substantia- 
t ion was revealed as more vehicles were produced 
and launched (see Figure 1). 
Basis of Analysis 
Method of Analysis 
The re l iabi l i ty  predictions reflected'fh 
th i s  analysis pertain t o  inherent design charac- 
t e r i s t i c s  of the Ablestar vehicle. This does 
not include aspects of app1icat;ions integrity 
hazards i n  the engineet-ing, fabrication or f i e ld  
handling operations. It i s  anticipated that  
there i s  some prbbability such factors w i l l  de- 
grade the inherent rel iabil i ty;  however, the i r  
effects are the considerations of the monitoring 
*~xclusive of Advanced Guidance System. 
program desc .i i n  the l a t t e r  part  of the pa- 
per. 
Inherent r e l i ab i l i t y  calculations fo r  
t h i s  study are based on constant hazard time 
s t ress  conditions. This follows from consider- 
able experience with b a l l i s t i c  niissiles and 
space vehicles, which has indicated tha t  part  
fa i lure  may be equally l ike ly  t o  occur during 
any time i n  the vehicle f l i gh t  while the parts  
are  under s t r e s s . l  With t h i s  constant hazard 
condition and the time s t ress  periods of the 
operating components the low fa i l u re  probabili- 
t i e s  found are associated with the Poisson dis- 
t r ibut ion of times t o  fai lure,  T: 
f ( ~ )  = emM 
where: M i s  mean time t o  f a i l u r e  
t i s  the operational time s t r e s s  
For the non-failure condition we define the re- 
l i a b i l i t y  model as: 
R = e  - t / ~  - - t f  
where f i s  the f a i l u r e  ra te  which i s  defined i n  
the same time uni t s  a s  t. 
Source of Failure Rates 
The Failure Rates l i s t e d  i n  the fourth 
column, "NO. of Failures per 103 Hours i n  
Manned Aircraft" of Table 1, " ~ a i l u r e  Rates of 
Electronic and Associated Parts" are derived 
from Fire Control System equipment fa i lure  data 
during 10,000 system hours of f l i gh t  operation. 
Failure rakes on the propulsion system were ob- 
tained during s t a t i c  t e s t  f i r i ngs  and during pro- 
pulsion system checkout tes t s .  These f a i l u r e  
ra tes  are l i s t e d  i n  Table 2. For the Unity 
Stress  ~ e v e l *  during powered f l i gh t  and coast, 
and f o r  Ref. (1) Stress  ~ e v e l ~  during the  coast 
period, t h i s  system i s  assumed t o  be under the 
same environmental s t resses as  a manned a i r c r a f t .  
Ground t e s t  data on system performance of the 
same components i n  other vehicles was used t o  
estimate the fa i lure  r a t e  of the Ablestar stage 
during f i r s t  and second stage burning time. 
Component part f a i l u r e  ra tes  f o r  parts  used i n  
the  Ablestar stage are shown i n  the discussion 
tha t  follows be lo*^, and i n  Tables 4, 5, 6,  and 7. 
Rel iabi l i ty  Levels and Stress Factors 
The choice of the Unity Stress  Level 
stems from the uncertainty i n  accepting s t r e s s  
level. factors from reference sources. Since 
these factors were derived from systems which 
are not duplicated i n  the Ablestar configura- 
tions, it follows tha t  these factors  cannot be 
the  same f o r  both. To prescribe the complete 
range of possible r e l i ab i l i t y  variation f o r  the 
*Hereinafter cal led USL. 
t e s t  data available, 95% confidence l imi t s  were 
determined. This i s  not be be confused with a 
confidence i n  the r e l i ab i l i t y  of the vehicle, 
which could be established from actual f l i g h t  
successes. 
Environment-Time Program 
For each f l igh t ,  the Ablestar stage may 
be described as experiencing f ive  d i s t i nc t  en- 
vironments from f i r s t  stage "ride" t o  post burn- 
out. These f i ve  environments are (1 )  the "ride" 
on the  Thor, (2)  the time of f i r s t  f i r i n g  of the 
"104" propulsion system, (3)  the coast time, when 
the f a i l u r e  r a t e  i s  assumed t o  be t he  same as for  
manned a i rc raf t ,  (4)  the period of re -s ta r t  (sec- 
ond f i r ing) ,  and (5)  the period beyond shutdown 
f o r  the Spin Table actuation and the payload sat- 
e l l i t e  separation. These times are shown i n  
Table 3. The time between f i r s t  stage burnout 
and second stage f i r i ng  i s  not considered separ- 
a te ly  because it i s  too short i n  length t o  affect  
the overall  calculations. 
Analysis of the  AJ10-104 Propulsion System 
The AJ10-104 propulsion system re l i ab i l i -  
ty, when used i n  the Ablestar stage, was estima- 
ted  on the basis  of the best time-related fa i lure  
data on t h i s  equipment available. The values are 
based on the accumulation of a l l  recorded t e s t  
data (time and replaced parts)  from the  Able pro- 
gram. As t e s t s  are  continued on Ablestar vehicleb 
the r e l i a b i l i t y  and confidence ref lected i n  t h i s  
report were expected t o  become more va l id  o r  per- 
haps require readjustment. Since no pr ior  meth- 
odology was available t o  predict rocket re l iab i l -  
i t y  i n  advance of actual hardware and t e s t s  on 
tha t  hardware, much speculation was entertained 
on the accuracy of these predictions. 
Estimation of Failure Rates 
A t  the time of the analysis there were 
thir teen successful f l i gh t s  involving Able-type 
uni ts  pr ior  t o  Ablestar or  Delta. There also 
were four other Able uni ts  which, unfortunately, 
never had opportunity t o  perform due t o  malfunc- 
t lons  occurring i n  the f i r s t  stage vehicles. The 
t o t a l  f l i gh t  time of these uni ts  vas 1332 seconds, 
fo r  an average of a l i t t l e  over 100 seconds oper- 
ation per propulsion system. It was evident tha t  
a val id estimate could not be made with t h i s  data 
since the time on each unit was only a l i t t l e  
more than 1/3 the expected AJ10-104 f i r i ng  time 
and the t o t a l  f i r i ng  time was only four and one 
half times t ha t  of a single AJ10-104 propulsion 
system's operating time. 
To obtain more operating time, data was 
obtained from the PFRT, Acceptance, and checkout 
t e s t s  of these prior  vehicles flown. The "hot" 
f i r ings  fo r  a l l  vehicles added up t o  3999 seconds. 
Based on ten checkout t e s t s  of AJ10-40 and 
~ ~ 1 0 - 4 2  propulsion systems, the average checkou 
time of a single vehicle was found t o  be 64.4 
hours. Therefore, it 17as concluded tha t  the ho 
firing test time was not sufficiently significant 
as added test time in this analysis. For seven- 
teen vehicles the total checkout time was calcu- 
lated as 17 x 64.4 = 1095 hours. 
In determining the USL reliability this 
1095 hours was used as the basis for determining 
the failure rates of propulsion system elements. 
During the checkout and firing tests per- 
formed prior to the analyses there were 38 AJ10- 
104 applicable failures of one kind or another 
which could have happened in flight and would af- 
fect operation-of the vehicle as specified. In 
addition to these there were other malfunctions 
which would not affect vehicle operations as spec- 
ified and were therefore not included in this 
evaluation. 
These 38 applicable failures were the 
basis of Table 8 which lists those failed items, 
and the number of these items on the propulsion 
systems, ~~10-40, 42, 101, and 104. The failure 
rate obtained is also listed in this table. 
Environmental Conditions 
The AJ10-104 reliability, however, is the 
product of several separate reliabilities because 
it has the restart capability and thus undergoes 
several environmental changes. 
At lift-off the most severe vibration 
takes place as the first stage engine ignites. 
Combined vibration and acceleration environment 
continue for about 165 seconds before shutting 
off. During this time relatively few of the sec- 
ond stage parts are subjected to operating pres- 
sures. Those items which are subjected to pres- 
sures include the helium tanks, regulator valve, 
tubing, check valves, tank shut-off pilot valve, 
nitrogen tanks, reghlator, lines, check valves, 
and hydraulic system. During this time no por- 
tion of the second stage propulsion system, in- 
cluding the attitude control sub-system, will be 
operating. 
The first stage shutoff is followed by 
approximately two seconds of coast time before 
the second stage ignites. 
The next operating phase takes place when 
the AJ10-104 ignites with combined acceleration, 
vibration, and high pressures and temperatures. 
This continues with all items being stressed until 
about 275 seconds have elapsed when the propulsion 
system shuts down for 20-30 minutes of coast de- 
pending on the mission. During this coast period 
the hydraulic pump shuts down; the coast attitude 
control (nitrogen system) functions while the pro- 
pellant tank and almost all lines remain under 
pressure. The coast period is followed by a 15- 
20 second AS10-104 firing in which all portions 
of the system are required to operate again. This 
is followed by the final low stress coast period 
when the spin-table spins up and ejects the pay- 
load. This coast period is about 17 seconds. At 
this point the Ablestar Stage has completed its 
mission. 
20 
Determination of Reliability 
Reliability calculations were made for 
both the perfect and acceptable flight situations: 
as defined earlier. 
Perfect Flight. The reliability of the 
AJ~o-104 propulsion system, including the Gimbal- 
ing system, is computed as 
where tl refers to time under a particular stress 
and fl the failure rate during that time, the sub- 
scripts 1-5 have the same meaning as in the fore- 
going where "1" refers to the "ride" on the Thor, 
"2" to the first burning, "3" to the coast period, 
"4" to re-start firing and "5" to the period be- 
yond shutdown during the spin table actuation. 
The following discussion shows the method 
of determining the reliability of the propulsion 
system for the Transit 2-B. The total failure 
rates of the subassemblies of the ~10-104 propul- 
sion system are shown in Table 4 and the failure 
rates of the individual elements are shown in 
Table 6. The total failure rate for all items is 
55.76 failures per 1000 hours for the unity stress 
level. 
During the "ride" on the Thor, the thrust 
chamber assembly and the TPS switch are not under 
stress so f = 55.76 - 6.56  round Test Failure 
Rate of TCA~ -0.92 (~ailure Rate of TPS Switch) = 
48.28 failures per 1000 hours for the unity stress 
level. During the first burning of the AJlO-104, 
the failure rate f2, is 55.76. 
During the coast periodthe TCA, TPS switch, 
and Gimbaling components are not operationally 
stressed so f3 = 35-76 - 6.56  r round Test Failure 
Rate of TCA) - 0.z (~ailure Rate of TPS switch) 
- 4.58 (~ailure Rate of Gimbaling components in- 
cluding hydraulic accumulator) = 43.70 failures 
per 1000 hours for the unity stress level. During 
the restart firing the settling valve does not 
need to operate further so f4 = 55.76 - 1.82 = 
53.94 failures per 1000 hours for the USL level. 
During the 17 seconds coast period beyond shut- 
down, only the fuel tank pressure system needs to 
operate and this has a failure rate of 2.24 fail- 
ures per 1000 hours for the USL. 
Hence for the USL 
Acceptable Flight. The following reli- 
ability estimate is based on the assumption that 
items such as propellant gas fill quick disconnects 
and oxdizer vent valves are items which do not 
function or operate af ter  i n i t i a l  loading. Any 
leak in these items will be detected while the 
vehicle i s  still  on the ground. It is also noted 
that  the pressure transducers are not essential 
for acceptable operation. 
Table 4 shows that  the t o t a l  failure rate 
for all items is 55.76 failures per 1000 hours for 
the unity stress. The failure rates of parts which 
do' not need t o  function for an acceptable f l ight  
must be subtracted from these figures. 
The fo~owingtabula tes  the failure rates 
of these items hot under consideration for an 
acceptable f l ight  : 
USL 
F.R./~OOO Hours 
2 oxidizer Probes 
9 Transducers % , 8 
9 Quick Disconnects 1.64 
1 Oxidizer Vent Valve - 1.82 
TO!lU 12.04 
So the a i l u r e  Rate of a l l  items under considera- 
t ion is 55.76 - 12.04 = 43.72 failures per 1000 
hours for  the unity stress level. 
Items not required t o  function or not 
stressed during f i r s t ~ s t a g e  operation are: 
USL 
F.R./~OOO HOWS 
Thrust Chaniber 1 - (1) 6.56 
mt ~haniber &op valves ' (2) 5.48 
TC Prop Valves Pilot  Valves (2) 2.74 
n e x  ~ i n e s  ( p r & ~ i t )  (3 1 2.74 
Pressure Switches (2 1.82 
f i e 1  Vent Valve -90 
Miscellaneous (lines, gaskets, 
It It 0 rings, sleeves, etc. 1.74 
Total fai lure ra te  of items not 
required t o  operate during 1st 
stage operation 21.98 
The t o t a l  failure ra te  estimate of a l l  
essential and functional items in the AJl.0-104 
propulsion system is 43.72 failures/1000 hours for 
the unity stress level. Therefore, the failure 
rate, fl, during the f i r s t  stage ascent i s  43.72 - 
21.98 or 21.74 failures/1000 hours for  the USL 
level. 
During the f i r s t  burning of the AJl.0-104, 
the failure rate, f2, i s  43.72 failures per 1000 
hours for  the USL. 
rl 
The items which are not required t o  func- 
t ion or are not under pressure through the coast 
period are : 
Thrust Chamber 
TPS Switch 
Ginibaling equipment/shutof f 
during coast time 3.66 
Helium Regulator 1.82 
Hydraulic A c c d l a t o r  -92 
Total Failure Rate of Items 
not under Stress 13.88 
Using the above l i s t ing  it is seetl that  
the fai lure rate, f , during coast period for the 
USL is 43. 'p - u .38 = 29.84 failures/l.000 hours. 
During the restart  f ir ing the sett l ing valve 
doesn't need t o  operate W t h e r  so f 4  = 43.72 - 
1.82 = 41.90 failures/l000 hours for the unity 
stress level. As  in  the case of perfect f l ight ,  
f5, the failure rate during the f ina l  17 second 
coast period, is 2.24 failures/1000 hours for the 
USL. 
Hence for an acceptable Transit 2-B 
fl ight,  the USL is 
Calculations for Couriek LAB.' The calcu- 
lation for the Courier mission was made In a simi- 
l a r  manner as for the Transit 2-B flight: For the 
Courier 1-B system the Failure Rates for a l l  en- 
vironments are the same as for  the Transit 2-B. 
The only difference in re l iabi l i ty  of the propul- 
sion system is due t o  the longer coast time. The 
US>-of a "perfect" Courier 1-B AJl0-104 propulsion 
system ris 
the USL level of an "acceptable" Courier 1-B AJ10- 
104 propulsion system is, 
A similar calculation was performed to obtain the 
Transit 3-A reliability prediction, 
Analysis of the Ablestar Stage Forward Section 
The reliability of the Forward Section of 
the Ablestar Stage was estimated from relatively 
recent failure rates of electronic components 
found in 10,000 system hours Of flight operation 
of Fire Control System equipment. The total fail- 
ure rate as shown in Tables 5 and 7 is 12.62 fail- 
ures per 1000 hours for the USL level for "perfect" 
flight of the Transit 2-B (i.e., when all compo- 
nents are operating in accordance with specifica- 
tions); this is the failure rate during the whole 
flight except for the 17 seconds of spin table ac- 
tuation after restart burnout. On the Courier 1-B 
the Assembly Integrating Accelerometer needn't 
function after the first burnout so the failure 
rate becomes 12.62 - 1.08 = 11.54 failures per 
1000 hours for the USL during the coast and re- 
start periods. The failure rate of the components 
in the Forward Section directly connected to and 
including the spin table is .38 failures per 1000 
hours for the USL. These reliability calculations 
do not include the STL guidance package which was 
Government-furnished and thus treated as external 
to the Ablestar Stage as supplied by Aerojet- 
General Corporation. In the case of "acceptable" 
flight where only operation of essential parts is 
considered, the failure rate for the telemetry , 
system may be neglected and the overall failure 
rate for the Transit 2-B becomes 12.62 - 3.08 = 
9.54 failures per 1000 hour:: for the USL. For 
"acceptable" Courier 1-B the failure rate is 
11.54 - 3.08 = 8.46 failures per 1000 hours for 
the USL during the coast and restart periods. 
The following calculations show the USL 
reliability estimates of the Forward Section 
Assembly. 
For a "perfect" flight the forward section 
estimated USL reliability for the Transit 2-B is, 
For a "perfect" flight the P o m d  section 
estimated USL reliability for the Courier 1-B is, 
r 
For an "acceptable" flight the foxward 
section estimated USL for the Courier 1-B is, 
- 
Reliability Monitoring 
In order to assure that the reliability 
predicted in this report was obtained, it was nec- 
essary to monitor the components as they were test- 
ed. The maximum number as well as the average num- 
ber of failures for each component are given in 
Tables 9 and 10. For example, from reading Table 
9 we infer that if all the'black boxes containing 
capacitors were tested for 1000 hours each we would 
not expect any failures. Even if there were as 
many as three failures of capacitors, this may still 
be acceptable as random expectancy; however, four 
failures would indicate the failure rate was exces- 
sive. In the went four or more failures were ex- 
perienced, an investigation as to the nature of the 
failures would be made. Similarly, the m a x h u m  
number of coils, connectors, diodes, and other elec- 
tronic parts which may fail in ground test due to 
chance causes can be read from Table 9. If, for 
instance, the total test time per black box were 
100 hours, we could not allow any failures except 
for one each in diodes and resistors without ini- 
tiation of suitable corrective action. Table 10 
lists the propulsion system items and their maxi- 
mum failure rates, and is interpreted in the same 
manner as Table 9. 
For an "acceptable" flight the forward section 
estimated USL reliability for the Transit 2-B is, 
Initial Results of Monitoring 
Frorn the first t~ro vehicles produced, data 
was derived from ground tests performed on these 
vehicles that reflected amazingly close correla- 
tion of failure rates (and hence reliabilities) with 
the anticipated figures for the propulsion subsys- 
tem. The results of electronics tests indicated 
several units xiere not vithin expected failure 
rate limitations as previously described. A ta.bu- 
lation of these initial findings is sho~~m in Table 
11 with reliability interpretation shown in Table 
12. Changes were initiated in the electronics 
portions of the stage early in the program to re- 
move obvious items of equivocal perfolmance. As 







Rel iabi l i ty  of Ablestar Stages 
Running 6 Month Cumulative 
Note: The Electrical Power Subsystem is  not shown on th is  graph. With only 
, 
one failure, occming i n  January, we. have asubystem M'EBF of ao1 hours 
for  January 1962. 
a 6  
W A  
ABLESTAR STAGE PREDICTED RELIABILITY FIGURES 
PREDICTED RELIABILITY - ABLESTAR SWGE FOR A TRANSII! 2-B MISSION 
Ablestar Stage Propulsion System Forward Section 
Reliability $ Reliability $ Reliability 
Perfect Flight 
95% Lower Confid. ~evel** 
95% Upper Confid. ~evel** 
PREDICTED RELIABILITY - ABLESTAR STAGE FOR A COURIW 1-B MISSION 
Ablestar Stage Propulsion System Forward Section 
Reliability '$ Reliability $ Reliability 5 
Perfect Flight 96.0 
95% Lower Confid. Level , 95.0 
93% Upper Confid, Level 97.0 
PmICTED RELIABILITY - ABLESIIAR STAGE FOR A TRANSIT 3-A MISSION 
Ablestar Stage 
Reliability $ 
Propulsion System Forward Section 
Reliability $ Reliability 
Perfect Flight . . 
95% Lower Confid. Level 
95% Upper Confid. Level 
Acceptable Flight 
9596 Lower Confid. Level 
95% Upper Confid. Level 
** The upper and lower 95% confidence level pertains t o  the re l iabi l i ty  value found when the g r m d  
tes t  and coast environment i s  assumed t o  be of the same severity as the powered f l ight  environment, and 
the number of failures reflected W i n g  the source data t e s t  periods are considered. 
TABLE B 
ABIBSTAR STAGE RELIABILITY FIGURES FROM GROUND TESTS 
OF S/N 005 AND 006, AZUSA AND CAPE CANAVBRAL 
CURRENT RELIfiBILITY - ABLESII'W STAGE SIN-005 (COURIEII 1 - B  MISSIOR) 
- . -2 
Perfect Flight 
Ablestar Stage Current Propulsion Current 
Reliabi l i ty $ F/H~.  Sys t .~e l .$  F / H ~ .  
95% Lover Confid. Level 80.42 * 2 
95% Upper Confid. Level 88.74 * 2 
CURRENT RELIABILITY - ABLESTAR STAGE SIN-006 (TRANSIT 3-A MISSION) 
Ablestar Stage Current Propulsion Current 
Reliabi l i ty $ F/Hr. sys t .~e l .$  F / H ~ .  
Perfect Flight 86.06 0635 96.45 * .16581 
95% Lower Confid. Level 81.40 * 2 
95% Upper Conf id. Level 89.33 * 2 
Acceptable Flight 
95% Lower Confid. Level 





  el. -$ 
*1 - Includes Attitude Control System as  per Report No. L 0358-01-10, Section 111 




FAILURE RATE OF FORWARD SECTION (ELECTRONIC) PARTS 
BASED ON PRIMARY FAILURES 
Component 
Test-Hours Failures 
27.33 x 10 6 31 
Coils, Chokes, Reactors, 5.56 x 10 6 
Mag. Amps, Filters 
Crystals Semi-Cond. Diodes 57.50 x 10 6 84 
Motors, Resolvers, Gyros, Synchros .k x 10 6 33 
4.31 x 10 6 Relays 158 
Resistors 83.71 x 10 
6 228 
Switches 2.11 x 10 
6 27 




* Derived from FCS equipment auring lo4 system hours flight operation 
KO, of Fzilures 







Line, Flex (propellant ) 




Valve, Attitude Control (1>* 
Check 
Fuel Vent (1) 
Helium Vent (1) 
Oxidizer Vent (1) 
Hydraulic Pressure 
Relief 






FAILW W E  OF PROPULSION SYSm (MECHANICAL) 




~ e f  ( 1 ) ~ e v e l  
Equiv. Test 
Time Hours Failures 
No. of 
Failures 
3 10 Hours 
Valves with superscript (1) sre  all similar and are assumed t o  have the same fa i lure  rate .  
* The time of test ing at t i tude control was too s m a l l  t o  consider. 
TABU 3 
DURATION OF EACH EXWlRONMENT UNDERGONE BY ABLESTAR 
Time (seconds ) 
Environment 
Booster Duration 
F i r s t  Firing Duration 
Coasting Duration 
Second Firing Duration 
Post Second Firing 
Total 
Transit 2-B Courier 1-B 
TABLE: 4 
FAILURE RATE OF A~10-104 PROPULSION SYSTEM 
Part  
-
Hydraulic System Instal la t ion,  
Gimbal Actuation 
Line Valve Assemblies 
AJ10-104 Main Assembly, Tanks 
Transducer Ins ta l la t ion  
Thrust Chamber & Support Assy. 
Harness Ins ta l la t ion  
Attitude Ins ta l la t ion  Control and 
Restart  System 
Attitude Control & Restart  System 
Panel Assembly 
Oxidizer Valve Hydraulic Assembly 
Pneumatic System Ins ta l la t ion  Assembly 
Thrust Chamber Assembly 
F i l l  & Drain System Ins ta l la t ion  
Oxidizer Tank Pressurization 
Ins ta l la t ion  
Safety and Arming Destructor 
Tank Assembly 
Overall Failure Rate 
USL Expected 









Gyro Reference Assembly 
Battery & Control Box Assy. 
Telemetry Battery Assembly 
Battery Assembly 
DC-DC Converter Assembly 
Telemeter Signal Conditioner 
Telemeter RF Assembly 
Assembly Integrating 
Accelerometer 
Electronic Assembly, FLT Control 
Final  Assembly Programmer and 
Sequence Control 
Telemetry Antenna Assembly 
Distribution Box 
Fairing Separation 
Overall Failure Rate 
Burnout Test 
~a i lures /1000  
Hours 
* These items not essen t ia l  f o r  "acceptable" f l i g h t .  










Fittings, Flanges, Elbaws 
Fil ters ,  mechanical 
Fi l ters ,  E l e c t r i c d  
Flex Lines, Propellant 
Manif old 







Tank Assembly, Propellant 
Tank Assembly, Helium 
Tank Assembly, Nitrogen 
TABLE 6 
FUNCTIONAL PARTS I N  THE AJl0-104 PROPULSION SYSTEM 






Total Functional Parts 
Total Failure Rate 
No. i n  
System 
Expected Ground 
Test ~ a i l u r e s /  
1000 Hours 
55.76 fa i lures  
/lo00 hrs . 
FUNCTIONAL PAIPPS I N  THE FOKWARD ASSWLY 






Amplifiers, Bulova and Composite 
Battery 
Bolt, Explosive 
Capacft o r  
Chopper 













No. i n  
System 
Expected t e s t  
~ai lures/1000 
Hours 
TABLE 7 (cont ) 
FUNCTIONAL PARTS I N  THE FORWARD ASSmLY 
( ~ a i l u r e  rates  are based on manned a i r c r a f t  environment) 
Component Part 
No. i n  
System 
Relay 29 -037 
Resistor 634 . 003 
Shaft 1 .03l 
Spin Table 1 .006 
Spring 18 .009 
switch 11 .013 
Tachometer Motor 1 .078 
Terminal 294 .001 
Transducer 1 .150 
Transformer 20 .OX? 
Transmitter, Bendix 1 -534 
Transistor, Sensistor 16 4 .027 
Valve, Explosive 4 .0l3 
Valve, Circle Seal 2 .I30 
VCO 10 
Total Functional Components 1746 
Expected t e s t  





FAILURE RATE DETERMINATION FOR CRITICAL ITENS 
BASED ON 1090 HOURS ACTUAL TEST  TI^ 
A~10-40, 42, 101 Propulsion Systems ~~10-104 Propulsion System 
Critical 
Failures Expected 
Recorded Comp. in USL Comparable USL 
W i n g  Propuls ion I?ailure/ Items in ~ailure/ 
Tests System 1000 Hr. Sys tern 1000 Hr. 
Check Valve 1 
Gas Reg. Valve 2 
FTCV 5 
Gimbal Equipment 4 
OTCV 1 
Propellant Flex Lines 3 
Oxidizer Vent Valve 2 
Fuel Vent Valve 1 
High Pressure Liner (~ubes) 4 
Harness Connector 4 
Pilot Valves 3 
Helium Vent Valves 1 
Hydraulic Pressure Relief Valve 1 
Hydraulic Accum. 1 
Oxidizer Probe 2 
Pressure Switch 2 
Attitude Control Valve 0 
Quick Disconnects 1 
Helium Shutoff Valve 0 






















EXPECTED FAILW RATES OF E~CTRONIC COMPONENTS 
IN THE ABLESTAR STAGE UNDER NON-FIRING TEST CONDITIONS 
Number Median F/R &. F/R Total Median 
Used Per Hour Per Hour F/R Per Hour 
Total M a x i m  
F/R per HOW 
EXPECTED FAILURE RATE OF PROPULSION SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
UNDER NON-FIRING TEST CONDITIONS 














Connector, Electrical 30 
Connector, Mechanical 1 0.2 














Tank Assembly, Propellant 1 2.0 I 
Tank Assembly, Helium 3 0.16 1 
Tank Assembly, Nitrogen 6 0.14 1 






FORWARD SECTION (ELECTRICAL, SPIN TABLE & NOSE FAIRING) 
Range Safety 














AJ-10-104 PROPUISION SUBSYSTEB + GIMBAL ACTUATION 
& HYD. SUPPLY SYSTEM, AND NITROGEN GAS JET CONTROL SYS!t!EM 
Current 
No. Time, Failure Rate 
Failures H r s  . F / H ~ .  
Propulsion Subsystem 
Gimbal Actuation Syst. & Hyd. Supply 
N i t r .  Gas J e t  Control Syst.  
TOTAL F.R. 
TABLE 12 
SUMMARY, ABLESTAR STAGE FAILURE RATE & RELIABILITY 
ABLESTAR STAGE S/N 005 & 006, AZUSA & CAPE CANAVERAL 
Current Current Subsystem 
No. Time Failure Reliabi l i t ies  
Subsystem Failures - H r s .    ate , F / H ~ .  S / N - O O ~  s/N-006 
Range Safety 5 73 25 .06825 ,9524 .9549 
Attitude Control 13 330.28 03936 .9791 ,9801 
Electr ical  Pover 1 29.07  ,003 42 -9976 .9977 
Propulsion 7 144.52 .ow45 .9662 .9680 
Programmer o 200.83 o 
Telemetry 19 271.77 .06991 -9512 .9536 
Airborne Guidance O 27.58 O 
Structural o 78.6 o 
* C Denotes Cr i t ica l  
M Denotes Major 
m Ilenotes minor 
Month Ending January 31, 1962 
WBLF: 13 
SUBSYSm FAILURF: DATA SUMMARY 
This Subsystem Summary page is  published i n  each Monthly Progress Report ' l i s t i ng  
Range Safety 
Programmer 





the f a i lu re  rates, f a i lu re s  and hours f o r  each sttbsystem f o r  the current month 
and also a running a i x  month's cumhlative. 
1 
* 


























6 2 ~ 1 8  
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CALCULATION OF CONFIDENCE: LIMITS FOR RELIABILITY OF ABLESM STAGE 
In general the 95% confidence l imits  of a 
r e l i a b i l i t y  are computed a s  follows: 
Compute the  mean time be ween fai lures,  M, P and f ind  the Reliabi l i ty R = emt m; thelil taking N 
as  the number of fa i lures  used i n  computing M,find 
lower M!tW as L = M - 1.96 M/ f i  and upper bi!CBF a s  
U = M + 1.96 M/p. A s  the fa i lure  ra tes  i n  the 
different environments a re  different, it is  neces- 
sary t o  f ind an equivalent time, T, and equivalent 
Ml'Bl?, M; so,the equations used i n  major Paragraphs 
3 and 4 of the section can be transformed from 
Table A-1 tabulates M and T for the various unity 
s t r e s s  l eve l  oases. The values of T/M axe shown 
i n  the body of t he  paper. 
From Table 1 it i s  seen tha t  710 fai lures 
occurred during the tes t ing  fo r  evaluating the 
Failure Rate of the most numerous components i n  
the  forward section, and from Table 2 it i s  seen 
tha t  38 fa i lures  occurred during the test ing of 
propulsion systems, So, for  the forward section, 
n i s  considered t o  be 710 with Jii= 26.65; and fo r  
the  ~ ~ 1 0 - 1 0 4  propulsion system, n i s  38 with fi = 
6.16. 
Table A-2 shows T and M a s  well as  confi- 
dence l imi ts  for  the unity s t ress  level. 
The technique of "'Polerancing by the Dif  - 
f e rent ia l  ~ethod"3 w a s  used i n  finding the conf i- 
dence limits f o r  the overall system (i.e., p r o m -  
sion system and forward section). 
In t h i s  method i f  F = F (x,Y) and the 
standard deviations sx and sy are known or  are 
estimated, then the standard deviation of F can be 
computed as _ I -  
Now FR = R and FR2 = R1. I n  computing 
1 2  
the upper l i m i t ,  % = (Rul - R1) 1 / 1 0  96 and 
U l  I 
sm2 = (%2 - n2) 111.96 where RU and % are 1 2 I 
upper l imits  fo r  the r e l i a b i l i t i e s  of the propul- 
sion system and forward sections respectively. 
Similarly S R L ~  = ( R ~  - R ~ )  1/1.96 and ~+q = 
( ~ 2  - R L ~ )  111.96 are computed where R L ~  and Rb I 
are  the lower limits for  the r e l i ab i l i t i e s .  I 
The upper 9546 l imi t  of r e l i a b i l i t y  is, 
R~ R~ + 1.96 
and the lower 9546 M m i t  of r e l i a b i l i t y  is, 
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In  the present case F = R1 % where R1 is  the re-  
l i a b i l i t y  of the propulsion system and R2 is  the 
r e l i a b i l i t y  of the forward section. 
TABLJ3 A-2 
95 PERCENT CONFIDENCE CALCULATIONS FOR SUB-SYSTEMS 
95% Confidence 95% Confidence 
1.96 M Limits on MTBF Limits on M T Rel iab i l i ty  
Type of Analysis - Sec . Sec . 
- A T  Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Transit 2-B perfect 
propulsion system 
Transit 2-B acceptable 
propulsion system 
Courier 1-B perfect 
propulsion system 
Courier 1-B acceptable 
propulsion system 
Transit 2-B perfect 
forward section 
Transit 2-B acceptable 
f omard section 
Courier 1-B perfect 
f onrard section 
Courier 1-B acceptable 
forward section 
TABLE A - 1  
RELIABILITIES AND TIME STRESSES FOR SUB-SYSTEMS 
( Propulsion System 
Perfect ( Forward Section 
Transit  2-B ( Propulsion System 
Acceptable ( Forward Section 
( ~ r o p u l s i o n  System 
Perfect ( Fomrasd Section 
Courier 1-B ( Propulsion System 
Acceptable ( Forward Section 

/ RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF FBDUNDANCY MECHANISMS 
Nathan Lichter 
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and 
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Bay Shore, New York 
Reliability expressions are derived for  two 
basic functional redundancy techniques as applied 
t o  a two-channel system? active redundancy (both 
channels operate ) and standby redundancy (one 
standby redundancy (one channel operates; the 
other i s  switched in  upon fai lure of the f i r s t ) .  
Each expression i s  investigated for  the effect of 
the following: 
1. Failures of a channel which cause the 
redundant channel t o  f a i l ,  
2. Failures of a channel which do not effect 
the redundant channel, 
3. Load sharing, 
4. Reliability of the switching device. 
The equations for  each of these methods and 
the i r  specific parameters are contained i n  thei r  
respective sections. Solutions t o  these equa- 
tions have been determined over a wide range of 
variables using the IBM 7090 computer, and the 
results  are shown graphically i n  Figures 9 and 11. 
An analysis of these plots leads t o  the follow- 
ing observations and conclusions: 
1. Active redundancy rather than standby 
redundancy should be used whenever technically 
feasible due t o  i t s  simplicity and re l iabi l i ty  po- 
t en t i a l  resulting from load sharing (derating) as 
noted below. 
2. The traditional re l iabi l i ty  expression 
for  active redundancy, 
n 
may provide erroneous conclusions since it does 
not allow for the negative effect of short type 
fai lures or the beneficial effect of derating re- 
sulting from load sharing between the two active 
channels. Comparison of th i s  expression with that 
for  standby redundancy assuming perfect decision 
and switching devices shcnm that  standby redun- 
dancy re l iabi l i ty  is only sl ightly greater than 
active redundancy re l iabi l i ty  under these assump- 
tions ( ~ i ~ u r e  9). 
3 .  As the probability of short failures in- 
creases, the re l iabi l i ty  of the active redundant 
system decreases such that  when the ra t io  of short 
t o  open failures is unity, system re l iabi l i ty  is 
approximately equal t o  the re l iabi l i ty  of a single 
channel. System failure resulting from "shorts" 
can be minimized by the addition of isolation de- 
vices i n  each channel t o  divorce the failed chan- 
nel  from the system. 
4. On the other hand, if the active redun- 
dant elements exhibit reduced f a i l w e  rates be- 
cause they share the load (aerated), system relia-  
b i l i t y  i s  greater than that  obtained from, 
2 R = 2RC-RC . Assuming short failures are negli- 
gible, active redundancy re l iabi l i ty  w i l l  exceed 
standby redundancy, even with perfect switching, 
when the ra t io  of open fai lure rate a t  half load 
(derated operating condition) t o  open failure rate 
a t  f u l l  load is one half (1/2). 
5 .  The obvious disadvantage of standby re- 
dundancy is the complexity resulting from the 
decision/switching device. An open type fai lure 
i n  th i s  device f a i l s  the redundant system, and a 
rapid deterioration i n  system re l iabi l i ty  results 
as the open type fai lure rate increases a8 shown 
in  Figure 11. 
6. Neglecting the open type fai lure of the 
switching device, the re l iabi l i ty  of the standby 
redundancy system w i l l  always exceed 2RC - RC2 
provided the probability of successful switchover 
from the fai led channel t o  the standby channel is 
greater than the re l iabi l i ty  of the channel it- 
self .  
- ' +  -' ' -  
Introduction 
Systems designed fo r  extended missions often 
apply redundancy when complexity and the inherent 
part fai lure ra te  preclude achieving desired re- 
l i ab i l i ty  goals. There are various ways of 
achieving redundancy. In view of limitations on 
weight and space, it is important that  optimum 
methods be selected, compatible with the design 
objective. 
This paper presents a technique for  evaluat- 
ing two types of redundancy: active, where the 
redundant csmponents function continuously; and 
standby, where the redundant components do not 
function u n t i l  a f a i l u r e  occurs, vhereupon a 
switching device replaces the fa i led  component 
with an operable one. The evaluation is made 
considering the  e f fec t s  of a number of variables 
such as  short and open type fai lures ,  load shar- 
ing, and r e l i a b i l i t y  of the switching devices. 
Some of these e f fec t s  have been presented 
separately i n  other studies but t h i s  paper com- 
bines a l l  of these variables in to  a s ingle  s e t  of 
equations.3j4 In order t o  simplify the presen- 
ta t ion,  the study has been limited t o  the exponen- 
t i a l  d i s t r ibu t ion  and second order redundancy. 
However, the  method i t s e l f  i s  applicable t o  multi- 
channel systems with higher order redundancies and 
fo r  dis t r ibut ions other than the exponential. 
The method i s  useful even when spec i f ic  
fa i lu re  ra tes  a r e  not available since the curves 
generated can be applied i n  a qual i ta t ive sense 
by the  systems designer. 
The term independent1' means t ha t  t he  per- 
formance, or  loss,  of one channel has l i t t l e  or  
no e f fec t  on the  f a i l u r e  probability of the other. 
It i s  not necessary fo r  both channels t o  be phys- 
i c a l l y  ins ta l led  para l le l  i n  order t o  be function- 
a l l y  pa ra l l e l  i n  a r e l i a b i l i t y  sense. For example, 
two check valves, A & B, are  ins ta l led  in  ser ies  
t o  insure against reverse flow as shown i n  Figure 
2A. There a r e  essent ial ly  three modes of fa i lu re  
tha t  can occur t o  each of these valves: 
1. Failure t o  close when flow reverses 
2. Failure t o  open when flow commences. 
3. External leakage. 
Single Channel Rel iab i l i ty  
The term "channel" is used i n  t h i s  report t o  
describe a determinate path of flow between two 
points and may consist  of a part,  element, group 
of parts,  module, subsystem, o r  equipment and i t s  
connecting hardware. Thus it i s  assumed tha t  
where a channel consists of many parts  or  elements 
i n  series,  a f a i l u r e  of any one may interrupt  the 
flow and w i l l  contribute t o  channel fa i lu re .  
I f  the  f a i l u r e  pat tern of the channel can be 
described by the  exponential dis t r ibut ion,  the  
t o t a l  channel f a i l u r e  rate ,  A ,  is then equal t o  
the sum of the  f a i l u r e  ra tes  of the  individual 
par ts .  Carhart defines the  r e l i a b i l i t y  of such a 
configuration as  : 1 
R = exp [at], 
Figure 2 
Figure 2B i s  the r e l i a b i l i t y  block diagram repre- 
senting the above arrangement, with subscripts 1, 
2, and 3 indicating the modes of f a i l u r e  d i s -  
cussed above. 
This example \ a s  chosen t o  demonstrate t he  
choice of the  term "Active Redundancy" rather  than 
"Para l le l  Redundancy. " The word "paral le l"  i s  
sometimes misleading, implying physical arrange- 
ments and possibly ignores cer tain modes of 
f a i l u r e  . 
where For cer tain instal la t ions,  f a i l u r e  modes 2 
A = t o t a l  f a i l u r e  r a t e  of channel, and and 3 a re  v i r t ua l l y  non-existent so t ha t  Figure 2B 
reduces t o  tha t  portrayed by Figure 1. 
t = mission time 
The probability of system success can be 
shown t o  b e : l  
Active Redundancy - Independent Channels RT = R + RB - RARB , A ( 2 )  
When two independent channels, each capable 
of performing the same task, a re  both functioning where 
continuously they a re  considered act ively redun- 
dant. This s i tua t ion  is portrayed i n  Figure 1. RA = r e l i a b i l i t y  of channel A, and 
RB = r e l i a b i l i t y  of channel B. 
I f  both channels are  identical,  o r  have the  
same r e l i a b i l i t i e s ,  RA = R = R, Equation (2 )  re-  
duces to :  B 
Figure 1 
Since very few systems w i l l  ever approach the 
i dea l  independent conditions defined above, Equa- 
t ions  (2)  & ( 3 )  can be considered as theoret ical  
independent active redundancy. 
When the exponential dis tr ibut ion i s  consid- 
ered applicable, Equation (2)  may be rewritten as  
follows : 
R~ = exp [-hAt] 
where 
h A  = t o t a l  fa i lure  r a t e  of channel A, 
A B  = t o t a l  fa i lure  ra te  of channel B, and 
t = mission time. 
If both channels have the same fa i lure  rates, 
AA = A B  = A ,  Equation (4)  reduces to :  
RT = 2 exp [ -k t ]  - exp [ - 2 ~ t ] .  
Active Redundancy - Dependent Channels 
I n  most cases of act ive redundancy certain 
types of f a i l u r e  poss ib i l i t i es  exist  where the 
en t i re  system w i l l  be affected. I f  the channels 
A and B i n  Figure 1 are e l ec t r i ca l  i n  nature, a 
short o r  ground type fa i lure  i n  e i ther  A or B w i l l  
r e su l t  i n  system fai lure,  whereas an open type 
f a i l u r e  w i l l  not a f fec t  system operation. A sim- 
i l a r  s i tuat ion can be c i ted  fo r  a hydraulic sys- 
tem. I f  A and B represent hydraulic pumps, a 
large leak o r  pump casing burst  w i l l  deplete the 
reservoir and consequently cause complete system 
fa i lure .  It is apparent then tha t  as  the r a t i o  of 
probability of short  type t o  open type fa i lures  
increases, a point may be reached where active 
redundancy provides lower r e l i a b i l i t i e s  than a 
s ingle channel. This r a t i o  i s  l a t e r  shown t o  be 
approximately unity. 
In many applications of active redundancy, 
the load i s  actual ly shared by the two channels 
where each channel is capable of carrying the en- 
t i r e  load. This fac tor  should be considered i n  
estimating the system r e l i a b i l i t y  since numerous 
equipments exhibit  a decrease i n  fa i lure  ra te  with 
decreasing load. Thus i f  channels A and B each 
carry half the load, the  individual channel f a i l -  
ure r a t e  may be considerably less  than normal, 
u n t i l  one f a i l s ,  whereupon the other takes on the 
f u l l  load a t  a higher fa i lure  hazard. 
The dependent active redundancy system can 
be successful i n  the following modes of operation. 
P(l) Both channels, A and B, each carrying 
half load, function successfully u n t i l  time t. 
P Both channels, A and B, each carrying (2)  
half load, function successfully u n t i l  time ti, 
where A f a i l s  - due t o  an open type fai lure,  and 
B continues t o  function a t  f u l l  load u n t i l  time t. 
P Same as P except B f a i l s  and A con- (3)  (2)' 
tinues t o  function. 
The following diagram, Figure 3, represents 





where: A' = operation of A at half load. 
B' = operation of B at half load. 
A = operation of A at full load. 
B = operation of B at full load. 
t i  = time to first channel failure. 
Figure 3  
Mathematically, the probability of these oc- 
curences may be expressed as follows: 
where 
I 
R~ = probability that  channel A does not f a i l  for  any reason a t  half load 
during time interval  0 t o  t, and 
i = Probability t ha t  channel B does not f a i l  for  any reason a t  half load 
during time interval  0 t o  t. 
where 
( l - ~ i ~ )  = probability that  channel A f a i l s  
t o  open a t  half load during time 
in te rva l  0 t o  t, 
= probability that  c h a e l  A does not R ' t ~  f a i l  due t o  a short type fai lure .at  
hylf load during time interval 0 t o  
tl' 
5 probability that  channel B does not 
f a i l  fo r  any reason a t  half load 
during time interval 0 t o  ti, and 
= probability that  channel B does not 
'jRStl f a i l  fo r  any reason a t  f u l l  load 
auring time interval t; to  t, 
where 
= probability that  channel B does not 
f a i l  f o r  any reason a t  f u l l  load 
during time interval 0 t o  t, and 
R ;  
= probability that  channel B does not 
fail  f o r  any reason a t  f u l l  load 
during time interval 0 t o  ti. 
where the definitions fo r  Equation (7) apply ex- 
cept that  the channel identification reverses, 
since B f a i l s  and A continues functioning. 
Therefore, the probability of success of an 
active redundant system w i l l  be the summation of 
the probability of success of each of the above 
possible modes of operation, or: 
In many applications channels A and B can Fe 
assumed t o  be identical. Therefore Ri = = R , 
Substituting these values in  Equation (9) and 
simplifying yields : 
I f  the channels of the system under analysis 
do not reflect  a change i n  the probybility of suc- 
cess with changing load, then R = R , Rtt = R' 1 
- t, , 
Now i f  there is no possibility of short type 
failures, R I -+l and Ro-+R, Equation (11) re- v' - 
duces t o  T$, = 2R-R", which is the same as Equation 
(3)  for independent active redundancy. Thus Equa- 
t ion (3)  is the special case of Equation (9) where 
the channels are identical and the performance of 
ei ther channel is completely independent of the 
other. 
Exponential Failure Pattern 
Assuming that the fai lure pattern of the 
channels i s  exponential, Equation (10) can be re- 
written as follows : 
R T = exp [ - 2 ~ I t ]  
where I 
A; = fai lure rate for open fai lures of either 
channel a t  half load, 
I 
As = fai lure rate for  short fai lures of 
ei ther channel a t  half load, 
A' = t o t a l  failur? rate of ei ther channel a t  
half load, x = A :  + A ;  
X = t o t a l  fai lure rate of ei ther channel a t  
f u l l  load, 
t -- mission time, and 
1 
tl = time a t  which primary channel fa i l s .  
L 
Before Equation (12) may be applied, an e s t i -  
mate of t; must be made since it is usually the 
only parameter not normally available. 
The exponential fai lure pattern of the chan- 
nel  i s  shown i n  Figure 4. 
Time 
Figure 4 
The mission time, t, should usually be sub- 
s t m t i a l l y  less  than 1/ A', the mean-time-between- 
fai lures.  The expected value of ti w i l l  be the 
mean of the shaded area under the probability 
density function ( ~ i ~ u r e  4 )  or: 
Solving Equation (13) fo r  the expected value 
of the time a$ which the primary channel f a i l s  
yields : 
I f  the same assumption is made as i n  the der- 
ivat ion of Equation (11) where the  channels of the 
system under analysis do not re f lec t  a change i n  
probability of success with changing load, then 
A =  A ' ,  ho  =A:, andAs = A ; .  Substituting into 
Equation (11) and simplifying the resul ts  : 
= exp L2At] 
f .  
Note tha t  the prime i n  ti is retained since ti is also based upon open failures. It i s  shown 
l a t e r  t ha t  tl, the expected time a t  which the 
primary channel of a standby redundant system 
f a i l s ,  is  a function of both open and short type 
fa i lures  . 
Again assuming tha t  there is no possibi l i ty 
of short type failures, As-0, and Equation (16) 
reduces to :  
RT = 2 exp [-kt] - exp 1-2At] (17) 
Equation (17) is  identical  t o  Equation (5)  
again proving tha t  the assumption of active re-  
dundancy with independent channels is only a 
special  case of active redundancy with dependent 
channels. 
Comparison Of Independent And Dependent 
Active Redundancy Eq~~at ions  
Graphic Comparison 
Systemreliabi l i t ies  computed for  various com- 
binations and values of fa i lure  ra te  substituted 
i n  Equation (16) a re  plotted against t o t a l  channel 
fa i lure  r a t e  i n  Figure 9. The effects  of short  
type f a i lu re s ,h s  >o,  and reduced open f a i lu re  
r a t e  with shared loads, A d/A0 < 1, are  shown fo r  
a 1 year mission compared with the r e l i a b i l i t y  of 
the independent active redundant system. 
The curves in Figure 9 resuqt from repet i t ive 
solutions of the applicable equations u t i l iz ing  
the f a c i l i t i e s  of an IBM 7090 d i g i t a l  computer. 
It can be seen tha t  as  the probability of 
short type fai lures increases, the r e l i a b i l i t y  of 
the system decreases below the curve representing 
a theoret ical  independent active redundant system, 
when A s/ho = 1, system re l i ab i l i t y  is approxi- 
mately equal t o  channel re l iab i l i ty .  Conversely, 
i f  the equipment exhibits reduced open fa i lure  
ra tes  because the load is shared between the two 
channels, A &/Ao < 1, system r e l i a b i l i t y  increases 
above the theoret ical  curve and may exceed a 
standby redundant system with perfect switching, 
which is discussed i n  de t a i l  i n  the following 
section. 
Analytic Comparison 
Since it has been shown that  A =  h o  + As,  
Equation (16) may be rewritten: 
By rearranging t h i s  equation and comparing 
the resul t  with Equation (5), a qual i tat ive com- 
parison may be made between estimates of system 
re l i ab i l i t y  based upon independent and dependent 
redundancy. Equation (18) becomes : 
RT = 2 exp [-A0t] exp [-hS(t; + t )] 
- exp [-*A0t] 
Obviously ti < t (see Figure 4) .  It follows 
then tha t  exp [-A (ti + t ) ]  > exp [-2ASt] and that 1 2 exp [-AS ( t i  + t 31 - exp [ -2hst] is  positive and 
also greater than exp [ -$( t i  + )] . '?he f i r s t  
term of Equation (19) i s  smaller than the first 
term of Equation (5) by the factor  exp [ - ~ ~ ( t i + t ) ]  
and although the second term of Equation (19) is 
smaller than tha t  of Equation (5), it does not 
diminish as rapidly as the first term since 
( 2  exp [-&(ti+t)] -exp [-2ASt] 1 >exp [ - ~ ~ ( t ' + t ) ]  . 
Theref ore uslng the estimate of system r e i i a b i l i t  y 
based upon dependent redundancy, Equation (19 ), is 
always less  than that  obtained by basing the es- 
t imate upon independent redundance, Equation (5 ) . 
The preceding discussion proves t h a t  where 
short  type f a i l u r e s  a r e  possible, t h e  use of 
Equations (2 )  through ( 5 )  t r i l l  lead t o  opt imist ic  
solut ions .  
Further, it w i l l  now be shown t h a t  it is 
possible f o r  a redundant system t o  be worse than 
a s ing le  channel. Another rearrangement of Equa- 
t i o n  (162 y ie lds :  
0.8717. When applying Equation (12), the  system 
r e l i a b i l i t y  is  found t o  be 0.9877. 
I f  the  c l a s s i c a l  equation, referred t o  a 
independent act ive  redundancy, equation (3),  was 
used, the  system r e l i a b i l i t y  would be estimated 
t o  be .9835. This does not appear t o  be s ig -  
n i f i c a n t l y  d i f fe ren t  from the estimate from 
Equation (12). However, when examining the un- 
r e l i a b i l i t y ,  Q, where 1 = R + Q, it can be seen 
t h a t  the estimate of t h i s  probabi l i ty  of f a i l u r e  
has been increased 34%. 
(20) Standby Redundancy 
But exp [-,it1 = R, t h e  channel r e l i a b i l i t y ,  then Figure 5 i s  a schematic of a two-channel 
system i n  standby redundancy. Note t h a t  the  
%=R 1 R+2 exp[hst;] (1-exp [-i0t] ) 1 (21) secondary channel (B), i s  completely isolated 
from the primary channel (A), by a decision 
It i s  obvious then, t h a t  when 
(R+2 exp I S  h t l  '1 (1-exp [-hot] ) ) > I ,  
then % > R; 
and 
Rf2 exp A tl (1-exp [ -hot ] ) I = 1, I s  ' I  
and when 
(1-exp [-hot ] ) ) <IJ 
then RT < R. 
Example 
A t y p i c a l  square wave o s c i l l a t o r  power 
supply, A, i s  shown i n  Figure 10. To i m -  
prove r e l i a b i l i t y ,  a second power supply, B, 
has been placed i n  act ive  dependent redun- 
dancy. The c i r c u i t s  have been modified t o  in-  
sure t h a t  no component par t ,  f a i l i n g  short ,  
would r e s u l t  i n  a system f a i l u r e .  This was 
done t o  take f u l l  advantage of the act ive  re-  
dundancy with derated channels. 
Equation (12) may now be used t o  e s t i -  
mate the  system r e l i a b i l i t y .  It should be r e -  
cognized t h a t  X r S = O  and t h a t  A' represents 
the  t o t a l  channel f a i l u r e  r a t e  a t  half  load 
do  = 2 .  An assumption is  made t h a t  the  fuse  
w i l l  always open the  c i r c u i t  upon an equipment 
short  type f a i l u r e .  I f  t h i s  assumption cannot 
be considered va l id ,  t h e  system r e l i a b i l i t y  
would be estimated by the  method discussed l a t e r  
i n  the  section on Dependent Active Redundancy 
With Isolat ion Devices. 
The f a i l u r e  r a t e s  used f o r  t h i s  example a re  
shown i n  Table I f o r  both 100% and 50$ rated out- 
put .  For a mission time of one year, the  re -  
l i a b i l i t y ,  R, of each power supply channel, i s  
making device (D) and a switching device (s). 
The secondary channel does not perform any func- 
t i o n  unless the  primary f a i l s ,  and the secondary 
channel is  successfully switched i n t o  the  system. 
output %-- 
Figure 5 
An example would be two amplifiers connected 
i n  para l l e l .  When the  output of A f a l l s  outside 
the  acceptable tolerance l imi t s ,  the  decision de- 
vice  t r iggers  the  switch re lay  t o  replace channel 
A with channel B t o  maintain system operation. 
Bio switches a re  not absolutely necessary t o  ac- 
complish t h i s  task, but serve t o  show the complete 
i so la t ion  of channel B from A. Depending on the 
function of the  system and the c i rcu i t ry ,  the  
second switch may be replaced by other  means of 
isola t ion,  such as  two diodes a s  shown i n  Figure 6. 
The schematics i n  Figures 5 and 6 port ray 
c i r c u i t r y  t h a t  i s  i r revers ib le .  That i s ,  once 
the  decision device has required switch-over, 
e i t h e r  by f a i l u r e  of the  primary channel o r  by 
f a i l u r e  of the  decision making and/or switching 
device, it cannot rese lec t  the  primary channel. 
The consideration of systems including revers ible  
decision devices i s  beyond the scope of t h i s  paper. 
The assumptions made or  implied i n  the pre- 
ceding paragraphs are  summarized below t o  f a c i l i -  
t a t e  the  analysis.  
Figure 6 
1. The channels are  isolated such t h a t  a 
f a i l u r e  i n  one cannot cause f a i l u r e  i n  another. 
2. The standby channel i s  not affected by 
the  environment, i .e. ,  the f a i l u r e  r a t e  before 
operation i s  negligible compared t o  the f a i l u r e  
r a t e  during operation. 
3. The decision-switching device i s  i r rever-  
s ib le .  
An examination of the above schematics a l so  
indicates t ha t  the  decision device, which may con- 
sist of a detector or  monitor and a cornparitor can 
be considered i n  se r ies  with the switch from a re-  
l i a b i l i t y  standpoint. Therefore, the term 
"switching device'' w i l l  hereafter include a l l  of 
these items. 
The system appearing i n  Figure 5 can be suc- 
ce s s fu l - i n  the  following modes of operation. 
P The primary channel, A, operates suc- ( 1  
cessful ly  up t o  time t, The switching device i s  
successful, i.e., does not make a f a l s e  decision, 
t o  time t. 
P(2) The primary channel f a i l s  a t  time tl. 
The switching device, not having made a f a l s e  de- 
cision, replaces the primary channel with the 
secondary channel, B, which operates successfully 
t o  time t. 
P(3) The primary channel operates u n t i l  the 
switching device makes a f a l s e  decision, a t  time 
t2, connecting the secondary channel, which oper- 
a tes  successfully t o  time t. 
The following diagram, Figure 7, i l l u s t r a t e s  




( 2 )  
Mathematically, the probabi l i t ies  of these 








= probability t h a t  channel A does 
not f a i l  f o r  any reason during 
time interval  0 t o  t, and 
- 
Rsw = probability t ha t  switch does not 
make a f a l s e  decision during time 




(1-R ) = probability t ha t  channel A does A f a i l  f o r  any reason during time 
in te rva l  0 t o  t, 
:, probability tha t  switch has not RsRtl made a f a l s e  decision pr ior  t o  t., 
L 
R , and then operates success- 
SWt, 
f u l l y  when channel A f a i l s  a t  time 
t l j   SF^^' Or R ~ ~ t l  = I . ' s ~ t ~ *  
~t i s  not necessary f o r  the switch 
t o  operate a f t e r  tl, 
probability tha t  channel B does not 
f a i l  f o r  any reason during time in-  
t e rva l  tl t o  t, 
where 
R~ = probability tha t  channel B does not f a i l  f o r  any reason during time in- 
t e rva l  0 t o  t, and 
RBtl = probabflity tha t  channel B does not relay would appear t o  the switching f a i l  fo r  any reason during time in- 
A. The switch would then i n i t i a t e  
device a s  an open fa i lure  i n  channel 
te rva l  0 t o  tl. 
the relay t o  energize channel B. It 
(24 would appear, therefore, only neces- 
sary t o  consider the open contact 
type of the relay from time tl t o  t. 
where The choice of the time in terva l  is 
(1-R ) = probability tha t  switching device ' dependent upon the exact design of EM 
w i l l  make a. fa l se  decision a t  time the switching device. ) 
t2, during the time interval  0 t o  t. Equation (25) can be considered a special 
= probability that channel A functions case of Equation (26) where R = 1. Obviously 
< so successfully u n t i l  f a l s e  decision by Rn 5 R since Rgg = 1. Therefore, it is evident 
switch a t  time t After t2, it does T 2' t ha t  the switching device' should be designed so 
not matter whether channel A is ca- tha t  R S O - c l .  
pable of functioning or  not. 
?At2 = probability tha t  channel B does not f a i l  for  any reason during time in- 
te rva l  t2 t o  t, 
where 
% = probability t ha t  channel B does not f a i l  fo r  any reason during time in- 
te rva l  0 t o  t, and 
R = probability t ha t  channel B does not 
Bt2 f a i l  for  any reason during time in- 
te rva l  0 t o  t2. 
!l!he.probability of system success w i l l  be the 
summation of the probability of success of each 
of the above modes of operation, or: 
?I! = P( l )  + P(2) + P(3) 
In many cases of standby redundancy, chan- 
nels A and B are identical  and capable of per- 
I 
forming the same function. Under these condi- i 
t ions  RA = % = R , R  - 
- ".el = and 
- RAt2 = %t2 -Rt,. Substituting these values i n  
Equation (25) and rearranging yield9 : I 
The following observations should be noted: I 
1. The terms involving t2 (time a t  which 
the switching device makes a fa l se  decision) drops 
out of the equation. This indicates t ha t  the re- 
l i a b i l i t y  of a standby redundant system with two 
identical  channels is independent of the time 
a t  which the switching device makes a fa l se  deci- 
sion. 
A 
Although the term Rm (probability of no f a l se  
(25) decision) has also dropped out of the equation, 
it i s  related t o  the term RSRt, where R SR= 
This equation does not include the,probability 
of switch contacts f a i l i ng  open. This approach 
i s  considered reasonable since it is feasible t o  
design equipment where the probability of t h i s  
type fa i lure  i s  highly remote. In cases where 
t h i s  type fa i lure  cannot be eliminated, Equation 
(25) is modified as follows t o  include t h i s  
factor  : 
I 
Rm4RSF, see Equation (23). Thus successf'ul 
operation i s  equally dependent on both the de- 
cision device not making a fa l se  decision and the 
decision device functioning sa t i s fac tor i ly  upon 
fa i lure  of the f i r s t  channel. 
2. The r e l i a b i l i t y  of the standby redundant 
system w i l l  never be l e s s  than tha t  of a single 
channel, i .e., F$ > Rl since 1 + (1-R) I ] > l  be- 
cause R is  always l e s s  than unity. This is true, 
regardless of the value of the probability of 
sucessful switch-over, since R SRt,/Rt. -O 
A. A 
only when R -c 0. (Note tha t  these con- SRt. 
where clusions neglect the poss ib i l i ty  of open type 
switch fai lures,  i.e., 
RSO = probability tha t  the switch w i l l  not Rso -1). 
f a i l  open during the time interval  3. For standby redundancy t o  be more r e l i -  
0 t o  t. (Note tha t  a further examina- able than theoret ical  independent active redun- 
t ion of Figure 6 reveals tha t  a f a i l -  dancy, the probability of successful. switch-over 
ure caused by an open contact of the must be greater than the r e l i ab i l i t y  of an indi- 
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vidual channel, R >R. This statement is  proved SR 
as  follows: If RSR = R, then RsRt /Rt = 1, and 
1 
equation (27) then reduces t o  % = 2R-2 which is  
- 
equation (3), theoret ical  independent active re-  
dundancy.  o ow ever, r eca l l  tha t  equation (3) does 
not include the poss ib i l i ty  of short type fa i lures  
and assumes R = Ro. Also, again note the assump- 
t i on  tha t  RSO -1). 
It was shown previously tha t  i f  short type fa i lures  
a r e  possible and the equipment under consideration 
does not re f lec t  increases i n  r e l i ab i l i t y  with re- 
duced load, the r e l i a b i l i t y  of an active redundant 
system w i l l  be l e s s  than tha t  expressed by Equa- 
t i on  (3), R ~ < ~ R - R ~ .  Therefore it i s  concluded 
tha t  under these conditions, standby redundancy 
w i l l  yield improved resul t s  over active redun- 
dancy a s  long a s  R >R and RSO-1. SR 
Exponential Failure Pattern 
I f  the f a i lu re  pattern of the channels and 
the switch is,assumed t o  be exponential, Equa- 
t i o n  (25) may be rewritten: 
where 
- I 
A A  = t o t a l  fa i lure  ra te  of channel A, - 
A = t o t a l  fa i lure  ra te  of channel B, B 
= f a i lu re  ra te  of switching device 
making a f a l se  decision, 
ASR = t o t a l  fa i lure  ra te  of switching device 
= A +A 
SWt SF 
where 
AS,= fa i lure  r a t e  of switching device not 
operating properly when required, 
t = mission time, 
tl = time a t  which channel A f a i l s ,  and 
t2 = time a t  which fa lse  decision i s  made by switching device. 
When channel A is identical  t o  channel B, 
AA = A = A. Subqtituting into Equation (28) 
yields : 
Before Equation (29) may be applied, it w i l l  
be necessary t o  determine the value of tl, the 
expected time a t  which the primary channel f a i l s .  I 
The expected value of t l ,  has been derived 
i n  Equations (14) and (15). In t h i s  application 
however, the fa i lure  of the primary channel is 
based upon the t o t a l  fa i lure  ra te  a t  f u l l  load 
rather than open fa i lures  a t  half load. There- 
fore ~ ( t ~ )  is : 
Substituting the expected value of tl into 
Equation (29) provides the most u se f i l  form for  
comparitive studies. 
Comparison of Active And Standby 
Redundancy Equations 
Graphic Comparison 
Figure 9 shows tha t  for  a mission time of 
1 year, where short type fa i lures  are not possi- 
ble, A 's = As = 0,  active redundancy can exceed 
standby redundancy with perfect switching when 
the r a t i o  of channel fa i lure  r a t e  a t  half load 
t o  f u l l  load is one half,  hl/A = 1/2. 
Therefore, i n  the general case, where short 
type fa i lures  are possible and the equipment ex- 
h ib i t s  reduction of fa i lure  r a t e  with reduced 
load, it w i l l  be necessary t o  solve both Equa- 
t ions (12) and (29) t o  determine which type of 
redundancy w i l l  provlde the highest re l iab i l i tes .  
Figure 11 shows the ef fec ts  of switching 
r e l i ab i l i t i e s  on system r e l i a b i l i t y  for  a one 
year mission and compares standby redundancy 
against independent active redundancy and 
single channel r e l i ab i l i t y .  Curve 1 is the 
maximum r e l i a b i l i t y  obtainable with a standby 
redundant system since perfect switching i s  
employed. Curves 2, 3, and 4 show the rapid 
degradation of system re l i ab i l i t y  as  switching 
device fa i lures  are introduced. However, curve 
2 i l l u s t r a t e s  t ha t  i f  the switching device can- 
not f a i l  open, reasonable improvement i s  made 
over single channel r e l i ab i l i t y  even with low 
probability of successful switchover and curve 
4 demonstrates t ha t  it cannot be worse than 
single channel r e l i ab i l i t y .  
Now where even the s l ight  possibi l i ty of 
open type fa i lure  of the switching device ex- 
ists, a s  shown i n  curve 3, considerable re- 
duction of system r e l i a b i l i t y  occurs, espe- 
c i a l ly  i n  the area of low channel fa i lure  rates .  
The low fa i lure  ra tes  portrayed i n  the abscissa 
of Figure 11 imply very simple channels and 
thus  even low f a i l u r e  r a t e s  of the switching 
device of curve 3 w i l l  indicate  poor system 
r e l i a b i l i t i e s .  It should be apparent then t h a t  
standby redundancy can be b e t t e r  Jus t i f i ed  where 
more complicated equipment (those having higher 
f a i l u r e  r a t e s )  are  employed. 
Note a l s o  t h a t  i f  the  second assumption f o r  
the  configuration i n  Figure 6 i s  not e n t i r e l y  
va l id ,  the  standby redundant system r e l i a b i l i t y  
a s  computed by Equations (27) and (31) may be 
s l i g h t l y  opt imist ic .  However, a degree of con- 
servatism can be obtained by assuming a small 
increase i n  t h e  basic  f a i l u r e  r a t e  of the  chan- 
n e l  when applying the  standby redundancy equation. 
Analytic Comparison 
If equipment exh ib i t s  a reduction i n  f a i l u r e  
r a t e  with reduced load, it i s  possible t h a t  the  
r e l i a o i l i t y  of an act ive  redundant system can ex- 
ceed the r e l i a b i l i t y  of a standby redundant sys- 
tem even i f  100% perfect  switching i s  employed. 
To prove t h i s ,  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of short  type f a i l -  
ures a re  neglected, ks-+O, kts-+O. 
Equation (12) f o r  dependent act ive  redundancy 
reduces t o :  
R T = exp [-2k1t] + 2 (1- exp [-ktt])  
exp [-(*$-A) ti ] exp I-kt] (32) 
and assuming perfect  switching, kSR-0, f o r  equa- 
t i o n  (29) yie lds  : 
p = ~ X P  [-kt] + (1-exp [-kt])  exp [htl] 
The f i r s t  term of Equation (32) w i l l  be 
greater  than the  f i r s t  term of Equation (33) when 
k t <  (A/2). The second term of Equation (32) can 
be g rea te r  than t h a t  of E uat ion ( 3 3 )  s ince 
2 , ti < t and exp [-?kt -A) ti is always 
positive,  i.e., 2(l-exp 1-k't] ) exp [-(kt - h ) t i ]  
--  
can be l e s s  than o r  greater  than (1-exp [-kt] ) 
exp [ktl] depending on the  r e l a t i v e  values of X 
and k l .  It a l s o  follows t h a t  as  X1-0, Equation 
(32) approaches uni ty  f o r  any value of A, where 
0 ~ k ~ c o  
Example 
Consider once again the square wave osc i l -  
l a t o r  power supply, Figure 10, used as  the  ex- 
ample f o r  ac t ive  redundancy. In t h i s  application 
the  same power supply channels a re  connected i n  
a standby redundant configuration, s imilar  t o  
t h a t  shown i n  Figure 6. 
Dbta col lected by the R e l i a b i l i t y  Control 
Section a t  Grumman Aircraf t  Engineering Corpora- 
t i o n  has shown t h a t  a r e a l i s t i c  estimate of the  
t o t a l  f a i l u r e  r a t e  of the  switch e lectronics ,  
kSR, i s  1.51 x loq6,  lo addition, the  design of 
the  device i s  assumed t o  be such t h a t  any type 
of f a i l u r e  w i l l  ac t iva te  the switching re lay  and 
a l s o  t h a t  the  re lay  i s  designed so t h a t  the  prob- 
a b i l i t y  of an open contact is extremely remote. 
Thus Equation (29) applies.  
Subs t i tu t ingk ,  from Table I, i n t o  t h i s  equa- 
t i o n  r e s u l t s  i n  a standby redundant system over- 
a l l  r e l i a b i l i t y ,  RT, equal t o  0.9905 as  compared 
t o  0.9877 f o r  act ive  dependent redundancy. In  
other words, i f  the  assumptions made have been 
correct,  the  standby configuration shows a s l i g h t  
improvement over the  act ive  redundant system. 
Of course, i n  making a decision a s  t o  the  type of 
configuration t o  recommend, consideration must be 
given t o  such parameters as  wear out,  maintain- 
a b i l i t y ,  ava i lab i l i ty ,  e t c .  
Dependent Active Redundancy - 
With I so la t ion  Device 
The previous discussions indicate  t h a t  the 
systems designer should attempt t o  use act ive  
redundancy whenever t h e  equipment exh ib i t s  re -  
duced f a i l u r e  r a t e s  with reduced load. Such sys- 
tems are  usual ly  Lighter and simpler, when tech- 
n i c a l l y  feas ib le .  However, fu r ther  increase i n  
system r e l i a b i l i t y  may r e s u l t  from the addition 
of i so la t ion  devices i n  each of t h e  redundant 
channels t o  prevent an equipment short  from f a i l -  
ing both channels and draining the  power supply. 
Figure 8 i l l u s t r a t e s  a two-channel act ive  
redundant system with i so la t ion  devices. When 
a short  occurs i n  one of the  equipments, the  
switching aevice i s o l a t e s  the  channel from the 
system permitting the surviving channel t o  pick 




The r e l i a b i l i t y  of an active redundant sys- 
tem with isolat ion devices i s  expressed by the 
same equation developed fo r  the active redundant 
system l e s s  the  i so la t ion  devices (Equation 12) 
except t ha t  the  terms i n  the equation are in- 
terpreted a s  indicated below t o  f i t  t h i s  appli- 
cation. Equation (12) i s  repeated here fo r  con- 
venience : 
% = exp [ - 2 ~ * t ]  + 2 exp [-(At +A; -A) t i -~t]  
@-em 1- X t 0 t  ] ) , 
where 
A = equipment "short" f a i l u r e  r a t e  a t  W l l  
load, 
X o  = channel "open" f a i l u r e  r a t e  a t  f u l l  
load, 
= equipment "open" f a i l u r e  r a t e  + isola-  
t i on  device (switch) "open" f a i l u r e  
r a t e  + inadvertent switch-over f a i l u r e  
ra te ,  o r  
X = t o t a l  channel f a i l u r e  r a t e  a t  f u l l  load, 
t = mission time, 
. 
A; = channel "open" f a i l u r e  r a t e  a t  half load, 
= equipment "open" f a i l u r e  r a t e  + isola-  
t i on  device (switch) "open" f a i l u r e  
r a t e  + inadvertent switch-over f a i l u r e  
rate ,  o r  
A' = channel fa i lu re  r a t e  a t  half load re-  
s 
su l t ing  from both an equipment "short" 
f a i l u r e  and the i nao i l i t y  of the 
switching device t o  open the c i r c u i t  
t o  i so l a t e  the shorted equipment from 
the system and i s :  
ASF = isolat ion device f a i l u r e  r a t e  (not 
functioning when required), 
A' = t o t a l  channel f a i l u r e  r a t e  a t  half 
load 
The probability (P) t ha t  a channel w i l l  
not f a i l  due t o  an equipment short f a i l u r e  i s  
a function of the short fa i lu re  probability and 
the  probability t ha t  the isolat ion device w i l l  
successfully open the shorted c i r c u i t  immediately 
following the short.  Using equation (4)  t o  ex- 
press the joint  probability,  P, t ha t  e i t he r  event 
w i l l  be successful: 
P = exp [ - ~ ' ~ t ]  = exp [ - ~ * ~ ~ t ]  
+ exp [ - ~ ~ ~ t ]  - exp [-(*lS1 + hSF) t ]  (34) 
Rearranging terms, Equation (34) becomes 
P = exp [ - h t s t ]  = 1-(1-exp [ - & t s L t  ] ) 
(35) 
It has been shown i n  the  l i t e r a t u r e  t ha t  the 
approximate solution of eXp [-XI where, exp [ -XI  
"1-x, introduces very l i t t l e  e r ror  when the 
value of the exponent is  small (xs 0.3)>t2 I f  
it i s  assumed tha t  the exponents i n  the above 
equation are within the acceptable range, then 
the equation may oe rewritten: 
A comparison of the r e l i a b i l i t y  equations 
for  act ive redundancy with and without isolat ion 
devices indicates  t ha t  no general statement of 
trend can be made as  t o  which i s  the  be t t e r  from 
theo re l i ab i l i t y  viewpoint. The comparison must 
be made fo r  a specif ic  application on the basis  
of the  d e t a i l  design of the redundant arrange- 
ment and considering complexity, weight, and ease 
of checkout. 
where 
A*s = equipment short fa i lu re  r a t e  a t  half 
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GRAPHIC SOLUTION OF RELIABILITP LOGIC EQUATIONS 
W i l l i a m  E. Marshall 
Senior Reliability Engineer 
Minneapolis-Honepel1 Ordnance Division 
Hopkins, Mnnesota 
Reliability logic equations can i n  some in.. 
stances become extremely complex bemiuse of un- 
avoidable duplication, triplication, sequential 
wents, interactions, interdependencies, eto. 
In these instances, i f  reliabili ty logic equations 
a re  not used, the results of reliabili ty predic- 
tion can be deceivingly inaccurate. This paper 
presents a simple, accurate procedure for graphic 
solution of reliabili ty logic equations. A 3- 
phase, solid-state inverter with a failure de- 
tecting and switching; c i r d t  and a standby-re- 
dundant, single-phase inverter is wed as an 
example of how to  solve reliabili ty logic eq- 
uations graphically. 
Reliability Logic - Kathematimil Relationships. 
To examine reliabili ty logic relationships 
as  they are discussed 5n th i s  paper, consider a 
system comprised of a single Black Box, I1A". 
Logically, one could say that: 
The system would f a i l  
if 
Black Box llA1l f a i l s  (1) 
In most systems, the reliabili ty logic ex- 
pression can be simplified to  the above form. 
There are, however, rednndant systems which can- 
. not be thus sinplified. Because certain defects 
i n  one redundant channel can cause system failure 
i f  these defects are actlompanied by certain other 
defects in another redundant channel, in these 
instances duplioation w i l l  arise in the reliab- 
i l i t y  logic expression. 
Suppose thls system had several black boxes 
and that i n  i t s  simplist form, the reliabili ty 
logic expression included Black Box nAn three 
times. I f  one were t o  analyze the effect of 
Black Box l1An ody, upon the system he would 
generate either reliabiUty logic expression: 
The system would f a i l  
if 
Black Box "All f a i l s  
AND i f  
Black Box I1A" f a i l s  
AND i f  
Black Box llA1l f a i l s  
or reliabili ty logic expression: 
The system would f a i l  
i f  
Black Box llAf f a i l s  
OR i f  
Black Box "A" fa i l s  
A t  f i r s t  glance, the above logic statements 
appear to  be rather ridiculou8ly obvious; how- 
ever, this type of duplication is neither r i d i -  
culous nor obvious when it is inter-woven within 
a complex set of relationships, inter-relation- 
ships, interdependencies, and many black boxes. 
Ei the simplified reliability logSc expression in 
one project, two functions appear three times 
each, and six h o t i o n s  appear twice. That 
particular expression cannot be f'urther simpli- 
fied; hence, duplication is unavoidable, and 
must be properly accounted for. 
There are two methods for predicting the 
failure probability when duplication arises. 
Mrst, one assume that no duplication exists 
(i.e., that logic statements (2) and (3) each in- 
volve three separate, non-related black boxes) 
and se t  up the formula for the failure probabil- 
i t y  accordingly. Second, one can se t  up and 
solve the reliabili ty logic equation to  derive 
the formula for  the failure probability. Al-  
though the first method is incorrect, it i s  often 
used as an approximation. 
Mathematically, logic statements (I), (2), 
and (3) will give 3 different failure probabili- 
t i es  if duplication is disregarded as  explained 
above in  the f i r s t  method. T h i s  disregard for 
duplication can be expressed as followst Single 
function A is 'assumed to be three separate black 
boxes. For illustration, they can be shown as 
A2y and A2* Failure of these black boxes is represente t usr A:, A;, and A* 3' 
P(A;) = probability of failure of Black Box ltAllt 
P(A;) = probability of failure of Blaelc Box lrA2n 
p(A1) = probability of failure of Black Box "A3" 
3 
I f  Q = systemas probability pf faillare 
then: 
computed &om logic statement (1) 
(2) 
and: 
computed from logic statement (2) 
Q = P(A;) P(A;) P ( A ~ )  - [P(A~)] 3
3 
and t 
(3) computed from - logic - . statement (3) 
243 
(see reference 1 )  
Although a l l  three logic s-ca-cements are 
correct, the fa i lure  probabilities computed i n  
the above manner, which disregards duplication of 
events, a re  different .  In t h i s  example, the 
reason for  the differences between equations (h) , 
( 5 ) ,  and (6) and the magnitude of the differences 
are easi ly seen; however, i n  more complex systems, 
the reasons and magnitudes become obscure. 
Logic statements (l), (2), and (3) can be 
re-analyzed using logic algebra (see reference 2) 
with the following resul ts :  
Based upon logic statement (1) 
Based upon logic statement (2 )  
Q " P(A1 and A' and A ' )  = P(A1) (8) 
Based upon logic statement (3) 





3 6 z3P(A1) 9 
The above r e l i ab i l i t y  logic eqriations are 
easy t o  solve. In complex systems, the solution 
of r e l i ab i l i t y  logic equations is often d i f f i cu l t  
or  a t  the least ,  very tedious and painstaking. 






The need for  duplication i n  r e l i ab i l i t y  
logic equations, the inaccuracy of disregarding 
t h i s  duplication, and the method of solving 
r e l i ab i l i t y  logic equations graphically, can be 









Consider a 3-phase, solid-state inverter,  
with a fa i lure  detection and switching c i rcui t ,  
and a standby-redundant, single-phase inverter.  
A block diagram of t h i s  system i s  shown i n  Figure 
1; however, the circui try is  beyond the scope of 
t h i s  paper. This i s  neither a randomly selected 
everyday example nor i s  it a hypothetical or 
I OUTFUT - - - - -  
SYNCHRONIZING 
INTERCONNECTIONS 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ficticous example. An actual system was select- 
ed, then modified and simplified so as t o  best 
i l lus t ra te  graphical solution of rel iabil i t j .  
logic equations. The logic statement for system 
failure is: the system w i l l  f a i l  i f  one of the 
primary, single-phase inverters llA1l, ~ ~ B ~ ~ ,  or "C 
f a i l ,  and if either the fai lure detector and 
switching circuit  "En f a i l s  or the redundant, 
single-phase inverter "Dl1 fa i ls ,  or if more than 
one of the primary, sbgle-phase inverters fai ls .  
The above logic statement, although correct, 
is both confusing and inadequate for  setting up 
re l i ab i l i ty  logic equations; therefore, a com- 
plete logic statement in block diagram form is 
shown , in  Figure 2. These re l iabi l i ty  logic 
relationships oould be correctly diagrammed i n  
many different ways; however, Figure 2 is suf- 
f ic ient  for  this illustration. T h i s  diagra- 
matic technique is discussed f'urther in reference 
2. Although the diagram is suooess-oriented for 
sSlq3lification and ease of illustration, it 
could have been failure-oriented i f  desired. 
Above each blook in  the diagram, the mean-time- 
between-failures, the reliability, and the fai lure 
probability of the subsystem represented by that  
block are shown. 
Figure 3 shows the basic way in which 
series - parallel  fai lure probabilities combine 
t o  produce system failure probabilities. The 
failure probability of the combination of Black 
Box IIAn. and Black Box "Btt logically in parallel  is 
Q a P(A')P(B') + P ( c ~ ) P ( D ~ )  - P(A~)P(BI)P(c~)P(D:) 
FIGURE 3 - SEEIES-PARALUL FAILURE PROBABILITY 
L 
QAB PARALLEL ' P(Af) P(B8) 
and the fai lure probability of the oombination of 
Black Box llCt' and Black Box lgD1l logically in 
parallel is 
QCD PgRQILEL = P(Ct) P@') 
therefore, the fai lure probability of these two 
combinations logically i n  series is 
 ERIE^ COMBINATIONS QAB PARALLEL + @D PARAILEL 
-QAB PARALLEL QCD P A R A L ~ L  
- 
- -  
B - C -  
- 
DISREGARDMli TRIPLICATION OF EVENTS A 8 ,  B* , C I, AND D 1 ,  
Q = (P(A~) + P ( B ~ )  + P(c~)) ([P(A') + P(B*) + P(D~)I  [P(A~) + P ( D ~ )  + ~ ( c l ) ]  [P(D~)  + P ( B ~ )  + P(CI)] + P(E$ 
% .00069 
USING LO(iIC EQUATIONS WHICH TAKE INTO ACCOUNT TRIPLICATIONt 
Q = P[(A' or Bf or C*) and ((A' or B' or  D') and (At or Df or Cf) and (Dl or Bf or GI))  or E'] 
= .0048 by graphic solution (see Figure 5 )  
FIGW 4 - INVERTER FAILIlRE PROMBILITY 
Omitting the higher order term, 
w i l l  not i n j ec t  error  of serious consequences; 
hence, 
Higher order terms of t h i s  type are  intentionally 
omitted from the calculations i n  Figure 4, 
The above principles fo r  conibining probabil- 
i t i e s  are used t o  analyze the 3-phase, solid-state 
inverter  as shown in Figure 4. It w i l l  be noted 
tha t  events A, B, C, and D each are  shown three 
times i n  this diagram (as well a s  i n  Figure 2.) 
The calculations shown i n  Figure 4 assume tha t  
each box in the f igure is to t a l ly  non-related, 
and by this method it appears t ha t  the fa i lure  
probability is .(lo069 instead of i ts t m e  .(I048 
( t o  be discussed later.) 
Figure 4 also bh0- the following logic equa- 
t ion  f o r  the sgstem fa i lure  probability: 
Q = P[ (A~  o r  81 o r  c ,)  and [ ( A *  or  B* or  Dl) and 
(A*  or D l  o r  C') and (Dl or Bt or 01)) or E*] 
Using several sheets of paper and a few hoursf 
time, one can reduce this equation t o  the exact 
form: 
o r  the following approximate form: 
Where A represents success of Black Box "An and 
A' represents f a i lu re  of Black Box 
Graphic Solution. Rather than using several 
sheets of paper and a few hours time, one can 
solve this same r e l i a b i l i t y  logic equation in sev- 
e r a l  minutes with one sheet of paper (Figure 5), 
and a calculator. 
Basically, t h i s  diagram traces a l l  possible 
combinations of subsystem performances of a hypo- 
the t ica l  population of 1,000,000 inverters. 
The f i r s t  item which the logic i n  the dia- 
gram considers is how single-phase inverter  "Am 
operates. Since .973 is its re l iab i l i ty ,  single- 
O f  the i n i t i a l  1,000,000 inverters  973,000 
w i l l  have successful phases "AU3 946,729 w i l l  
have successful phases "AU and ltBU; and 921,167 
w i l l  have successful phases flAo, nBr , and %It. 
O f  the original 1,000,000 inverters, 27,000 w i l l  
have fa i lures  in phase ItAn and 729 w i l l  have 
fa i lures  in phases "An and "Bn. 
phase inverter "An w i l l  operate successfully i n  
973,000 of the original million Inverters. This 
is  represented by the number 973,000 above the 
horizontal l i ne  a t  the r igh t  of block: "Event A 
occurs.11 Of the 1,000,000 inverters, 27,000 wi l l  
&+ 
have single-phase inverters  "An which fail  t o  op- 
erate  successfully. This is represented by the 
nuniber 27,000 on the ver t ica l  l i n e  below the 
block: "vent A' occurs. Of the 973,000 inver- 
t e r s  i n  which single-phase inverter  @An operates 
successfully, the next logical  s tep is  t o  examine 
the performance of single-phase inverters "Bn and 
"C" and i f  necessary *IDtt and switching c i r cu i t  
IS1' .  I f  one traces each individual combination 
of sub-events in t h i s  diagram, he wi l l  find tha t  
no combination contains a sub-event more than 
once. This is an especially important check 
which can and should be made on a complex diagram. 
These two conbinations i l l u s t r a t e  graphical 
solution of one success logic relationship and 
one fa i lure  logic relationship. Figure 5 shms a 
t o t a l  of four success and nine fa i lure  logic re l -  
ationships - each relationship different  from a l l  
others. 
- 
These relationships of mbsystqm performan- 
ces which resul t  i n  system auccess ( l i s ted  from 
top t o  bottom) are: 
A and B and C 
A and B and C l  and E and D 
AandB'  a n d C a n d E a n d D  
A' and B and C and E and D 
and the relationships of subsystem performances 
which resul t  i n  system fa i lure  ( l is ted '  from l e f t  
t o  r ight)  are: 
A' andB1 
A and B' and C *  
A1 and B and C l  
A and Bl  and C and El 
AandB andC' andE'  
As and B and C and El 
A and B1 and C and E and D l  
A and B and C I  and E and D l  
A' and B and C and E and D l  
Disregarding duplication w i l l  not always 
give falsely optomistic resul ts .  In  a success- 
oriented diagram, i f  duplicate blocks appear log- 
ica l ly  i n  ser ies  and i f  t h i s  duplication i s  dis- 
regarded, the resu l t s  w i l l  be falsely pessimistic. 
I f  duplicate blocks appear logically i n  para l le l , '  
















































































































































s u l t s  w i l l  be f a l s e l y  optomistic. 
It i s  important t o  re-emphasize t h e  e f f e c t  of 
disregarding the log ic  re la t ionship approach. In  
t h i s  example, the  t r u e  f a i l u r e  probabi l i ty  comput- 
ed by using the  logic  approach i n  Figure 5 i s  
,0048; .00069 appears t o  be the  f a i l u r e  probabil- 
i t y  i f  log ic  re la t ionships  are  disregarded a s  i n  
Figure 4. 
Conclusions 
In some instances,  r e l i a b i l i t y  log ic  re la -  
t ionships  include unavoidable duplication. I f  
t h i s  duplication is disregarded, r e l i a b i l i t y  o r  
f a i l u r e  probabi l i ty  calculat ions  w i l l  be i n  e r ro r .  
This dupl icat ion can be properly accounted f o r  by 
using log ic  equations. Graphical solut ion of re-  
l i a b i l i t y  log ic  equations i s  simple, accurate, 
and time saving. 
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MTBF APPORTIONMENT 
I N  RELIABILITY CONTROL OF THE MAULER DESIGN 




One of the more important tasks f o r  the re- 
l i a b i l i t y  engineer i s  translating a re l iabi l i ty  
system specification requirement into subassembly 
design requirements that  have meaning for  the de- 
sign engineer. But the perfomnce of th i s  task 
alone does not ensure tha t  the re l iabi l i ty  design 
requirements w i l l  be met, particularly when the 
state-of-the-art is being taxed t o  its l i m i t .  
The task of translating re l i ab i l i ty  system re- 
quirements into subassembly requirements, called 
"MTBF Apportionment, " must be complemented by 
firm management re l iabi l i ty  policies and effec- 
t ive  control procedures. 
This paper describes the technique used by 
re l i ab i l i ty  engineers i n  apportioning the MAULER 
Acquisition and ~rack/~l luminator  radar-subsys- 
tems MDF (mean-time-between-f ailure) design re- 
quirements down four levels t o  the subassemblies. 
This paper reveals how the MIBF apportioned val- 
ues, when made specific design requirements en- 
forced by MAULER Systems management policies and 
key re l iabi l i ty  procedures, evolved into an ef- 
fective tool for  controlling khe re l iabi l i ty  of 
the MAULER radar subsystems design presently in  
i t s  i n i t i a l  R&D phase a t  Raytheon Company. 
For security reasons, certain design fea- 
tures, re l iabi l i ty  indices, and the actual break- 
down and numerical values in  the MTBF apportion- 
ment cannot be disclosed. 
Introduction 
Most re l iabi l i ty  specifications and docu- 
ments in  existence today are in  agreement that  
r e l i ab i l i ty  must be designed into an equipment, 
and that  "designing fo r  rel iabil i ty" must be a 
par t  of the ear l ies t  concept of system design. 
The design engineer i s  to ld  that  t h i s  i s  his  re- 
sponsibility, and that  he must "design for  r e l i -  
a b i l i t y  f i r s t ,  maximum performance second. To 
ass i s t  him in  h is  task, numerous re l iabi l i ty  
handbooks for  design engineers have been pub- 
lished during the past few years. These hand- 
books contain several hundred pages of "helpful 
hints," failure-rate tables, aerating curves, 
nomographs and pictographs, stochastic variable 
concepts and mathematical-probability symbols, 
Weibull distribution functions, and a t  leas t  two 
"improvements" of TshebyshefP1s inequality theo- 
rem. With a l l  these "useful" tools a t  his  dis- 
posal, the design engineer, who i s  usually re- 
sponsible for  only one or  two subasseniblies out 
of the several hundred that  make up the complex 
electronic subsystem or  system, i s  expected t o  
design t o  meet re l iabi l i ty  requirements specified 
quantitatively in  terms of the system MTBF, mis- 
sion-success probability, or often loosely de- 
fined a s  "...for achieving optimum system r e l i -  
abil i ty.  I f  the re l iabi l i ty  requirements are  
specified quantitatively in  terms of MTBF, he is 
expected somehow t o  find a way in  harmony with 
the other hundred or more design engineers t o  
meet the single system re l iabi l i ty  design objec- 
tive. Sharing of the re l iabi l i ty  design load i s  
not considered since it cannot be even identified 
much less  defined by the design engineers. To 
say the least ,  thb efforts  i n  terms of meeting 
the system MTBF requirements are haphazard. 
It remains the task oof the re l iabi l i ty  en- 
gineer, disciplined and trained in  the te-01- 
ogy and methods of re l iabi l i ty  mathematics and 
engineering, t o  translate and apportion equitably 
the system MTBF quantitative contractual require- 
ments into subassembly quantitative requirements 
meaningful t o  and within the scope of responsi- 
b i l i t y  of the individual design engineer. Once 
the re l iabi l i ty  design requirements are defined 
and established for  each saassenibly by the re- 
l i a b i l i t y  engineer, meeting the apportioned MTBF 
requirements for  each sribassembly, and the con- 
tractual  EPPBF requirement fo r  the system, becomes 
a team effort  by design, system, and re l i ab i l i ty  
engineers. 
However, for  the MAULER Reliability Program 
the re l i ab i l i ty  engineer's task does not end 
here. I n  terms of MTBF quantitative values, the 
re l iabi l i ty  contractual requirements for  the MAU- 
LER radar subsystems, because of the severe en- 
vironmental conditions expected, represent a need 
fo r  advancing the radar reliability-design state-  
of -the-art by a factor of a t  leas t  two. A very 
diff icult  technical enterprise remains. Conse- 
quently, throughout the l i f e  of the MAULER design 
program, i n  addition t o  providing technical sup- 
port ,  the re l i ab i l i ty  engineer must continually 
monitor the re l iabi l i ty  progress of the MAULER 
design. He must do th i s  without usurping the 
traditional prerogatives of the system and design 
engineers. This he does through the policies and 
procedures developed and established mutually for  
the Program by the MAULER Systems Organization 
and the Reliability Section. 
Apportionment by "Active-Element-Groupt1 
Where quantitative re l iabi l i ty  indices are  
specified i n  a contract, the practice of appor- 
tioning MTBF values (or failure-rates) fo r  divid- 
ing the load in meeting re l iabi l i ty  contractual 
requirements of electronic systems i s  not new. 
It has been implemented extensively by the custo- 
mer, usually the military agencies, and the prime 
contractors al ike i n  parcelling out re l iabi l i ty  
requirements t o  several contractors or  stibcontrac- 
tors.2 It has been used by subcontractors as  a 
means of controlling within the i r  own internal or- 
ganization the allocation or  division of the r e l i -  
a b i l i t y  design load. In essence, it i s  l i t e r a l l y  
"cutting up the pie" of re l iabi l i ty  contractual 
requirements when no matter how the pie is cut, 
the whole must equal the sum of a l l  i t s  pieces. 
Of course, the objective of any apportion- 
ment i s  equity. An equitable apportionment i s  
one where the design ease or  diff iculty in  meeting 
the apportioned MTBF i s  properly distributed fo r  
a l l  the subsystems or  units concerned. Conversely, 
an inequitable apportionment defeats the intended 
purpose, causing an unbalance among subsystem or  
unit  requirements, resulting i n  the disproportion- 
a t e  added weight, volume, cost and design time f o r  
certain affected subsystems o r  units. 
The methods and degree of scientific ap- 
proaches used f o r  apportioning MTBFs have ranged 
widely from co plicated but sophisticated weight- 3 ing techniques t o  "educated guesses." The meth- 
ods based on "hunches" or  "guesses" are of l i t t l e  
interest. For our purposes, the only methods of 
concern are those i n  which some degree of scien- 
t i f i c  approach is used. These methods, a l l  of 
which are basically measures of the comparative 
degree of complexity of systems or equipments, 
can be broadly divided into the three main cate- 
gories described below: 
Apportionments by "Weighting Factorstt 
This method i s  found most effective fo r  ap- 
portioning the necessary MTBF of a large complex 
system composed of heterogeneous subsystems such 
a s  a radar, a computer, and a missile subsystem. 
Based on analytical studies, advance knowledge or  4 past experience,\ the apportionment must be made 
with reasonable equity involving trade-offs or  
weighting between subsystems such factors a s  modes 
of eperation, state-of-the-art, and readiness re- 
quirements. Since the MAULER radars (see Figure 
1 )  have the contractual MTBF requirements speci- 
f ied  by the prime contractor, th i s  method i s  not 
germane t o  the radars. Consequently, a detailed 
discussion of th i s  method wvuld be beyond the 
scope of t h i s  paper. The interested reader i s  
advised t o  consult the reference noted. 
Of these three categories, the "Active-Ele- 
ment-Group" or "AEG" method has been the most 
useful and applicable t o  the MAULER radar design 
effort  a t  Raytheon, and is the method discussed 
in  deta i l  in subsequent paragraphs. The method 
is based5 on an approximate count of tubes and 
transistors (active-element) in  the subsystems 
and assemblies, assuming a given number and types 
of supporting passive-elements, and modifying the 
results with weighting factors extrapolated from 
known f i e l d  performance of similar equipments. 
The usefulness of the "AEG" method i s  i t s  appli- 
cabil i ty a t  the most c r i t i c a l  time of the design 
cycle -- during the early design concepts. 
Apportionment by "Parts-Count1' 
The familiar "parts-count" technique widely 
used i n  re l iabi l i ty  prediction work was adopted 
during the l a t t e r  period of the MAULER engineer- 
ing model phase, when the component parts list 
and design parameters were known with a reason- 
able degree of accuracy, merely t o  refine the 
MTBF apportionment made earl ier  by the "AEG" 
method. 
Apportioning the M!C!Bg 
fo r  the MAULER Radars 
The Reliability Block Diagram and M a t h e m a t s  
Model 
--.--.- 
The f i r s t  step in  apportioning the MTBF of 1 
an electronic equipment subsystem i s  t o  analyze 
the tac t ica l  f'uuction and modes of operation of 
the subsystem and of each unit  within the subsys- 
tem.  The next step i s  t o  determine for each mode 
of operation the reliability-dependency of each ( 
unit  within the system. Any unit  whose function 
and satisfactory operation are v i t a l  to  the tac- 
t i c a l  mission of the entire subsystem is consid- 
ered t o  be reliability-dependent and i s  repre- 
sented simply as  one block in  a series chain of 
similarly reliability-dependent units as  shown 
below: 
r v 
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B 
Mathematically, the t o t a l  r e l i a b i l i t y  % of the The AcqRadar Model. For the purposes of 
subsystem, where fa i lures  from Unit t o  Unit are t h i s  paper, only one principal mode of operation 
independent, i s  expressed simply by the well-known for  the Acq radar need be the 
formula : active-search mode, assuming three elevation chan- 
nels and no computation evaluation a s  represented 
by the sol id blocks i n  the r e l i a b i l i t y  model shown 
n=  42 
R T =  fl R; in  Figure 2. Let us further assume tha t  t o  sa t -  
i= l i s f y  a part icular  situation, only two out of the 
three elevation channels need t o  operate sakisfac- 
where, fo r  the example given, R3 i s  the re l iab i l -  tor i ly .  The r e l i ab i l i t y  mathematical model fo r  the Acq i s  then properly expressed as: i t y  of the two redundant units  A and B; namely: 
By assuming tha t  fa i lure  occurrences fo r  each uni t  
i n  the subsystem a re  ~xponent ia l ly  distributed, where the expression i n  the brackets i s  the r e l i -  
namely: a b i l i t y  t ha t  a t  l ea s t  two out of three elevation 
channels a re  operating sa t i s fac tor i ly  and RE is 
R = e +-kt or e -$Im the r e l i a b i l i t y  of a Data Converter Unit 
(3) where : 
where h = f a i l u r e  r a t e  
and m = MTBF 
except f o r  the redundant units A and By the f a i l -  
ure ra tes  of a l l  other units  a r e  additives: and RVC and RRB are the  r e l i ab i l i t i e s  of the bank 
of m, velocity channels and the bank of n  range 
Experience has shown tha t  fa i lure  occurrences fo r  
electronic equipment often exhibit the Weibull 
fa i lure  distribution: 
bins respectively. But, 
(4) 
where: 
a = scale parameter 
f i  = shape parameter 
Y =  locat ion parameter 
However, for  large complex subsystems, the error  
introduced by assuming P = 1, giving equation (3) 
above, i s  negligible fo r  the purpose of fa i lure  
r a t e  (or  MTBF) apportionment. It i s  t h i s  assumed 
additive property of f a i lu re  ra tes  t ha t  makes pos- 
s ib l e  simple arithmetic calculations tha t  can be 
eas i ly  explained t o  design engineers. To make the 
apportionment task a working tool, simplicity i n  
calculation is  more important than unnecessary 
mathematical precision. In  the case of multiple 
redundant units  o r  assemblies, especially where 
the units a r e  neither functionally identical nor 
essential  t o  certain modes of radar operation thus 
introducing a form of "quasi-redundancy," the MTBF 
apportionment calculations do not lend themselves 
t o  the simple arithmetic techniques such a s  in the 
case of series-dependency where exponential f a i l -  
ure distribution can be assumed. Fortunately, 
however, i n  most pract ical  cases, a s  i l lus t ra ted  
i n  subsequent paragraphs, the r e l i ab i l i t y  block 
diagram and mathematical model can be great ly 
simplified by an engineering analysis of the unit 
functions and type of c i rcu i t ry  involved. 
where Rvc i s  the r e l i ab i l i t y  of a single velocity 
channel and is the number of velocity channels 
t ha t  can f a i l  without causing degradation of the 
ta rge t  data. Similarly: 
where Rrb i s  the r e l i ab i l i t y  of a single range 
bin and 4 is  the number of range bins tha t  can 
f a i l  without causing degradation of target  data. 
By means of a l i t t l e  r e l i a b i l i t y  engineering 
analysis of the subassembly functions and type of 
cj-rcuits for  ~ e l o c i t y  channels and range bins, 
and assuming conservatively tha t  velocity 
channels and/or 4 range bins can f a i l  before 
causing mission abortion, for  a pessimistic e s t i -  
mate tha t  each channel and bin have a fa i lure  
r a t e  of 25$ per 1000 hours, calculations show 
tha t  for  the required mission of the MAULER sys- 
tem: 
Thus, assuming that  for  the mission RDC is prac- 
t i ca l ly  unity, equation (6) reduces aimply to: 
an equation that  can be handled easily fo r  pur- 
poses of HIBF apportionment. 
'Phe prece&ng paragraphs have illus%rated an 
earl ier  statement tha t  with some engineering 
knowledge of the unit or assembly fuuctions, of 
the circuits  involved, the required mission time, 
and some appreciation of the approximate fai lure 
rates, most r e l i ab i l i ty  mathematical models can 
be greatly simplified. This is a must for  per- 
forming MTBF apportionment. 
T/I Radar Reliability Model. With the excep- 
tion of the Coolina Unit which must be shared b r  
both raitars, the ~ a c k / ~ l l u m i n a t o r  radar units &d 
circuitry are  completely independent of the Acq 
radar (See Figure 3). Except i n  the Cooling Unit, 
a malfunction i n  one radar w i l l  not affect  the 
other radar. 
The re l iabi l i ty  model for  the T/I radar is 
straightforward with the exception of the four 
Speed Gate-Logic-Coherent Sweep saasseniblies 
which provide some degree of quasi-redundancy. It 
i s  not true redundancy in  that  a single speed gate 
can be used a t  any one time for  a given target, 
but each high-and-low-speed gate fo r  an approach- 
ing target i s  complemented by high and low speed 
gates fo r  receding targets that  have passed over- 
head. One might say that a second chance o r  shot 
is thereby provided, but th i s  is not quite correct 
inasmuch as  it may mean getting a second shot a f t -  
e r  the target has accomplished its mission. 
Nevertheless, th i s  sl ight advantage in quasi-re- 
dundancy is taken into account for  MFBF apportion- 
ment purposes. 
Measuring the Complexity of Each Unit 
By t h i s  time, the reader has noted a count 
of AEGIS ("~ctive-~lement-G~WS") indicated for 
each block i n  the  re l iabi l i ty  model of Figares 2, 
and 3. An AEG consists of a tube or  transistor, 
or its equivalent active-element, and i t s  es t i -  
mated nuniber of related supporting passive-ele- 
ments. D u r i n g  the early design concepts, the 
methoa of assessing the relative complexities of 
different units o r  assemblies in  a subsystemby 
estimating the count of AEGts in  each unit o r  as- 
senibly, based on whatever engineering information 
there is  on hand or on comparable existing equip- 
ment, provides a simple and effective base measure 
for apportioning or parcelling the subsystem MTBF 
requirements down t o  the subassembly level in 
quantitative terms that  are meaningful to  the de- 
sign engineer. 
The method of estimating the nuuiber of AEGs 
is not new, having been developed some years ago 
as notedby an ear l ier  reference. The difference 
here i s  that  it is  not used for  preBiction pur- 
poses. It matters l i t t l e  what the actual failure 
rates are. We are merely seeking a relative mea- 
sure of complexity between units and assemblies. 
For each unit o r  assentbly where a count of AEG 
has been made or  estimated, the MTBF apportioned 
is simply an inverse porportion of the whole as 
follows: 
Apportioned Unit m F  - 
Contractural Subsystems MTBF 
Total Number of AEGs for  Subsystem 
Nuniber of AEGs fo r  Unit or  Assembly 
An apportionment of the fai lure rate, of course, 
would be the reciprocal i f  the assumption of ex- 
ponential distribution per equation (3) is valid. 
The only reason for  apportioning on the basis of 
MTBFs rather than fai lure rates is  that  the sub- 
system requirements are specified in  terms of 
MTBFs. For working purposes, we convert a l l  MTBF 
values into fai lure rates. 
Since the MAIJLJZR radars are made up of many 
types of transistorized analog and digi ta l  c i r -  
cuits  as well as low-power and high-power active 
networks, in i t i a l ly  it would be very di f f icul t  to  
select and count multiples of a single "typical" 
AM: as representative of the subsystems. For 
th i s  reason, three sizes of the most common AEZs 
were chosen as follows: 
1 transistor 1 transistor 1 transistor 
3 resistors 5 resistors 8 resistors 
2 capacitors 3 capacitors 5 capacitors 
1 diode 3 diodes 1 diode 
1 coi l  
7 parts 12 parts 16 parts 
When the three AM: counts were completed, 
the three types of AEGs were then reduced or nor- 
malized t o  a single "typical" AEG (namely, AEZ1) 
by considering AEG2 equal t o  1.7 7, and nso, 
equal t o  2.3 AEG1, simply on the r a t  o of number 
of parts. A moot point may be argued here that  
normalizing s t r i c t ly  on the basis of parts-count 
ignores the known fact  that  transistors, diodes, 
resistors, capacitors and coils  have different 
fai lure rates. Had differences i n  fai lure rates 
been considered, a greater accuracy in normaliz- 
ing would have resulted; but, as proved l a te r  by 
the more accurate parts-count method, no serious 
inequities in the apportioned MTBF were found 
where the estimated AM: count was accurate ini-  
t ia l ly .  
Special parts, such as waveguide elements 
and power tubes were assigned weighted "equiva- 
l en t  AEGs." For example, a klystron amplifier, 
which according t o  our experience on other pro- 
jects have exhibited about eight times higher 
fai lure rates than for a typical AM:, was counted. 
a s  "8 equivalent Ms. " Furthermore, 100 radar 
AEGs ordinarily contain approximately 50 poten- 
tiometers, 50 crystals, and 2 pulse transformers. 
Wherever th i s  r a t io  of additional number of parts 
was estimated t o  be ei ther too high or too low, 
proportional weighting was applied t o  the AEG 
count. On the whole, there were few instances 
where th i s  proportional weighting was necessary. 
One extreme example of weighting for  another 
reason was the d igi ta l  computer circuitry. AS 
proved by f i e ld  experience, d ig i ta l  circuitry i s  
relat ively insensitive t o  parts parameter d r i f t  as 
a result  of aging or  temperature stress. Digital 
circuits  have f i e ld  fai lure rates one-tenth that  
of analog circuits  having an equivalent number of 
parts. Consequently, the t o t a l  number of MGs 
counted for the computer was divided by ten for 
the purpose of apportioning the MTBF. Tables 1, 
2, and 3 summarize the AEG count, made during the 
early design concept, and the conventional parts- 
count was made several months l a t e r  fo r  predic- 
t ion  purposes and fo r  refining the earl ier  appor- 
tionment. Subsequently, minor adjustments and 
re-apportionments were made. 
Breaking the Unit-apportioned M!CBF values t o  
the Assembly (or third) and t o  the Subassembly 
(or fourth) levels simply required a repetition of 
what was done a t  the Unit level. Apportionments 
a t  the th i rd  and fourth levels are either incom- 
plete or have t o  be revised a t  th i s  date because 
of recent major changes i n  the design concept a t  
the subsystem level. Obviously, any major change 
i n  the design concept a t  a given level required 
an W F  re-apportionment a t  a l l  lower levels i n  
order t o  keep the apportionment equitable. 
Meeting the Apportioned MTBF Requirement 
Implementing Reliability Control 
Once the MTBF requirements have been defined 
fo r  each subassembly, sound managerial policies 
must be se t  into motion and certain key procedures 
must be enforced t o  assure that  the MTBF require- 
ments w i l l  be met. One such procedure or document 
i s  the Specific MAULER Engineering Requirements, 
better  known a t  Raytheon as "SMERs .I1 
The "SMER." As represented pictorial ly i n  
Figure 4, the MAULER Systems Organization analyzes 
the customer subsystem requirements, and from 
these requirements develops and establishes firm 
design engineering requirements for units, assem- 
blies, and subassemblies via a SMER document. A 
key design parameter specified in  the SMER i s  the 
apportioned MTBF value. Thus, the SMER i s  the ve- 
hicle by which the apportioned MTBF value becomes 
a binding requirement fo r  each subassembly as 
much as signal-to-noise ratio, power dissipation, 
peak power, and other radar design parameters t o  
be met and proved. It then becomes the responsi- 
b i l i t y  of the design engineer, consulting with 
the-rel iabil i ty engineer, t o  design for meeting 
the specified subassembly MTBF. The design en- 
gineer must make a l l  the failure-rate calcula- 
tions for  his  assembly; the re l iabi l i ty  engineer 
checks and verifies the calculations. The design 
engineer's tool i n  th i s  task i s  the MAULER Reli- 
ab i l i ty  Engineering Manual. 
The MAULER Reliability Ehgineering Manual. 
Each design engineer was issued a MA- Reli- 
ab i l i ty  Manual-during the early design concept 
period. The Manual, compiled by the Raytheon Re- 
l i a b i l i t y  Section a t  Wayland, contains complete 
se ts  of stress-aerating curves and failure-rate 
tables from the RCA ~ ~ 5 9 - 4 1 6 - 1  report and other 
necessary re l i ab i l i ty  information extracted from 
the best key documents originated by re l i ab i l i ty  
engineers a t  Raytheon and the industry a t  large. 
To teach them how t o  use th i s  tool, periodic re- 
, 
l i a b i l i t y  seminars and lectures are conducted fo r  
the design engineering groups by the Reliability 
Section. 
The Parts Application Review. Daily contact 
between the re l i ab i l i ty  and design engineers is 
maintained through the Parts Application Review 
Plan (see Figure 4) which is a continuing review 
of the circuits  and parts application by the re- 
l i a b i l i t y  engineer. In th i s  manner, he is a;lways 
available for  consultation and i s  able t o  monitor 
the progress of the design. As he notices design 
discrepancies or  potential r e l i ab i l i ty  o r  main- 
tainabil i ty deficiencies, he ca l ls  them t o  the 
attention of the responsible design engineer. 
Whenever a disagreement occurs on the method of 
corrective action, or when the action requires an 
ef for t  or  decision that  i s  beyond the control of 
the interested re l i ab i l i ty  and design engineers, 
the re l i ab i l i ty  engineer in i t ia tes  a Reliability 
Corrective Action Request (RcAR) form. 
The "RCAR. " The Reliability, Corrective Ac- 
t ion Request or  "RCAR" (see Figure 4) is a Ray- 
theon Equipment Division-wide procedure i n  a one- 
page format that  has proved effective on other 
projects during the past years in  in i t ia t ing and 
bringing quick action on re l i ab i l i ty  problems un- 
covered by re l i ab i l i ty  engineers. The in i t ia tor ,  
who i s  the re l iabi l i ty  engineer, identif ies and 
describes the problem and recommends a course of 
corrective action i n  the upper section of the 
RCAR form. The addressee, the person responsible 
for  the design of the equipment under question, 
must give a satisfactory reply within a given 
number of days. Failure t o  reply within th i s  
period means that  the matter wi l l  be brought t o  
the attention of management. 
Gaining Acceptance by the Design Ebgineer 
Looking back i n  retrospect some two years 
ago when the concept of MTBF apportionment was 
f i r s t  introduced t o  the MAWE8 design engineers, 
we recal l  the many stumbling blocks we had t o  
overcome and the many misconceptions we had t o  
c lar i fy  t o  gain the confidence and acceptance of 
the design engineers. To the highly-analytical 
mind of many design engineers, the radical idea 
of treating such intangible ent i t ies  as M!i!BFs or 
failure-rates -- which are i n  themeelves indices 
of re l iabi l i ty ,  a probability function -- as i f  
they were neatly-measurable parameters such as  
resistance, voltage, and frequency, w a s  somewhat 
akin t o  an unscientific, pseudo-engineering, 
"Ouija-Board" approach. O u r  seminars and lectures 
in  mathematical probability and s t a t i s t i c s  t o  de- 
sign engineers, i f  presented at a high-technical 
level, were often looked upon disdainfully a s  os- 
tentatious displays of our mathematical prowess; 
' i f  presented a t  a lower technical level, the use 
of visual aids such a s  playing cards and dice t o  
i l l u s t r a t e  the  theory of chance i n  r e l i ab i l i t y  
only strengthened the i r  secret  suspicions tha t  the 
r e l i a b i l i t y  engineers used a roulet te  wheel i n  ap- 
portioning the subsystem MTBF. More effective 
were our r e l i a b i l i t y  lectures from an engineering 
approach, part icularly on a "work-shop" basis  
where the design engineers e i ther  act ively par t i -  
cipated o r  followed an actual r e l i ab i l i t y  analysis 
and prediction of a given subassembly. But the 
most effective of a l l  in  gaining acceptance has 
been the da i ly  contacts of our r e l i ab i l i t y  engin- 
eers with the design engineers where there was a 
f r ee  interchange of ideas i n  common engineering 
language. Thus, the i n i t i a l  barr iers  of suspicion 
gradually crumbled. 
A s ignif icant  measure of the acceptance 
gained is  the f a c t  tha t  although management poli-  
- c ies  and procedures ex is t  fo r  resolution of con- 
f l i c t s  t ha t  may a r i s e  between r e l i ab i l i t y  and de- 
sign engineers, during a two-year period --- even 
though the number of confl icts  were many --- none 
was serious enough t o  submit t o  managerial arbi-  
t rat ion.  In our opinion, t h i s  i s  a good record. 
Of course, due credi t  f o r  the success must be giv- 
en t o  the MAULER Systems Reliabi l i ty and Quali ty 
Control Manager and others i n  the Systems Organi- 
zation who from the very onset of the design ef-  
f o r t  issued management directives i n  support of 
the Rel iab i l i ty  Section l i n e  organization t o  the 
effect  t ha t  the PllTBP apportioned values were bind- 
ing design requirements. This backing dispelled 
any doubts i n  the design engineer's mind a s  t o  
whether the r e l i a b i l i t y  requirements would be en- 
forced. 
A Pract ical  Program f o r  a Realizable Goal 
During the preliminary phase of the MAUISR 
Acq and T/I radar subsystems design concepts, our 
i n i t i a l  r e l i a b i l i t y  prediction indicated that: 
I f  a carefully-planned program 
f o r  designing r e l i a b i l i t y  into 
the  equipment were implemented 
effectively, an advancement i n  
radar reliability-design state-  
of-the-art by an MTBF improve- 
ment factor  of a t  l ea s t  two 
would be necessary to meet the 
r e l i a b i l i t y  contractual require- 
ment s. 
i d i t y  of our premise tha t  a planned control pro- 
gram fo r  designing r e l i a b i l i t y  i n to  the equipment 
would o r  could be implemented effectively. The 
key was the MlCBF apportionment. It defined not 
only the r e l i a b i l i t y  requirements quantitatively 
for  each subassembly, but also parcelled-out the  
r e l i ab i l i t y  design load t o  each design engineer. 
The lock was the SMER or  Specific MAULER Engineer- 
-
ing Requirements document. It converted the MTBF 
apportioned values to binding design requirements 
and thereby validated our i n i t i a l  premise tha t  a 
r e l i ab i l i t y  design-control program was pract ical  
and could actually function i f  organized properly. 
The MTBF Apportionment and the SMER, by 
themselves, do not guarentee the attainment of 
our r e l i a b i l i t y  design goal -- they only open the 
door and make attainment of the goal possible by 
other r e l i a b i l i t y  engineering tasks. S i g n i f i c e  
progress towards achieving the goal has been made 
t o  date. As we enter the R&D design phase, the 
R&D model reliability-prediction, which i s  i n  
process and due t o  be completed at the end of 
t h i s  month, w i l l  measure t h i s  progress. 
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the technical challenge was-not insurmountable, 
as  borne out by l a t e r  predictions. Of greater 
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RELIABILITY EVALUATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
TESTING OF PRINTED-WIRING-BOARD SOLDER JOINTS F 
Mark L. Hinkle 
Light Military Electronics Department 
General Electric Company 
Utica, New York 
j 734 ' Abstract 
During the last three to four years, 
our Reliability and Maintainability Engi- 
neering group has conducted a series of 
reliability tests of solder (tin, lead; 
60-40) joints on printed-wiring boards. 
The following discussion presents only a 
few highlights of this testing and eval- 
uation. 
In particular, the results and con- 
clusions are given from an extensive test 
configuration that evaluated the effect on 
solder-joint reliability of some eight 
different factors. These results have 
provided us with definitive quantitative 
solder-joint failure rates upon which can 1 be based availability-cost tradeof fs and 
preferred printed-wiring-board solder- 
joint configurations for ultrahigh relia- 
bility even with high rates of temperature 
cycling and temperatures of 100°C. 
I Introduction and Background 
It is not unusual to have as many as 
130,000 solder joints in a single subsys- 
tem for which we have provided printed 
wiring boards. A solder joint f ilure 
rate between 0.1 and 0.001 X per 
joint operated hours would contribute--on 
the average--between 26 and 0.26 failures 
for each such subsystem during a 2000- 
hour operating life. As electronic com- 
ponent part average failure ra es approach 8 this range (0.1 to 0.001 x 10- failures 
per operating hour) solder joints alone 
could well contribute approximately two- 
thirds of all failures. Therefore, be- 
cause of the need for high-reliability 
single-time missions, and also because of 
availability-cost considerations, solder- 
joint failure rates between 1 X 10-9 and 
1 X 10-12 failures per hour are a present 
need. 
I1 Factors Contributing to Failure 
Earlier evaluations of the many fat- 
tors affecting printed-w ring-board P solder-joint reliability indicated that, 
after cooling, the solder joint has a 
complicated pattern of internal and ex- 
ternal stresses. These stresses result 
from the slightly different coefficients 
of thermal expansion together with the 
inability of a practical manufacturing 
process to differentially adjust and con- 
trol the temperatures of each material 
(solder, board, copper runs, eyelet, and 
component leads) while the solder is 
solidifying. Subsequent heating and 
cooling of joints through component heat 
dissipation should alternately reduce and 
then re-establish the built-in internal 
solder-joint stresses. This stress cycling 
should cause solder-joint fatigue damage 
and thereby accelerate solder-joint fail- 
ure. 
Other factors contributing to failure 
are the decrease in strength of tin-lead 
(60-40) solder at high temperature2 and 
after high-temperature aging. The 
strength of this solder, after 1000 hours 
at 100°C, is reduced to approximately 10 
percent of its initial value. The percent 
of initial strength versus time is approxi- 
mately a negative exponential function. 
The above considerpctions led to the 
successful development of "high-temperature- 
cycle" and "medium-+temperature-cycle" en- 
vironmental tests* for accelerated environ- 
mental evaluation of printed-wiring-board 
solder-joint reliability. 
I11 Verification that a Temperature 
Cycling Technique would Accelerate 
Solder-Joint Failures 
A pilot test was m n  to determine 
whether solder joint failures could be 
accelerated by temperature cycling. Ten 
printed wiring boards of l/16-inch XXX-P 
phenolic, each containing sixty one-watt, 
10-ohm composition resistors connected in 
series, to give a population of 1200 
solder joints were tested. A high- 
temperature cycle (from 25OC to about 
97O~ and return to 25OC every 30 minutes) 
was accomplished by applying 130 volts to 
each board for 20 minutes (dissipating 
0.47 watts per resistor) and then cooling 
with a fan during a 10-minute power-off 
period. A mild vibration was applied 
during the testing. Ten failures, dis- 
tributed between 53 and 6091 hours of 
testing, definitely established that tem- 
perature cycling accelerated solder joint 
failures . 
*other approaches to the problem of accel- 
erated testing were taken. One of these, 
thermal-shock testing, may be of more than 
academic interest. It was found that ther- 
mal shock tended to increase solder-joint 
reliability. Details appear in Appendix 3. 
IV Extensive Test Design Configuration 
r 
Prior- evaluations and t e s t  r e su l t s  
were used as the bas is  f o r  constructing 
a t e s t  designed t o  determine and evaluate 
the e f fec t  on printed wiring board solder 
joints  of: (1)  type of joint; 2 board 
material; (3)  board thickness; ((4) hand 
touch-up of solder  joints; (5)  removal 
and replacement of components; (6)  method 
of repai r  of f a i l e d  parts;  (7) tempera- 
ture; (8) vibrat ion.  The f i r s t  four a re  
design and process factors;  the f i f t h  and 
s ix th  a re  user r e l i a b i l i t y  considerations, 
the seventh and eighth a f fec t  both design 
and use. Design choices among the f i r s t  
four fac tors  w i l l  be made i n  the l i g h t  of 
the environmental e f fec t s  revealed by 
these temperature and vibrat ion t e s t s .  
Following is a complete l is t  of the levels  
of the eight  fac to rs  tes ted .  
1 . Joint  Types (design configurations, 
see Figure l*) 
a .  Standard (eyelet  only) 
b. Plated through with eyele t  
c .  Plated through without eyelet  
d .  Molded plated through 
2,3. Printed Wiring Board Materials (2)  
and Board Thickness (3) 
a. XXXP-Phenolic (1/16-inch and 
1/8-inch) 
b. Epoxy Glass (1/16-inch) 
c . Dial ly l  Phthalate (1/16-inch-- 
molded ) 
4. In-process Manufacturing and 
Touch-up of Solder Joints  
a .  with touch-up 
b. without touch-up 
5. Removal and Replacement of Com- 
ponents Before Test 
a .  with removal and replacement 
b. without removal and replace- 
ment 
6 .  Two Methods of Repair of Failed 
Joints  
a .  with removal of old solder 
b.  without removal of old solder 
v. Temperature Environments 
a .  High temperature cycle 
b .  Medium temperature cycle 
c . High temperature aging 1 0 0 " ~ )  
d .  Room temperature aging 1 2 5 " ~ )  
8 .  Vibration During Life Test 
a .  with vibrat ion (1  g rms a t  the 
end of each 500 hours of l i f e  t e s t  f o r  
30 minutes, sweeping through the 
boards resonant f requenc i n  every 
3 minutes and 40 seconds7 
b . without vibrat ion 
The t e s t  design selected was neces- 
Sar i1  a very small subset of the b2 X 
3 X 25 - 1539 t e s t s  that  would have been 
required f o r  complete f a c to r i a l  represen- 
t a t i on  of the levels  of a l l  fac tors  that  
A. 
could have been evaluated . Conclusive , 
r e su l t s  were, however, obtained f o r  a l l  
of the fac tors  tha t  were evaluated. 
I 
Table I gives the d i s t r ibu t ion  of 
I 
printed wiring board sample s izes  f o r  the 
fac tors  indicated.  Random samples of the 
board populations were selected f o r  the 
t e s t  conditions. Removal and replacement 
of components, touch-up of solder  joints ,  
and repa i r  of solder jo ints  were per- 
formed upon subsamples of the eyele t  only, 
high-temperature-cycle t e s t  conditions. 
Samples receiving vibra t ion were re- 
moved from the temperature environment 
and vibrated a t  25°C and then returned t o  
t e s t .  Each printed wiring board used i n  
the t e s t s  had 100, one-watt, 10-ohm com- 
posit ion res i s to r s  connected i n  se r ies ,  
giving a population of 200 solder  joints  
f o r  each board indicated i n  Table I.+ 
The solder-joint  temperature environments 
were generated i n  the following manner. 
A.  High Temperature Cycling P g  . 2) -  
Each board was connected t o  1 0 volts ,  
giving a 0.256 watts/resistor  d i s s i -  
pation t o  heat the solder  jo ints  from I 
25OC t o  a maximum of 100°C within 20 
minutes. A motor cam mechanism then I t 
turned off power and turned on a fan  
t o  cool t o  the 25°C within 10 minutes. 
B. Medium Temperature Cycling ( ~ i g .  3) 
The boards were heated from 25°C t o  
35°C i n  25 minutes, by blowing a i r  
across two 600-watt heaters.  Then 
0.65 vol ts  was applied t o  the boards, 
dissipating 0.042 watts per  res i s to r ,  
and heating the solder jo ints  t o  45°C 
i n  30 minutes. After 2 1/2 hours a t  
45"c, cool a i r  was blown across the 
boards returning the solder  jo ints  t o  
25°C i n  30 minutes where they remained 
f o r  three hours. 
C .  High Temperature Aging. The sam- 
ples-~ a t  100°C. 
D. Room Temperature Aging. The am- 
bient  temperature was 25°C. 
V Results and Conclusions on the 
Factors Evaluated 
The following conclusions were made 
on the bas is  of the t e s t  r e su l t s  summarized 
in  Tables I1 and 111. Although estimated 
f i n a l  cumulative f a i l u r e  r a t e s  a re  given 
i n  Table 111, f o r  many sample t e s t  condi- 
t ions the hazard ra te  was not constant 
across time; i n  addition, the d i s t r ibu t ion  
of f a i l u r e s  between the boards i n  some 
cases indicated def in i t e  board-to-board 
*Tables appear a t  end of paper 
 illustrations appear a t  end of paper 
differences within a sample& The latter 
effects are discussed in Section VI, and 
Appendices 1 and 2. 
The following are the conclusions 
reached upon each of the factors evaluated 
in the test: 
1. Joint Types  a able 11). The 
plated through hole, solder joint is 
the only solder joint configuration 
that should be used for high relia- 
bility for high-temperature environ- 
ments from 50" to 100°C when tempera- 
ture cycling effects are present. No 
preference for any of the three types 
of plated through configurations eval- 
uated has been shown. 
2, 3. Board Material and Thickness 
 a able 111. At temperature cycling 
to a maximum of 45"C, where avail- 
ability-cost tradeoffs indicate an 
eyelet-only construction has a satis- 
factory reliability, the order of 
preference for board materials and 
thickness is : 
A. 1/16" epoxy glass: 
solder joint failure rate approxi- 
mately 0.05 x 10-6 failures per joint 
operated hour. Longevity: exceeds 
5720 hours 
B. 1/8" XXX-P Phenolic (not 
tested in medium-temperature cycling 
environment) 
C. 1/16" XXX-P Phenolic: solder 
joint fai ure rate approximately 
2.6 X lo-& failures per joint oper- 
ated hours. Longevity: exceeds 1000 
hours. 
4. In-Process Manufacturing Hand 
Touch-up of Solder Joints (Table 
111). Indicated slight improve- 
-. 
ment on "eyelet-only" solder joint, 
at high temperature- cycling environ- 
ment. No improvement indicated at 
medium temperature cycle. Therefore, 
it was recommended that in-process 
hand touch-up of solder joint be dis- 
continued as uneconomical; however, 
this does not preclude process- 
shutdown and corrective action when 
the solder joints of a printed wiring 
board fail to pass inspection. 
5. Removal and Replacement of Com- 
ponents Before Test (Table 111). 
Careful removal and replacement of 
all 100 resistors, by hand soldering, 
on two 1/16" epoxy glass boards and 
two 1/16" XXX-P Phenolic boards, all 
with an "eyelet-only" construction, 
indicated that reliability during 
high temperature cycling was not de- 
graded, but improved--if compared 
with the other 10 boards. The solder 
(removed and replaced) joint samples 
also had failure rates approximating 
those for the touched-up joints on 
similar boards. 
6. Repair of Failed Joints  a able 111). I 
A. After 482 hours of high tem- 
perature cycling and a 1560-hour 
storage delay, the solder joints of 
the 1/8" and 1/16" XXX-P Phenolic 
bQardspwere ,re~aired. The solder 
joints repaired by melting the solder 
with an induction heating machine and 
removing all solder before resoldering 
consistently indicated a failure rate 
less than the original failure rate of 
the sample from which they came. This 
was not true for the solder joints 
that were resoldered by touch-up of 
the failed joint without removing 
the solder. 
7. Tenperature Environments  a able 11). 1 
The order of severity of the test 
environments in accelerating solder 
joint failures was : 
A. High-temperature cycling 
B. Medium-temperature cycling 
C. High-temperature aging 
D. Room-temperature aging 
These effects were noted as being a 
combination of accelerating the time 
of occurrence of first failures, as 
well as accelerating the rate of fail- 
ure rate increase after the incidence 
of first failures. 
8. Vibration During Life Test. By 
conducting vibration at discrete times 
after each 500 hours of temperature 
cycling, and checking the solder joints 
before the vibration testing, it was 
established that failures occurred 
during the vibration testing. These 
failures are attributed to the com- 
bined effects of decreased solder 
joint strength during temperature 
cycling, and final detection of the 
intermittent or open condition after 
vibration. 
VI v h  
Field Operational Data 
An indicated solder-joint failure rate 
of 0.0003 X 10-6 failures per joint oper- 
ated hour has been obtai ed from field 3 operational failure data for the Polaris 
fire control system. One solder joint 
failure has occurred after over three 
billion solder-joint operated hours. The 
maximum local ambient temperature cycled 
to in this equi ment is about 35°C or E 10°C below the 5°C of the medium- 
temperature cycle of the laboratory test . 
This, in part--if not entirely--explains 
the different solder joint failure rate 
of 0.05 X 10-6 failures per hour for 1/16" 
thick epoxy glass boards with an eyeleted 
(not plated through) solder joint, in the 
l abora tory  medium-temperature-cycle en- 
vironment. 
The so lde r - jo in t  f a i l u r e  r a t e ,  f o r  
approximately the same so lder - jo in t  con- 
f i g u r a t i o n  a s  above (same type of board 
and j o i n t  cons t ruc t ion) ,  from f i e l d  d a t a  
f o r  the  ED f i n a l  MIT Po la r i s  Guidance 
Computerpindicates 0.03 X 10-6 f a i l u r e s  
per  j o in t  operated hours.  This i s  f o r  
th ree  f a i l u r e s  during approximately 100 
mi l l i on  so lde r - jo in t  operated hours.  This 
l a t e r  f a i l u r e  r a t e  i s  f o r  a maximum l o c a l  
ambient temperature near  the 45°C maximum 
temperature of the labora tory  medium- 
temperature-cycle t e s t i n g  mentioned above, 
and ind ica t e s  the r e l a t i v e  seve r i ty  of the 
labora tory  temperature cycl ing t e s t i n g  
(about twice t h a t  of f i e l d  operat ion use, 
i . e .  0.05 X 10-6/0.03 X 10-6 = 1 . 7 ) .  
The most l i k e l y  explanat ion f o r  t h i s  
d i f f e r ence  is  t h a t ,  f o r  the f ie ld-operated 
equipment, the 4 5 ' ~  represents  the l o c a l  
maximum ambient temperature which only a 
small  percentage of so lde r  j o in t s  approach, 
while i n  the  labora tory  t e s t i n g  a l l  
so lde r  j o i n t s  were cycled t o  wi th in  about 
3°C of the  4 5 ' ~  maximum. 
VII Specia l  Methods of Analysis 
Applied t o  Some Comparisons 
The p r o b a b i l i t y  of chance occurrence 
of the r e s u l t  i nd i ca t ing  the prefer red  
type of joint--plated-thro gh construc- 
t ion- - i s  l e s s  than 7 X lo-? even based 
upon nonparametric run theory ( ~ ~ p e n d i x  
1) .  
Reference t o  Figures 4~ and 5 A  i n d i -  
ca t e s  t h a t  f o r  the bes t  standard ( eye l e t  
only)  so lde r  j o i n t s  t e s t e d  a l l  boards 
f a i l e d  e a r l i e r  than 2000 hours, while 
none of the plated-through jo in t s  had 
f a i l e d .  Figures 4~ and 5B give hazard 
r a t e s .  
The preference f o r  the 1/8" XXX-P 
Phenolic i s  based on the high-temperature 
t e s t  r e s u l t s .  ( s ee  Figures 6B and 7B f o r  
the summary of the worst 1/811 sample and 
compare with Figures 8B and 9B f o r  the 
1/16" samples. ) For the  1/16" samples, 
instantaneous hazard r a t e s  of 700 and 
24 X 10-6 occurred a t  o r  before 180 hours, 
while f o r  the  worst 1/8" sample ( ~ i g u r e  
6 ~ )  the hazard r a t e  does not exceed 20 X 
10-6 u n t i l  between 180 and 282 hours.  
  he v a r i a b i l i t y  i n  the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of 
f a i l u r e s  between boards i s  well  i l l u s -  
t r a t e d  by Figure 6~ and Figure 7A. This 
v a r i a b i l i t y  i s  not  a s  extreme a s  t h a t  ob- 
ta ined  with one of the 1/16" XXX-P 
Phenolic board samples i n  the medium- 
temperature-cycle t e s t i n g . )  
The conclusions on touch-up, removal 
and replacement, and methods of r e p a i r  
were based upon comparison of the f a i l u r e  
r a t e s  f o r  each condit ion a s  compared with 
the f a i l u r e  r a t e s  f o r  the i n i t i a l  v i rg in  
j o i n t s  f o r  t h a t  same sample. This may be 
i l l u s t r a t e d  by considering the  two methods 
of r e p a i r  of so lde r  j o i n t s .  With r e f e r -  
ence t o  Figure 3A, the samples of 32 and 
272 jo in t s  repaired by f i r s t  removing a l l  
old so lder  ind ica ted  s u  sequent f a i l u r e  
r a t e s  of 0 and 12 X both below t h a t  
f o r  the o r i g i n a l  v i r g i n  j o i n t s .  This was 
a l s o  t r u e  f o r  the  o ther  r e p a i r  method on 
the 1/16" XXX-P Phenolic boards.  However, 
r e p a i r  on the 1/8" boards without r e -  
moving the  old so lder  ind ica ted  an  i n -  
creased f a i l u r e  r a t e  when compared t o  the 
o r i g i n a l  j o i n t s .  The v a r i a b i l i t y  i n  r e -  
s u l t s  obtained when the old so lder  was 
not removed could be explained by the care 
taken i n  reso lder ing  t o  obta in  a complete 
remelt of the old s o l d e r .  This i s  known 
t o  be des i r ab l e .  With the  prefer red  
method not only i s  a complete melt of 
so lde r  obtained but  new so lde r  is  used. 
Therefore, the removal of old so lde r  was 
p re fe r r ed .  
Since none of the plated-through 
so lde r  j o in t s  had f a i l e d  a f t e r  4000 hours 
of high temperature cycl ing,  a few of 
these so lde r  j o in t s  were se lec ted  f o r  a 
q u a l i t a t i v e  microscopic examination t o  de- 
termine i f  there  was any indica t ion  of 
i nc ip i en t  f a i l u r e .  Figure 10 i s  a 25- 
power magnification of a s ec t ion  of such 
a so lde r  j o in t  which had a s l i g h t  p e r i -  
pheral  surface crack i n  the so lde r  around 
the  e y e l e t .  No evidence of the crack 
propagating could be de tec ted .  
Summary 
This paper has described the develop- 
ment of a high-temperature-cycling t e s t  
which is  most severe f o r  r e l i a b i l i t y  
t e s t i n g  of so lde r  j o i n t s .  The r e s u l t s  of 
labora tory  medium-temperature-cycling 
t e s t s  have been compared with f i e l d  t e s t  
r e s u l t s  t o  i nd ica t e  quan t i t a t i ve ly  the  
s e v e r i t y  of t h i s  t e s t  l e v e l .  It is not 
known what the  r e l i a b i l i t y  of these p la ted-  
through jo in t  types is, even a t  the high 
temperature cycle t e s t  condi t ions .  But 
f a i l u r e  r a t e s  l e s s  than 0.01 X loq6  per  
j o in t  operated hour a r e  ind ica ted  a s  
f e a s i b l e  even a t  operat ing temperatures 
t o  100°C with extreme temperature cycl ing.  
How much lower these f a i l u r e  r a t e s  w i l l  
be a t  maximum operat ing temperatures of 
about 45OC is  not  known a t  this time and 
may not  be known f o r  a few years .  
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cated an inverse e f fec t  on solder-joint 
r e l i a b i l i t y  of t h i s  par t icular  short-term 
s t r e s s  tes t ing.  However, component par t  
r e l i a b i l i t y  considerations--damage during 
t h i s  thermal shock--precluded using t h i s  
inverse e f fec t  t o  improve solder joint  
r e l i a b i l i t y .  
The conclusions are based upon the 
following t e s t  evaluation. A sample of 
20 printed wiring boards was selected.  
These were 1/16!! XXX-P Phenolic boards, 
each containing s ix ty  one-watt, 10-ohm 
composition res i s to rs  connected i n  se r ies  
giving a population of 2400 solder jo ints .  
A random sample of 10 of the 20 boards was 
subjected t o  12 cycles of thermal shock: 
from 80°C t o  12 seconds i n  l iquid  ni t ro-  
gen. (p r io r  thermocouple measurements 
indicated tha t  the solder joints cooled 
below -185OC within s i x  seconds, while 
11 t o  12 seconds was required f o r  the 
board temperature t o  s t ab i l i z e  below 
-185OC.) A l l  twenty boards were then sub- 
jected t o  the high-temperature cycle l i f e -  
t e s t  conditions. The resul ts  a f t e r  6600 
hours of l i f e  t e s t  were: 
1. None of the solder joints given 
12 cycles of thermal shock fa i l ed  during 
thermal shock tes t ing.  
2. Only one solder joint  of the 1200 
thermal-shocked joints fa i l ed  during sub- 
sequent l i f e  t e s t .  
3 .  Ten solder joints of the other 
1200 solder joints fa i led .  
4 .  Twenty-f our res i s to rs  on the 
thermal-shocked boards fa i l ed  during l i f e  
t e s t .  No res i s to rs  fa i l ed  on the other 
boards. 
During test ing,  detai led examination 
of a l l  the res i s to rs  on the t e s t  boards 
indicated there were rad ia l  hai r l ine  
fractures i n  the body area of some of the 
res i s to rs  on the thermal-shocked boards. 
These r e s i s t o r s  subsequently fa i l ed  dur- 
ing the l i f e  tes t ing.  
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TABLE 11. TEST DATA 
*Top-joint fa i lures  a r e  designated by a T following the number: a l l  o thers  a r e  bottom-joint failures. 
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TOP OF BOARD 
/- THERMOCOUPLE NO. 4 
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* One Top Joint Failed . 
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' a .. I.. 
HIGH TEMP. CYCLE FAILURES P E R  BOARD 
Lire 
Teat Total Bobrd No. 
Houre Fallurea 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0 1 1 1 2  
180 10 1 9  
260 14 1 11 2 
462 62 1 17 6 30 8 
1560 
AGING 64 3 17 6 30 8 
VIB 105 7 6 10 4 24 7 38 9 
1000 157 12 1 9 1 19 5 5 20 12 50 17 
VIB 178 17 2 1 10 1 24 5 8 26 12 52 20 
1500 109 20 2 2 11 2 26 5 8 27 14 58 24 
VIB 215 22 3 3 12 3 28 6 6 28 14 63 27 






EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION OF PREDICTIONS OF 
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by 
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Introduction Prediction of Probable Circuit Performance 
, 
The satisfactory performance of a circuit is Circuit Failure Characteristics 
usually specified in terms of a range of acceptance 
values for one or more output parameters, such a s  At some risk of over simplification, it can 
voltage level, load current, or  frequency response. be said that circuit failures a re  the result of one 
Circuit malfunction occurs if a parameter value of two possible events: (a) catastrophic com- 
falls outside these failure limits. Suchaparameter ponent part failure, which causes circuit failure 
value may be due to a catastrophic failure of a in nearly all cases; or (b) component part parameter 
component part or  to degradation of component degradation, which may result in out-of- specifi- 
part  parameters with age. cation drift of a circuit output parameter even 
though no part has failed catastrophically. The 
Consider, now, the matter of predicting the distinction between these two general types of 
reliability of circuits during the design phase of a circuit failureis not always clear in practice. 
development program. Reliability engineers have However, catastrophic failure in a component 
concentrated their attention mainly on predicting part is usually described as  an extreme excursion 
reliability based on catastrophic component part of a parameter within a short time interval, re- 
failure. At the same time, there has been an sulting in severe impairment of the part's nor- 
awareness of the circuit degradation question, and mal function. Circuit drift failure may be defined 
considerable literature now exists on the theory a s  any crossing of a failure boundry by an output 
of predicting probable circuit performance. 1,2 y 3  J~ parameter, with all component parts functioning, 
More difficult to find a re  published experimental but with one or more part  parameters exceeding 
results showing the practicality of these tech- initial specification limits. * 
niques. 
Circuit Degradation Failure Model 
Predictions of probable circuit performance 
appeal to those factors in a circuit design which A performance characteristic of a particular 
a r e  of direct concern to the designer. These pre- circuit - for example, the steady-state output 
dictions take into account the particular design voltage - is a function of several component part 
configuration and the interaction of part param- parameters whose exact values for any single 
eters on operating points, plus the effects of part circuit a re  unknown. It will be assumed that a 
parameter drift and their joint probabilities of large number of this circuit is to be assembled 
occurance. and operated in identical fashion. The output 
parameter is treated as a random variable, Y, 
This paper reports the results7 obtainedwhen with continuous distribution function, 
six digital computer switching circuits were 
analyzed for probable performance at 2000 hours FY(Y) = P {Y 5 Y), 
life, compared with measured performance at 
(1) 
about the same age based on a controlled life test in which 
of circuit samples. Three of the more common 
techniques covered in the literature are applied: y is a particular value of the parameter, and 
the Combination method," the Monte Carlo 
method (synthetic sampling), and regression Fy (y) is the probability that a circuit with 
analysis. parameter value y or less will occur, 
* this definition assumes that no combination of 
acceptable initial parts will be assembled into 
* designating the analytical combination-of- a circuit having unacceptable output parameters 
distributions for functions, of random variables. at  time zero. 
I .  
AS eighits ark operated and beg@ to, lta&eW, 
the componefit part parameters undergo changes 
in value, cau~ing y e  total population to change in 
some'm+,er. Therefore, Y~ denotes a random 
variable defined at some time, 'tw hours, andthe 
distribution function becomes, 
The methods of analysis used in this study 
require that the drift (or degradation) of individual 
component part parameters with time be approxi- 
mately nondecreasing or  nonincreasing over the 
time period of interest. Also excluded are inter- 
mittent and catastrophic part parameter failures. 
Recalling that satisfactory circuit opera- 
tion is defined in terms of failure limits on 'p", 
the probability of satisfactory performance of 
this parameter at time "t", considering only 
drift, is, 
/ '5" gives \ 
I satisfactory performance ] = I - P { Y ~ s ~ ~ }  - 
in which (3) 
y is the lower-valued failure limit and 1 
y2 is the higher-valued failure limit on 
output parameter 'p". * 
In this paper, attention is focused upon 
evaluating how well a predicted distribution 
function agrees with the observed (measured) 
distribution of an individual output parameter. 
The foregoing discussion brings out the fact that 
predicting distribution functions of circuit output 
parameters is certainly basic to predicting over- 
all circuit drift reliability. A complete predic- 
tion of circuit reliability would utilize these 
parameter distributions to obtain a total proba- 
bility of drift failure, which might reasonably be 
assumed to be an event mutually exclusive from 
catastrophic circuit failure. Derivation of total 
drift failure proability must consider whether 
independence between output parameters exists 
(it probably does not). 
---- 
* assuming ~ ~ ~ ( y ~ )  - (yl) = 1, in agreement 
with the definition drift failure 
stated previously. 
Estimating circuit Distribution Functions 
An estimate of the distribution function of a 
circuit output parameter at various ages may be 
obtained by fabricating a number of circuits and 
operating them for the required time, during 
which the performance of circuits is periodically 
measured, This method, commonly called a 
'life testv, providz a direct, statistical estimate 
of the distribution Fyt(y). However, this method 
is time consuming and relatively expensive. 
Analytical prediction methods are based on 
the use of test-derived statistical estimates of 
component part parameter distributions, which 
are combined to yield a circuit distribution 
function. A circuit output parameter may be 
expressed as some function of the part parameter 
values, 
in which the "xiv are assumed to be "nl? inde- 
pendent component part parameters, each having 
a continuous distribution function, at time "t", 
Estimates of part parameter distributions are 
derived from aging tests performed either by the 
part manufacturer or by the equipment developer, 
in the early phases of a project. These tests are 
generally less expensive than circuit life tests, 
and they may be applicable to many circuits using 
the same types of component parts. Depending 
on the application, it may also be possible to 
estimate Fxi (xi) fromprevious tests of similar 
component pad  types. 
Deriving Fyt(y) from the various Fx~,~(x~!'s 
requires that Yt be analyzed as a joint probability 
function of all (Xi t)'s for any "y " Wue. 5 The 
general analyticat solution in the continuous case 
proceeds as  follows: 
a. equation (4) is solved for some xi, 
for example xi ,  to give the new 
function, 
b. the probability density function of 
tv?: fYtb) = FY;(Y) 
is then, 
the solution of which can be used to obtain Fyt(y) 
for any "y". In (6) the notation 00 integration 
limits means that they are  carried out over all 
values of the "xi". 
Combination Method 
In practice it rarely is feasible to obtain an 
exact analytical solution due to the difficulty in 
solvjng (6), for all but the simplest forms of 
y ( 5); and then only for restricted forms of 
Fxi, t ( ~ i ) ' ~ .  For example, if y(%) is of the form, 
an algebraic solution exists if both X and X2 are  1 distributed N : (px, c g ) ,  a "Norma distri- 
bution with mean, px, and variance, crx2, given 
by, 
2 In this special case, Fy (y) is also N : (py ,  fly ) , 
with parameters given by, 
Approximate forms of Fyt(y) can often be 
obtained using the combination method by simplifi- 
cation of y(xn). For example, part parameters 
with small variance, and those having little 
effect on "y", may be assumed to be constant 
for a given "P. The remaining variables must 
be assumed to be approximately Normal. In 
some cases, these may be transformed to some 
new random variable which is approximately 
Normal. Approximate solutions are given in 
Reference 5, for product and quotient functions 
of random variables. 
Monte Carlo Solutions 
A second method of solution which avoids the 
difficulties in (6) is the use of synthetic sampling, 
or  the Monte Carlo method. Since all distributions 
F m  (xi), have been estimated from tests, i t  is posd&le to randomly sample values of each Xi,t 
with the prescribed probability that any par- 
ticular jth variate, (xi) j, will be selected in a 
large number of trials. A digital computer may 
be programmed to perform the selections, and 
provide solutions of y (xn). It is not necessary 
(although it is possible) to identify the part 
parameter distributions as being a specific type, 
such as Normal, since the computer program 
samples from a reconstructed form of the 
observed distribution, regardless of its shape. 
Each trial consists of randomly selecting 
a single complete set of "xi" values, denoted 
(xn) for the jth trial. The circuit equation is 
then solved for this set. 
A large number of trials are performed, 
from which a set of circuit output values are 
accumulated, y = (yl, y2, . . . , yi, . . . y ~ ) .  
Within this set of values, particular values of 
"y" occur with approximately the same frequency 
a s  would be predicted by an analytical solution of 
equation (6). This is, 
(number of solutions, y i < y) 
for large M. Note also that complex forms of 
Y (5) constitute a lesser problem, since 
numerical computer solutions a re  usually feasible. 
Circuit Equations 
Some choice also exists in deriving a circuit 
equation, y = y(xn). A conventional method is to 
apply linear circuit theory, approximating non- 
linear parameter functions where necessary. A 
'second method is to derive an empirical equation 
using regression analysis, or  the "least square" 
technique, which requires that several circuits 
be assembled from "tagged" component parts 
whose parameters have been measured and re- 
corded. Circuit output values are then measured, 
making it possible to relate an output value, y, 
to the several (independent) component part 
parameter values, xi, by some general expression, 
in which "eW is a particular value of a new 
random variable, "E ", having zero mean. 
t l  E I? represents an error term not explained 
by the regression. Again, in practice it 
will hopefully be possible to explain 
most of the variation in "y" using only one or  two 
gi (xi) functions, of relatively simple form such 
as, 
in which ai and Pi are constants estimated by 
the least-squares method. Assuming the empirical 
constants remain valid a s  circuits age, a pre- 
diction of Fy (y) can then be made using either the 
algebraic method or the Monte Car10 method. 
Several circuit equations may be required if 
a circuit operates in more than one distinct 
"mode". For example, in the switching circuits 
included in this study, two steady- s tate conditions 
were of interest, since satisfactory performance 
depends on both the UP-level and DOWN-level 
circuit outputs. 
Component Part  Parameter Distribution 
Estimates 
Estimates of component part parameter dis- 
tributions for this study were obtained from life 
tests during which circuit electrical load and 
ambient temperature were simulated. Typical 
test duration was about 2000 hours, and the most 
common sample size for component parts was 
about 50. Data reduction followed conventional 
statistical methods, and an effort was made to 
establish the type of distribution which best fitted 
the sample data and a t  the same time was reason- 
able in view of physical considerations. Establish- 
ing types of distributions and their parameters is 
primarily of concern to the Combination method of 
analysis. When the Monte Carlo analysis method 
is used, it is only necessary to determine several 
points on the sample frequen y histogram, to 
which the computer programB then "fits" an 
empirical distribution function. In the Cambination 
method, use is made of the first two moments 
(the mean and the variance) of the sample param- 
eter measurements. These completely describe 
the distribution, assuming that the population dis- 
tribution is approximately Normal. If a frequency 
histogram is skewed noticeably positive, a con- 
version to a Normal distribution can sometimes 
be made by a logarithmic transformation. 
One of the largest single problems faced in 
obtaining valid estimates of part parameter dis- 
tributions for this study was created by the well- 
known dependence of semiconductor parameters 
on test measurement conditions, such as  temper- 
ature and operating point, o r  "bias". Since it 
was necessary to use existing part test data, no 
choice could be exercised in selecting measure- 
ment conditions, and the best alternative was to 
interpolate to the proper operating point. When 
test measurements were available for more than 
one operating point, this interpolation was not too 
risky. Manufacturer's specification sheets were 
frequently useful, in this connection, since these 
usually show graphs of "typical" device parameters 
a s  a function of operating point, based on ac- 
cumulated experience. These "typical" curves 
can be assumed to describe the translation of a 
part parameter mean value, when dealing with a 
complete distribution function, which implies that 
the entire parameter distribution is shifted to the 
new point. This brings up a final point concern- 
ing parameter distribution estimates, related to 
operating point. The true operating point of any 
component may be partly determined by the values 
of other random variables in the circuit, thus 
violating the assumption of independence between 
part parameters. If the dependence is strong, it 
may be necessary to write this relationship into 
the circuit equation, y- (x ,) as  was done in 
several cases in this study. 
Results Of Predictions Of Distribution 
Functions 
Description of Study Circuits and Predictions 
The circuits employed in the study comprised 
three active and three passive configurations, 
varying in complexity from five to nine com- 
ponent parts. The three passive circuits were an 
OR-gate switching network, and two AND-gate 
networks of slightly different design. The active 
circuits were an Emitter-follower, plus a 
saturating Inverter and a nonsaturating Inverter 
of different configurations. Each active circuit 
employed a single transistor of different type. 
For each circuit, an equation was derived 
for two output parameters. These were the 
steady-state output UP-level and DOWN-level 
voltages, except for the nonsaturating Inverter, 
in which case a regression equation was derived 
for the two transient response terms, Fall Time 
and Fall Delay Time of the output voltage pulse. 
Description of Circuit Tests 
The circuit tests, with which predictions 
a re  compared, were performed on sample sizes 
of 24 to 152 circuits, at  temperatures simulating 
the expected application and with fixed electrical 
loads. These tests were carried out over a 
period of several years, in connection with three 
different development programs, with various test 
objectives, test controls, and measurement 
techniques. Again, as  with the component part 
tests utilized herein, these tests a re  not con- 
sidered optimum for the purposes of this 
study. 
The question of error  sources in measure- 
ments was considered, in comparing observed 
and predicted distribution functions. Estimates 
were made of the possible bias error  in readings, 
and the sampling error  in the mean value of read- 
ings which arises from the statistically-small 
circuit sample sizes. Both of these are  illustrated 
Examples of Results 
Figure 1 illustrates a typical result of the 
cumulative probability polygons (distribution 
functions) of the observed circuit test results 
compared with predicted results by two methods - 
the Combination and the Monte Carlo analyses. In 
general these two methods yielded similar pre- 
dicted distributions, especially for the less com- 
plex passive circuits. When any appreciable 
difference existed, the Monte Carlo prediction 
was usually closer to the observed result. Another 
general tendancy noted in comparing predicted 
and observed distributions was that the observa- 
tions had greater variance. Estimates of the 
possible reading variance introduced by zero- 
mean measurement error  sources, such as in- 
strument interpolation, parallax, and scale 
(electrical) errors,  showed that the excess 
variance could have been introduced by these 
sources. 
The possible bias (calibration) error  was 
estimated to be about f 1/2% of the mean voltage 
level with the test set-up used. This e r ror  source 
could contribute to a general shift of the observed 
distribution in one direction, for a given set of 
readings. Since a statistically small sample of 
each circuit was tested, the representativeness 
of a sample must be considered in its effect on 
the mean value of observed readings. The 95% 
confidence interval about the observed mean helps 
to indicate the magnitude of the effect this un- 
certainty causes. 
Figure 2 illustrates the greatest difference 
that resulted between observed and predicted 
distributions among all circuits, an example which 
shows the necessity for obtaining component part 
parameter distributions at  the correct operating 
(bias) point. This particular prediction turned 
out to be primarily a function of the transistor 
saturation voltage, measurements of which were 
taken at "worst case" conditions during part tests. 
Attempts were made to scale the observed dis- 
tribution to the proper conditions, but with less 
than complete success, as  can be seen. 
Figure 3 shows the best result obtained, 
which illustrates the sort  of correlation which can 
be obtained between observed and predicted 
distributions when both the predicted and measured, 
variables are  under good control. In this example, 
test measurement controls were known to be 
exceptionally good, and valid part parameter data 
were available. The difference between the Com- 
bination and Monte Carlo predictions in this case 
is believed to be essentially due to the fact that a 
more exact circuit equation could be used with 
Monte Carlo analysis, and that the part parameter 
distributions were more accurate. 
Figure 4 is included to illustrate results 
obtained using a regression equation, and the 
Combination method of analysis. The circuit out- 
put parameter in this case was Fall Delay Time, 
a component of the transient response of the 
circuit. The regression equation used was of the 
form, 
T,,. = s + w, (15) 
in which, 
A A 
a and 6 a re  least-squares constants 
derived from test measurements, and 
the inverse product of the base-collector D. C. 
gain and the cut-off frequency of this gain para- 
meter for the transistor. 
Table I summarizes the over-all results of 
all predictions, in terms of maximum percentage 
difference between any predicted distribution and 
the observed distribution of the parameter from 
tests. The comparisons a re  made at the mean 
value of the observed parameter distribution, and 
at the approximate plus ((or minus) one standard 
deviation point, whichever was most in error.  
Twenty out of these twenty-four comparison 
points show a percentage difference of 5% or less, 
with a maximum percentage difference of 12% in 
two instances. The latter result is illustrated 
in figure 2. 
Conclusions And Recommendations 
The results of the study show that an analysis 
of probable circuit performance can produce use- 
ful and accurate estimates of the expected dis- 
tribution of circuit output parameters during 
operating life, given that valid estimates of com- 
ponent part parameter distributions a re  employed. 
Therefore, some of the same objectives as  those 
of a circuit life test may be accomplished, with 
comparable accuracy, using various analytical 
methods. The potential of these techniques for 
performing a design review during synthesis of 
design.3~ evident. 
-  he ability to estimate distribution functions 
of a circuit output parameter by analytical means 
has been established under life test conditions. 
Whether or not such estimates can be used to de- 
termine the expected drift reliability of circuits 
under field operating conditions is unknown. How- 
ever, for certain applications, such as satellite 
and space missions of long duration, during which 
eqvironmental s t ress  may approximate constant 
temperature life test conditions, the analytical 
results may well furnish the means for estimating 
' drift malfunction probability. Under more com- 
plex conditions, the ability of the Monte Carlo 
method to handle comprehensive circuit equations 
suggests that, for operational predictions, input, 
load, failure limits, and temperature may be 
written into circuit equations and treated a s  
additional functions of random variables with 
estimated distribution. 
The three analysis techniques employed allow 
certain conclusions to be drawn about relative 
accuracy, ease of use, etc. It was concluded 
that each method may enjoy advantages in certain 
applications. The Monte Carlo method possesses 
over-all advantages which make it the most attrac. 
tive for general applications. Outstanding among 
. these advantages are: 
A comprehensive circuit equation may 
be used, the starting point for which 
may be conventional circuit equations. 
No practical restrictions exist on the 
type of circuit equations, the numbers of 
variables, o r  the type of distribution 
functions used. 
Evaluation of several failure sources 
may be readily performed in a single 
analysis. 
Reanalysis is simplified, for example, 
if component part values or  distributions 
a r e  changed. 
Accuracy is generally better. 
Disadvantages which may be important in 
some instances are: 
A medium-to-large capacity computer is 
required for analysis. 
Computer programing is required, a step 
which usually means the designer cannot 
perform the entire analysis himself. 
The Combination method proved to be 
relatively easy to use after circuit equations were 
simplified. It provided quicker results than the 
Monte Carlo method and, for the simple passive 
circuits (AND, OR gates), results were of com- 
parable accuracy in most cases. Where differences 
were noted, however, the Monte Carlo results 
were closer to the measured circuit distributions. 
The disadvantages of the combination method were 
noted as: 
The required simplification of defining 
equations may result in noticeable loss 
of accuracy. 
The method is restricted in both 
number of variables and type of part 
parameter distributions which can be 
handled. 
The regression method produced good re- 
sults for the analysis of two transient terms which 
contribute to circuit response time. The method 
appears to have special application when defining 
equations a re  not easily obtained from a circuit 
analysis or  when circuit equations cannot be 
written in terms of the distributed parameters 
which a re  commonly measured for component 
parts. It should not be compared directly with 
either of the previous methods for these reasons. 
In the regression applications in this study, analy- 
sis gave adequate results when using the Combi- 
nation method. In more complex applications the 
use of a Monte Carlo analysis of the regression 
equation should not be overlooked. Two dis- 
advantages of the method are  a s  follows: 
1. fabrication and measurement of a 
sample of circuit outputs and corre- 
sponding part parameters is required 
to develop the regression relationships; 
2. considerable effort may be necessary 
to determine the important part param- 
eters to include in an analysis and to 
develop useful relationships with the 
output parameter. 
\ Experience with the reduction of component 
part test data to estimate distributions for part I 
parameters indicated that acquisition of good data 
is a major problem even with large available 
quantities of data. Test design for component parts 
was in conformance with the circuit design philoso- 
phy, resulting in most test measurements being 
taken at "worst case1' limits for circuit appli- 
cations. Resultant distribution estimates were 
not valid in most cases for predictions of circuit 
life test performance. Attempts to adjust dis- 
tributions to other conditions were reasonably 
successful, judged by over-all results. It 
should be possible to avoid much of this problem, 
if probabilistic analyses of circuits a re  antici- 
pated prior to  design of part tests. Approximate 
distributions, obtained by adjustment for im- 
proper measurement conditions, offer an 
alternative which should be investigated for 
specific applications. 
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THE SPECIFICATION AND ASSURANCE 
OF LARGE MTBF'S 
TYPICAL OF SPACECRAFT ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENTS 
Clifford C . Petersen 
Motorola Inc. 
Military Electronics Division 
Western Center 
Scottsdale, Arizona 
Statement of the Problem 
While t h i s  paper may be regarded, i n  a 
sense, as  an open l e t t e r  t o  systems managers 
from one of the many suppliers of electronic 
equipments fo r  spacecraft, the topic is  of wide 
interest .  The aerosDace industry is confronted 
more and more frequently with the following 
question related t o  complex equipments of the 
type normally procured in small quantity for  use 
i n  spacecraft systems; the question is: "How is 
r e l i a b i l i t y  best  specified and assured?" 
Assurance 
We must deal with the  question of assurance 
before that  of the specification of r e l i ab i l i t y  
because the l a t t e r  w i l l  r e f l ec t  the amount of 
assurance tha t  is wanted. There is  l i t t l e  doubt 
t h a t  assurance i s  needed, since it i s  the 
logical  basis  for  making many decisions i n  the 
genesis of a space system. Without assurance 
we are  forced in to  decisions based on hope or 
judgment. The Department of Defense is talking 
loud and clear  about incentive plans f o r  r e l i a -  
bi l i ty.1 Certain Congressmen are  speaking of 
having mar.ufacturers post bonds which would be 
forfei ted i f  t he i r  equipment fa i led  during 
countdown or i n  space 0~erations.2 Many manu- 
facturers  have had experience with cost ly modi- 
f ica t ion  programs t o  correct unrel iabi l i ty.  
From these fac ts  it is c l e w  tha t  assurance is 
needed by both the manufacturer and the 
customer. However, assurance must be timely, 
available i n  suff icient  degree a t  the time 
decisions are  t o  be made. There i s  no ju s t i f i -  
cation for  spending funds for,assurance intended 
merely t o  give an after-the-fact sense of 
satisfaction. 
There a re  many ways of assuring tha t  an 
equipment is, or w i l l  be, reliable. They d i f fer  
i n  degree a s  well a s  i n  technique and are f u l l y  
explored i n  the l i t e r a tu re  of the day. They 
include implicit  confidence i n  predictive e s t i -  
mates based on par t  counts, t r u s t  i n  the 
implementation and surveillance of special 
design and manufacturing practices, reliance on 
~ r o d u c t  iin~rovement achieved by oversbess 
tes t ing  t l  fai lure,  and the demonstration of 
mean time between fa i lures  by l i f e  tes t .  These 
techniques are used singly or i n  combination to  
create confidence a t  a time prior  t o  actual 
countdown. The l i f e  t e s t  technique usually 
gives the most confidence. I n  sp i te  of some 
obvious problems, Tie believe demonstration by 
l i f e  t e s t  should be a mandatory technique for  
generating assurance, even f o r  la rge  mean times 
between fai lure.  
Demonstrated Assurance 
The MTBFls requbed of spacecraft equip- 
ments usually a re  large. Requirements we 
encountered a year or two ago were s tated i n  
terms such a s  90 per cent r e l i a b i l i t y  f o r  a 
one-year mission for  equipments intended for  
Advent, OAO, and OGO, More recently we have 
bid on equipment having r e l i a b i l i t y  require- 
ments s tated i n  terms of large IQBF's. Typical 
are : 
Deep Space Communications System forApol10 - 
5,200 hrs, design goal 
Minitrack Beacon for  Apollo - 
16,7f;0 hrs, design goal; (8820 hrs  of 
t e s t  experience, no fa i lures)  
S-Band Beacon - 
5,000 hrs, requirement; 1S,000 hrs, 
design goal 
Data Reception System fo r  Gemini - 
16,800 hrs, requirement; requires t e s t  of 3 
systems for  16,800 accumulated 
equipment hours, 
Radar Set for  Space Seeker Sa te l l i t e  - 
10,000 hrs, requirement. 
When we think of accumulating many equip- 
ment-years of controlled l i f e  t e s t  data i n  
order t o  demonstrate KCBF1s l i k e  these with 
high confidence we are  shocked. Usual 
scheduling practices a re  such tha t  there i s  too 
l i t t l e  time before expiration of contracts t o  
perfom such demonstrations. New developments 
typical ly run a year or two and modifications 
of present devices are usually wanted i n  l e s s  
than one year. Also the present s t a t e  of the 
art of accelerated t e s t  techniques i s  too un- 
developed to  a l lev ia te  the situation. We w i l l  
now suggest several means of mitigating th i s  
problem. 
Making Demonstra'tion Possible 
One possible way t o  gain time for  lengthy 
demonstration i s  t o  extend the contract given 
t o  the equipment developer t o  a t i m e  beyond the 
delivery dates of deliverable items, and make it 
extend t o  t.b latest possible time when a jXrm 
re l iabi l i ty  assessment is required. This would 
perndt the longest possible duration of rel ia-  
b i l i t y  deLonstration tests. It also assumes 
that  the  information will be useful in decision- 
making af te r  deliverg of ecpipmsnts. We believe 
that  it is nut too l a t e  to apply demonstrated 
results t o  decision-making up t o  the time of 
blastoff, whether these be decisions regarding 
launch operations, modifications, or contract 
inoentive payments. 
Another means of gaining t4.m is t o  ask 
that  manufacturers -0 supply basic equipments 
wit21 minor modifications shav evidence of long 
duration l i f e  tests which they have previously 
conducted on the i r  basic product. Progressive 
d a c t u r e r s  with so-died off -the-shelf items 
shodd feel the real need to knaw the MPBF of 
the i r  equipments for thei r  own assurance, a s  
w e l l  a s  for irnprcming thei r  prospects of gahlng 
new contracts. So much time is often spent 
mulling over such a step tha* it is w e l l  for 
manufacturers to  remember that a test never 
started is never finished. 
Yet another alternative, if time absolutely 
does not permit demonstrated assurance with a 
high confidence, is to caU for the performance 
of l i f e  tests of whatever duration is feasible, 
even though not long enough to provide ful l  
confidence. Increasing the number of equipments 
t o  more than the few usually subjected t o  l i f e  
test seems highly desirable. Testing such in- 
creased quantities fo r  one-half, or one-quarter, 
of the mission time would provide a f a i r  degree 
of confidence. While such a t e s t  would not 
demonstrate longevily, it would produce a more 
satisfactury number of equipment-hours and would 
permit surveillance of a more representative 
sample. To avoid life or re l iabi l i ty  t e s t s  
entirely because a tsuly adequate test cannot be 
conducted would be an enror. Our experience has 
sham that  much is revealed fably early i n  an 
equipment or system l i f e  tes t ,  giving knowledge 
of a type not uncovered in typical equipment 
qualification tests .  
Specification 
The specification and schedule should be 
consistent with a c m s e  of action selected from 
the suggestions just presented. The schedule, 
should. insofar as  wactical. allow adeauate 
time fGr the discovOV&y and correction oi? equip- 
ment design deficiencies. The system manager, 
in requiring a demonstration by t e s t  during the 
course of the contract, should spec* the 
duration of the test, conditions of t e s t  
(preferably selected From standard AGELIB lavels), 
the number of equipments to  be tested, and the 
d e r  of allowable failures. He is in  the best 
position to determine tradeoff between schedule 
and confidence. I f  he leaves the design of the 
demonstration test t o  the eqyipraent suppIIer, 
bids w i l l  ref lec t  various interpretations of 
th i s  costly task. 
The specification should also include other 
oFten neglected means of adding t o  re l iabi l i ty  
assurance. Three such means seem worthy of 
discussion. 
Parts standardization should be implemented 
on a systemwide basis whenever possible. The 
a d v ~ t a g e s  are so tremendous that  f u l l  consider- 
ation should be givendo requiring the use of 
specific component parts that have proven merit 
or that  w i l l  be so established i n  a coordinated 
t e s t  program. Reducing the variety of types, 
values, and makes of parts makes it possible t o  
conduut strong efforts  in improving them, i n  
saxeening them, i n  debrming the i r  fai lure 
rates, and i n  understanding their  limitations 
and behavior as basic building blocks, 
Standardization is not easy. Equipment pro- 
ducers have thei r  own preferences, and strong, 
early leadership must be taken i n  such a 
standardization effort. We have seen a few 
such attempts f a l l  on the i r  face principally 
because theywere of an optional nature or 
because they were not started soon enough. 
Admiral Home, i n  the keynote speech a t  the 
Eighth NationalR & QC+Symposium, endorsed a 
I 
reuommendation by an Electronic Industries 
Association committee t o  the effect tha t  the 
number of types and values of parts now being 
I 
used should be reduced drastically. When parts 
with guaranteed levels of fai lure ra te  are 
available, through implementation of the 
Darnell report, it may become easier t o  
standardize within a systembeuause the vendors 
of parts w i l l ,  i n  effect, be classified as t o  
rel iabil i ty.  By requiring that  procurement be 
t o  a specified re l iabi l i ty  level, the variety \ 
of part types and vendors i n  use i n  the system 
w i l l  be narrowed. We note a recent bend 
toward a degree of standardization through the 
easily stated edict t o  euse Minuteman grade 
parts.11 A word of caution is appropriate on 
t h i s  score. Not a l l  users are aware that  a 
great deal of screening and burn-in testing is 
performed on such parts by the purchaser before 
being installed i n  Minuteman equipments. While 
it is true that a certain amount of product 
improvement advantage and a narrowing of pa& 
varieties is  achieved by attempting t o  use 
~fMinuteman parts,f' we feel  that the re l iabi l i ty  
advantages t o  the casual user have been over- 
sold. 
The second neglected area relates t o  
orientation of designers with respect t o  the 
f i e ld  use conditions. Frincipal designers 
should be shown systems rnockups, given f5rst-  
hand opportunity t o  see where thei r  equipments 
are bolted into the system, and taken on-site 
t o  witness typical end use conditions. Merely 
specirying environments and operating periods 
is rather inadequate i n  conveying t o  the 
designer a retainable picture of the kind of 
operating, handling, and checkout abuse t o  
which his equipment will be subjected. h.opar 
orientation of designers Kill  provide additional 
assurance that  designs w i l l  be compatible with 
use conditions and thus more reliable. 
The third neglected area concerns f i e ld  
fai lure removal and analysis activities. The 
equipment manufacturer should be included i n  
these operations as he is in  the best position 
t o  detect possible deficiencies of his elec- 
trontc equipment and t o  gather complete informa- 
t ion  needed fo r  the analysis and corrective 
aetion decisions. It is  no secret that fai lure 
analysis of deficien i e s  occurring i n  the f i e ld  
is fa r  from optimum.3 @I the spot trouble- 
shooting by the equipment manufacturer and 
return of unmolested equipments t o  his plant for  
further analysis and repair would add t o  
assurance that  re l iabi l i ty  objectives would be 
more quickly achieved. 
Longer Burn-In 
So f a r  i n  t h i s  ta lk  we have attempted t o  
establish t h a t  r e l i ab i l i ty  assurance is needed, 
that  systems specifioations should require 
several often neglected means of increasing 
assurance, and that  demonstration l i f e  t e s t s  
should not be eliminated, even though finding 
sufficient time t o  perform the tes ts  is a 
di f f icul t  problem. I n  stating that  such tes ts  
naturally take a long time, it is implied that  
aacelerating techniques are not presently valid 
and that  previously accepted experience and 
theory regarding the constant fai lure ra te  of 
electronic equipments applies t o  typical space- 
craft  missions. We w i l l  now discuss the impli- 
cations i f  a decreasing failure rate, rather 
than constant failure rate,  were actually 
applicable t o  long term space missions, and 
present some facts that  indicate th i s  may be 
the case. A decreasing failure rate, of course, 
would point t o  the advisability of longer burn- 
i n  periods. It also would shorten the demon- 
stration tes t ,  or looking a t  it another way, 
would give more confidence with a given duration 
of test. A possible curtailed demonstration 
t e s t  for  a typical spacecraft MTBF could be a s  
follows. It could require 5 t o  10 equipments t o  
be burned-in for 1000 hours each a t  AGREE X- 
level, during which pefiod failures would be 
analyzed but not be considered a s  d~ficiencies.  
Presumably the decreasing failure ra te  would be 
confirmed during the burn-in period. All equip- 
ments could then be required t o  survive the next 
2000 hours of t e s t  a t  the less severe AGREE M- 
level  with perhaps no more than one failure 
permitted during the 10,000 t o  20,000 equipment- 
hours of tes t .  I f  marginal parts were replaced 
during the long burn-b, and only one failure 
occurred during the 2000-hour tes t ,  there would 
be additional basis f o r  confidence that  the 
fai lure ra te  was decreasing and that longer 
missions could be accomplished with very low 
probability of fai lure ky equipments that  had 





The Case for Decreasing Failure Rate 
The concept of constant fa i lure  rate being 
characteristic of complex electronic equipmants 
started as  a result  of early field studies by 
ARInc and others. Experience still shous that 
when e q u i p n t s  are repaired as  thq fail, 
particularly when this occurs Frequently, part 
ages become mixed and the constant fa i lure  r a t e  
is a good approximation for  eqtdpments. A s  a 
result  of this, the convenient Uling t o  do is 
assume that  parts also must have a constant 
f d l u r e  rate, and this gives bi r th  to a flm 
of activit ies in reliabilitypredictionwith 
refinements that  are  of questionable merit. 
H o r n  and Shoup of ~ o e i n g ~  have analyn;ed 
the failure ra te  of B-52 systems versus mission 
time and found that 2-hour f l ights  experienced 
failure rates of 34% per hour, while missions 
of 10 t o  24 hours had failare ra tes  of 1% per 
hour. These figures are cumulative fo r  many 
systems of the airplane but the electronic 
systems followed this same trend, The effect  
is attributed t o  turn-on stresses, take-off 
environment, and the  consequences of poor 
maintenance making themselves f e l t  t o  a greater 
degree on short missions. 
Remington Rand U ~ v a c ,  in private coanrmni- 
cations, indicates that published data on thei r  
Athena cmputer s y s k n  shows a steadily de- 
creasing failure rate, n m  l e s s  than 4 per 
miI2i011 ~ O W S  per part. This computer has 1- 
operating periods, few failures, and a mild 
environment; it thus has some of the character- 
i s t i c s  of space flight conditions. 
The evidence is stronger for  arts. P Procassid and Romano of Motorola have demon- 
strated with very extensive t e s t s  (20,000 hours 
i n  duration) that  gemanium switchhg and 
amplifier transistors clearly follow a Weibull 
fa i lure  distribution w i t h  decreasing failure 
rate. The Weibull P parameter ranged Fram 0.1 - 
t o  0.4. This work s h m d  tha t  a stated Minute-+, 
man goal of .0007% per thousand hours during a 
three-year period should more properly be 
defined as a cumulative percentage of fai lures 
t o  be allowed in  this period. A s  stated, a 
constant fai lure r a t e  is implied, whereas it was 
proved that  on specific test l o t s  the ear- 
fa i lure  ra te  was higher than the goal and the 
f i n a l  fai lure ra te  was lomr than the goal. 
A t  Motorola, we so have data on 10,000- i? and 15,000-hour tests of deposited-carbon 
resistars, s i lve~ed  mica capacilxws, and paper 
capaaitors, that  dist inctly shm diminishing 
fai lure ra tes  as time is extended. Often ue 
have found a t  the end of lmg term t e s t s  that 
the sutviing parts, instead of being worn out 
or unreliable, are really just  w e l l  broken in. 
Hines of Corning G l a s s  works7 presented the 
results  of over I66 mil l ion unit-hours of t e s t s  
on fixed glass capacitors earlythis year. The 
fa i lure  rates observed were strongly decreasing 
a f t e r  about 1500 hours and were well described 
by a Weibull distribution d t h  (3 = 0.4. Hines 
made a strong plea tha t  we cease "the practice 
of blindly assuming an exponential fa i lure  
distribution,l or constant fa i lure  rate. Weaver 
and Smith of Minneapolis-~one~well~ have shown 
tha t  gyro spin motors exhibit decreasing fa i lure  
rates (Weibull distribution with @ a 0.65) up 
t o  the time wearout mechanisms take effect. 
L, R. Goldthwaite of the Bell ~aboratories9 
suggests that what we have been calling exponen- 
tial failure distributions with constant fa i lure  
ra te  may actually be log normal distributions 
which have decreasing fai lure r a tes  a f t e r  the 
mode has been reached. The two distributions 
are easi ly confused i f  the data is meager. 
If decreasing fa i lure  ra tes  are generally 
applicable t o  parts, then equipment design 
efforts that  are strongly oriented toward rel ia-  
b i l i t y  should produce equipments having de- 
creasing fa i lure  rates. On suoh well-designed 
equipments, relat ively few parts would be re- 
placed, even i n  the burn-in period. The effects 
of poor maintenance would be eliminated because 
repair during burn-in would be accomplished in- 
plant. 
Needed Research 
A t  present it appeaxs t h a t  we should obtain 
our fu l l e s t  assurance of r e l i ab i l i ty  by l i f e  
test ing and longer burn-in of equipments and 
systems. Because of the considerable cost i n  
dollars and hours required fo r  doing this ,  
however, it is imperative that  we devise means 
of accelerating tes ts ,  imprave the accuracy of 
our predictive estimates of rel iabil i ty,  and 
gain the capability of identifging and screening 
out parts having l e s s  than average potential 
lifetimes. 
We must learn how t o  suffictently and 
validly accelerate t e s t s  on equipments and parts. 
Attempts t o  do th i s  on equipments have been rare. 
More work is needed such as the effort  by 
Pettinato and ~ c ~ a u ~ h l i n l ~  which resulted in  
determining an acceleration factor of 2.3 fo r  
communications equipment when the ambient 
temperature was increased from 25 to  70°C. 
Acceleration attempts on parts have led t o  con- 
f l ic t ing results  and t o  many claims that  they 
are not valid because the methods induce non- 
typical  fa i lure  modes. More fundamental work 
i n  t h i s  area, such as that  being done by the 
Battelle Memorial Ins t i tu te  under sponsorship 
of the E C R C , ~  should be encouraged. 
We should determine more accurately what 
fa i lure  distributions really axe applicable t o  
parts, equipments, and systems so that  our pre- 
dictive estimates will be based on fact ,  not 
convenience. I f  the exponential distribution 
is  found generally non-applicable, then we wi l l  
need t o  perfect practical methods of calculating 
re l i ab i l i ty  from the combined effects of parts 
having many different types of fai lure distribu- 
tions. 
I t ' s  imperative that we search further into 
the material behavior associated with fai l ing 
component parts so that  we i d e n t i e  the mechan- 
i s m s  of failure. Such knowledge would pennit us  
t o  more effectively apply predictive screening 
techniques for,which sta%tstical  methods are 
already highly developed.l* This knowledge of 
fa i lure  mechanisms would ale0 lead t o  a better  
choice of stresses i n  our attempts t o  accelerate 
l i f e  testing. 
We should gather rel iable data on the 
occurrence of part fai lures i n  the various 
fa i lure  modes. This information is necessary 
i f  we are t o  apply redundancy effectively a t  the 
part level. Whether, fo r  example, a resistor 
f a i l s  by shorting more often than it f a i l s  by 
opening a circuit  determines whether redundant 
resistors should be i n  series or in parallel. 
A mistake i n  our assumption could result  i n  
making the circuit  l e s s  reliable, and of course 
our predictive estimates would also be erroneous. 
Success i n  a l l  these areas of research 
would increase our ab i l i ty  t o  design more 
reliable equipment and make it possible for  us 
t o  gain needed assurance of rel iabil i ty,  a t  an 
early t i m e ,  by t e s t  and by more accurate pre- 
dlctive estimates. 
The i n i t i a l l y  stated question relat ive t o  
large m F l s  typical of spacecraft missions 
was, "How is  re l iabi l i ty  best specified and 
assured?" We have answered as  follows: 
assurance by means of l l f e  t e s t  demonstration 
i s  the best kind of assurance even i f  such t e s t s  
m u s t  be curtailed; several ways of making long 
t e s t s  practicable were suggested; some often 
neglected specification requirements were dis- 
cussed; and the implications of a decreasing 
fai lure ra te  and longer burn-in of equipment 
were explored. Finally we suggested that  re- 
search be vigorously pursued i n  the following 
areas : 
Development of accelerated t e s t  
techniques. 
Determination of actual fai lure rates. 
Understanding of fa i lure  mechanisms 
and application of th is  knowledge 
to  screening teohniques. 
Data collection on failure modes t o  aid 
redundant design and predictive 
estimates. 
Improvement i n  our present methods of gain- 
ing assurance of r e l i ab i l i ty  w i l l  become a 
necessity as  space missions and attendant mean 
times between fa i lure  become longer. 
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The AFSC Program Structure assigns numbers 
and l e t t e r s  t o  the various programs i n  order 
to identify the efforts  for management control. 
The fac t  that most of the command and control 
systems have the designator ltLtl affixed . has 
prompted the reference t o  them as the "Ln 
systems. 
In  th i s  paper the mission of ltLW systems 
has been described, the complexity of the 
equipment indicated, and the importance of these 
systems t o  our national defense efforts  pointed 
out. 
The efforts  by the Electronic Systems 
Division to  comply idth the A i r  Force policy 
that  a comprehensive re l iabi l i ty  program be 
required for each contract,to assure delivery 
of reliable systems and equipment to the A i r  
Force inventoryaPedescribed in  considerable 
detail.  
Definition and Mission of "Lm Systems 
The breadth and variation of the A i r  Force 
Systems Command's efforts  require a meas of 
categorizing th is  ef for t  into subelements for 
management &d control. The AFSC program 
structure was developed to provide the criterion 
whereby each AFSC job is categorized and 
identified. The systems which th i s  paper w i l l  
deal with are those of the ItLt1 systems which are 
categorized in  the program structure PS 400L 
through PS 499L. The command and control sys- 
tems, often referred to  as "Ltt systems, are 
composites of equipment, skil ls ,  and techniques 
which, while not instruments of combat, are 
capable of performing the clearly defined func- 
tion of enabling a commander t o  exercise 
continuous control of his forces and weapons in 
a l l  situations by providing him with the infor- 
mation needed to  make operational decisions and 
the means for passing on these decisions. 
These systems are extremely c~mplex with 
parts counts of some totaling 450,000,000 parts. 
While the use of parts count as an indication 
of system complexity may be somewhat misleading, 
it can be seen from the enormity of the number 
alone that  these systems are tremendous i n  size 
and complexity. For system designed to perform 
such an important function in our defense system, 
it is easy to see why re l i ab i l i ty  has become such 
an important design factor and why the achieve- 
ment of re l iabi l i ty  could be such a probb.  
A complete system includes all subsystems, 
related facil i t ies,  equipuent, materiel, 
services, and p e r s o ~ e l r e q u i r e d  fo r  operition of 
the system so that  it can be considered a self- 
sufficient unit  in its intended operational 1, 
envirbnment. The mission of these systems m y  
then be stated as that of collecting, trans- 
mittingi processing, and displaying i n f o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t i o n  
for conmJand decisions and f o r  control of forces, 
weapons ," and aerospace vehicles. From this 
simple-mission stetaanent of the systems developed 
by the Electronic Systems Division (ESD) we get 
a vivid picture of the importance of this work 
to the defense and survival of our nation and 
our al l ies.  Without these systems there could 
be no early warning, detection, interception nor 
destruction of aggressor weapons in time to 
prevent destruction of our nation and resources. 
To develop these systems various USAF 
organizations have been amalgamated into a w e l l  
coordinated team a t  Laurence G. Hanscom Field in 
Bedford, Massachusetts to povide a concurrent 
approach to the task of providing electronic 
systems for command and control of aerospace 
forces. This team is comprised of representa- 
tives from research and deve lopn t ,  logistics, 
training, and using conunauds w i t h  specific 
system acquisition responsibilities being 
assi  ed to a specific System Program Office 
(SPOYidentified a pgram structure designa- 
tor between 400L and 499L. Technical support 
of the program is provided by the Rome dlr 
Developent Center (RADc) a t  Griffiss A.F.B., 
Rome, New Pork and non-profit organizations such 
as MITRE. The officer in charge of the SPO has 
the off ic ia l  t i t l e  of the Systaan Program Director 
and as such is charged with the responsibility 
to develop, and to deliver the f i r s t  complete 
system to  the using c o d  on schedule, a t  the 
lowest p i c e  poss5ble and with the highest 
practicable capability and re l iabi l iw.  
Reliability Reauirements 
In  recognition of the importance of the 
design f o r  r e l i a b i l i t y ,  Headquarters USAF 
publish\-d a regulation, AFR 375-5 en t i t l ed :  
Re l iab i l i ty  Program f o r  Gleapon, Support and 
Command and Control Systems, which defines 
r e l i a b i l i t y  a s  the probabi l i ty  t h a t  a system 
w i l l  perform a required function under specified 
conditions, without f a i l u r e ,  f o r  a specified 
period of time. This regulation a l so  c lea r ly  
enunciates the  A i r  Force policy on r e l i a b i l i t y ,  
Brief ly  s ta ted ,  t h e  A i r  Force requires t h a t  
r e l i a b i l i t y  be considered a s  a major design 
f a c t o r  t o  be s t ressed during e a r l y  system 
studies ,  source select ion,  design, development, 
and production. Each program f o r  which a 
contract i s  wri t ten s h a l l  include r e a l i s t i c  
r e l i a b i l i t y  requirements expressed a s  numerical 
probabi l i ty  values from the minimum acceptable 
t o  the  desired goal, with such intermediate 
quant i ta t ive  values required t o  measure pro- 
gression, and a s t a t e d  minimum acceptable 
confidence l e v e l  f o r  each probabi l i ty  value. 
These r e l i a b i l i t y  requirements w i l l  extend 
through the system contractor,  subcontractor, 
and vendor l eve l s  with monitoring points 
established i n  order t o  a s s i s t  the  A i r  Force 
i n  surveillance of t h e  program through a l l  
phases of development and production, 
It i s  evident from the b r ie f  statement of 
the  A i r  Force policy on r e l i a b i l i t y  t h a t  great  
emphasis is  placed upon quant i ta t ive  require- 
ments i n  contracts  f o r  equipment o r  s tudies  i n  
which the Air Force w i l l  have an equity. We a t  
the  ESD hold t h a t  it i s  jus t  a s  important t h a t  
these numerical statements of r e l i a b i l i t y  re- 
quirements be r e a l i s t i c .  Further,  the  upper 
value es tabl ished a s  a goal should be such t h a t  
a constant advancement i n  the  state-of-the-art 
i s  made by requir ing greater  refinement of 
methods, techniques, and components t o  achieve 
these goals. To provide r e a l i s t i c  values f o r  
new equipments performing new functions i s  
d i f f i c u l t  and it is  i n  matters of t h i s  type 
t h a t  t h e  technical  support of the  Rome A i r  
Development Center (RADC) is  r e l i e d  upon. In  
the  search f o r  more r e a l i s t i c  r e l i a b i l i t y  re- 
quirements, it has become increasingly obvious 
t h a t  r e l i a b i l i t y  alone does not t o t a l l y  meet 
the  ItLft systems requirements; therefore,  the  
requirements have been more and more s ta ted  i n  
terms of a v a i l a b i l i t y  where not  only r e l i a b i l i t y  
i s  a prime engineering factor ,  but maintaina- 
b i l i t y  becomes increasingly important. The use 
of t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  f igure  of meri t  permits 
trade-offs between r e l i a b i l i t y  and maintaina- 
b i l i t y ,  thus making possible the  select ion of 
optimum values of each t o  be achieved while 
considering the t o t a l  l i f e  cycle of the  equip- 
ment. Such t o t a l  considerations r e s u l t  in more 
A i r  Force per do l la r  and a t  the  same time 
provides the  high l e v e l  of mission capabi l i ty  
required by our customers, the  using commands. 
While t h i s  paper primarily deals  with 
r e l i a b i l i t y ,  it should be borne i n  mind t h a t  i n  
each instance where r e l i a b i l i t y  i s  used the  word 
maintainabi l i ty  could be inser ted with equal 
appl icat ion and importance. 
Before the  regimen i s  described t o  you, by 
means of which the  r e l i a b i l i t y  and/or maintaina- 
b i l i t y  programs a r e  administered a t  the ESD, it 
might be well  t o  discuss very b r i e f l y  a system 
developed by the ESD. The systems with which 
most of us a r e  famil iar  a t  t h i s  time a r e  the  
B a l l i s t i c  Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) 
and Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE). 
The sAGE/BIRDIE/NIKE System i s  a good 
example of an integrated miss i le  and command and 
control  system. For those of you not fami l ia r  
with the  BIRDIE equipment, BIRDIE stands f o r  
Battery Integration and Radar Display Equipment. 
This equipment provides the  connecting l i n k  be- 
tween the  SAGE system and the non-Missile Master 
equipped surface-to-air miss i le  f i r e  u n i t  
complexes and a r e  designed t o  permit e f fec t ive  
b a t t l e  appl icat ion of Army provided missi les  
through North American A i r  Defense (NORAD) 
d i rec t ion  from SAGE f a c i l i t i e s  by d i g i t a l  com- 
munications and electronic  designations. The 
primary purpose of the  BIRDIE equipment i s  t o  
in tegra te  the a i r  defense a r t i l l e r y  (ADA) u n i t s  
with SAGE t o  provide data interchange between 
f i r e  un i t s  and t o  enable the  ADA defense 
commander t o  monitor the a i r  b a t t l e .  
This integrated SAGE/BIFUIIE/NIKE system 
provides an excel lent  comparison of the  s t r a t e -  
gems avai lable  t o  the engineer t o  achieve the  
high degree of r e l i a b i l i t y  required of these  
systems. The SAGE system provides a s ing le  
channel of operational control extending from 
NORAD Combat Operations Center (cOC) down t o  
SAGE regions and sectors .  This concept of 
operation d i c t a t e s  the  vesting of operational 
authori ty  of the  whole defense system i n  a 
centra l ized agency having complete cognizance of 
the  a i r  s i tua t ion .  Within these concepts the  
SAGE/BIRDIE/NIKE system must function so  t h a t  
adequate u t i l i z a t i o n  of Air Defense A r t i l l e r y  
weapons may be accomplished with respect  t o  
other  weapon systems. To achieve the pos i t ive  
control with the  necessary assurance t h a t  these 
functions w i l l  be performed, it is  e s s e n t i a l  
t h a t  delegation of defense respons ib i l i t i e s  and 
modes of operation be enunciated. To accomplish 
the  SAGE mission, there  a re  four modes of opera- 
t ion.  The nominal mode of operation o r  Mode I 
i s  t h a t  each SAGE Direction Center (DC) w i l l  be 
responsible f o r  and w i l l  exercise complete 
control  over the  conduct of the  a i r  b a t t l e  
within i t s  sector  boundaries. Mode I1 - when 
any DC becomes inoperative, adjacent DC1s w i l l  
accept f u l l  a i r  defense respons ib i l i t i e s  and 
authori ty  over specif ied portions of t h e  
disabled DC. Mode 111 - i n  the  event of two 
adjacent D C 1 s  becoming inoperative o r  any other 
s i t u a t i o n  develops t h a t  prevents Mode I and 
Mode I1 operation the  Norad Control Center (NCC) 
w i l l  assume respons ib i l i ty  and operational con- 
t r o l  within t h e i r  specif ied areas.  Mode I V  - i n  
the  event t h a t  any a i r  defense weapon system o r  
u n i t  loses  a l l  contact with the  SAGE DC or  NCC 
under whose control they were previously opera- 
t i n g  they w i l l  operate autonomously under such 
l o c a l  control  a s  may be operative within the  
system o r  u n i t  with respons ib i l i ty  f o r  control  
vested i n  the  l o c a l  u n i t  o r  weapons system 
commander. 
It can be read i ly  perceived from the  
described modes of operation t h a t  the  system 
provides p a r a l l e l  redundancy i n  the  paths t h a t  
may be u t i l i z e d  t o  exercise control over the  
weapons. While some degradation may be 
suffered i n  switching t o  a l t e r n a t e  modes, the  
p robab i l i ty  of successfully accomplishing the  
required mission i s  very high. \,ken it i s  
considered t h a t  t h i s  portion of the  system i s  i n  
s e r i e s  with the  weapon and warhead probabili t ies,  
it i s  apparent t h a t  a high probabi l i ty  i s  re -  
quired. The use of high y ie ld  atomic warheads 
would r a i s e  the  probabi l i ty  of k i l l ,  provided the  
de l ive ry  of the  device within a given distance, 
t o  v i r t u a l l y  1.00 probabili ty.  
The t h i r d  element i n  t h i s  s e r i e s  system i s  
the  vehicle i t s e l f .  The probabi l i ty  t h a t  the  
f i r i n g  from the point of l i f t o f f  and t ra jec to ry  
t o  the  t a r g e t  area i s  the lowest value of t h e  
s e r i e s ,  but it must be real ized t h a t  t h i s  
probabi l i ty  can a l s o  be improved upon by 
redundancy. Assignment of addi t ional  weapons 
t o  t h e  same t a r g e t  w i l l  increase the probabi l i ty  
of success f o r  in te rcep t  and k i l l .  From t h i s  
example, it can be seen t h a t  the  r e l i a b i l i t y  
of ground electronic  equipment permits t h e  use 
of l e s s  r e l i a b l e  subsystems t h a t  a r e  non- 
recoverable o r  one-shot uni ts .  This i n  i t s e l f  
w i l l  provide the  choice of u t i l i z i n g  the  more 
re f ined  o r  developed equipments where it can be 
repaired and returned t o  service.  
General Implementing Documents and Philosophy 
The SAGE system has served a s  an example of 
what has been accomplished by the  ESD and we now 
tu rn  t o  the  present and fu tu re  e f f o r t s .  The 
AFR 375-5, Re l iab i l i ty  Program f o r  bleapon, 
Support, and Command and Control Systems, es ta-  
blished the requirement fo r  quant i ta t ive  s ta te -  
ment of r e l i a b i l i t y  goals and minimum acceptable 
r e l i a b i l i t y  levels .  It is  now ic2ortant  t h a t  
we examine the  vehicles avai lable  t o  us t o  
achieve these goals,  P r i o r  t o  the  publication 
of t h i s  regulation, there  were i n  existance 
specif icat ions  and standards t h a t  had evolved 
from the  Advisory Group on Re l iab i l i ty  of 
Electronic  Equipment (AGREE) Report, and 
various exhibi ts  developed by d i f f e r e n t  centers 
and divis ions  such as  the  Aeronautical Systems 
Division, B a l l i s t i c  Systems Division, Electronic 
Systems Division, and the  Rome A i r  Development 
Center. These specif icat ions ,  \mi t t en  t o  
provide the  framework f o r  our r e l i a b i l i t y  pro- 
grams, were modified, consolidated, rewritten, 
and submitted t o  industry f o r  t h e i r  comments 
and/or recommendations t o  provide a general 
document t h a t  would r e f l e c t  the  l a t e s t  thinking 
of agencies involved d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y  
with complying the s ta ted  requirements. These 
specif icat ions ,  a s  they a r e  today, const i tute  
the  too l s  avai lable  t o  us t o  implement a 
comprehensive r e l i a b i l i t y  program f o r  our sys- 
tems. There a r e  numerous specif icat ions  pub- 
l ished on r e l i a b i l i t y ,  but the ones used by the 
ESD have been narrowed down t o  MIL-R-27542 
(superseding MIL-R-26674), R e l i a b i l i t y  Program 
Requirements f o r  Aerospace Systems, Subsystems, 
and Equipment; MIL-R-27070, R e l i a b i l i t y  f o r  
Development of C-E Equipment; MIL-R-26474, 
R e l i a b i l i t y  f o r  Production of C-E Equipment; 
MIL-R-26667A, R e l i a b i l i t y  and Longevity Re- 
quirements, Electronic  Equipment, General 
Specification for ;  MILStd-441, R e l i a b i l i t y  of 
Mil i tary Equipment; USAF Bulle t in  506, Relia- 
b i l i t y  Monitoring; USAF Bulle t in  510, Relia- 
b i l i t y  Organization; and MIL-Q-9858, Qua l i ty  
Control System Requirements. 
These specif icat ions  a r e  by necessi ty  
general i n  nature and a re  wri t ten t o  be equally 
applicable t o  e lectronic ,  aeronautical,  
b a l l i s t i c ,  and space systems. For t h i s  reason, 
ESD has found it necessary t o  supplement the  
ins t ruct ions  contained i n  these specif icat ions  
with more e x p l i c i t  guidance i n  the  preparation 
of requests f o r  proposals (RFP I S ) ,  contractor 
~eliabilit~fiaintainability Plans, e t c  . I n  
addition, ESD recognizes t h a t  contractor guidance 
must be provided i n  the  form of br ief ings  f o r  a l l  
bidders. Illhen a contractor has been selected, 
ESD provides more e x p l i c i t  ins t ruct ions  and 
d i rec t ion  i n  order t o  obtain the  type of program 
needed by the A i r  Force t o  support the  design 
and development of a specif ied system. This 
guidance provides a f i r m  requirement f o r  spec i f i c  
tasks  t o  be accomplished by the contractor,  time 
phasing of events, A i r  Force contractor moliitor- 
ing procedures, and methods of communication, 
Bidderst Briefings.  ESD expects t o  have 
and has had par t i c ipa t ion  by S ta f f  Re l iab i l i ty  
coordinators- i n  bidders briefings.  The 
purposes of t h i s  pa r t i c ipa t ion  a re  to: (1) 
review, in te rpre t ,  and answer questions on the  
numerical r e l i a b i l i t y  requirements; (2) explain 
overa l l  ESD r e l i a b i l i t y  philosophy; and (3) 
out l ine  and recommend the  type and quantity o r  
depth of r e l i a b i l i t y  information needed fo r  
evaluation of bidders1 r e l i a b i l i t y  proposals. 
This l a t t e r  information usually includes: 
(1) a prediction of the  r e l i a b i l i t y  of the  
proposed system and any a l t e rna te  systems; (2) 
the  r e l i a b i l i t y  organizational s t ruc ture  and the 
l i n e s  of communication between management and 
r e l i a b i l i t y ,  design engineering and r e l i a b i l i t y ,  
manufacturing and r e l i a b i l i t y ,  t e s t  engineering 
and r e l i a b i l i t y ,  e t o ,  ; (3) the  corrective ac t ion  
loop; (4) the  design review st ructure ,  i t s  
authority,  and modus operandi; (5) a descr ipt ion 
of the experience and achievements on past  
programs which involved numerical r e l i a b i l i t y  
requirements ; and (6) where possible, a compari- 
son of un i t  operational o r  achieved MTBF9s on 
s imilar  systems with predicted un i t  I\ITBF9s on 
the  proposed system or  systems. 
The reliability proposal material of the 
successful bidder will serve as the contractorls 
major input to the reliability guidance meetings 
to be discussed in the next paragraph. 
Contractor Guidance Meetings. FSD is 
utilizing reliability specifications in their 
various "Ln system programs. Since, as 
mentioned earlier, these specifications are 
written in a manner which affords interpreta- 
tions as to content and work scope per system 
program, FSD conducts reliability guidance 
meetings for the contractor. The main purposes 
of these meetings are to establish thet (1) 
series of tasks or work items which will define 
or constitute the contractorts formal relia- 
bility effort. The basis for these tasks is 
expected to be found in the contractor's reply 
to ESD's RFP and the basic reliability 
specifications stipulated contractually; (2) 
task descriptions, calendar time durations, and 
manpower necessary to perform each task; (3) 
 ontr on tractor monitoring at reliability program 
review points; the number of review points will 
be a function of the importance, scope, and 
overall duration of the system program; (4) 
contractor control techniques for subcontracting 
reliability activities; and ( 5 )  schedule and 
content of reliability reports to be suhmitted 
to the ESD. 
Secondary purposes of these meetings are 
to: (1) establish the reliability lines of 
communication between ESD and the contractor 
and his subcontractors; and (2) identify con- 
tractor and ESD personnel involved in the re- 
liability effort and their respective respon- 
sibilit$es. Perhaps the most obvious fact 
about planning for the attainment of system 
reliability is that there are numerous places 
during a system program at which unreliability 
can creep in strictly from faulty communications 
between the agencies involved in bringing a 
system into the UWn inventory. 
Referring to the first main.-purpose of the 
guidance meetings, the use of the wor'd formal 
serves a particular objective; namely, to 
indicate that the contractorls responsibility 
for reliability activities must extend beyond 
the performance of his reliability tasks into 
all his engineering, technical support, and 
I management activities. Reliability must be 
considered in all the decisions and resulting 
actions in order that a system will be 
delivered to USAF which satisfies or exceeds 
the numerical reliability requirements. Under 
this philosophy of operation, the formal 
reliability effort is placed in proper perspec- 
tive: it is a series of tasks which assist in 
but do not guarantee the delivery of a reliable 
system and which must not only be integrated 
within the whole family of contractor tasks 
but also must influence the manner in which 
these tasks are performed. 
The interaction and dependency of 
contractor tasks are brought out during guidance 
meetings. As examples, ESD usually negotiates 
a line item or task within the formal reliability 
program which requires that the contractor's 
reliability organization conduct a malfunction 
data collection and feedback system. Th6 
existence of this task is partially justified 
since it supports the overall corrective action 
process. Therefore, its weak-link identifica- 
tion output must be utilized by reliability and 
other agencies responsible for corrective action 
within the contractor 1s overall organizational 
structure. The requirement for predictions of 
system reliability dirring the design phase of a 
system program requires the contractor's design 
engineering agency to supply actual component 
part application margins of safety to his relia- 
bility organization. ESD does not expect that 
the reliability organization will be required to 
compute actual component part margins of safety 
but will review and utilize the information 
available from the design process itself. As we 
will mention later, FSD expects the reliability 
organization to paiticipat;! with design 
engineering in the selection of part application 
margins of safety. 
A clear representation..of the contractor's 
control techniques for the reliability activities 
of his subcontractors is viewed as necessary for 
contractor management of flL" system reliability 
programs. Similarly, the establishment during 
guidance meetings of monitoring or milestone 
points between ESD and the contractor and the 
general type and depth of information to be 
made available for ESD review at these meetings 
is necessary for ESD reliability management. In 
addition, the regular submission to ESD of 
reliability reports is another management 
control technique. 
The final output of guidance meetings is 
the submission to and approval by ESD of the 
contractorls formal reliability program plan. 
Reliability Specifications and Some Resulting 
ESD Reauirements 
At this time, 1et:'s consider several of the 
reliability specifications which have been 
employed by ESD on past system contracts and 
some resulting ESD requirements based on these 
specifications. The manner in which these 
specifications and related tasks are to be 
employed on particular system programs will be 
determined by ESD prior to the briefing and 
guidance meetings on reliability. 
a. MIL-R-27070. Reliability for 
Development of C-E Equipment 
This specification requires a con- 
tractor to perform the following tasks: (1 ) 
system reliability predictions; (2) reliabilit 
indoctrination of key contractor personnel; (37 
prime contractor plan for control and direction 
of subcontractor reliability activities; (4) 
critical and/or limited life component part 
studies and application recommendations; ( 5 )  
program and implement techniques for designing- 
in reliability; (6) reports to ESD; and (7) 
reliability demonstration tests. 
In Performing reliability predictions 
and submitting prediction reports to ESD, a 
contractor must indicate all mathematical 
equations, including the derivation of any 
original mathematical expressions and the 
source of failure rates and K factors employed 
in making the predictions. If failure rates 
peculiar to a particular contractor are 
utilized in predicting, in lieu of "standardt1 
failure rates contained in the RADC Reliability 
Motebook, for example, ESD requires statistical 
and engineering descriptions of the methods 
involved in collecting and reducing the data to 
failure rate form. 
The reliability design techniques 
described in this specification are considered 
to be the basic means by which reliability can 
be designed into an 5" system. These tech- 
niques can be grouped conveniently into three 
general categories: (1) conservative selection 
and application of piece parts; (2) minimizaG 
tion of environmental influences; and (3) use 
of redundant functional replacements and/or 
alternate modes of operation. The last tech- 
nique is generally applicable for ItLl1 systems 
which are not extremely restricted by weight 
and volume considerations and which, in terms 
of numbers of functional parts, are highly 
complex. 
While the specific reliability design 
techniques to be employed per program are 
dependent on the overall system mission require- 
ments, it is a basic ESD reliability policy 
that all component part applications must 
receive adequate margins of safety in order to 
minimize the probability of system failure from 
nickel and dime sources. This reliability 
policy has been supported by the publication of 
the RADC Reliability Notebook which presents 
component part application interaction models 
(stress vs failure rate) and recommends regions 
for reliablh operation. In selecting component 
part vendors, ESD expects a contractor to be 
guided by his past failure rate experience on 
other system contracts, his incoming inspection 
test records, his periodic vendor qualification 
reviews, and standard part lists. 
A contractorls overall plans for 
designing reliability into "L1' systems are 
receiving considerable review and auditing by 
ESD. Audits will be concerned with such things 
as how a contractor, with a proposed system 
design which incorporates limited life or high 
failure rate items such as a klystron and/or 
magnetron, plans to introduce compensating 
reliability factors into his system design in 
order to minimize the influence of these items 
on the overall system failure rate. 
Several ESD reliability programs have 
already begun to require the submission of a 
'Reliability Design Handbb6k. Each handbook 
is actually a specified plan for designing 
reliability into a system and, therefore, 
discusses planned minimization of operational 
stress techniques, part appliaation marghs of 
safety, etc. 
With regard to reliability indoctrina- 
tion of key personnel, a- contractor is expected 
to su~plement previous reliability education 
negotiated on other programs with a minimum 
number of lectures, pamphlets, posters, etc. , 
ESD usually requires that all lecture%-notes cu?d 
list of attendees be made available upon request. 
Since several items (reliability test- 
ing, reports) of MIL-R-27070 are common to 
other reliability specifications, comments on 
these items will be presented during the 
discussion of these specifications. I 
b. MIL-R-275L2. Reliability Promam Re- 
guirements for Aerospace Systems, Subssstems, 
and Equipment 
For purposes of a brief discussion, 
MIL-R-27542 activity requirements can be grouped 
under several categories : (1 ) reliability pro- 
gram management ; (2) parts reliability engineer- 
ing; (3) systems reliability en ineering; (4) 
failure analysis and feedback; f 5) statistical 
engineering; (6) manufacturing support; (7) 
field support; (8) reliability tests and dem- 
onstration; (9) human factors engineering; (1 0) 
special studies ; (1 1 ) reliability indoctrination; 
and (12) reports to ESD. 
Reliability program maria ement involves: 
(1) the development of a plan; (2f integration 
lan within the overall system program 
monitoring and review of the require- 
ment work items or tasks; ( ) modification of 
the plan as necessary; and t 5) prime contractors 
plan for control and direction of subcontractor 
reliability activities. As we have mentioned 
before, in a prime contractor's reliability 
plan, the subcontractor control function and 
prime contractor monitoring points must be 
clearly defined for ED. Since MIL-R-27542 
does not specify any date from award of con- 
tract for submi$sion of a plan, ESD usually 
make the submission requirement a maximum of 
fourty-five (45) days. The exact date will 
vary with the type and scope of a program and 
will be agreed to at the contractor guidance 
meeting. 
Parts reliability engineering is 
mainly concerned with the selection and applica- 
tion of "L1f system piece parts. In the area of 
system reliability engineering, ESD is inter- 
ested in design reviews - type of reviews, 
timing or frequency, personnel involved, 
corrective action recommendations, assignment 
for follow-up of the recommendations, the 
corrective action break-in points, and the 
quantitative e f fec ts  of such corrective actions 
on system re l i ab i l i t y ,  
Design revierrs a re  expected t o  be 
performed with sh i f t ing  emphasis and frequency 
throughout a program and the i r  conduct i s  
expected t o  be influenced by the design fo r  
r e l i a b i l i t y  techniques planned i n  the "Relia- 
b i l i t y  Design Handbo~k.~~ ESD i s  interested i n  
part icipat in i n  the following formal types of 
reviews: (17 parts  l ist ;  (2) s t r e s s  analysis; 
(3) circui t ;  and (4) physical or  mechanical. 
Review of parts  lists i s  aimed a t  veri- 
fying tha t  parts  planned fo r  use i n  a system are 
capable of meeting the application requirements. 
A t  such a review, a contractor i s  expected t o  
have available t o  support h i s  selection such 
information as: (1) each par t ' s  e l ec t r i ca l  and 
environmental rat ing;  (2) qualification t e s t  
data; and (3) previous f a i l u r e  r a t e  experience. 
t r e s s  analysis reviews assure ESD tha t  
an adequate margin of safety has been provided 
for  each application. Adequate is  dependent on 
the overall  system r e l i a b i l i t y  requirements. 
Circuit reviews assure ESD t ha t  c i rcu i t s  a re  not 
being incorporated in to  a system which are un- 
necessarily complex and prone t o  frequent 
c r i t i c a l  type fai lures .  Physical or mechanical 
reviews are  f o r  assurance tha t  mechanical 
features such as  brackets, mountings, bolts,  
etc.  a r e  adequate. They are a l so  concerned 
with the review of cooling techniques and the 
number and location of t e s t  points. For c i r cu i t  
and mechanical reviews, a contractor 's senior 
engineering and engineering management people 
are expected t o  parkicipate. 
While the above reviews are formal and 
preplanned,'ESD expects continuous informal 
reviews and communication betueen design engin- 
eering and the r e l i a b i l i t y  organization. For 
example, these informal reviews may Zalce place 
as  the r e su l t  of in-plant f a i l u r e  information 
collected and processed during the manufactur- 
ing process. 
A l l  engineering change proposals (ECP1s) 
submitted t o  ESD must contain a prediction of 
the quantitative effect  of the proposed change 
on system re l i ab i l i t y ,  A contractor must 
support h i s  predictions by appropriate fa i lure  
data and mathematical techniques. Therefore, 
t o  accomplish these predictions, a contractor 
must maintain throughout a program a mathe- 
matical model which presents a continuous 
representation of the r e l i a b i l i t y  of his  system. 
He maintains t h i s  model a s  part  of his  
s t a t i s t i c a l  engineering ac t iv i t ies .  
1-Jhile f a i l u r e  data  collection and 
analysis ac t i v i t i e s  support the corrective 
action process by the ident if icat ion of actual  
weak-links, they also enable the assessment of 
system re l i ab i l i t y .  Contractors are  expected 
t o  maintain a current computation of system 
r e l i a b i l i t y  throughout a program, t o  make 
comparisons of actual  or achieved and required 
r e l i ab i l i t y ,  and to  use these assessments, 
comparisons, and f a i l u r e  data  t o  modify the 
mathematical model referred t o  above. Prime 
contractors are  expected t o  a c t  a s  the "data 
centertf for  a l l  subcontractoss and be able t o  
indicate rapidly t o  ESD actual  f a i l u r e  causes, 
f a i l u r e  patterns, densities,  and modes 
throughout h is  en t i re  system. 
During contractor guidance meetings, 
the fa i lure  data  feeaback and assessment system 
and the corrective action loops w i l l  be 
discussed. A contractor 's r e l i a b i l i t y  plan w i l l  
be required t o  contain these systems and loops. 
The maintenance of a current mathe- 
matical model, the conduction of formal and 
informal design revieus, f a i l u r e  data  analysis, 
feedback, corrective action follow-up, and 
review of ECP1s are viewed by ESD as important 
control ac t i v i t i e s  of a r e l i a b i l i t y  program. 
The need for  a well organized qual i ty  
control function during the manufacturing 
process is  recognized by MIL-R-27542. A prime 
purpose of such a function i s  the minimization 
of the number of operational or  f i e l d  fa i lures  
t ha t  w i l l  be classif ied as  t o  cause - "manu- 
facturing error." W i l e  inherent and manu- 
facturing error fa i lures  regulate the delivered 
r e l i ab i l i t y ,  it is  rea l ly  operational r e l i a -  
b i l i t y  t ha t  i s  of concern t o  ESD. The l a t t e r  
quantity is  influenced not only by inherent 
and manufacturing errors but also f i e l d  
handling and operational caused fai lures .  
To help minimize the l a t t e r  category 
of f a i l u r e  causes, the majority of ilLfl systems 
have designed or  bu i l t  i n  a cer tain amount of 
self- test  capability t o  insure proper system 
operation and the selection of al ternate  modes 
of operation i n  the event prime operational 
modes malfunction or f a i l .  Such bu i l t  i n  t e s t  
equipment increases the overal l  complexity of 
the system and must be prevented from inducing 
prime mission equipment fa i lures ,  However, 
such equipment does a s s i s t  repair  personnel i n  
performing the maintenance function. 
The efficiency of the maintenance 
function i s  also improved by providing hand- 
books which correctly r e f l ec t  a l l  the engineer- 
ing changes t o  the system and the resu l t s  of 
r e l i a b i l i t y  recommendations, such as ,  preventive 
maintenance concepts, developed during design 
reviews or  as the r e su l t  of f a i l u r e  data 
experience. 
Spare equipment r e l i a b i l i t y  i s  
expected t o  be a t  l e a s t  equivalent t o  prime 
mission equipment. Therefore, the r e l i a b i l i t y  
tasks a re  expected t o  be performed on spares. 
The r e l i ab i l i t y  mathematical model i s  required 
to  be used as a basis for  computing spare 
requirements. Similarly, there is a need for 
close communication between a contractorts 
engineers woking on prime mission equipment, 
reliability personnel, and engineers assigned 
.the task of developing or procuring AGE. This 
need arises not only from the implications of 
AGE selection based on prime mission equipment 
configuration but also from the fact that AGE 
for "Ln systems are in themselves usually 
complex electronic equipments. Obviously, AGE 
that is not reliable could lengthen, following 
a prime mission equipment failure, the time 
that an ItLl1 system is either in a down-state or 
required to operate in a less accurate and less 
desirable alternate mode. 
Reliability demonstrations and reports 
are common to MIL-R-27070, MIL-R-27542, and 
MIL-R-26474. 
c . MIL-R-26474. Reliability for Pro- 
duction of C-E Ecluipment 
MIL-R-26474 requires tasks which are 
es~emCially similar to those suggested in MIL- 
R-27070. These tasks are also compatible with 
work items in MIL-R-27542. Two areas of common 
concern in these three specifications which 
have not been discussed are reliability dem- 
onstration via equipment testing, as opposed to 
analytical or mathematical demonstration, and 
monthly reports to ESD. 
ESD recognizes that the basic 
sequential model presented in MIL-R-26474 is 
not directly applicable to a complete "L1' 
system which may have several alternate modes 
and redundant replacements for various func- 
tional circuitry. The basic sequential model 
is viewed as a possible vehicle for relia- 
bility demonstrations of simple series systems, 
a particular mode of operation of a complex 
system, a subsystem of a system, etc. 
ESD requires t'he submission of a test 
plan for approval prior to the commencement of 
any reliability tests. The suggested mathe- 
matical model for reliability demonstration is 
a critical item of a contractor's plan. It 
governs the duration of the tests and the type 
and quantity of data or information to be 
collected and processed. ESD does not consider 
that a reliability test plan is complete until 
a clear indication of the contractorts failure 
feedback system and corrective action loop is 
presented. The basic loop will have been 
agreed to at the guidance meetings. 
ESD is also concerned over the type 
of failure analysis (records vs laboratory) to 
be performed as the result of any reliability 
test failure. Mere records or data analysis is 
not considered to be completel~ satisfactory 
for the initiation and support of corrective 
action. Records must be supplemented by 
laboratory analysis. 
Contractorts monthly reliability 
reports to ESD may be separate items or a 
section of the contractor's overall monthly 
reports. ESD expects the following types of 
reliability information to be included in a 
monthly report: (1) current reliability status 
and trend; (2) predicted status by next report 
period; (3) identification of actual and 
potential weak-links; (4) corrective action 
contemplated and taken; (5) predictions of 
corrective action quantitative effects on 
system reliability; (6) summary of failure 
analysis conducted; (7) reliability education 
lectures presented; (8) summary of design 
reviews held; and (9) action required by ESD 
to resolve reliability problems. It is 
recognized that the type and quantity of infor- 
mation in a report is a function of the scope 
of the reliability program, and the status of 
the program during a report period. However, 
it is expected that prime contractors will 
discuss each subcontractorts activities 
separately from their own. 
Post Contract Award Reliability Promem 
Monitorinq 
Each System Program Office (SPO) has per 
ESD policy at least one engineer with direct 
responsibility for monitoring negotiated 
reliability programs. Immediate support for 
this monitoring function is obtained from the 
reliability organizations at RADC and from the 
ESD staff reliability organization. 
During the contractor guidance meetings, 
definite ES~/Contractor monitoring points are 
established. The meetings are arranged to 
correspond with significant events within the 
overall system program plan. The main purposes 
of the meetings are to: (1) review contractor 
overall progress on the reliability tasks; (2) 
participate in design reviews; (3) offer 
recommendations for improvement of contractor 
performance; (4) review the reliability require- 
ments and progress toward these requirements; 
and (5) where necessary, redirect the scope and 
intent of one or all reliability tasks. 
Since contractorts reliability reports to 
ESD will be reviewed, questions will be raised 
and answers needed which perhaps cannot wait 
for formal meetings. Therefore, informal 
communication in the form of letters, memos, 
etc. is expected to take place throughout a 
program. 
In addition, if a contractor's performance 
on the reliability program is considered to be 
marginal, ESD will request, in addition to the 
previously scheduled meetings, further 
conferences . 
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DESIGNING RELIABILITY IN SPACECRAFT S O U R  POWER SUPPLIES 
I. Doshay and W. F. Emrich, Space-General Corporation, E l  Monte, California 
., 
1 7 ~ 9 ~  SUMMARY information (such a s  expected meteoroid damage, component failure rates, and an  under standing of 
Recently completed studies on proton radia- the expected environment), present a considerably 
tion and meteoroid damage involving solar cells more complete picture for the use of design engi- 
have prompted a f resh  look at solar power sup- neers. Is Z 
plies from a reliability point of view. Consider - This paper i s  an attempt to compile informa- 
ations of both catastrophic failures and degrada- tion from the various solar sources into a logical 
tion of solar power devices a r e  included. Two methodology a s  an aid to the design engineer. 
design concepts have been prepared, each of which Considerations of both catastrophic failures and 
encompasses techniques of redundancy to obtain degradation of solar power devices will be dis- 
a high level of reliability. The reliability goal cussed separately. Failures caused by meteoroid 
selected for this design i s  99% for a lifetime of impact severe enough to cause fracture of a cell 
one year. and an open o r  short circuit caused by thermal ex- 
A design reliability analysis i s  made of each pansion will be considered in the first  category. 
of the alternative designs. Reliability techniques Included in the second category will be the effects 
a r e  used in deciding between the designs. Sample of proton radiation. 
calculations a r e  included for the effects of redun- Since the primary purpose of this paper i s  to 
dancy, a s  well a s  environmental effects such a s  discuss solar ar rays ,  a l l  other components of a 
radiation and meteorite damage. Tables and solar power supply such a s  batteries, regulation 
graphs a r e  presented covering the effects of ra-  equipment, etc.,  will be kept constant, regard- 
diation and meteorite damage. All sample cal- less  of the solar a r ray  configuration. Using this 
culations, tables and graphs presented have been technique, a l l  differences in the system reliabil- 
specifically selected to provide an  aid to the de- ity must be attributed to the solar ar rays .  
sign engineer for use in the design of solar power The calculations of reliability made in this 
supplies . paper a r e  made with the following a s ~ u m ~ t i o n s : ~  
Introduction 1. Open circuits of mounted solar cells occur 
a t  random. 
A fundamental necessity in the considerations 2. Shorts to ground within the a r ray  do not 
of a vehicle operating in space i s  a source of occur. 
power. For long periods os space operation, it is 3. The probability of a short sircuit of an  
desirable that this power source be developed individual solar cell i s  negligible. The failure 
f rom the space environment itself. Three sources, rate in this mode is  assumed to be zero. 
thermal, nuclear, and solar energy a r e  consid- 4. Failure rates of the interconnections a r e  
ered to be possible within current technological negligible . 
limitations. Since failure or success of the en- 
t i r e  mission in space is  dependent on the reliabil- Catastrophic Failure Effects 
ity of the enery conversion system and the source 
of storage and supply, it i s  appropriate to perform Considerable solar a r ray  environmental study 
detailed analyses of such systems prior to deter- by the authors on such projects a s  Ranger, OSO, 
mining the configuration for a given application. Transit, and Arents indicates that, using the pres- 
The thermal energy power sources appear to ent fabrication techniques, thermal expansions a r e  
have considerable performance and reliability not cause for malfunction problems (independent 
advantages over solar and nuclear energy devices. of the substrate). Considerable damage will 
However, a scarcity of application data exists on occur to filter glasses, but this damage has no 
such devices beyond their experimental uses. Re - apparent effect on the power -producing capability 
search into areas  of nuclear source power devices of the solar panel. 
has been quite extensive. Practical applications of Experiments indicate that a t  meteoroid im- 
such equipment arenow in production within NASA pact energies above l o6  ergs, damage to a cell 
programs which a r e  identified under the SNAP may be sufficient to cause complete failure of the 
designation. Studies a r e  now being conducted on cell. This energy corresponds to a visual magni- 
the reliability of these space power mediums, and tude between 18 and 19 (Whipple). Referring to 
these a r e  intended for future publication releases, figure 1, we see that impacts of this energy will 
Recently completed studies on proton radia- occur a t  the rate of 4 per 1000 ft2 exposed a rea  
tion damage involving solar cells has prompted a per hour (worst case).4,5, 6 ~ 7  Assuming the a rea  
f resh look a t  solar power supplies from a relia- of a solar cell a s  2 cm2, we find that the failure 
bility point of view. These new sources of expectancy for a cell i s  0.075 per year, or  the 
information, together with other readily available probability of surviving meteor destruction is, 
311 
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31 2 
RELATIVE CHANGE - SHORT CXRCUIT CURRENT 

1-0.075 = 0.925 for the single cell in a near- 
space orbit for one year. 
It may be noted that another approach to pre-  
dicting meteoriod effects may be taken on the 
basis of the accumulation of total hole a rea  as a 
function of time. 8 Such approach may be directly 
related to the thickness of the shield and the ma- 
t e r i a l  of which it is made. However, it would be 
difficult to interpret effects of non-hole making 
meteor collisions into this time-dependent-hole - 
a r e a  methodology. This is believed to be pri-  
marily due to the expectancy of failures of cells 
on the basis of the number of collisions sufficient 
to cause damage rather than the hole a rea  in - 
volved. 
Degradation Effects 
Recent estimates of protqn flux in the Van 
Allen radiation belts place the flux a t  2 x lo4 
(E '7 40 mev) protons/cm2-sec for the inner belt 
2 and 10 (E T 60 mev) protons/c'm2-sec for the 
outer belt. 9, lo, l1 
Studies recently completed by Denney and 
  own in^' give us a basis for applying these es-  
timated fluxes. These studies a r e  partially sum- 
marized in figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 is a com- 
posite showing the degradation a s  a function of 
integrated flux for 3 particle energy levels. The 
very narrow spread of the curves on this figure 
suggests that damage is  not heavily dependent 
upon the energy involved and gives us a f i rm foun- 
dation for basing our calculations on the basis of 
integrated flux without regard to the energy of the 
protons. 
Figure 3 shows the typical power output ex- 
pressed in percent efficiency a s  a function of 
integrated flux. 
Sample Problem ' 
As an  example of how to apply this informa- 
tion, we will assume a hypothetical orbit. This 
satellite will be in a 100-minute orbit; 60 minutes 
in sunlight, 40 minutes in the earth's shadow. Ten 
minutes of each orbit will be in the inner Van 
Allen belt, and 10 minutes will be in the outer 
belt. Power requirements will be assumed to be 
50 watts continuous, with a 10 minute peak of 60 
watts each orbit. Our reliability goal i s  99% 
(solar a r rays  only) with a lifetime of one year. 
Based on the above assumptions, it i s  deter- 
mined that the average power requirement for the 
satellite i s  51 watts per hour or  85 watt hours 
total per 100 minute orbit. Since this amount of 
power must be generated in 60 minutes out of 
each 100-minute orbit, the solar a r ray  must be 
capable of producing 85 watts of power. 
Let us further assume that we desire this 
power a t  28 volts. 
P = EI 
85 watts = 28 volts x I 
I = 3.06 amps 
Assume an  optimum voltage of 0.467 v per cell. 
The number of cells in series to get 28 v is equal 
to 2810.467 = 60 cells. 
Using 11% efficiency gridded cells, the.a&r- 
age current of 0.467 volts i s  51 ma. The number 
of cells in parallel to get 3.06 amps is equal to 
3.06f. 051 = 60 cells. 
Therefore, to get 85 watts of power under the 
above circumstances would require 60 x 60 = 
3600 cells. 
We will examine two electro-me,chanical con- 
figurations, and attempt to define the better one 
in terms of reliability. The f i rs t  configuration 
which we will call design "A" will consist.of 5 
individual cells in a ser ies  module arrangement 
(see figure 4). Five cells in series will give 
5 x 0.467 v = 2,335 v a t  51 ma. Twelve of these 
modules will be wired in ser ies  to get 28 volts 
(12 x 2.335 ='28). We shall call  this series string 
of 5 x 12 = 60 cells a "banktt. Sixty such banks 
will be required in earallel  to get 3.06 amps 
(60 x .51 = 3.06)' Figure 5 shows a sample wir- 
ing diagram for design "A". Design "B" will con- 
s is t  of 10 cells which will be sweated to a thin 
kovar substrate a s  shown in figure 6. They will 
be wired in parallel. Ten cells in parallelwill give 
(10 x 0.,51 amps) 0.51 amps a t  0.467 v and 60 of 
these modules will be wired in ser ies  to give 28 
volts (60 x .467 = 28). This parallel-series group 
of 600 cells (10 x 60) is  called a "bank". Six such 
banks connected in parallel will be necessary to 
get 3.06 amps (6 x .51 = 3.06). Figure 7 shows 
a sample wiring diagram for design !'B". 
Reliability Determination 
During the course of a year, the integrated 
proton flux impinging upon our solar ar rays  may 
be calculated by multiplying the total, time of ex- 
posure by the flux density or 
10 minutes, inner belt 8760 hours 
X 100 minute orbit year 
3600 seconds 2 x lo4 protons 
X + hour cmL sec 
10 minutes, outer belt 8760 hours 
X 100 minute orbit year 
L 3600 seconds = 
hour c m  sec 
2 6.4 x l o l o  ~ r o t o n s l c m  for the intended 
miss ion (one year) 
5 CELL 
SINGLE CELL SERIES MODULE 
ELECTRICAL 
EDGE VIEW EQUIVALENT 




FIGURE 4, Description of Solar Cell Modu les  
FIGURE 5, Wiring of 5 Cell Series Modules 
FIGURE 6. 10 Cell Para l le l  Module 




FIGURE 7, Wiring of 10 Cells Para l le l  Modules 
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> TABLE 1 $ -  ., : . 
.-J -1. I.-.... NORMAL 'DISTRLBUTION - SELECTED PROBABILITY POINTS 
' 1'1 
4 
Referring again to figure 3, we see that a t  an 
integrated dose of 6.4 x 10l0 protons/cm2 we can u = JN= J(878 + X)(O. 323)(0.667) PP 
expect to lose, in the worst case, 18Yo of the ini- 
t ial  power-producing capability of the cells. 
Results of independent calculations shown be - 
low a r e  in agreement with the above calculations: 
tg9= 2.326 (from Table 1) 
Discussing f i r s t  design "A" (5  cells in series), From the relationship t = =, substituting 
the calculations of radiation damage indicate an  u 
Model 
Freden and White, normalized to  Van Allen's 
4 2 2 x 10 ~ / c m  /sec a t  peak and extended to 20mev 
Freden and White spectrum above 40 mev 
normalized to Van Allen's 2 x lo4 p/crn2 /sec 
a t  peak; extensions to 20 mev using Haugle and 
Kuffen Slope. 
18% loss of power. Therefore, we must plan for 
2.326 = X - (0.323)(878 + X) an 18% excess of cells a t  the s tar t  of the mission. 
Since 3600 cells will give the required power a t  J(878 + X)(O. 323)(0.667) 
the onset: 
X - - 1 8  x = 3600 
= 4390 cells or  878 each 5 cell mod- 
ule s will provide sufficient power including off set 
of the radiation damage. 
Since the probability of surviving meteor de- 
struction of a cell  a s  previously estimated i s  
0.925, the probability of survival of a 5 cell ser ies  
module i s  ( 0 . 9 ~ 5 ) ~  o r  0.677, and the failure ex- 
pectancy equals 1 - 0.677 or  0.323 for the intended 
one -year mission. Applying this failure expectancy 
to the number of modules which we must provide 
to satisfy the radiation hazard, we find that we 
must ca r ry  
Integrated flux 
1011 ~ / c m 2  
for E=20 mev 
1 0 ~ ~ ~ / c m ~  
X = 419 extra modules in our solar a r ray  because 
of anticipated meteorite damage. But 419 extra 
modules is the average number we can expect to 
lose. Half of the time we can expect to lose less 
than 4 19 modules and half the time more than 4 19 
modules. The problem then becomes one of deter- 
mining that number of extra modules such that a t  
the end of a year in  orbit we can expectaminimum 
of 878 good modules, 99% of the time. 
Since N is  large, the normal approximation of 
the binomial will be used where 
Fraction of Initial Max. Power 
75Yo 
55% 
X = Spare cells for 99% reliability 
N = Total cells required = 878 + X 
P = Module failure expectancy = 0.323 
q = (1-p) = 0. 677 = probability of survival 
p = Np = (0.323)(878+X) 
and solving for X using the quadratic formula we 
find X = 467, modules. 
Therefore, in order'to satisfy a 99% relia- 
bility for the mission for design "A", we must 
carry  878 + 467 = 1345 modules or  6725 cells. 
A similar methodology can be applied for de- 
sign "B" (10 cell parallel module). In this case, 
since the individual cells a r e  in parallel and a 
meteorite hit will remove only 1 cell  from the 
circuit rather than 5 a s  in the "A" configuration, 
the calculation will be made on the basis of in- 
dividual cells (rounded up to groups of 10 cells 
since the basic building block of this design is a 
10 cell module). Total number of cells needed to 
allow for radiation damage = 4390. Predicted 
number of meteorite-destroyed cells = 356. 
Number of extra cells needed to satisfy the 99% 
reliability requirements = 40 1, rounded to 410. 
Total number of cells needed for design "Bt' = 
4800. 
Conclusions 
As can be seen from the above calculations 
there a r e  some major differences between the 
alternative designs. Design "A" requires 1925 or 
40% more cells than design "B". Design "A" 
would also require approximately 29% more area. 
Therefore, design "B" would be preferred. 
The sample problem discussed above was for 
demonstrative purposes only. No attempt was 
made to select a "real" orbit. Figure 3 and Table 
1 a r e  included a t  the end of this paper a s  an aid 
to the designers. Once suitable orbits a r e  cal-  
culated it should be possible topredict  the inherent 
design reliability of a given solar  a r r ay .  
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ACHIEVEMENT OF RELIABILITY 
IN 
SPACE SYSTEMS 
Harvey W. Fritz 
Space Systems Division 
Air Force Systems Command 
Los Angeles 45, Calif 
The first DOD sponsored Joint Military- 
Industry Reliability Symposium was held in 1954. 
During that symposium and the subsequent five 
symposia, a tremendous number of ideas and 
techniques related to the improvement of guided 
missile reliability were presented. Yet, at  the 
close of the last symposium which was held in 
February 1960, it was the general consensus of 
opinion that we had a long way to go in achieving 
the desired level of guided missile reliability. 
Recognition of this problem of missile 
reliability i s  universal, but consider further the 
fact that in the past few years the United States 
has embarked upon a full scale space program. 
This program currently consists of the develop- 
ment of such systems as: manned lunar explora- 
tion vehicles, communications and weather 
satellites, and military space systems. 
In the development of space systems the 
designer i s  confronted with reliability problems 
which make those which face the missile 
designer seem simple by comparison. He must 
now design systems which will function contin- 
uously for long periods of time without mainte- 
nance in new kinds of environments, such as: a 
near perfect vacuum, radiation, zero gravity, 
meteorite and micrometeorite impact, and new 
temperature considerations. These environ- 
ments are,  in addition to the shock, acceleration, 
vibration and temperature environments which 
a re  inherent in the boost phase. 
Table I presents some relative reliability 
requirements for a subsystem in aircraft, 
missile, and satellite applications. The typical 
subsystem chosen i s  a 25 Watt UHF transmitter 
which might be used in any one of the three 
applications. The mission times and reliability 
requirements shown in Table I have been taken 
from documents containing requirements which 
have been placed on existing systems and are  
therefore considered representative of actual 
requirements. I t  should be noted that although 
the Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) for the trans- 
mitter in a missile application is only slightly 
higher than the MTTF in an aircraft application, 
the MTTF requirements for the space application 
are  several orders of magnitude more severe 
than those requirements for either missile or 
aircraft applications. 
The magnitude of the design problem 
created by the high vacuum environment of space 
is exemplified in the following quotation from a 
Hughes Aircraft Company Technical Memorandum 
(Reference 3): 
"One of the most severe problems presented 
by the space environment is the effects of ultra- 
high vacuum on lubricants and metallic surfaces. 
Most lubricants which are  presently available 
a re  useless in space due to their high vapor 
pressure which eventually results in their com- 
plete volatilization. When the lubricant has 
disappeared, the coefficient of friction of the 
surfaces in contact increases greatly. 
"The loss of lubricant is followed by a 
progressive loss of surface films either by 
volatiIization or a s  a result of frictional wear. 
Once surface films and adsorbed gases a re  lost, 
contact between the uncontaminated surfaces caq 
result in galling and seizing or 'cold welding.' 
"The problem of preventing seizure 
requires consideration not only in bearings, but 
also in electrical contacts, such as ,  commutator 
brushes, slip rings, switches and relays!' 
This same reference describes an experi- 
ment which demonstrated "cold welding" of 
materials in high vacuum. In this experiment a 
cold rolled steel plate and rod were brought in 
contact with each other in a vacuum of 8 x 10-9 
mm Hg after elimination of surface contamina- 
tion. After contact, the rod was moved across 
the surface of the base. Complete seizure 
occurred after a short distance of movement. 
A measurement of the tensile strength of the 
seizure was made and was found to be approxi- 
mately 45,000 psi, which approaches the bulk 
strength of the metal. I t  should be noted that 
the vacuum used in this experiment is one which 
would be experienced at approximately 350 miles 
above the earth's surface. It  is  estimated that 
the vacuum in space can become 10-l4 mm Hg 
or lower. 
Other effects of high vacuum on materials 
are  sublimation and evaporation of materials. 
Certain materials may give off corrosive gases 
when they sublime or evaporate. Such corrosive 
gases may cause severe corrosion effects in 
adjacent equipment or may substantially alter 
the strength or functional characteristics of the 
component containing the sublimating or evapo- 
rating material. 
The penetrating radiation environment of 
spaoe may be a formidable problem to the 
designer of space vehicles. Penetrating radi- 
ation may be due to a variety of sources. 
Probably the most important sources are: 
Cosmic radiation, trapped radiation (Van Allen 
Radiation), and solar -flare radiation. Mate - 
rials subjected to radiation from these sources 
may severely change in their physical and 
chemical properties. As a result, components 
containing these materials may suffer intoler- 
able changes in their performance character- 
istics or strengths. 
High temperatures within a space vehicle 
will be caused primarily by direct solar 
radiation, although other effects such as  earth 
shine, earth radiation, and internal heating of 
the equipment itself will contribute to the high 
temperature environment. Normallv, when 
designipg for, tepperature-control, ihe engineer 
considers the efiects of convection in dissi~atine 
.3 
hea$.   ow ever;' he must keep in mind that there 
i s  no convection in space. One can design for 
temperaare dontrol by means of absorptive and 
reflective surfaces on the outside protective skin 
of the spacg vehicle. By adjusting the reflective 
and absorptive properties of the surfaces, the 
intake and output of heat can be adjusted; and i f  
it i s  balanced with the amount of heat being 
generated by the internal equipment, then the 
internal temperature can be made to ptabilize at  
an acceptable level. The effect of direct solar 
radiation is.  on the side of the space vehicle which 
Now the question arises: How much 
reliability i s  required for the critical parts~of 
space systems? In order to answer this question, 
it is  necessary to examine the relationship be- 
tween complexity and reliability. 
Reliability i s  defined a s  the probability that 
a system will perform a required function under 
specified conditions without failure. 
Mathematics of probability states that the 
overall reliability equals the product of the 
reliabilities of the individual parts a s  follows: 
is-tgward the sun, This side may become very 
hot, while the side away from the sun may be where pl ,  p2, pg, pn a re  the reliabilities of 
very cold. - This condition may be by each of the individual parts of the system. A 
rotation of.the vehicle. However, this may not part i s  defined a s  one piece, or a combination 
be feasible,in the case of a vehicle ,in,which parts pieces joined which are 
of the vehicle must be continually oriented subject to disassembly without destruction of the 
toward the ,sun. designed use. In this formula i t  i s  assumed that 
Collision with space particle* such as  the failure of any one of the parts will cause a 
meteoriqqs and micrometeorites a r e  a definite failure of the system. The graph in Figure 1 
space problem and must be taken into account illustrates the effect of complexity on reliability 
in design. A considerable amount of data has for systems of various complexities. I t  can 
been obtained relative to the density of the space readily be seen that in achieve a 
dust micrometeorites, their masses, and their reliability of 80 percent in a system having 
sizea. Tabla 11 gives some design figures which 400 parts, each part must have a failure rate 
can be use& for determining the thickness of the greater than per 1800 Or a 
protective shell to be used on.the outside of a 99.945%. Now consider the reliability required 
satellite or space vehicle. Another problem for each of the parts of a 100,000 part system 
created by space dust i s  that after a period of in order to achieve an 80% system reliability. 
time the outside surface will become roughened The answer i s  99.99978% or 1 permissible 
a s  if it were sandblasted. This sandblasting failure per 450,000. 
upsets the balance between absorptivity and If this answer startles you, i t  should be 
reflectivity in the case of those space vehicles noted that the failure rate should really be 
which a re  using this means a s  a device for tem- much less, because the probabilities of un- 
perature control. detectable human errors  throughout the chain 
. The reliability problem of space systems of events from the time of system conception 
i s  further complicated by their tremendous to the time of "end use " were not included. 
critical part complexity. In a missile or space The foregoing treatment of reliability 
system there a re  hundreds of thousands of versus complexity indicates two areas in which 
critical parts. Publications indicate that the to concentrate in order to achieve high orders of 
Atlas m'ssile contains between 250,000 and reliability. These are: fir st, simplification 
300,000~artsJ  the majority of which a re  critical. and second, increased critical part reliability. 
Now consider the potential cqmplexity of Simplification should certainly be attempted to 
a manned space system. The number of critical the maximum* due the ever in- 
parts may be a million or more. If a failure of creasing demands for increased performance 
a part occurs in a space system after launch, and for the accomplishment of increasing 
you have to live with the consequences. There numbers of exotic tasks, the complexity of our 
just isn't any repair. The consequences of aerospace systems continually increases. 
failure of such parts a s  relays, connectors, - d ~ h e r e f o r e ,  i t  appears that achievement of a? 
transistors, etc., may be the loss of a multi- ultra high order of reliability for parts, com- 
million dollar missile, the failure of a.multi- ponents, and subsystems i s  the approach which 
billion dollar attempt to land a man on the moon nmSt be pursued* 
and return him safely, or may jeopardize our At this point I am sure you are  beginning 
national prestige or security. to think that the task of achievement of the 
It i s  significant to note that there a r e  a required ultra high level of reliability i s  im- 
number of publications which indicate great possible. I t  i s  not impossible. However, i ts  
concern by the Department of Defense relative accomplishment i s  a challenge of a staggering 
to the unreliability of electronic equipment, both magnitude to the imagination of our industrial 
ground-and airborne. Much of this concern was management and to the ingenuity of our design, 
developed during World War 11. Since that time production, test, and quality control engineers, 
improvements have been made in electronic and our scientists. 
part and equipment reliability. However, the Fundamental to the accomplishment of the 
increase in critical part  complexity of our space task i s  an immediate expansion of management 
systems has been increasing a t  a greater rate disciplines to control the actions of every in- 
than the part improvement rate. dividual, who could conceivably degrade the 
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system reliability, from the time of conception 
through ,"end use" in order to assure that the 
actions of these individuals are realistically 
directed toward attainment of the reliability 
goal. 
Much can be said about the disciplines 
required in each major management area. 
However, I wish to address my comments to the 
design area, because I believe it  i s  the designer 
who has the greatest impact on the level of 
reliability finally achieved. It i s  the efforts of 
the designer that establish the highest potential 
reliabilcty of a system. ~ e l i a b ~ t y  must be 
designed into the parts, components, subsystem 
and systems--it cannot be tested or inspected in. 
In order for a designer to achieve the ultra 
high degree of reliability-required in aerospace 
systems he must meticulously pursue the follow- 
ing basic tasks: 
1. Acquire or determine the level of 
environmental stresses to which his equipment 
will be subjected. 
2 .  Design his equipment to be compatible 
with established environmental stress levels. 
3. Prove design adequacy. 
Knowledge of the environmental stresses 
to which an equipment will be subjected i s  the 
basic building block for a designer. He must 
know every conceivable environment and its 
magnitude both external and self induced to which 
hisvequipment will be subjected throughout its 
entire life cycle. Where a firm knowledge of the 
environmental conditions is  not available a con- 
servative estimate must be established. 
After establishment of the values of 
environmental stresses to be used, the designer 
must consider the following major factors in 
order to achieve a reliable design: 
1. Safety factors and safety margins. ' 
2. Failure mode identification and cause. 
3. Failure effective analysis. 
4. Standardization of design and parts. 
5. Simplification of design. 
6. Assessment of state-of -the-art. 
7. Trade-offs of parameters. 
8. Derating of parts. 
9. Redundancy for greater reliability. 
10. Maintainability. 
1 1. Producibility . 
12. Design for acceptable storage life with 
minimum packaging or need for special environ- 
mentally controlled storage. 
13. Ease of operation. 
14. Ease of transportation. 
15. Ease of inspection. 
1 6. Human engineering. 
17. Calibration. 
Throughout the design process the design- 
er  i s  faced with the problem of determining 
whether or not he has designed the required 
degree of reliability into a part, component, 
subsystem or system. It  i s  common practice 
for designers to rely on the following sources 
for this evaluation: 
1. Testing one or a small number of 
parts or equipments to specific environmental 
levels. 
I . . 
. r 
2. : Analysis of fhld and factiiry'fp?lure' ." "' 
,?I I . - 7 , -  
,. : .... data. , , i  I,,-. 
3. Analysis of flight results fr6m.teien-S- - 
. . c  :,- ' 8 .  - try records. 
Environmental te sting of an equi$ih&t i 6': ' " ' 
certainly a necessary part of'the design-'evalu- ; 
ation procedure. Holvever, testidg o$e a r ' a  ' ' \  
,.. 
small number of equipments to a 'specific - - - . 
environmental level raises a seribus quirition" . 
relative to the degree of confidence %+,the - : 
strength bf the equipment i s  riot at' or.;dl+se to'.'! ' 
the threshold df failure. If, in'fact, fie 'eciuip-' ' 
ment were at the threshold of fdilure, 2'gre8t-. " '  
probability exi$ts that subsequently procure% ' -' 
equipments- of the design which was tested woiild 
fail below that 'specified entrironmentaf. 1;etrel 
due to rpaniifacturing variability. It i s  ds'o , "'.' 
significant tot note that accurate enviirorimlintal:' 
stress levels b e  rarely ever khown early 'in-a, ': 
developmental'program. Hence; the designer ' - 
could be testing to at value of an environeental. ' 
stress level below that which will actually be 
encountered. This possibility in coihbiriation' ' 
with inevitable manufacturing variapipty could"':, 
reault in high probability of subsequent failure' , 
of his equipment. : .> . ' 
Analysis of fietd failure data is S e r j  ' '- " 
important in proving des%gn adequacy., How~yer, 
the conditions surrounding the acquisition of' ' 
these data, e.$., pressure of sch'edules, training 
of person+, etc., can seriously Kffect'th~ir ' ' ' 
accuracy and completeness. FurtIiermore,-,the 
enviionmental conditions in which-these failures 
occur are distinctly different than Berodspace 
system flight enviromnents. As a rbsult,' d ' .. . 
great'deal of speculation relative to the exa'ct' ' 
cause of fail'urg i s  inherent in this method of, 
evaluation of design adequacy. ' , / - I :*, 
There certainly i s  no sdbstitute' for flibht 
test programs for demonstrating the perfof;' * 
mance capability of an aerospace system. Now: 
ever, i t  i s  certainly a fallacy to depend pri- . 
marily on telemetry from a system durifig'flight' . 
to pinpoint accurately the cause 'bf d faildre.., . - .  , ' 
To obtain enough channels of telemetixing $6 . 
accompli.sh.failure analysis in a systeh'hving 
hundreds of th6usa1idb of critic-a1 parts i s  , ' ,'-. 
. . . . . ,  practically imkossible. 
This rdethod of evaluation definitely had . . ' 
serious limitations when applied to aerospaci?: 
systems where! the launckied system's cbst " ' : 
millions of dollars. l?krthermore, ili rno'st of ' ' 
our s@ace programs the total number ofveh'icl.ei 
to be launched i s  very small; or it.may,eireli be ' . 
* .  I 
. ... 
one .' I . - . .  
Therefore, the highest possible degrk'e' of - ' '  
confidence that a reiiable design h'ai'been ' ' ' ' ' ' 
achieved must be develbpetl prior to  Iau9ch. 
I belibve that one of the most red5stic ' ' ' ' 
methods of proving design adequah); 'with tlie . : ' 
highest degree 'of confidence i b  through th'6 , ': ' ' 
engineering principle of the safety factor'ar' : " ' . 
. G , ' .  
safety margin. 
The pritlciple of the safe* factor i s  not new. 
It has been-used for ages by engiheers pri*aakQy .'
in the: de sign'of structule s and devices whiSh 
involve human safety, ' i. 8;, bdildirig st*ctu$al ' ' ; : 
. - < . L ,  .> I , .  
members, bridges, elevators, etc. We look 
upon the aircraft  a s  a highly reliable machine. 
This high degree of reliability i s  primarily due 
to the establishment of safety factors in the 
strength of critical parts, such as  wings, landing 
gears, control mechanisms, etc. I t  i s  very 
important to note that the use of safety factors i s  
not something that i s  optional on the part  of the 
designer of aircraft  critical parts--it i s  a design 
discipline which i s  rigidly imposed on the 
designer through specifications. 
The safety factor i s  defined a s  the ratio of 
the ultimate strength of an equipment to the 
maximum s t ress  to which the equipment will be 
subjected. In  order to prove the existence of a 
safety factor it i s  necessary to subject an equip- 
ment to a "test-to-failure." Test-to-failure i s  
accomplished by subjecting the sample to in- 
creasing levels of an environmental s t ress  until 
failure occurs- -failure may be either functional 
or  structural. Generally, when a designer has 
proven that he has designed the specified safety 
factor into an equipment, he i s  not required to 
repeat the test. The question then arises: Would 
testing of additional samples of the same equip- 
ment produce the same value of a safety factor? 
Due to inevitable manufacturing variability, a 
variation in  the equipment strength and the value 
of the safety factor can most certainly be 
expected. Since this is true, i t  i s  necessary to 
determine the magnitude of these strength vari-  
ations, because the existence of a large vari- 
ation could result in a high probability of failure. 
Considering the fact that the failure rate 
of the critical parts  of our aerospace systems 
may be only one permissible failure in 500,000 
or  1,000,000, knowledge of the strength for these 
parts and i t s  relation to the maximum environ- 
mental s t resses  to be encountered i s  absolutely 
necessary. 
In order to determine the variation in the 
strength of a part  or  equipment i t  i s  necessary 
to "test-to-failure" samples of the parts  or 
equipments. The results of these tests-to- 
failure can be plotted a s  shown in Fig. 2. 
The standard deviation of the resulting 
variation about the average strength can then be 
calculated (See A pendix for a sample calcu- 
lation). The n u b s t a n d a r d  deviations that 
exist between the maximum environmental s t ress  
and the average strength can then be referred to 
a s  the "safety margin." The utilization of the 
"safety margin" evaluation technique provides 
the designer with a realistic means of assessing 
the probability of a failure due to strength vari- 
ations. 
I t  i s  important to note that a test-to-failure 
reveals modes of failure and critical weaknesses. 
Therefore, after each test-to-failure the 
character of the exposed modes of failure and 
critical weaknesses should be thoroughly 
analyzed. Such an  analysis after the f irst  test 
may indicate that a very simple design change 
could increase the strength of a part or equip- 
ment substantially, As a result of incorporating 
the change, the second test might demonstrate a 
safety factor so large that no further testing 
would be necessary. Even though a second sample 
were not available for test-to-failure, an in- 
crease in confidence in the design would be 
established a s  a result of the design change. 
Another result of the mode of failure analysis 
might indicate that the part o r  equipment i s  
totally unacceptable. 
If several parts  or  equipments a r e  tested 
to failure and the resulting safety margin i s  
unacceptable, the designer may increase the 
safety margin in the following ways: The f i rs t  
solution i s  to reduce the strength variation. 
This might be accomplished, for example, by a 
more rigid quality control. The second solution 
i s  to increase the average strength through 
redesign. The third solution i s  to reduce the 
maximum environmental s t re  s s. An example of 
how this could be accomplished would be the 
provision of additional cooling in a case where 
heat i s  the problem. Another example would be 
the isolation of the part or equipment from the 
hostile environment, e. g., isolation of parts  or  
equipments from the effects of a "hard vacuum" 
by placing them in a pressurized hermetically 
sealed container. 
Now the question arises: What value of 
safety margin should be demonstrated for the 
critical parts of a space system? Since failure 
ra tes  of one in 500,000 or 1,000,000 may be 
required, the answer should be a t  least  5 
standard deviations. 
Since the safety margin forms the basis for 
an estimate of a failure rate, the inevitable 
question arises: How much confidence can be 
assigned to the values of safety margins obtained 
from testing-to-failure small numbers of units, 
such a s  10 or 121 In  a statistical sense, the 
answer is: Very little confidence when evalu- 
ating the critical parts  of equipments of highly 
complex space systems. The number of units of 
hardware available for test  -to-failure, even 
including parts, i s  definitely too small to develop 
a reasonable degree of statistical confidence. 
This fact can be appreciated when one considers 
the fact that demonstration of a failure rate of 
one in 100,000 a t  a 90 percent confidence level 
requires 230,259 units to be tested before f i rs t  
failure - even a t  a 50 percent confidence level, 
69,315 would have to be tested before f irst  
failure. 
Even though the estimate of the failure rate 
on the basis of the demonstrated safety margin 
may be crude, nevertheless, i t  provides the 
basis for engineering confidence not attainable 
by any other means. 
Now, I wish to present an  actual example of 
an application of the safety margin method of 
proving design adequacy. The example chosen 
was taken from the document in Reference 2, 
and involved the design evaluation of a gas pro- 
ducing squib. Figure 3 shows a plot of the data 
acquired during the evaluation, and the following 
quotation provides the explanation of evaluation 
procedure and results quoted below: 
"In order to arrive 'at  an engineering con- 
fidence level in the squib, a determination was 
made of the degree of performance variability. 
Moderate sample sizes were tested and the re -  
sults plotted a s  shown in Figure Number 5 
(Fig. 3 in this text). This data was then 3 .  
m e d  and conclusion reached in regard to 
the safety factor existing between the actual Aircraft Co., 15 July 1961; 
performance and the requirement. E.E.  Brueschke and R.H. Suess. 
"The group on the left represents a control 
group which was tested a t  room ambient temper- 4. 
ature with no previous environmental testing. Effects; Lockheed Missiles and Space 
The center group represents items that under- Division, Lockheed Aircraft Gorp. ; 
went 20 cycles of thermal shock between -80°F Document No. LMSC 5-10-61-29. 
and t2200F. The group on the right represents 
items that underwent 20 cycles of thermal shock, 
identical to the previous group, but which in 
addition were subjected to shock and vibration 
environments a t  2 2 0 ~ ~ .  The ordinate represents 
gas volume expressed in cubic centimeters. As 
indicated, 600 cc i s  the medium activation 
volume required. 
"Results of the control group around a 
mean of 980 cc indicates a rather wide vari-  
ability. 
"The Thermal Shock group shows a much 
narrower variability around approximately the 
same mean. 
"The combined Thermal Shock and 
Dynamic Test Group shows approximately the 
same degree of variability a s  the previous group 
but a t  a higher mean of approximately 1060 cc. 
"However, the large number of sigma units 
between the mean and the requirement in every 
group indicates that there i s  practically no prob - 
ability of any of these squibs failing to deliver 
the minimum 600 cc volume required. 
"During the development of the squib, the 
mean gas volume has steadily increased up to 
the present level shown at  the right with a 
corresponding decrease in variability. The 
present squib with i t s  extremely low variability 
i s  regarded a s  a high reliable battery com- 
ponent." 
In this presentation I have attempted to 
point out only the fundamental aspects of the 
safety factor and safety margin concept for 
proving design adequacy. A more detailed 
treatment may be acquired through a study of 
the documents in attached l i s t  of references. 
In summary, I wish to state again that i t  
i s  the designer who established the highest 
potential reliability which may be attained by a 
system. Therefore, i t  i s  incumbent upon the 
designer to use the most effective tools available 
to prove adequacy of his designs. I t  i s  my 
f i rm conviction that the widespread use of the 
safety factor and safety margin concept will 
significantly accelerate the achievement of the 
high degree of reliability required in our space 
systems. 
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itude of these strength variations, because the 
existence of a W g e  variation could result  i n  a high probability of 
failure. 
Considering the fact  a t  the fai lure rate of the c r i t i c a l  parts 
of our aerospace systems msy be only one permissible fai lure in  
500,000 o r  1,00O,OM), lmowledge of the strength fo r  these parts and 
i t s  relation to the mexionun environmatas. stresses t o  be encountered 
is absolutely necessary. 
Ia order tc determine the variation i n  the strength of a part or 
eqdpment it is necessary t o  "test-to-failure" samples of the parts 
o r  equipntents. The results of these tests-to-failure can be plotted 
as shown in Fig. 2. 
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Richard W. Cole 
Applied Physics Laboratory 
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The TRANSIT navigation system as presently 
conceived and planned consists of four s a t e l l i t e s  
orbiting a t  500 t o  600 nautical miles i n  a polar 
orb i t .  Each s a t e l l i t e  contains two high f re-  
quency transmitters whose frequency i s  obtained 
through multiplication from an u l t r a  stable 
osc i l la tor  fo r  doppler data plus a memory from 
which the s a t e l l i t e s  present ephemeris data i s  
continuously transmitted i n  d ig i t a l  form using 
pa i rs  of doublets with phase modulation on one 
of the high frequency transmitters.  Any ship a t  
sea outf i t ted with suitable receiving and com- 
puting equipment can determine a precision f i x  
on i t s  position by using only the doppler track 
and ephemeris data from a single s a t e l l i t e  pass 
provided the pass f a l l s  within a suitable angle 
between the horizon and d i rec t ly  overhead. By 
using multiple s a t e l l i t e s ,  frequent worldwide 
coverage i s  maintained and only a single in- 
jection stat ion i s  required. The sa t e l l i t e s  
w i l l  be launched in to  orb i t  using launching 
vehicles supplied by the Military. Economic 
factors  make it necessary tha t  the t ac t i ca l  
s a t e l l i t e s  operate sa t i s fac tor i ly  i n  the space 
environments for  periods of time which are long 
when compared t o  present day ground equipment 
where maintenance i s  used t o  maintain continued 
operation. Maintenance i n  space i s  limited t o  a 
few v i t a l  functions via command l ink  and re- 
dundancy i s  reduced t o  near zero by severe space 
and weight limitations. Sa t e l l i t e  technology i s  
a new endeavor f o r  mankind which involves the 
many unknowns of the space environment. As a 
resul t ,  the Applied Physics Laboratory i s  making 
every effort  t o  conduct a program which i s  
balanced between research, development, and 
engineering whose program goal i n  r e l i ab i l i t y  i s  
t o  make a long operational lifetime i n  orbit an 
inherent "designed in" characteristic of the 
TRANSIT t ac t i ca l  s a t e l l i t e s .  
The TRANSIT navigation system as  presently 
conceived and planned consists of four s a t e l l i t e s  
orbiting a t  500 t o  600 nautical miles i n  a polar 
orbi t .  Each s a t e l l i t e  contains two high f r e -  
quency transmitters whose frequency i s  obtained 
through multiplication from an u l t r a  stable 
osc i l la tor  fo r  doppler data plus a memory from 
which the sa t e l l i t e s  present ephemeris data i s  
continuously transmitted i n  d ig i ta l  form using 
pa i rs  of doublets with phase modulation on one 
of the high frequency transmitters.  Any ship a t  
sea outf i t ted with suitable receiving and 
computing equipment can determine a precision 
f i x  on i t s  position by using only the doppler 
t rack and ephemeris data from a single s a t e l l i t e  
pass provided the pass f a l l s  within a suitable 
angle between the horizon and direct ly overhead. 
By using multiple sa te l l i tes ,  frequent worldwide 
coverage i s  maintained and only a single in- 
jection stat ion i s  required. The s a t e l l i t e  w i l l  
be launched in to  orbi t  using launching vehicles 
supplied by the Military. 
Reliabi l i ty requirements ordinarily stem 
from perf ormance requirements, economic factors, 
or  both. In the case of the TRANSIT program, 
the Laboratory has been requested t o  extend the 
rel iable lifetime of TRANSIT orbiting sa t e l l i t e s  
t o  a goal of f ive  years--a requirement often 
quoted today i n  Military contracts. A few of 
the  factors which greatly complicate t h i s  task 
are  as  follows: 
(1) New Environments 
The characteristics of the outer saace 
A 
environments are not f u l l y  known, nor 
are the long term effects  of these 
space environments upon electronics, 
electromechanical, and optical devices 
and materials known. With the present 
s ta te  of the a r t  i n  vacuum technology, 
the extreme vacuum of outer space as  
projected by theory cannot be simulated 
on the ground. Our a b i l i t y  t o  simulate 
radiation, particularly nuclear radia- 
tion, i s  grossly limited and long term 
exposure as  required i n  l i f e  test ing i s  
impractical. The large number of 
temperature cycles, with the associated 
thermal stresses, which a TMSIT 
s a t e l l i t e  would experience i n  f ive 
years may be a hazard t o  long l i f e .  
( 2 )  Performance Demands Tax the State of 
the A r t  
I n  some areas, system requirements 
place severe demands on the s ta te  of 
the a r t  with the resultant increased 
probability of degradation fa i lures  . 
(3) Changing Technology 
Electronic technology i s  i n  a constant 
s ta te  of evolution. This w i l l  resul t  
i n  changes i n  s a t e l l i t e  design t o  i m -  
prove performance, part icularly i n  
marginal areas, which changes introduce 
new techniques and hardware with the 
attendant r e l i ab i l i t y  hazards. 
(4) Miniaturization 
Space and weight l i d t a t i o n s  force the 
use of ultra-miniaturization with a l l  
the  attendant new techniques, parts, 
and materials. Fabrication 'becomes an 
acute problem because of the basic 
limitations of people t o  handle small 
parts and the limited production 
quantities make extensive tooling and 
automation prohibitively costly. 
People in  some quarters fee l  that  
TRANSIT should use small launching 
vehicles for  e c o n d c  reasons, yet, 
since the limited payload weight 
capability of these vehicles requires 
the elimination of essentially a l l  
redundancy, the  cost factors associated 
with the reduced re l iabi l i ty  of these 
non-redundant sa te l l i tes  may result i n  
a less  economical "system" than one 
using the  more expensive larger 
launching vehicles capable of a 
significantly greater payload. 
( 5 )  Long Operating Lifetime Without 
Maintenance 
The required operating lifetime of the 
sa te l l i t e  without maintenance is ex- 
ceptionally long when compared t o  pre- 
sent day ground equipment. With the 
exception of the transoceanic cables, 
a l l  electronics today depend upon 
maintenance for  continued operation, a 
procedure not presently feasible with 
satell i tes.  The transoceanic cables, 
a simple system in  comparison with a 
satel l i te,  made l ibera l  use of re- 
dundancy, a technique which can be 
used only sparingly i n  TRANSIT i f  
severe weight limitations are imposed. 
( 6 )  Limited Space Vrouble Shooting 
Spkce and weight' limitations severely 
limtt the amouut of telemetry which 
can be included for trouble shooting 
purposes while i n  orbit.  Since the 
telemetering electronics i t se l f  w i l l  
experience the sa te l l i t e  environment, 
it too presents a re l iabi l i ty  problem. 
It i s  worthy of note, however, that i n  
several cases, APL sate l l i tes  now i n  
orbit and operating successfully 
would have been to ta l  fai lures had not 
some telemetry and command functions 
been included which allowed some 
troubleshooting and correction. 
duced i n  very limited' quantities with 
but a few i n  orbit a t  any time, coupled 
with the evolutionary trend i n  techno- 
logy means that techniques t o  achieve 
improved re l iabi l i ty  through s ta t i s t i c s  
an& failure loop cxosure are of l i t t l e  
usefulness. 
(8) Extreme Cost 
Each sa te l l i t e  which f a i l s  af ter  being 
satisfactorily launched into orbit w i i l  
represent a sizeable monetary loss. 
Fromthe foregoing, it follows that achieving 
a f ive  year lifetime i n  orbit for TRANSIT 
sate l l i tes  requires f a r  more than a s t a t i s t i ca l  
prognostication by a re l iabi l i ty  project or the 
preparation of voluminous high re l iabi l i ty  
specifications by a parts group. 
Program t o  Date 
When APL entered the sa te l l i t e  f ie ld  i n  
February, 1959, it recognized that  the many unu 
knowns of the space environment coupled with the 
effects which long term exposure t o  th i s  
environment might have upon sa te l l i t e  hardware 
could well make the road from the physics 
laboratory t o  space-worthy hardware an arduous 
one. Certainly, re l iabi l i ty  i n  the connotation 
of f ive year l i f e  i n  orbit, could not be an 
i n i t i a l  requirement. However, research data 
v i t a l  t o  the development of the TRANSIT navi- 
gation system could be obtained from sate l l i tes  ' 
having operational lifetimes i n  orbit i n  terms 
of a few months. It was therefore considered 
sound policy t o  launch experimental sa te l l i tes  
as quickly as possible drawing upon the know- 
how of Laboratory personnel who had had exten- 
sive experience i n  guided missiles i n  an effort 
t o  obtain sa te l l i tes  .quickly which would be as 
space-worthy as possible. In th i s  way, the 
Laboratory would not only stand a chance of ob- 
taining data vi ta l ly  needed for  the further 
development of the navigation system, but w~uld 
also s tar t  t o  obtain f i r s t  hand experience with 
hardware i n  the space environment. Dr .  R. B. 
Kershner, director of the Terrier Missile Program 
for  many years during which time he gained vast 
experience over the f u l l  span of technical 
management from system design t o  f i e l d  operations, 
was appointed as director of the newly formed 
TRANSIT Division. The division was manned. with 
assorted scientists supported by engineers and 
technicians, the majority of whom had had ex- 
tensive experience i n  the Laboratory missile 
programs including the design, packaging, and 
fabrication of missile f l ight  hardware and 
missile f ie ld  t e s t  operations. From the outset, 
it was decided that  the sa te l l i tes  should include 
both telemetry and command logic subsystems as a \ 
means of obtaining as much in-orbit information 
as  possible and provide a means for  limited 
corrective action. The sa te l l i t e  hardware 
designs have been the result of the efforts  of 
teams consisting of circuit,  thermal, and 
packaging design specialists and the fl ight 
hardware was fabricated by highly skilled 
technicians. The circuit design engineers, a 
l o t  of u l t ra  conservative perfectionists, often- 
times themselves conducted the f ina l  bench 
testing on f l ight  hardware and served on the 
3 f i e ld  crews. Within the l imits of time and man- 
power, the performance of each circuit was 
evaluated for  variations i n  electrical  parameters 
of the parts, power supply voltages a d  impedance 
as  well as temperature. Each sa te l l i t e  sub- 
assembly was subjected t o  several cycles of ex- 
treme high and low temperature t o  weed out faulty 
parts  and solder joints, then the e lect r ica lper-  
fo~nance was checked during vibration and over a 
range of temperature. Selective assembly was 
used i n  c r i t i ca l  circuit  areas and 100$ screening 
inspection was imposed on psrts believed t o  be 
c r i t i ca l  circuit  source8 of unreliability. 
Redundancy was uti l ized i n  cabling and connector 
terminals as  well a s  some important subsystems 
such as  the stable oscillator and camand re- 
ceiver. The completed sa te l l i tes  were given an 
inspection critique by personnel not directly 
associated with the  hardware, then subjected t o  a 
thorough system t e s t  both electrical  and environ- 
mental including vibration and thermal-vacuum. 
Fromthis point on, rigid rules of procedure were 
imposed t o  control a l l  phases of the operation, 
which rules required extensive sa te l l i te  retesting 
should any subsystems have t o  be changed. 
The tempo of the program has been un- 
believable. For instance, i n  the case of the 
TRAAC satell i te,  the time between the in i t ia t ion 
of the design and the delivery of a fu l ly  tested 
sa te l l i t e  was 4 months. This included design, - 
procurement, par t ia l  breadboarding, packaging, I 
fabrication, checkout, assembly, f l ight  acceptance 
testing, and delivery. 
To date, eight APL sate l l i tes  have been 
launched of which five were successFully placed 
into orbit.  Of the eight satel l i tes,  four carried 
one piggyback sa te l l i t e  each and one carried two 
piggyback sa te l l i tes  supplied by outside agencies. 
Two of the APL sa te l l i t e s  have portions of thei r  
payload powered by radio-isotope parer supplies 
supplied by Martin under an AEC contract, the 
f i r s t  nuclear power t o  go into orbit.  The 
approximate electronic parts count for  the 
ear l ier  sa te l l i t e s  was 1150 parts sans solar cells  
while the l a te r  sa te l l i tes  approximated 2000 
parts. Experience with these sa te l l i tes  which 
may shed some l ight  upon the re l iabi l i ty  of 
sa te l l i tes  i n  orbit is as follows: 
(1) Af'ter 24 months i n  orbit, signals are 
still  received on two frequencies from 
TRANSIT IIA when it is i n  the sunlight 
even though a &ift i n  the calibration 
of a thermostat resulted indirectly in  
the batteries blowing up. 
(2) TRANSIT IVA is s t i l l  transmitting on 
fourlfrequencies af ter  one year i n  
orbit. The 2049 b i t  delay l ine  memory 
has been loaded and read out repeatedly 
with but an occasional error. The R I P S  
is  s t i l l  operating satisfactorily but 
the cc-mrercially supplied telemetry 
transmitter failed early. Mode 
shifting of the command system has been 
experienced frequently, but th i s  
appears t o  be due t o  external causes 
(friendly jamming). 
(3) W S I T ,  IVB i s  s t i l l  trans+tting on 
four frequencies a f t e r  seven months i n  
orbit. A l l  telemetry is operating and 
has held calibration amazingly well. 
The l344 b i t  magnetic core memory has 
been loaded and read out repeatedly 
without error. The solar at t i tude 
detector indicates approximately 15 
percent degradation of th,e sa te l l i tes  
solar parer generating capability due 
t o  radiation damage. Soon a f te r  
launching, the satellike was 
successfully magnetically stabilized 
t o  within better  than 2 degrees of the 
earth's magnetic f i e l d  direction. On 
March 8, it was observed that the 
sa te l l i t e  was swinging greater than 10 
degrees off stabilization. An analysis 
of the data indicatedth3.s was most 
probably due t o  the impingement of a 
micro-meteorite against the outer 
surface of the sa te l l i te .  The 
oscillations of the sa te l l i t e  have 
subsequently damped out and the 
sa te l l i t e  i s  again aligned within 
better  than 2 degrees of the local 
magnetic f i e ld  direction. 
The TRAAC research sa te l l i t e  
(standing for  TRANSIT Research and 
Attitude control) is still  operating 
af ter  seven months i n  orbit. Large 
quantities of radiation data have 
been collected using assorted sensors 
and a 256 b i t  d igi ta l  telemetry system. 
Althoughthe b o a  fo r  gravity orienta- 
t ion did not deploy, the  associated 
weighted spdng bound by b i m n y l  did 
deploy demonstrating that  the sub- 
limation phenomena can be used as a 
control meclgmism i n  space. Solar ce l l  
experiments have shown a 20$ decrease 
i n  current output due t o  radiation 
damage. Due t o  the inclination of the 
orbits of IW3 and TRAAC, these 
sa te l l i tes  spend considerable time i n  
the inner Van Allen radiation belt.  
Thus, it i s  expected that the rate of 
radiation damage being eqerfenced i n  
these sa te l l i tes  wi l l  be considerably 
higher thaaewiv be exper&enced i n  the 
tac t ica l  sa te l l i tes  i n  polar orbits. 
People i n  some quarters have said that  
the t i n  i n  solder would s~blimate i n  
the vacuum of,, outer space, resulting i n  
a re l iabi l i ty  hazard. A s , a  result, 
two specimens of vacuum deposited 
60-40 solder, each 0.8 x 10-6 inches 
thick, were located on tQ9, exterior 
sudact  of ,the TRAAC ~ a t p l l i t e .  The 
resistance of these specbens was 
monitorgd t o ,  detect any. sqblimation 
or erosion of the solder.., Results 
a f t e r  seven months i n  ozbit indicate 
tha t  there i s  no detectable change i n  
the thickness or character of e i ther  
solder sample. 
(6) Extensive data reduction has shown tha t  
the long term s t ab i l i t y  of the stable 
osc i l la tors  i n  the  vacuum of outer 
space is  about a decade be t te r  than 
when at one atmosphere on the ground. 
In spi te  of these encouraging results,  the 
Laboratory i s  s t i l l  of the  opinion that  the road 
t o  consistent f i ve  year l i f e  i n  orbi t  w i l l  be a 
d i f f i cu l t  one. 
As a resul t ,  the  Laboratory t r e a t s  
r e l i ab i l i t y  a s  a responsibility resting 
d i rec t ly  upon the  shoulders of every division 
member be he the director, engineer, or technician. 
Reliabi l i ty i s  considered i n  every decision along 
with performance, weight, power, size, cost or 
what have you. A separate r e l i ab i l i t y  project 
serves a support function i n  the  division. The 
modest budget of the TRANSIT program cannot 
support a massive r e l i ab i l i t y  program. As  a 
result,  every ef for t  i s  made t o  engage i n  those 
areas of endeavor which w i l l  produce the greatest 
yield. A very abridged description of these 
ef for t s  i s  as  follows: 
1. The Laboratory w i l l  continue t o  orbi t  
research sa t e l l i t e s  such a s  TRAAC 
which sa t e l l i t e s  w i l l  contain both 
experiments i n  basic research and re- 
l i a b i l i t y  experiments. The basic 
research experiments w i l l  include 
typical ly ( a )  supplementary radiation 
measurements similar t o  those now i n  
the TRAAC s a t e l l i t e  t o  gather data i n  
those areas where existing data i s  
inadequate, (b ) continued experimenta- 
t i on  with a t t i tude  control, and (c)  
magnetometer measurements. The 
function of the r e l i ab i l i t y  experiments 
i s  t o  develop direct ly a be t te r  under- 
standing of the effects  of the t o t a l  
space environment upon electronic parts  
and materials. For instance, a simple 
experiment was included i n  the TRAAC 
s a t e l l i t e  where the frequency of an 
osci l lator ,  using a unijunction 
transistor  a s  the active element, was 
controlled by the RC time constant of 
a metal film resis tor  and a sol id 
tantalum capacitor. In seven months 
tha t  TRAAC has been i n  orbit,  the 
frequency has not changed more than 
$. Our conclusion: Apparently 
the t o t a l  space environment of TRAAC 
does not appreciably effect  certain 
e lec t r ica l  parameters of these par t i -  
cular electronic components and, 
therefore, any ef for t s  on these parts  
should be directed toward improving 
t h e i r  catastrophic re l iab i l i ty .  A 
similar "simple-minded" experiment i s  
being designed t o  be incorporated in to  
the  next research s a t e l l i t e  t o  check 
the  ,L? vs time of t ransistors  fabri-  
cated i n  several ways. Attempts w i l l  
be made t o  correlate these resul ts  with 
the  resu l t s  of t ransistors  subjected t o  
radiation on the ground. Simple ex- 
periments t o  evaluate materials i n  
space are  also planned. In  t h i s  way 
we hope t o  determine where the  big 
problems with the space environment 
r e s t .  
The s a t e l l i t e s  w i l l  continue t o  be 
designed a s  conservatively a s  possible. 
Redundancy w i l l  be included where 
feasible and telemetry for  limited 
troubleshooting i n  space. Analytical- 
experimental correlation studies w i l l  
be conducted on each c i rcui t  t o  be 
followed eventually by optimization 
studies using advanced d ig i t a l  com- 
puter design techniques t o  achieve 
designs with the largest possible 
margin of safety against f a i lu re  due 
t o  performance degradation. 
The hardware wi l l  be packaged pre- 
dominately with the welded matrix 
technique. Thorough thermal design 
studies, both analytical and thermal- 
vacuum w i l l  be conducted t o  reduce the 
maximum temperature of hot spots, keep 
average temperatures low, and keep 
temperature excursions small. Since 
the  procurement of electronic parts  
with special weldable leads has been 
found t o  be impracticql i n  many cases, 
a modest R&D program i n  welding has 
been implemented whose primary object- 
ive i s  t o  develop a bet ter  understanding 
of the factors  which must be controlled 
t o  consistently produce rel iable welds 
with ordinary lead materials. 
Reliable parts  a re  fundamental t o  
re l iab i l i ty ,  therefore, the re l ia -  
b i l i t y  project i s  expending considera- 
b l e  e f for t  i n  t h i s  area. A programma- 
b l e  automatic semiconductor t e s t e r  has 
been procured which i s  capable of 
collecting variables data. This 
machine w i l l  be used t o  loo$ t e s t  a l l  
semiconductor devices used i n  s a t e l l i t e  
hardware, t o  collect parameter data 
required by the design engineers, and 
t o  col lect  data on the variations of 
t he  parameters during l i f e  test ing.  
A l l  data w i l l  be automatically re- 
corded on IBM cards. Specifications 
are  being prepared fo r  every electronic 
par t  t o  be used i n  s a t e l l i t e  hardware. 
These specifications w i l l  require a 
100$ screening inspection by the 
manufacturer a s  a means t o  weed out 
those parts  potentially destined t o  
early fa i lure .  10,000 hour l i f e  
tes t ing  du ing l o t  sample inspection 
w i l l  be a requirement on annual pro- 
curement with l o t  acceptance based 
upon the i n i t i a l  2,000 hours. Study 
programs w i l l  be implemented t o  develop 
a be t t e r  understanding of the appli- 
cation of c r i t i c a l  parts  such as 
ba t te r ies  and solar ce l l s  and programs 
t o  develop more rel iable parts  
supported as  appropriate. 
5. Pi lot  matrix t e s t  programs w i l l  be 
carried out on several parts  t o  gain 
an insight into the required conditions 
for  l i f e  testing. It has been the 
Military-Industry custom t o  divide 
qualification samples into groups and 
conduct l i f e  t e s t s  on one group. Life 
tes t ing  was ordinarily conducted a t  a 
constant temperature corresponding t o  
the maximum rated temperature fo r  the 
part .  I n  TRANSIT, the parts  w i l l  
experience 30,000 temperature cycles 
with excursions from a few degrees for  
internal  parts  t o  upwards of 165O~ for  
external parts.  To achieve f ive  year 
l i f e  i n  orbit,  parts must be obtained 
whose fa i lure  rate  approximates one 
fa i lure  per 500,000,000 unit hours i n  
space a f t e r  being exposed t o  preboost 
environments and launched into orbi t .  
As a resul t ,  the conditions under 
which l i f e  test ing i s  conducted may be 
a most v i t a l  factor t o  ultimately 
achieving r e l i ab i l i t y  i n  s a t e l l i t e  
hardware. 
6 .  A program t o  conduct matrix-life t e s t s  
on electronic parts i s  being imple- 
mented t o  obtain the application data 
so v i t a l l y  needed by the design 
engineer. 
In  conclusion, s a t e l l i t e  technology i s  a 
new endeavor fo r  mankind where the successful 
operation of complex equipment fo r  extended 
periods of time i n  the t o t a l  space environment i s  
a requirement. A s  a resul t  of the many unknowns 
associated with t h i s  new endeavor, the Applied 
Physics Laboratory i s  making every effort  t o  
conduct a program which i s  balanced between 
research, development, and engineering whose 
program goal i n  r e l i ab i l i t y  i s  t o  make a long 
operational l i fet ime i n  orbit an inherent 
"designed in" characteristic of the TRANSIT 
t a c t i c a l  s a t e l l i t e .  

OVERALL SUMvlARY OF BELL TEMPHONE LABORATORIES PAPERS 
I f  there i s  a single thread connecting t h i s  
s e r i e s  of papers, it is economics a s  equated t o  
survival.  Reluctant as  we seem t o  admit it, we 
are  engaged i n  war with a remorseless enemy who 
knows what he wants. He has said tha t  he w i l l  
"bury" us. He i s n ' t  fooling. One of h i s  major 
aims i s  the destruction of enonomy71f we 
bui ld weapons fo r  effective fighting, but ignore 
economics t o  the point of national f inancial  
collapse, we sha l l  have presented t h i s  enemy 
with the  greatest  bargain-basement victory i n  
his tory.  I f  we are t o  survive, every system we 
build must be an adequate system; it must be the 
one t h a t  w i l l  perform i t s  intended function a t  
the  lowest possible t o t a l  cost. F i r s t  cost i s  
not enough, because lowest f i r s t  cost may involve 
highest t o t a l  cost.  
To build these excellent systems, we must 
pay whatever it costs t o  get components with the 
lowest at tainable fa i lure  ra tes .  There i s  no 
apparent l imi t  t o  the variety of systems needed 
now, and t o  be needed i n  the future. However, 
a l l  systems employ the same family of basic 
components. We need t o  do a thorough job of 
controlling the i r  manufacture, inspection and 
use, i n  order t ha t  the highest r e l i a b i l i t y  may be 
obtained. This must be done objectively, and we 
must not accept po l i t i c a l  interference. Moreover, 
we must keep a careful watch fo r  improvements on 
old devices, and fo r  the appearance of new devices, 
so  t h a t  these may be subjected t o  the same con- 
t r o l s .  
Having the  best  possible components, we must 
choose the  best  design tools  and r e l i a b i l i t y  
tools .  We must develop a functional defini t ion 
of f a i l u r e  f o r  our system, and then must design 
each functional block so tha t  it w i l l  cease 
working only when one of i t s  par t s  f a i l s .  We 
must provide our equipment with the  environment 
i n  which i t s  components w i l l  actual ly give us a l l  
t h a t  we have put into them. We must seek simplic- 
i t y  of design, on the grounds t ha t  the simple 
think may work when needed; the more elegant 
arrangement may be impossible t o  maintain. In  
short,  we must search our concept fo r  f r i l l s  and 
chop them out. 
Having arrived a t  a preliminary design, we 
must assess i ts  r e l i a b i l i t y  with care; and we 
must reconsider the design of any portion whose 
a b i l i t y  t o  meet the t o t a l  performance goals does 
not appear assured. Wherever possible, design 
must use old building blocks of high reputation, 
i n  order tha t  the most may be realized from past  
investments -- and tha t  our limited strength may 
be husbanded fo r  use where r ea l ly  needed. 
well: It might promise highly-reliable perform- 
ance i f  only minor changes were t o  be made; on 
the  other hand, it might be a valuable t ex t  on 
what t o  avoid. 
Design and r e l i a b i l i t y  people must s t r ive  
constantly toward the goal of economy, tha t  i s ,  
lowest t o t a l  cost of finished equipment. From 
the ea r l i e s t  development stages, we must be 
serious i n  our consideration of every trouble, 
and i n  our e f for t s  t o  give the project the very 
bes-t; corrective feedback. When representative 
models are available, they must be tested ex- 
haustively i n  the closest possible simulation of 
the f i n a l  environment. And we must continue the 
process of trouble reporting and f a i l u r e  analysis 
even into the f i n a l  use stage. 
It has been shownthat a new equipment 
derives i ts  greatest  benefi ts  from fa i lure  
analysis performed i n  the ea r l i e r  stages, and 
tha t  the  chances of correcting troubles diminish 
as an equipment approaches t a c t i c a l  use. But we 
must t r y  t o  know a l l  we can, both good and bad, 
about each of our offerings i f  there i s  t o  be 
reasonable hope tha t  the next one w i l l  be a l o t  
be t te r  - t ha t  is, i f  it. i s  t o  have a lower t o t a l  
cost. 
There w i l l  be times when it w i l l  pay t o  look 
a t  an old building block tha t  has not performed 
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The Survival Concept 
I f  a single theme can be extracted from 
everything i n  the  known universe, it appears tha t  
t h i s  pattern can be labeled survival. I n  the 
animal kingdom t h i s  i s  part icular ly obvious. A l l  
normal individuals of every species breath 
oxygen, eat, propagate and each species i s  
provided with a mechanism of defense against a 
hos t i l e  environment. The t u r t l e  has a hard shell ,  
the b i rd  has wings, the rabbit  i s  f l e e t  of foot.  
In the usual environment, not al tered by man, 
the  rabbi t ' s  speed does not insure a part icular ly 
high level  of individual survival but the 
r e l i a b i l i t y  of h i s  propagating mechanism i s  
generally adequate for  survival of the species. 
It appears t ha t  the ins t i tu t ions  invented, 
devised, or developed by man, the home, the 
family group, the church, the corporation, the 
s ta te ,  and on up the  ladder are also structured 
around the basic concept of survival. 
Dexter S. Kimbal, a past  dean of the 
Engineering College a t  Cornell to ld  every 
freshman class, f o r  years, tha t  there i s  nothing 
made by man tha t  someone cannot make a l i t t l e  b i t  
worse and s e l l  a l i t t l e  b i t  cheaper. This i s  
survival d t  a low level, the individual or 
company level, or so it would seem. Supposedly 
the  cheaper se l l ing  price would a t t r ac t  more 
sales  i n  a competitive market and increase the 
company's profi ts .  One cannot help but observe 
a re la t ion  between the worse and cheaper concept 
and survival under competitive bidding current i n  
mil i tary procurement. 
I learned of a s m a l l  manufacturer recently 
who was making electronic gear, l e t  us say t e s t  
sets ,  on a mil i tary contract. He used no MIL 
specification parts .  His reply, when questioned, 
was quite interest ing and it would be t rue  as of 
now. "These par t s  are just as good as MIL parts,  
they probably come off the same production line, 
and they save me about 2076". They could have 
come off the same production l ine,  as MIL 
r e j ec t s  perhaps, o r  they could have been made 
by a supplier, much l i ke  himself, who bought h i s  
raw materials on the basis  of a trade name and 
2074 discount. 
Of course none of us here i s  i n  t h i s  kind 
of a business; we a l l  appreciate t ha t  the 
approach does not even promote individual 
survival on a long term basis. However, we do 
have t o  face a f a c t  t ha t  has been often dis-  
cussed. The mil i tary organization i s  required 
t o  pay from two t o  ten times (depending upon 
the source of the f igures)  the i n i t i a l  cost of an 
equipment f o r  maintenance, Just  keeping it 
working, each and every year. Of course, when an 
equipment i s  being repaired, it i s  m t  performing 
i t s  function, it i s  not working. Therefore, 
another equipment i s  required with its high 
maintenance cost t o  take i t s  place. We actual ly 
pay i n  two ways, we have t o  buy two o r  more equip- 
ments t o  do a single job because the maintenance 
requirements a re  high. This seems s i l l y  but we 
are a l l  aware t ha t  it takes 100 planes on a 
car r ie r  t o  put 20 or 25 i n  the air. I f  each of 
us had t o  keep 4 or 5 cars i n  our garage i n  order 
t o  drive t o  work every morning, I a m  sure we 
would col lect ively f ind some other way of get t ing 
t o  work, even i f  it meant walk. Propagation of 
more equipments i s  not as  easy for  us as  it is  fo r  
the rabbit and t h i s  could be a major fac tor  i n  
the low survival r a t e  of equipment species i n  the 
military f i e ld .  
Sustaining The Defense Structure 
We are  a l l  participating i n  one way or 
another i n  t he  building and support of a large 
military establishment. The taxes we and our 
companies pay buy the  equipments and maintain 
them. Curiously enough, much, i n  sane instances 
a l l ,  of our personal income and our companies' 
p rof i t s  derive from the military purchases of new 
equipments, par t s  fo r  maintenance a d  i n  a few 
instances maintenance and operation contracts.  
This looks something l i ke  a closed loop. 
Obviously it cannot be closed since out of these 
taxes must also come a whole host of costs fo r  
such things as government, management and labor 
which would make taxes f a r  exceed income and 
prof i t  i f  the loop were i n  f ac t  closed. This 
loop must be supplied with energy from an external 
source which, i n  a res t r ic ted  sense can be 
translated in to  dol lars .  This source can only 
be the general economy, the consumer goods 
industry. We are a l l  interested i n  our individual 
survival, our companies' survival, and r igh t ly  so 
but i f  the dol lars  t ha t  can be drained from the 
general economy are not suff icient  to bui ld and 
maintain an adequate military establishment, the 
country i t s e l f  cannot survive. It is necessary, 
therefore, t ha t  we d i rec t  a major effort  toward 
t h i s  higher leve l  of survival i n  order t o  make 
possible our individual survival. It i s  not 
someone e l s e ' s  job, it i s  our job. The cost of 
our defense structure must be reduced. 
The Reliabi l i ty Concept 
I f  we look back into history a l i t t l e ,  we 
f ind  tha t  some 30 years ago, the concept of 
quality control was introduced as a producer's 
t o o l  t o  enable management t o  know what h i s  shop 
was doing. This resulted i n  a better,  more 
uniform product a t  a lower cost. Shortly 
thereafter,  the basic tools  of quality control 
were expanded into a much broader concept, a 
consumer function which, i n  the Bell System 
acquired the name Quality Assurance. This 
function can be delegated and, i n  the Bell System, 
i n  f a c t  it i s  delegated t o  a separate organiza- 
t ion  i n  the Bel l  Telephone laboratories which i s  
even funded separately fromthe r e s t  of the 
Laboratories. This organization is  charged with 
the responsibility of providing assurance t o  the 
separate Telephone Companies t ha t  they are being 
supplied with equipments adequate for  t he i r  needs 
a t  the  lowest possible t o t a l  cost. Total cost, 
of course, includes i n i t i a l  cost, maintenance 
cost, operating cost, etc. So far ,  there has 
been no need fo r  a separate Reliabi l i ty Organiza- 
t i on  on the Bell  System side of the  house. 
I n  the military picture some years ago, 
equipments were getting more and more complicated. 
Much of it was down much of the  time; it 
required huge stocks of spares and considerable 
time t o  maintain; but most important, a t  leas t  so 
it appeared, it could not be counted upon when 
needed. Reliabi l i ty looked l ike  a panacea t o  
cure a l l  these i l l s  10 years ago. Now, we not 
only have Reliability, but we have maintain- 
abi l i ty,  human engineering and value engineering 
and who knows what w i l l  be added next week, or  
next year. &@ guess is  tha t  the job w i l l  not be 
done u n t i l  one of these special i t ies  takes over 
the responsibility of demonstrating t o  the user 
t ha t  he is getting equipments adequate for  h i s  
needs a t  the Lowest possible cost. Are the 
people i n  Reliabi l i ty big enough t o  assume t h i s  
obligation? Some one must assume it i f  the 
country is  t o  survive and few w i l l  questlon t h a t  
individual survival is  contingent upon survival 
of our country, our inst i tut ions and on down the  
ladder. 
Reliabi l i ty Definition 
A few years back, the A G W  Committee 
produced a defin5tion fo r  Reliabi l i ty with which 
everyone is  familiar: "Reliability is  the 
probability t ha t  a system w i l l  perform i t s  
intended function fo r  a specified time under 
specified conditions of use". Where is  cost i n  
t h i s  definition? The defini t ion i s  useful 
because, with certain assumptions tha t  are now 
unreasonable, it can be specified, measured and 
demonstrated. Fwthermore, if you bring i n  
confidence you can give the s ta t i s t ic ians  a f i e l d  
day. So we a l l  have fun but the user has t o  put 
i n  three systems where he needs one and he has t o  
pour out several times the cost of each and every 
one annually t o  keep one working a l l  the time. 
This gave b i r t h  t o  another definition, availabil- 
i ty .  This i s  defined as: 
where B = mean time between r auures  
8 = mean time required t o  restore 
normal operation. 
S t i l l  no dollars.  Also a cursory inspection of 
t h i s  formula indicates t ha t  a very high availa- 
b i l i t y  can be obtained with a small mean time be- 
tween fai lures provided tha t  the repair time i s  
short enough. Automatic identif iczt ion and large 
plug-in uni t s  w i l l  accomplish th i s .  
I should l i ke  t o  take t h i s  up l a t e r  but, i n  
the  mean time I w i l l  propose a defini t ion far  an 
adequate system. 
An Adequate System 
An adequate system i s  the lowest t o t a l  cost 
system tha t  w i l l  do-what-the-user expects it t o  
do whenever called upon. 
I would further  propose tha t  r e l i ab i l i t y  
engineers and r e l i a b i l i t y  organizations orient 
t h e i r  thinking and methods of approach so as t o  
provide the user with assurance of adequate 
systems. A process for  accomplishing t h i s  can 
be defined rather eas i ly  but i t s  actual 
implementation by cook book methods remains t o  
be developed. Figure 1 gives a diagrammatic 
version of the evolution of a system. 
1. Derivation of Intended Function 
It is necessaxy t o  assume t h a t  some specific 
problem exists  and tha t  a decision has beenmade 
t o  develop a system complex t o  solve t h i s  
problem. The f i r s t  obligation, then, is t o  
derive the Intended Function for  the system 
complex. It is  probably easiest  t o  convey the 
meaning of Intended Function by considering a 
simple example. Assume tha t  the Intended Function 
i s  t o  detect certain types of targets  appedng  a t  
some maximum rate, at some maximum density, a t  
some specific velocity and with a specific Lethal 
power. A complete statement of the Intended 
Function would embody a description of the target, 
assigning numbers t o  a l l  such quantities a s  the  
maximum r a t e  of appearance, density of attack, 
velocity and l e tha l  power with the addition of 
the operating environment of the proposed system 
complex. 
2. Derivation of Design Intent 
In  order t o  derive Design Intent  fo r  a 
single system it i s  necessary first t o  establish 
the general class of technical means. In the 
assumed example it w i l l  be radar. The rather 
general terms of the Intended Function such as, 
description of target,  velocity and le tha l  power 
are translatable in to  Performance Characteristics, 
of the radar, such as range, sens i t iv i ty  and r a t e  
of data acquisition while the assumed density of 
the attack is  translatable Into number of radars 
required. 
This i s  completely orthodox but, i f  we are t o  
think i n  terms of Adequacy from the user's stand- 
point we should go much further. Design intent 
can be considered best by dividing into two basic 
areas which are, i n  turn, subdivided. 
A. Operational Capability 
(1) Performance Characteristics 
(2) Mission Reliability 
(3) Availability 
B. Total Cost 
(1) Fi rs t  cost of a system 
(2 )  Installation cost of a system 
I 3) Cost of operation of a system 4) Cost of maintenance of a system 
(5) Number of systems required t o  solve 
the t o t a l  problem. 
Obviously, A, the operational capability required 
of a system cannot be formulated un t i l  the 
Intended Function of the proposed system complex 
i s  well established. Equally obvious; the t o t a l  
cost, B, cannot be determined un t i l  the operational 
capability i s  a t  least  tentatively established, and 
thirdly, it i s  evident tha t  there are a number of 
possible solutions, only one of which optimizes 
a l l  factors, a t  any stage of technical development 
including t o t a l  cost. Only after  th i s  has been 
done i s . i t  possible t o  work out the detailed 
system design (Product ~ e s i g n )  with any assurance 
tha t  it w i l l  solve the user's problem a t  the 
lowest possible cost. The res t  of Figure 1 w i l l  
be discussed i n  la ter  papers. 
In recent years we have come t o  see Itission 
Reliability and Availability requirements i n  
procurement specifications, usually i n  terms of 
thei r  basic'parmeters, mean time between failures 
and mean time required t o  repair. This i s  wrong. 
Unless these requirements have been derived from 
the Operational' Capability and t o t a l  cost study 
just described under Derivation of Design Intent, 
they are l i k e l y t o  contribute l i t t l e  t o  relieving 
the current situation where it costs many times 
the i n i t i a l  cost each year t o  keep a system 
complex working. 
Economic Factors 
A number of years ago during the preliminary 
skirmishes with the ZEUS data processing system 
it became evident that we were rapidly approaching, 
i f  we had not already passed, some kind of a l i m i t .  
The system would work, but it i s  doubtful i f  it 
would a l l  work long enough a t  any one time t o  
demonstrate that  it actually was working. This 
forced a concerted drive i n  two directions: 
1. Develop component parts with a lower 
inherent fa i lure  rate. 
2. Design circuits  that  w i l l  make f u l l  use 
of the inherent fa i lure  rates of component 
parts. 
Circuits could no longer be tolerated which 
would f a i l  to  perform their  function before a t  
least  one component part had failed. This drive 
was not forced by economic considerations but two 
major economic conclusions derive from it. 
1. The t o t a l  cost of a system, considering 
first cost and annual maintenance cost, 
continues t o  decrease as the fai lure 
r a te  of component parts decreases. 
2. We can afford t o  spend fa r  more than i s  
common practice t o  insure that  each 
circuit  i n  a system makes f u l l  use of 
the inherent fai lure rate of i t s  component 
parts. 
The f i r s t  economic conclusion w i l l  be sub- 
stantiated here but the second w i l l  be l e f t  for  
the next paper covering "System Reliability 
Estimation". 
A t  least, as f a r  as th i s  has been explored 
t o  date, the t o t a l  cost of a system t o  the user 
continues t o  decrease as component part fa i lure  
rates are reduced. It seems unlikely that  t h i s  
decrease w i l l  continue indefinitely and an 
extrapolation of actual cost data indicates tha t  
an increase in  to ta l  system cost can be expected 
around an average part fai lure ra te  of .0005$ per 
1000 component part hours due t o  an increase i n  
component part cost. 
Component Part Cost 
Figure 2 shows the relative cost of a trans- 
i s tor  as a function of fai lure ra te  i n  per cent 
per 1000 component part hours. A t  the fa r  right 
we have the ordinary commercial grade, 296 each 
i n  lo t s  of 1000, special disco.mts i n  larger 
lots .  Around .05 or a l i t t l e  less  we have the 
high re l iabi l i ty  MfL specification transistors. 
This was the grade that  we could not conceivably 
use i n  the ZEUS data processing system. Develop- 
ment work i n  the design of a suitable transistor, 
methods of manufacture and an extensive testing 
program were undertaken simultaneously. In the 
f i r s t  stabilization of th i s  process cost versus 
fai lure rate appeared t o  follow the broken curve 
(1). However, as the design and production 
processes matured and output increased, costs 
dropped and the curve merged into the l ine  defined 
by the other points. With further increases i n  
production, the cost d g h t  well f a l l  below t h i s  
l ine  but the solid l ine i s  a l l  that  i s  known a t  
present. Now i f  th i s  experience is extrapolated 
t o  a .0001 fai lure ra te  the highest cost we could 
anticipate is represented by the broken curve (2), 
the most likely cost by an extension of the 
straight line. The fai lure rates on the solid 
straight l ine are actual fai lure rates observed 
i n  systems installed in  the f ield.  
It i s  not intended t o  suggest that  we are ' 
the only ones sparking a lowering of component 
part fa i lure  rates. This i s  a rather general 
situation forced by large system complexes. 
Figure 3 shows relative cost versus fai lure ra te  
fo r  capacitors and res i s tors .  Although these 
component par t s  are  used i n  the  ZEUS Data Pro- 
cessing system, the component development work 
was done by others. The f a i l u r e  r a t e s  a re  again 
those observed in  systems in  the  f i e ld .  Curiously 
enough, these curves are also s t ra ight  l ines  but 
i f  we knew more of the  de ta i l s  they would probably 
show the  same turn up on the l e f t  during the early 
phases tha t  was previously shown f o r  t rans is tors .  
System Cost 
Figure 4 shows re la t ive  system cost as a 
function of the average component part  f a i l u r e  
rate .  Down t o  about .001 f a i l u r e  r a t e  i n  per cent/ 
1000 component part  hours these re la t ive  costs are  
derived from actual  costs and i n  the extrapolation 
t o  .0001 they are based upon the expected cost 
increase shown fo r  t ransis tors .  
Annual System Cost 
Figure 5 shows annual cost curves f o r  a 
system as  a function of component par t  f a i l u r e  
ra te .  The lowest curve shows annual maintenance 
cost. This requires some explanation. The replace- 
ment uni t  i n  the ZEUS Data Processing system i s  
known as the D un i t  which contains, on the  average 
150 A packages. Failure of a D uni t  i s  indicated 
automatically and, i n  the basic system concept, a 
new unit  can be substituted from stock i n  minutes. 
D un i t s  are  repaired on s i t e  by locaking and 
replacing the f a i l e a  A packages. Annual mainte- 
nance cost per system, therefore, includes (1) the 
cost of the  A packages needed fo r  replacement, 
(2)  the  cost of maintaining a stock of D units,  
t he i r  repair  and t e s t ,  and (3) the cost of t he i r  
replacement i n  a system; a l l  multiple& by the 
number of replacements required per year. The 
number of replacements i s  determined from the 
component part  f a i l u r e  ra te .  Continuous operation 
i s  assumed i n  t h i s  estimate which i s  the expected 
s i tuat ion.  Actual cost of the replacement parts  
does not contribute very much t o  the t o t a l  main- 
tenance cost u n t i l  very low fa i l u re  r a t e s  are 
reached so the t o t a l  maintenance cost i s  
essent ial ly proportional t o  f a i l u r e  r a t e  except 
a t  the  lower end of the  curve. 
The other three curves show the t o t a l  annual 
cost which i s  obtained by combining the i n i t i a l  cost 
of the system with the annual maintenance cost. 
The upper curve i s  fo r  a system with a l i f e  of one 
year. It i s  bought, operated and maintained for  
one year and then discarded. Actually, no one 
contemplates building systems with a one year l i f e  
but showing t h i s  curve does enable us t o  see a t  a 
glance how l i t t l e  the f i r s t  cost of a system 
contributes t o  the t o t a l  annual cost when the  
usable f a i l u r e  r a t e  of component parts  i s  high. 
For instance, i f  it i s  known tha t  a system costs 
about 10 times a s  much annually t o  keep it working 
as it costs t o  buy it in i t i a l l y ,  t h i s  curve can 
be scanned and it i s  seen that ,  where the re la t ive  
annual maintenance cost i s  380, the t o t a l  cost i s  
420. m e  difference, 40, i s  the f i r s t  cost of one 
system. It i s  evident, since 40 is approximately 
one tenth of 380 tha t  a system tha t  costs 10 times 
i ts  i n i t i a l  cost t o  keep going fo r  a year has an 
average effect ive component part  f a i l u r e  r a t e  of 
.04$ per 1000 component hours. This i s  very close 
t o  the f a i l u r e  r a t e  of high r e l i a b i l i t y  MIL 
Transistors, but it i s  somewhat higher than fo r  
high r e l i a b i l i t y  res i s tors  or  capacitors i n  well 
designed c i rcu i t s .  
Similarly, i f  the f a i l u r e  r a t e  actually 
realized by the system can be reduced t o  .01, a 
re la t ive ly  small reduction, the annual maintenance 
cost now equals the system f i r s t  cost. 
Now, i f  we r ea l ly  go a l l  out t o  an average 
component part  f a i l u r e  r a t e  of .001 and design 
systems t o  make f u l l  use of t h i s  low rate, annual 
maintenance cost is  only one twentieth of the 
f i r s t  cost of the system. 
The two middle curves are of greater interest  
because they represent the actual  t o t a l  cost 
s i tuat ion.  The 5 year curve applies t o  a single 
system with a 5 year l i f e ,  so one f i f t h  of the 
i n i t i a l  system cost i s  added t o  the annual 
maintenance cost t o  obtain the t o t a l  annual cost. 
It can be seen tha+ t h i s  t o t a l  cost curve turns 
up a t  an average component par t  f a i l u r e  r a t e  of 
.001. It can be concluded, therefore, t ha t  i f  
such a short l i f e  i s  desired for  some reason, the 
system need only be designed t o  make f u l l  use of 
parts  with a f a i l u r e  r a t e  of .OOL$ per 100 compo- 
nent par t  hours. 
I n  the lower curve, fo r  a 20 year system, the 
minimum cost point i s  a t  .0003. The r a t i o  between 
the annual cost of the minimum cost 5 year system 
and the m i n i m  cost 20 year system i s  50:18, 
nearly 3 t o  one. Of course, there i s  some doubt 
i f  component parts  with a f a i l u r e  r a t e  of ,0003 
are  actual ly available but t he  3 t o  1 gain makes 
them ~ r e l l  worth going a f t e r .  Also, t h i s  does 
make us wonder i f  there i s  any ra t iona l  reason 
for  knowingly designing, building and buying a 
system with a 5 year l i f e .  
Annual System Complex Cost 
No37 I should l i ke  t o  return t o  the accepted 
formulation of avai labi l i ty .  
Availability i s  defined as: 
where: 8 = mean time between fa i lures  
QR = mean time t o  restore normal 
operation. 
It i s  evident t ha t  it i s  not the actual  
value of the repair time tha t  i s  s ignif icant  i n  
determining ava i lab i l i ty  but it i s  its re la t ion  
t o  the mean time between fai lures .  
Suppose, for  example, t ha t  fo r  the solution 
of some part icular  defensive problem, a single 
working system i s  required. The system selected 
has an availabil i ty of 0.8. Now i f  we w i l l  be 
sa t is f ied  with def ensive coverage 99$ of the time, 
and using the binomial fo r  calculation, we must 
purchase, ins ta l l  and maintain three systems 
where only one i s  actually required a t  any one 
time. This represents a tr ipl ing of t o t a l  cost 
made necessary because the system has not been 
designed t o  really do the required job. The 
system i s  not adequate. 
Now suppose that  by considerable design 
effort  the availabil i ty i s  raised t o  0.9. With 
the same assumptions as previously made, two, 
instead of three systems are now required t o  
assure coverage a t  leas t  99$ of the time. This 
requires doubling, rather than t r ip l ing the t o t a l  
cost, a substantial improvement which would just ify 
paying considerably more for a single system. 
However, i f  we look a t  the problem from the 
high level survival point of view, can we really 
convince ourselves that  any system with an 
availabil i ty of less  than 99% i s  i n  fact  adequate 
t o  do the required job? We should not have t o  
purchase, i n s t a l l  and maintain two or three 
systems where only one is required. And what i s  
even more true, we can afford, on a t o t a l  survival 
basis, t o  pay handsomely for th i s  one really 
adequate system. 
Availabilities of 99% are not by any means 
impossible. I f  we look a t  the structure of the 
formula, it i s  only necessary t o  so design the 
system that  the time t o  restore normal operation 
is one one-hundredth of the mean time between 
fai lures.  There a re  two avenues of approach 
which w i l l ,  conceptually a t  least, achieve t h i s  
100 t o  1 ratio.  
1. Increase the mean time between failures. 
2. Decrease the mean time required t o  
restore normal operation. 
I f  the second method i s  chosen, th i s  w i l l  
invariably lead, i n  a large system, t o  large 
plug-in assemblies and automatic trouble location 
of such defective assemblies. It w i l l  hardly 
ever be economical t o  discard these large assem- 
bl ies  so provision must be made for  on s i t e  repair 
and adequate stocks t o  insure that  the needed good 
replacements are always available. The actual 
maintenance loail, therefore, has not been 
decreased but an additional cost has been 
incurred by the need for stocking and periodic 
test ing of large replacement assemblies. This, 
therefore, i s  the less desirable method of 
securing a 998 availability and it should be used 
only a f t e r  the f i r s t  method has been fu l ly  ex- 
ploited. 
Figure 6 i l lus t ra tes  the magnitude of gain 
possible by fu l ly  exploiting the f i r s t  method. 
This chart is derived from the t o t a l  system 
cost ( ~ i ~ u r e  5 )  previously used in  order t o  shaw 
the effect  on t o t a l  cost t o  the user of a system 
complex. The relat ive cost on the ordinate has 
3 scales the f i r s t  for single system availability 
of 0.8 the second fo r  0.9 and the th i rd  for  0.99. 
f t  has previously been stated tha t  the maintenance 
cost is not greatly changed by increasing the 
availability i f  th i s  i s  done only by decreasing 
the time required t o  restore the system t o  normal 
operation. Therefore, since it takes two systems 
t o  do the job of one i f  the availabil i ty i s  
reduced from 0.99 t o  0.9 and three t o  do the job 
of 1 i f  availability goes t o  0.8, our t o t a l  cost 
t o  the user of the system complex is multtplied 
by 2 and 3 respectively. 
Consider an example of an exceptionally well 
designed system which makes f u l l  use of component 
parts having an average fa i lure  r a t e  of .01$ per 
1000 component part hours and intended for  20 
year l i f e .  Assume, further that  the annual t o t a l  
cost for such system i s  $100,000. However, 
because the availabil i ty of the system i s  only 
0.8 it requires three systems i n  any complex t o  
do the job of one. The t o t a l  system complex 
cost, therefore, i s  $300,000 annually. Now i f  
th i s  system i s  redesigned t o  make f u l l  use of 
parts having an average fai lure r a te  of .001the 
annual to ta l  cost per system w i l l  be reduced t o  
$20,000. This, of course, brought the mean time 
between fai lures up t o  10 times the i n i t i a l  value 
which, of i t se l f ,  raised the availabil i ty f'rom 
0.8 t o  better  than .95. Bringing in the second 
method of raising availability, a l i t t l e  further 
work along the l ines of large plug-in assemblies 
and simplified, perhaps semi-automatic trouble 
location can lower the time required t o  restore 
normal operation and increase the availabil i ty t o  
0.99. Then only one system i s  needed t o  do the 
job formerly done by three systems. 
Itemizing these numbers: 
The to ta l  cost before redesign - $300,000 per year 
Total cost af ter  redesign - $ 20,000 per year 
Saving - $280,000 per year 
It looks possible to  drop our defense costs 
associated with system supply and maintenance t o  
7 or 8 per cent of what they now a re  i f  everyone 
i s  put on the team and plays the same game, 
survival. 
It should be stressed again that  we not only 
have t o  develop and make available component 
parts with inherent fai lure rates approaching 
.0001$ per thousand component part hours but we 
also have t o  learn how t o  design systems that  w i l l  
actually realize, in operation, these lower 
fai lure rates. 
Conclusions 
Reviewing t h i s  discussion, we have endeav- 
ored t o  establish that: 
1. Our individual survival, our companies' 
survival and on up the ladder depends 
upon the survival of our country which 
i n  turn i s  contingent upon an effective 
military establishment. 
2. An effective military establishment 
depends upon adequate systems. 
An adequate system can be defined as the 
lowest total cost system that will do what the 
user expects it to do whenever called upon. 
. System performance characteristics, 
Mission Reliability and availability are 
not of themselves adequate goals. The 
true goal is a system complex that will 
perform its intended function at the 
lowest possible total cost. 
4. This true go81 can be attained by, 
(a) accepting the cost of pushing compo- 
nent failure rates ever lower and (b) 
accepting the cost of designing systems 
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SYSTEM RELIABILITY ESTIMATION 
L. N. St.  James 
Bell Telephone Laboratories 
Whippany, New Jersey 
Introduction 
It i s  essential  tha t  some device, process or  
method be available fo r  estimating the r e l i ab i l i t y  
and avai lab i l i ty  of a system even when the system 
i s  only i n  the conceptual stage. This i s  not be- 
cause r e l i ab i l i t y  and avai labi l i ty are i n  them- 
selves end points but because these factors  must 
be known t o  a high degree of accuracy i f  an honest 
attempt i s  t o  be made t o  provide the user with a 
t ru ly  adequate system. 
The previous paper defined an adequate system 
as  the lowest t o t a l  cost system which w i l l  do what 
the user expects it t o  do whenever called upon. 
Also, i n  the l i gh t  of the economic considerations 
developed therein, we can put t h i s  defini t ion in to  
an operational form which f u l l y  covers the concept 
of "adequacy". 
An Adequate System 
An adequate system i s  one that  makes use of 
component par t s  having the lowest possible inherent 
f a i lu re  r a t e  and i s  so designed as t o  actually rea l -  
i z e  t h i s  fa i lure  ra te  i n  normal use. 
This i s  a fundamental and basic c r i te r ion  for  
adequacy, necessary but not necessarily suff icient .  
The second almost axiomatic rule, developed 
was : 
A system should be designed so as  t o  have an 
avai lab i l i ty  of a t  l ea s t  99$. 
It i s  only by designing and manufacturing a 
system so tha t  it i s  ready t o  perform i t s  Intended 
Function substantially a l l  the time, tha t  we can 
avoid ins ta l l ing  several systems when one system 
i s  needed at any one time. 
Referring t o  Figure 1, the estimation process 
makes use of factors, such as effective c i rcu i t  
margins and general adequacy of design obtained 
from the use phase of ear l ie r  systems. These 
factors  enter i n to  the estimates developed for  a 
proposed system f i r s t  i n  the Design Intent  phase 
and, l a t e r  as  design matures, into the Product 
Design phase. 
A. Operational Capability 
1. Performance Characteristics 
2. Mission Reliabi l i ty 
3., Availability 
B. Total Cost 
1. F i r s t  cost of a system 
2. Instal lat ion cost of a system 
3. Cost of operation of a system 
4. Cost of maintenance of a system 
5. Number of systems required t o  solve 
the t o t a l  problem 
Obviously, i f  we are t o  weigh various solu- 
t ions t o  a given problem i n  terms of system per- 
formance characteristics, mission r e l i ab i l i t y  
and avai labi l i ty and evaluate these i n  terms of 
the various components of t o t a l  cost t o  the user, 
we must have estimates of r e l i a b i l i t y  and avail- 
ab i l i t y  a t  l ea s t  as good as the estimates of 
performance and costs. After the Intended Func- 
t ion  of a system has been established and the 
actual design begins t o  develop, the estimating 
procedure must have within i t s e l f  provisions for  
keeping it continuingly abreast of the system de- 
sign. Only by such a process w i l l  it be possible 
t o  know i n  time t o  effect  significant and neces- 
sary changes i n  the developing system concept 
whether or  not r e l i ab i l i t y  objectives are being 
jeopardized. 
Reliabi l i ty Estimation Process 
The estimation of the mission r e l i ab i l i t y  
and avai labi l i ty of an electronic system are 
currently based upon a number of reasonable 
assumptions. Mission r e l i ab i l i t y  i s  defined i n  
the customary manner by: 
P = exp (+I 
where t P i s  the probability of success for  a 
mission time t jf i s  the meantime between fai lures of the 
system or the reciprocal of the fa i lure  
rate. 
In  order t o  further define the r e l i ab i l i t y  Assumptions 
estimation problem and place it i n  proper per- 
spective, it i s  desirable t o  repeat the definition Implicit  i n  this ,  of course, i s  the f i r s t  
of Design Intent. This was subdivided as follows: assumption. The times between fa i lures  are dis- 
tributed exponentially or, stated another way, 
the fa i lure  ra te  of the system remains essentially 
conatant during i ts  useful l i fe .  This, i n  i t s e l f ,  
i s  perhaps among the l e a s t  questionable of the 
assumptions required by the estimation process. 
I n  order fo r  the probability of success so deter- 
mined t o  have any r e a l  meaning t o  the user oper- 
at ing the system, lack of success, or  fa i lure  must 
be defined i n  terms of the Intended Function of 
the system. This requires a second assumption. 
There i s  a sharp, identif iable l i ne  of demarkation 
between a system capable of performing i t s  intended 
function and one tha t  is not so capable. 
I n  an extreme case, loss  of prime power on a 
radar obviously causes radar failure. It is com- 
p le te ly  open and shut, there i s  no question. 
However, consider a radar whose Intended Function 
i s  t o  detect a target  of some minimum effective 
cross section a t  some maximum distance and es- 
tab l i sh  a track i n  some maximum time. There are 
obvious reasons f o r  requirements of t h i s  so r t  such 
a s  the necessity t o  engage a target  suff icient ly 
f a r  from i t s  objective so tha t  it w i l l  not do just 
as much damage a s  it would have if. it actually 
reached i t s  objective. Also, but perhaps l e s s  
obvious, detection and establishing a track under 
l i m i t  conditions are not open and shut but are 
associated with a probability. This probability 
may be nearly unity or  it may be 50s or  l e s s  de- 
pending upon the system designer's embodiment of 
the Intended Function i n  his concept of Design 
Intent.  
Now consider degradation of the loop gain of 
the transmitter-receiver of, say, 3 db, 6 db, 10 db, 
etc. This i s  defini tely a r e l i ab i l i t y  considera- 
t i on  but where does it f i t  i n  the basic definition 
of mission r e l i ab i l i t y?  The t ru th  is, it does not 
fit u n t i l  some arbi trary definition of radar f a i l -  
ure  is  s e t  i n  terms of a supposedly rat ional  
interpretat ion of the Intended Function and i t s  
embodiment i n  Design Intent.  This leaves con- 
siderable la t i tude  f o r  the worse and cheaper 
contingent t o  provide a radar with a very high cal- 
culated mission r e l i a b i l i t y  tha t  w i l l  hardly ever 
do what the user expects of it. It i s  l i t t l e  
wonder t ha t  the term numbers racket has been 
applied t o  r e l i a b i l i t y  eAimation. 
I n  contrast, consider the effect  on a d ig i t a l  
data processing system associated with tNs radar. 
It i s  composed of many thousands of logic elements 
and, i n  the usual r e l i a b i l i t y  calculations, the 
fa i lure  ra tes  of all logic elements are added t o  
determine the t o t a l  f a i l u re  r a t e  of the ent i re  
data processing system. Now i n  cdcula t ing  a 
single track from data supplied by the radar and 
performing other manipulations required by the 
overall system, only a s m a l l  f ract ion of these 
logic elements a re  used. The fa i lure  r a t e  for  the 
data system therefore, is  pessimistic, much too 
high. This can compensate for  a too optimistic 
defini t ion of success i n  the radar case and it i s  
t h i s  so r t  of thing t h a t  permits the numbers 
racket t o  get even close t o  the t rue s i tuat ion i f  
used with discretion. 
I n  looking a t  the mission r e l i ab i l i t y  e s t i -  
mation process from the bottom up instead of from 
the top down, a th i rd  assumption has obviously 
been made. Any large homogeneous population of 
l i k e  component parts  has an inherent fa i lure  ra te  
which can be considered t o  be essential ly constant 
during the expected l i f e  of the system. This is  
certainly not tenable fo r  wear out items, such as 
magnetrons and large klystrons. However, a system 
actually comprises heterogeneous mixtures of com- 
ponent par t s  and, with replacement of fai led parts,  
the system approaches a constant fa i lure  rate. 
The fourth assumption i s  that,  i n  any system, 
these inherent fa i lure  ra tes  are completely in-  
dependent and therefore they can be added t o  get 
what we might think of as  the lowest achievable 
fa i lure  r a t e  of the system. 
Failure Definition 
It i s  probably best  t o  consider the ef fec t  
of the th i rd  and fourth assumptions on system 
r e l i a b i l i t y  estimation jointly since they in-  
te rac t  very strongly i n  the estimation process. 
We are f i r s t  faced with the usual problem, what 
i s  a fai lure? I n  the component p a r t  f ie ld ,  a 
fa i lure  i s  seldom defined as a res i s tor  becoming 
open or  short but it is usually defined as a 
change i n  one or  more of the important parameters 
of a component i n  excess of a specified amount. 
Definition of change as a fa i lure  carr ies  over 
i n to  the extensive l i f e  t e s t s  many of us have 
run over the years and it i s  exceeding some 
maximum change l i m i t  tha t  we c a l l  a fai lure.  
The inherent fa i lure  rate ,  then, i s  i n  f a c t  
based upon a change greater than some arbi trary 
l i m i t .  
I n  l i n e  with the fourth assumption these 
fa i lure  ra tes  are added t o  get the lowest 
achievable fa i lure  r a t e  fo r  a system. We look 
upon this simple addition as giving a g o d  tha t  
can be approached by a physical system but can- 
not actually be f h l l y  attained. I f  we concern 
ourselves only with meeting some mission re- 
l i a b i l i t y  goal we need go no further  than t o  
decide upon some multiplier for  t h i s  lowest 
achievable fa i lure  ra te  t o  give us the expected 
system fa i lure  r a t e -  This expected fa i lure  r a t e  
multiplier can be determined from a review of the 
past performance of the design group involved 
together with a study of the current design. 
This has proved t o  be a sat isfactory method i n  
the past. I f  it is  only necessary, then, t o  
meet some stated mission r e l i ab i l i t y  objective 
we can conceivably sign off even though the 
multiplier may be 5,  10 or  even higher. Stopping 
a t  t h i s  point has certain at t ract ive features, 
a relat ively minor one being tha t  it reduces the 
importance of the fourth assumption concerning 
the independence of component par t  fa i lure  ra tes  
which jus t i f ies  t he i r  addition. The most 
a t t rac t ive  feature, of course, i s  tha t  it permits 
the designer t o  carry over from ea r l i e r  designs, 
concepts, solutions and even c i rcui t s  and sub- 
systems without anyone concerning himself with 
improving their  fa i lure  rates .  This saves 
development time and cost but is  exceedingly 
exynsive t o  the user and, from an overall stand- 
po nt, nonsurvival- 
Total Cost Considerations 
I f  we are t o  discharge our obligation t o  
supply the user with a t ru ly  adequate system tha t  
he can f i t  in to  a t ru ly  adequate system complex, 
we must consider the t o t a l  cost picture. In  
general, t h i s  leads d i rec t ly  to: 
1, Use only component par t s  having the 
lowest fa i lure  r a t e  now available. 
2. Design the system t o  make f u l l  use of 
t h i s  low fa i lure  rate. 
3. Design the system for  an avai labi l i ty 
L l of a t  l e a s t  99%. 
The f i r s t  of these three statements has been 
shown i n  the f i r s t  paper t o  be a necessity. Parts 
t ha t  are too good and too costly are not yet  
available. The second, however, involves some 
increase i n  design ang development cost which may 
be substantial. However, i f  the t o t a l  number of 
systems required i s  large, t h i s  increase becomes 
negligible from an over-all cost standpoint. Also, 
the th i rd  statement involves some increase i n  
design cost i n  addition t o  an increase i n  the 
production cost of the system. 
We would l i k e  t o  be i n  a position t o  evaluate 
these costs. However, we have not yet produced 
enough systems of enough different  types t o  enable 
us  t o  estimate the increase i n  development cost 
required t o  make the system fa i lure  r a t e  no higher 
than the sum of the inhereni fa i lure  ra tes  of i t s  
component parts.  Also we have not fu l ly  explored 
the requirements i n  design for  a 99$ avai labi l i ty-  
We can, however, make estimates of the maximum 
dollars  tha t  can be expended for  these purposes 
on a relat ive basis and s t i l l  break even. The 
number of dollars  available i s  large. 
Achieving Inherent Component Failure Rate 
Figure 2 shows the m a x i m  increase i n  de- 
sign cost tha t  can be just i f ied i n  order t o  
achieve i n  the system the inherent fa i lure  ra te  
of component parts. Actually, i n  order t o  get 
this on a re la t ive  basis, a multiplier of the 
production cost of one system i s  plotted against 
a rat io,  the effective fa i lure  r a t e  of par t s  as 
used i n  the system divided by the inherent par t  
fa i lure  rate. The curves for  10, 100 and 1000 
systems represent upper bounds f o r  the additional 
design cost t ha t  can be just i f ied i n  order t o  
rea l ize  the inherent par t  fa i lure  r a t e  i n  the 
.system. Any cost l e s s  than tha t  shown on the 
curves represents a net gain i n  t o t a l  cost t o  
the user. Suppose we consider a specific value, 
a system tha t  is  so designed tha t  the effective 
component par t  fa i lure  ra te  i s  10 times the in- 
herent fa i lure  rate ,  i n  other words, 10 times 
worse than it need be. As we a l l  know, there a re  
many systems i n  use tha t  a re  not even t h i s  good. 
I f  the t o t a l  requirements are fo r  10 systems, 
anything less  than 80 times the f i r s t  cos.t, of 
the system can be spent t o  achieve i n  the system 
the f u l l  component capability. For a t o t a l  
requirement of 100 systems this l i m i t  becomes 800 
and fo r  the 1000 systems it becomes 8000. One 
system does not even show on the chart. However, 
t h i s  i s  only pa r t  of the picture, as w i l l  be 
discussed l a t e r .  
This points out the f u t i l i t y  of contracting 
fo r  the design and construction of one system 
without Pull knowledge of t o t a l  system requirements 
There just i s  not the money available t o  design 
an adequate system on the basis  of one. A l l  
possible corners must be cut and compromises made 
t o  make the design cost compare reasonably well 
with the production cost. Reliability, of course, 
i s  the f i r s t  consideration t o  suffer  and adequacy 
is never even thought of. When such a design i s  
bought, we are stuck with it when future contracts 
are l e t  t o  produce systems t o  f u l f i l l  actual re- 
quirements. 
It i s  not only necessary t o  buy two or  three 
times as many systems as are actually needed but 
each has roughly 10 times the maintenance cost of 
a t ru ly  adequate system. 
I f  we continue this exaanple of a system tha t  
s tar ted with 10 times the fa i lure  r a t e  of the sum 
of i ts  parts  and assume tha t  it had an i n i t i a l  
avai labi l i ty of 0.8, just  decreasing i t s  fa i lure  
r a t e  increased i t s  avai labi l i ty t o  be t t e r  than 
0.95. It i s  only a l i t t l e  way t o  the objective 
of 0.99. It seems reasonable t o  assume that  this 
would not increase the i n i t i a l  cost t o  the user 
by more than lo$. Furthermore, the design cost 
should be very small, perhaps another 10% of the 
original system cost. I n  any event it i s  evident 
t ha t  there i s  a d i rec t  interaction between the 
effective fa i lure  r a t e  of component par t s  as  used 
i n  a system and the avai labi l i ty of the system so 
it i s  quite impossible t o  separate these effects. 
Achieving An Adequate System Complex 
Figure 3 shows the maximum number of dollars 
tha t  can be spent t o  design a system tha t  w i l l  
make f u l l  use of component parts  having a fa i lure  
ra te  of .001$ per thousand component part  hours 
and with an avai lab i l i ty  of 99$. This value i s  
plotted against the t o t a l  number of systems re- 
quired i n  a complex. 
Since the determination of actual dol lars  
available involves a comparison between what i s  
currently being done and what conceivably can be 
done, it i s  necessary t o  s t a r t  from an assumed 
base which i s  as follows: 
System Design 1 
1. Production cost of one system 
$100,000 
2. Effective fa i lure  r a t e  of parts  
i n  system -01% 
3. Availability of system 0.8 
A n  adequate system which appears possible 
within the current s t a t e  of the art would have 
the following characteristics. It w i l l  be assumed 
that  system design 1 can be converted t o  system 
design 2 with no significant increase i n  the pro- 
duction cost of one system. This is  not quite 
true, but it greatly simplifies the calculations 
without mater id ly  al ter ing the conclusions. 
System Design 2 
1. Production Cost of one system 
$100,000 
2. Effective fa i lure  r a t e  of parts  
i n  system .001$ 
3. Availability of system 0.99 
A system complex requiring, fo r  example, 10 
systems operating essentially continuously would 
require the ins ta l la t ion  and maintenance of 30 
systems of design 1 t o  do the job. However, 
for  design 2, the avai labi l i ty i s  99$ and only 
10 systems must be instal led and maintained t o  do 
the job of 10. So f a r  t h i s  cuts the t o t a l  
assumed cost t o  one third.  Design 2 also drops 
the system fa i lure  ra te  t o  one tenth of the ra te  
f o r  design 1 and th i s  cuts the annual maintenance 
cost t o  one tenth for  each system. 
The over-all resu l t  seems almost fantastic. 
I f  only 10 systems are required i n  a complex 
and each costs $100,000, we can afford t o  spend 
$28 million on the design t o  obtain an avail- 
a b i l i t y  of 99$ and achieve an effective fa i lure  
r a t e  of .001$ per thousand component par t  hours. 
I f  the number i n  the complex i s  100, we can spend 
$280 million and s t i l l  break even. I doubt t ha t  
anyone w i l l  contend tha t  it i s  l ike ly  t o  cost 
more than a fract ion of this amount t o  design a 
t ru ly  adequate system and anything l e s s  than these 
huge numbers i s  a measure of our chances of 
survival. 
Summary 
Money, alone, w i l l  not accomplish the job and, 
a t  the moment, no cook book rules have been 
written. However, certain general principles 
can be stated. 
1. A t ru ly  functional defini t ion of fa i lure  
must be developed for  a system. 
2. Every c i rcui t  must be so designed tha t  it 
w i l l  continue t o  operate as  intended un- 
til a t  l ea s t  one component par t  i n  it 
exceeds i t s  end of l i f e  requirements. 
In  other words, circui ts  must be designed 
i n  terms of the component par t  fa i lure  
c r i te r ion  actually used i n  evaluating 
component parts. 
4. Circuits, plug i n  assemblies, subsystems, 
etc. should not be borrowed from ea r l i e r  
systems, with or  without performance type 
modifications, unless it can be demon- 
s t ra ted  from data t ha t  these units  actually 
have realized the inherent fa i lure  r a t e s  
of t he i r  component parts. 
5. Explore fo r  the simplest possible solu- 
tion. Avoid hanging on gadgets t o  make 
a marginal design squeak through. 
Many such things that  we all do w i l l  readily 
come t o  mind. An awareness of the cost problem 
and i ts  v i t a l  e f fec t  on survival. should provide 
the w i l l  t o  change our ways and rea l ly  design and 
manufacture adequate systems. 
L. N. ST. JAMES 
3. It i s  almost essential  tha t  ground based 
equipments and most mobile equipments be 
supplied with a temperature controlled 









































































































































































































































































SYSTEM I(ELIAB1LITY EVALUATION !I!ESTING 
G. A. Schiehser 
Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc. 
Whippany, N. J. 
A major purpose of system re l i ab i l i t y  tes t ing  been confirmed tha t  f u l l  use has been made of the 
i s  t o  provide information of value t o  the responsi- inherent part  fai lure rate .  The 9 s  avai lab i l i ty  
b l e  organizations, whether they be administrators, can be expected to have resulted in a 
designers, manufacturers o r  users. Any t e s t  or  design with large plug i n  uni t s  which, when i n  
evaluation procedure which does not incorporate trouble, are identified by some automatic or  easi ly 
the necessary devices f o r  providing the required workable process. It would appear, then, tha t  a l l  
information t o  these separate organizations, with we need t o  know is that  the mean tirne between 
widely differ ing in teres ts  and responsibilities, fa i lures  i s  a t  l ea s t  a s  long as the estimated time 
f a l l s  short of i ts  primary purpose. and tha t  the time required t o  restore normal opera- 
t ion  i s  not more than one one hundredth of t h i s .  
Referring t o  figure 1, showing system wrolu- However, i f  we look a t  the t o t a l  problem from the 
tion, two principal r e l i ab i l i t y  t e s t  phases have standpoint of the various organizations involved, 
been added with t e i r  information feed back paths. we are again with the situation of 
On the l e f t ,  the esign Verification t e s t  i s  shOwn having done what i s  necessary but not necessarily 
with information eriving from the model program I sufficient.  Let us refer  back t o  the basic concept phase feeding bac into the product design phase. underlying the operational defini t ion of an ade- Ordinarily, t h i s  aY be Considered as the Primary quate system; tha t  is, an adequate system i s  the channel However a l l  too frequently, Product lowest t o t a l  cost system tha t  w i l l  do what the 
Design (the specikications, drawings, t e s t  user expects it t o  do whenever called upon. 
requirements, etc. ) f a i l s  t o  f u l l y  re f lec t  design 
intent.  It i s  v i t a l  t ha t  the Design Verification From management's point of view, the design 
Test shows up t h i s  fa i lure  so tha t  necessary should be evaluated i n  terms of i t s  Intended 
changes can be made i n  the specifications and Function. Management might well s e t t l e  fo r  evalu- 
requirements. It i s  generally agreed tha t  t h i s  ation i n  terms of Design Intent  i f  it can be shown 
t e s t  should confirm whether or  not the system con- (and t h i s  i s  usually possible), tha t  Design Intent  
forms t o  the specified requirements, including the fu l ly  re f lec ts  the Intended Function. Furthermore, 
r e l i ab i l i t y  requirements, and few w i l l  deny tha t  the manager i s  not interested i n  prolonged and 
the potential  user should have access t o  these expensive tes t ing  of many systems fo r  show pur- 
data i f  he so desires. The point t ha t  we are poses, nor i s  he interested i n  delaying schedules 
trying t o  make is  tha t  the information derived and shipment dates beyond tha t  necessary t o  estab- 
f romth i s  t e s t  mst be much more than an estimate l i s h  one thing: W i l l  the system do what i s  
of the mean time between fa i lures  a t  some arbitrary expected of it whenever called upon? He needs t o  
confidence level. know t h i s  not just t o  sa t i s fy  h i s  contract obliga- 
t ions but, more importantly, t o  do what he can t o  
Reflect upon the operational form of the insure h i s  country's survival and thereby h i s  
defini t ion of an adequate system as derived i n  the companyls and h i s  om well being. Looking a t  
previous paper. management's basic question more closely, he has 
confidence i n  h i s  designers and he has kept abreast 
A n  adequate system i s  one tha t  makes use of of and taken an active part i n  the derivation of 
component par t s  having the lowest possible in- Design Intent  and i t s  expression i n  Product Design. 
herent fai lure rate, i s  so designed as t o  actually 
~f everything has operated without substantial 
real ize t h i s  fa i lure  r a t e  i n  normal use and i s  error  throughout t h i s  elaborate and complex process, 
designed t o  have an avai lab i l i ty  of a t  leas t  9% an adequate system w i l l  and usually does resul t .  
\ The manager, therefore, i s  looking for  undetected There are three d is t inc t  factors  involved i n  error. t h i s  concept (1) use lowest fa i lure  ra te  parts, (2) design t o  make f u l l  use of t h i s  lowest in-$ Looked a t  from the system designer's view- herent fai lure ra te  and (3) design for  an avails- point, he has done everything he knows how to b i l i t y  of 99%. A l l  three are basic properties insure tha t  h i s  creation meets the c r i t e r i a  fo r  an 
inherent i n  the design, but the f i r s t  need not adequate system. He has accepted the guidance of 
be (and i n  many conceivable Situations, Cannot be) the r e l i ab i l i t y  group and they have been mostly 
verified or  demonstrated by a system t e s t .  The r ight  i n  the past. Summed up, he f ee l s  confident, 
component par t s  used are specified on the drawings entering into the Design Verification testJ tha t  
and it should have been previously ascertained h i s  design w i l l  do what is  expected of it whenever 
that have the lowest attainable failure rate. called upon. However, he knows tha t  engineers are 
The system fai lure rate, o r  mean time between human and they do make errors, infrequently perhaps, 
fai lure,  has already been estimated and it has 
363 
but none the l e s s  errors .  What he asks of the  
Design Verification t e s t ,  then, i s  a high l e v e l  of 
assurance $ha t ,  i f  e r ro rs  have been made which w i l l  
s ign i f i can t ly  jeopardize the  adequacy of the  
system, such e r r o r s  w i l l  be exposed t o  view as  
rapidly as  possible .  He a l so  r e i t e r a t e s  manage- 
ment's viewpoint concerning schedules, not because 
he automatically thinks along these l ines ,  but  
because h i s  survival depends upon h i s  support of 
management. 
Now i f  we expand t h i s  thinking t o  cover pro- 
duction control  t e s t s  and r e f e r  again t o  f igure  1, 
the  information i s  shorn t o  derive from the  pro- 
duction phase and t o  feed back i n t o  production. 
It a l so  feeds i n t o  the  two higher levels ,  Product 
Design and Design Intent .  
I n  t h i s  case management's questions a r e  the  
same except now they a r e  asked of the overal l  pro- 
duction output. The designer 's  questions are  a l so  
directed toward t h e  t o t a l  output of production but 
they run more along t h e  l i n e s  of,  as anything 
happened i n  production t o  de te r io ra te  s ign i f i can t ly  
my previously es tabl ished design?" Of course, h i s  
o r ig ina l  questions a r e  s t i l l  asked concerning 
errors ,  since the re  i s  always a p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  
design e r ro rs  which existed o r ig ina l ly  were not 
detected i n  t h e  e a r l i e r  Design Verification t e s t .  
Added t o  t h i s  group we have the production 
engineer. He des i res  assurance from production 
control t e s t s  t h a t  he w i l l  know promptly i f  h i s  
manufacturing,inspection and t e s t  processes have 
permitted product t o  de te r io ra te  s ign i f i can t ly  
below the  capabi l i ty  inherent i n  the  design. With 
assurance t h a t  t h i s  has not occurred, he can f e e l  
confident t h a t  h i s  product w i l l  do what i s  expected 
of it xihenever ' cal led upon. 
Reflecting back over t h i s  discussion, a l l  the  
functionally involved groups a r e  looking f o r  the  
occasional error .  I f  none has been made, the  
Intended Function w i l l  be met by production systems 
and t h i s  includes the  mean time between f a i l u r e s  
and the  mean time t o  res to re  normal operation. 
Re l iab i l i ty  t e s t i n g  should be directed toward the  
much broader objective of answering the spec i f i c  
questions of the  functionally involved organiza- 
t ions ,  which reduce essen t ia l ly  t o  e r r o r  detect ion 
ra ther  than t o  t h e  90$ confidence demonstration of 
mean times vhich i s  becoming current ly  popular. 
It i s  only by such a complete process, a s  i s  
described i n  t h i s  s e r i e s  of papers confirmed by an 
e r r o r  detection t e s t ,  t h a t  the  use r  can secure 
assurance of adequate systems. 
Unfortunately, we do not have a l l  the  answers 
t o  t h i s  problem of e r r o r  detection. To date, we 
have t r i e d  several  procedures which have been more 
o r  l e s s  successful bu t  none have proved ideal .  
The objective should be t o  devise t e s t  procedures 
t h a t  w i l l  yield a high l e v e l  of assurance of 
detecting any s ign i f i can t  e r ro rs  i n  t h i s  elaborate 




CONFRONTING TRE ENVIRONMENT 
T. B. Delchamps 
Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc. 
Whippany, N. J. 
,757 "f-y involves compromise of mission performance. As 
with the man matching pennies, the accrued defi-  
This paper highlights two areas i n  the  c i t  is  v i r tua l ly  beyond recovery. 
environmental f i e l d  requiring a more imaginative 
and objective meeting of design and r e l i ab i l i t y  This i s  not t o  condemn the  schedule per se, 
functions. Thorough and timely environmental as  it is normally an effect ive instrument of 
definition, as  an essential  ingredient of success- orderly Progress; nor is it intended t o  lay  blame 
ful system design and meaningful r e l i ab i l i t y  e s t i -  on the conceiver, who after a l l  i s  encouraged t o  
mation, is  discussed. Two examples of current function i n  the  near abstract.  Rather, it i s  t o  
importance i n  the areas of missile-vibration and suggest t ha t  the  tyranny of time frequently de- 
space-environment simulation are  br ie f ly  reviewed. grades quality of ef f 01-t b~ s t i f l i ng  the  exercise 
of vision and review as  vital and continuing 
INTRODUCTION forces i n  development. Further, we sense here a 
basic weakness i n  our developmental philosophy, 
In biology, adaptation is  defined a s  the  which permits discrete special t ies  the  luxury of 
"modification of an animal or  plant (or of i t s  mutual indifference, and f a i l s  i n  maximum u t i l i za -  
pa r t s  o r  organs) f i t t i n g  it more perfectly for  t i on  of t o t a l  information available a t  any given 
existence under t he  conditions of i ts  environ- moment. 
ment . " Being of patient disposition, nature waits 
fo r  trouble t o  appear, and casually proceeds t o  TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE 
handle it. In systems development, however, we 
cannot afford the  leisurely approach. Here, the  There i s  perhaps no be t t e r  example of t h i s  
degree of success is  measured by our ab i l i t y  t o  organic ailment than industry's collective fa i lure  
m.ke most of the "modifications" during i n i t i a l  t o  deal effectively with the environment. Here i s  
deslsn. For th is ,  we must have a f a i r l y  good a formidable adversary demanding early recognition, 
idea of what the environment w i l l  be. W t h e r ,  definition and vigorous sustained action i n  defense 
_ what we don't know i n  advance about the environL of program goals. Elaborate f a c i l i t i e s  and myriad 
ment must be learned a t  the  ear l ies t  possible specifications notwithstanding, the fu l l  potential 
moment. One suspects t ha t  nature has been rather  of environmental cognizance i s  simply not being 
more successful i n  coping with environmental prob- realized. Indeed, design, prediction and labora- 
lems than her human offspring. Clearly, improve- tory evaluation based on careless, unsupported and 
ment i n  t h i s  s i tuat ion i s  everybody 's problem. unconfirmed assumption, frequently serve t o  degrade 
the product and cloud the r e l i ab i l i t y  picture. 
The ro le  of Environmental w i n e e r i n g  i n  sys- Through a combination of l a t e  and limited attention 
tems evolution i s  shown i n  broad outline on t o  environmental definition, and inadequate simu- 
Figure 1. The degree t o  which the Environmental la t ion  techniques, the t rue determination of prod- 
Eugineering ef for t  influences product r e l i a b i l i t y  uct  r e l i ab i l i t y  remains i n  default u n t i l  the 
depends d i rec t ly  upon the  quality, quantity and field-evaluation phase, when the opportunity fo r  . 
timeliness of the  prediction, definition and simu- corrective action has a l l  but vanished. ..$? : 
l a t ion  functions indicated. This theme w i l l  be -4%. i . ., , 
further developed i n  the  following. Forces resis t ing improvement i n  t h i s  situa- ' .  . . 
t i on  include r ig id  schedules, budget constraints, -. ? 
ANATOMY OF FAILURE provincial attitudes, indifference and even antag-?6"' 
onism toward any departure from the  t rad i t ional  
In the  ear ly  stages of system evolution, it terminal evaluation. There is no pat solution t o  
i s  expected tha t  those with concept responsibility t h i s  dilemma. The f i r s t  step may be recognition 
w i l l  remain somewhat aloof from physical rea l i ty .  of the problem as  an essential ly human one, with 
Barring measures t o  the  contrary, however, the  the mere physical aspects quite susceptible t o  
in i t ia l ly- jus t i f ied  oversight is  repeated and corn- imaginative treatment. In t h i s  vein, it would 
pounded by others i n  frenzied passage through seem appropriate t o  focus strong at tent ion upon 
various stages of d e t a i l  design, model fabrication, thorough envimnmental definition a s  a key %re- 
and laboratory qualification, culminating i n  grand dient i n  system development, demandin@; ,careful 
- 
climax with f i e l d  evaluation t e s t s .  Timing con- estimates, ea r l i e s t  posstble confirmation and con- 
siderations having displaced reason and judgment, tinuing review from i n i t i a l  concept through tac- 
the system quite frequently f a i l s  on schedule. t i c a l  capability of a given system. The companion 
What follows i s  costly, time-consuming and often 
problem of how bes t  t o  simulate environments of 
importance, tends toward ready solut ion once t h e  
essen t ia l  f a c t s  are known. 
THE PRICE OF IGNORANCE 
Ascribing broad connotation t o  t h e  terms 
s t r e s s  and strength, we can apply these terms i n  
a general way t o  any physical s i t u a t i o n  we wish. 
Specifically,  we can s t a t e  t h a t  f a i l u r e  occurs 
when s t r e s s  exceeds strength. Postulating a nor- 
mal densi ty  function f o r  s t r e s s  l eve l ,  and assum- 
ing t h a t  s t rength i s  a l s o  normally d i s t r ibu ted  
(but advancing no theories  i n  e i t h e r  regard),  we 
u i l l  now examine the probabi l i ty  t h a t  s t r e s s  ex- 
ceeds s t rength under various combinations of mean 
and variance f o r  each d i s t r ibu t ion ,  The severe 
penalty associated with ca re less  assumption of 
these  proper t ies  for  design purposes, o r  f a i l u r e  
t o  recognize t h e i r  va r iab i l i ty ,  i s  impl ic i t  i n  
t h i s  discussion. 
. Referring t o  Figure 2,  t h e  expected penalty 
i n  f a i l u r e  frequency imposed by high v a r i a b i l i t y  
and low mean of f se t  i n  s t r e s s  and s t rength proper- 
t i e s ,  i s  qui te  obvious. Conversely, t h e  benef i t s  
accruing from low v a r i a b i l i t y  and high mean of f se t  
a re  equally apparent. While the re  i s  nothing par- 
t i c u l a r l y  surprising about these  properties,  the  
re la t ionships  presented serve t o  emphasize the  
v i t a l  r o l e  of e a r l y  and accurate environmental 
de f in i t ion  i n  successful system development. 
Having established a general viewpoint, we 
w i l l  now examine some specif ic  e f f e c t s  of e r r o r  
i n  assumed environmental s t resses .  As we proceed, 
it should be remembered t h a t  t h e  e r ro rs  i n  ques- 
t ion,  though l i k e  i n  e f fec t ,  may a r i s e  e i t h e r  
through j u s t i f i e d  lack of p r io r  knowledge of t h e  
environment, unjust i f ied f a i l u r e  t o  ex t rac t  such 
knowledge from ear ly  experiments, f a i l u r e  t o  allow 
f o r  v a r i a b i l i t y  i n  measured s t resses ,  o r  j u s t  p la in  
carelessness i n  measurement o r  assumption. The 
f i r s t  e r r o r  mentioned above must be accepted and 
allowed for;  the  remaining three must not be 
tolerated.  
Referring t o  Figure 3, we observe t h e  estab- 
l ished f a i l u r e  response of mica capacitors t o  in-  
creased temperature. Note t h a t  an a r b i t r a r y  base 
l e v e l  of 30°C has been assumed. Apart from the 
famil iar  acceleration charac te r i s t i c  shown, and 
i ts  e f fec t  on replacement requirements, the  sig- 
n i f i can t  property inv i t ing  recognition i s  the  
increase i n  s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  var ia t ion  a t  higher 
temperatures. For example, moving from 50°C t o  
60°c along the  acceleration curve nearly doubles 
the  e f f e c t  of a 10°C var ia t ion i n  temperature 
about the  l eve l s  assumed. This i s  the  kind of 
physical r e a l i t y  so often ignored i n  the  casual 
se lect ion of environments f o r  r e l i a b i l i t y  estima- 
t ion  and evaluation purposes. Under these  
circumstances, prediction and sample parameters, 
upon which c r i t i c a l  program decisions frequently 
depend, are  rendered meaningless. 
Another example i s  presented on Figure 4 f o r  
germanium semiconductors. The foregoing comments 
apply equally wel l  i n  t h i s  case, with one excep- 
t ion .  The e f f e c t s  i n  question become l e s s  pro- 
nounced a s  d i s s ipa t ion  l eve l  i s  reduced. 
An important environmental. property of 
Nickel-Cadmium c e l l s ,  current ly  popular i n  s a t e l -  
l i t e  applications,  i s  presented on Figure 5. This 
example involves t h e  simple supply-and-demand 
rela t ionship of a s o l a r  power plant .  When con- 
verted so la r  energy exceeds d i s s ipa t ion  within 
t h e  s a t e l l i t e  f o r  extended periods, an overcharge 
condition develops. Tolerance t o  t h i s  s t a t e  i s  
essen t ia l ly  a function of c e l l  temperature, which 
determines t h e  voltage l e v e l  a t  any given charge 
current.  Cel l  voltages above about 1 .5  r e f l e c t  
a fully-charged negative electrode, and s igna l  
t h e  evolution of hydrogen a t  a f a s t e r  r a t e  than 
it can recombine a t  e i t h e r  electrode. The asso- 
c ia ted pressure buildup r e s u l t s  i n  f a i l u r e  of t h e  
case. 
Clearly, survival  of these  c e l l s  i n  s a t e l l i t e  
applications i s  c r i t i c a l l y  dependent upon tempera- 
t u r e  extremes experienced i n  o r b i t .  While thermal 
balance calculat ions  permit a reasonable estimate 
of ant ic ipated conditions f o r  i n i t i a l  design pur- 
poses, complex thermal properties of s a t e l l i t e  
skin, s t ructure  and act ive elements make f u l l -  
scale  prelaunch space simulation mandatory. Only 
i n  t h i s  manner can theore t i ca l  r e s u l t s  be con- 
firmed and reasonable assurance of r e l i a b i l i t y  i n  
o rb i t  be established. A current technique f o r  
conducting such t e s t s  w i l l  be b r i e f l y  covered 
l a t e r .  
A f i n a l  example of environmental s e n s i t i v i t y  
i s  presented on Figure 6. Here we have sho~rn t h e  
e f fec t  of broad-band random vibrat ion on contact 
continuity of a re lay,  assuming a white spectrum. 
G-levels indicated r e f l e c t  t h e  acceleration a t  
which balance of colinear res t ra ining and i n e r t i a  
forces i s  achieved f o r  a pa r t i cu la r  re lay.  The 
s ignif icant  a t t r i b u t e  of these  da ta  l i e s  i n  t h e  
steepening gradient i n  s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  the  white 
noise environment, with increasing degrees of en- 
vironmental mismatch. Again, t h e  necessi ty  f o r  
ea r ly  determination and application of environmen- 
t a l  knowledge as  v i t a l  adjuncts t o  product design 
and development, i s  c l e a r l y  implied. 
FORESIGHT VERSUS HINDSIGHT 
In  the  following, we w i l l  touch upon two 
simulation problems of current importance, and 
give l imited d e t a i l  on how these have been handled 
i n  recent programs. It i s  well  t o  point out t h a t  
both of these examples involve environments f o r  
which laboratory simulation o f fe r s  v i t a l  informa- 
t i o n  a t  t o t a l  costs  a t  l e a s t  an order of magnitude 
l e s s  than a single launch. Further, v i t a l  in for -  
mation generated i n  f l i g h t  i s  normally inaccess- 
i b l e  a t  t h e  moment of generation, and i s  frequently 
i r re t r i evab le  a f t e r  f l i g h t  termination. 
A Technique i n  Space Simulation 
O u r  f i r s t  example involves space-environment 
simulation, i n  which s ignif icant  s t r i d e s  i n  method 
have been made during t h e  past two years. It i s  
not intended t o  review t h i s  history, but ra ther  t o  
descr ibe i n  b r ie f  a simple and r e l a t i v e l y  inexpen- 
s i v e  experimental technique f o r  thermal-vacuum 
t e s t i n g ,  which i s  being applied successfully i n  
t h e  Te l s ta r  Communications S a t e l l i t e  program. The 
problem i s  t o  determine thermal-balance proper t ies  
and evaluate operating charac te r i s t i cs  of t h e  
s a t e l l i t e  under t h e  varying conditions of illumin- 
a t i o n  and i n t e r n a l  diss ipat ion which w i l l  be ex- 
perienced i n  o r b i t .  To do-this ,  we need an energy 
source, an energy s ink and a non-convective en- 
vironment. 
A cutaway view of t h e  t e s t  f a c i l i t y  being 
used i n  t h i s  program i s  presented on Figure 7. 
The workspace i s  a cylinder 4.5 f e e t  i n  diameter 
and 8 f e e t  long, bounded by a high-emissivity 
' s t a in less - s tee l  shroud, which i s  cooled t o  approx- 
imately -300'~ by l iqu id  nitrogen. Simulated 
s o l a r  i l lumination from th ree  carbon a rc  lamps, 
each with a 420-watt condensible beam possessing 
desired spec t ra l  properties,  i s  introduced through 
pyrex windows i n  t h e  r e a r  wall .  Pressures i n  the  
range of mm Hg are  maintained by a 16-inch 
diameter oi l -dif fusion pump. Provisions have been 
made f o r  supporting and slowly ro ta t ing  t h e  s a t e l -  
l i t e  i n  four orientations,  with instrumentation 
l eads  feeding through vacuum-tight terminals i n  
t h e  shaf t  end-plate. S l i p  r ings  have been avoided 
by programming ro ta t ion  i n  two direct ions ,  with 
s u f f i c i e n t  s lack i n  t h e  leads t o  accommodate sev- 
e r a l  tu rns  each way, Illumination i s  monitored by 
an a r ray  of th ree  l x  2 cm so la r  c e l l s  positioned 
about 6 inches i n  f ront  of the  s a t e l l i t e .  
Ideally,  energy densi ty  and spec t ra l  d i s t r i -  
bution of the  incident beam should correspond t o  
t h e  sun's rays i n  near-space. Similarly, absorp- 
t i v e  properties of the  heat s ink and i t s  tempera- 
t u r e  should match a s  c losely  a s  possible,  t h e  
cold, spectrally-black q u a l i t i e s  of space. Ear th 's  
r e f lec ted  energy (albedo) and infrared radiat ion 
must a l s o  be considered a s  energy contributors,  
and molecular mean-free-path i n  t h e  t e s t  a rea  must 
be high enough t o  permit neglect of air-conductive 
and convective heat- t ransfer  modes. 
The l a t t e r  requirement i s  s a t i s f i e d  by pres- 
sures  i n  t h e  range of t o  lom4 mm Hg, read i ly  
obtainable i n  t h i s  f a c i l i t y  using conventional 
vacuum techniques. In attempting t o  f u l f i l l  the  
other requirements, however, varying degrees of 
design compromise have been d ic ta ted  by a combina- 
t i o n  of program urgency and s ta te-of- the-ar t  l i m -  
i t a t i o n s .  Fortunately, the  required compromises 
a r e  theore t i ca l ly  and experimentally accountable 
o r  can be shown t o  have r e l a t i v e l y  minor e f f e c t s  
on thermal t e s t  r e s u l t s .  
The main problem involves energy reaching t h e  
s a t e l l i t e  from secondary sources. I f  t h e  in te rna l  
shroud surfaces were non-reflecting (absorpt ivi ty  = 
1 )  and a t  a temperature of ( i n t e r s t e l l a r  
space), t h e  s a t e l l i t e  ~ o u l d  receive only d i rec t  
radiat ion from t h e  a rcs .  Since these conditions 
cannot be achieved, secondary energy i s  received 
by the  s a t e l l i t e  from arc - l igh t  ref lect ion,  in-  
f rared ref lect ion,  and infrared emission from a l l  
v i s ib le  surfaces. To account f o r  energy from 
these secondary sources, a black s h e l l  of the  same 
external  dimensions a s  the  s a t e l l i t e ,  and posses- 
sing predictable thermal proper t ies  i n  space, has 
been used as  prime reference i n  evaluating and 
programming arc-lamp il lumination. Since lamp 
operation i s  l imited t o  a f a i r l y  narrow power 
range, r a t e  of energy input i s  controlled by vary- 
ing t h e  number of lamps i n  service a t  any given 
time. This can be done without degrading t h e  
experiment, since thermal time constants of t h e  
s a t e l l i t e  a r e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  long t o  f i l t e r  out t h e  
e f f e c t s  of any short-term var ia t ions  i n  illumina- 
t ion .  
Simulation of Missile Flight-Vibration Environment 
4s our second example, we w i l l  consider simu- 
l a t i o n  of the  missile f l ight-vibrat ion environment. 
Since the primary sources of vibrat ion i n  a missile 
are  the  propulsion system and aerodynamic excita- 
t ion,  t h i s  environment can i n  most cases be con- 
sidered random. A Gaussian model with mean zero 
i s  assumed f o r  vibratory accelerations,  and t h e  
vibrat ion environment a t  a pa r t i cu la r  s t a t i o n  i s  
characterized by power spectra.  
In practice,  simulation of the  random-vibra- 
t i o n  environment i s  normally achieved by driving 
an electrodynamic vibrator  with the  amplified 
s igna l  from a white-noise generator, band-limited, 
and clipped a t  3 sigma. A n  ar ray  of variable-&, 
variable-bandwidth f i l t e r s  i s  used t o  shape the  
driving spectrum t o  achieve f l a t  frequency r e -  
sponse of t h e  highly-reactive moving element with 
mounted t e s t  specimen, a process subsequently 
referred t o  as  equalization. The f i l t e r s  may a l so  
be used t o  provide varying accelerat ion density i n  
selected bands of the  response spectrum. 
Two ra ther  serious l imi ta t ions  a r e  imposed 
by using a white-noise generator i n  attempting t o  
simulate t h e  f l i g h t  vibrat ion environment. F i r s t ,  
with the  f i l t e r s  mentioned above, it i s  extremely 
d i f f i c u l t  t o  achieve any reasonable correla t ion 
with power spectra  measured i n  f l i g h t .  Second, 
with t h i s  approach there  i s  no way of handling 
var ia t ions  i n  power spectrum with time of f l i g h t .  
An a l t e rna t ive  approach i s  t o  dr ive t h e  v i -  
brat ion exc i te r  with data  s ignals  recorded during 
actual  missile f l i g h t s .  The value of such a pro- 
cedure i s ,  of course, dependent upon t h e  qua l i ty  
of the  data  recorded i n  f l i g h t ,  and upon the  
select ion of an appropriate f ix tu re  f o r  mounting 
the t e s t  specimen. In vibration-data acquisition, 
we have found tha t  airborne magnetic recorders 
offer  important advantages over telemetry, espec- 
i a l l y  i n  the areas of channel avai labi l i ty,  data 
frequency capability, dynamic range and in ter  - 
channel distortion. Use of such recorders should 
be considered whenever recovery i s  feasible. 
With regard t o  fixturing, it has been recent 
practice t o  employ a portion of the actual missilk 
structure i n  laboratory tes t s ,  and thereby intro-  
duce mechanical-impedance properties of the f l ight  
vehicle i n  some degree. 
To evaluate t h i s  technique, we have conducted 
such t e s t s  on a missile guidance package, using 
vibration data obtained with a recoverable a i r -  
borne magnetic recorder. Amissi le  nose section 
approximately 7 fee t  long, with guidance package 
installed, was mounted i n  the thrust  direction 
on a 15,000-pound-force vibration exci ter  
( ~ i g u r e  8). Sensing instrumentation, consisting 
of prezoelectric accelerometers, was arranged t o  
correspond with the f l i gh t  configuration. The 
flight-vibration signal recorded i n  thrust  a t  the 
missile parting flange (mounting plane i n  t h i s  
experiment), band-limited t o  2 kc, was used t o  
drive the exciter.  Vibration response was re-  
corded i n  both the driving plane and the guidance- 
mounting plane. 
Results of t h i s  experiment are plotted on 
Figure 9. The power spectra were obtained by 
d ig i t a l  analysis based largely upon Reference 2. 
The data show reasonable agreement between labora- 
tory and f l i gh t  spectra a t  the missile parting 
flange, with moderate deviations attributable t o  
equalization tolerance (f 3 db), system non- 
l inearat ies ,  and vibration-amplifier gain setting. 
Flight and laboratory spectra a t  the guidance- 
mounting rib, however, appear t o  bear l i t t l e  rela- 
t ion t o  each other. Clearly, differences i n  the 
character of excitation sources and structural  
transmission paths are responsible fo r  this .  In 
particular,  absence of aerodynamic forces and 
associated ef fec ts  on structural  s t a t i c  loads and 
dynamic response, ra i se  serious doubts as  t o  the 
merit of using vehicle structure i n  laboratory 
vibration t e s t s  on missile-borne equipment. 
These resul t s  strongly suggest t ha t  a pre- 
ferred technique would employ f l i gh t  data recorded 
a t  points on o r  adjacent t o  mounting lugs for  
equipment of interest ,  t o  drive such equipment i n  
t he  laboratory through r ig id  f ixtures.  It i s  of 
in teres t  t o  note t ha t  we have applied t h i s  l a t t e r  
technique i n  recent evaluations of gyro performance 
i n  the f l ight  vibration environment. 
CONCLUSION 
It seems l i ke ly  tha t  Daedalus might have i m -  
parted life-saving wisdom t o  son Icarus, had there 
been a wind tunnel and a sun simulator available 
for  pre-flight demonstration. One wonders, of 
course, whether the Greek Engineer was technically 
equipped t o  define the environments of interest ,  I r 
and t o  evolve a suitable experimental plan for  
the occasion. This i s  probably academic, however, 
since he was i n  too big a hurry t o  bother with 
such de ta i l s  anyway. But must it always be so? 
We think not. 
Failure i s  sometimes the  price of knowledge. 
More often, however, the price is paid for  infor- 
mation already available or  a t  l ea s t  accessible 
a t  modest cost. Since the environment must ulti- 
mately be reckoned with, then i t s  definition i s  
a matter of utmost urgency i n  any development 
effort .  Continued updating and application of 
environmental knowledge i n  design and evaluation 
are  essential  factors i n  minimizing wasted time 
and effort ,  two priceless commodities i n  today's 
market. Is t h i s  not, a f t e r  all, a common goal of 
a l l  r e l i a b i l i t y  e f for t?  
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It has been estimated tha t  man may have 
occupied t h i s  planet for  two b i l l i on  years. Dur- 
ing all but a fraction of one percent of t h i s  
very long time, h i s  upward progress has been slow, 
indeed, Gradually, man learned tha t  he must use 
the  ideas, discoveries and experiences of others 
as stepping stones toward h i s  distant  goal. When 
t h e  t o t a l  amount of recorded knowledge had reached 
a necessary level,  man's r a t e  of achievement be- 
gan t o  climb i n  exponential fashion. 
Today, we are recording such vast mounts of 
information tha t  we are a t  a loss  t o  s i f t  the 
useful from the useless. And the  problems of re- 
t r ieving needed material a re  often so great t ha t  
we are i n  danger of e i ther  having t o  rediscover 
o r  t o  do without. 
In the r e l i ab i l i t y  f ie ld ,  we seem t o  have 
reached the point where each pract i t ioner  must 
make a painful compromise between trying t o  do 
h i s  job and spending every waking moment studying 
the  t i d a l  wave of material crossing h i s  desk. I f  
we can only bear it for  just a l i t t l e  longer, I 
believe tha t  there i s  much promise of improve- 
ment. Before any complex f i e l d  of endeavor can 
become a "science, it must f i r s t  be an "art". 
Our dilemma stems from the fac t  t ha t  r e l i ab i l i t y  
i s  i n  t ransi t ion between these two states. 
Earl ier  t h i s  year, a t  the  Reliabi l i ty and 
Quality Control Symposium i n  Washington, and a t  
t he  IRE Convention i n  New York, we were impressed 
by men who had become engineers and then pursued 
the study of medicine. One man i s  using h is  
medical knowledge in  space engineering research; 
another i s  using h i s  engineering t o  solve Wgent 
data recording and correlation problems i n  the 
medical world. Both men should open some very 
important doors. This i s  always t o  be expected 
when various intel lectual  discipl ines are 
deliberately mixed. 
All.  t h i s  suggests t ha t  the  cooperation be- 
tween systems designers, equipment designers, 
component designers, human factors  engineers and 
r e l i a b i l i t y  engineers should be tightened. 
There follows an attempt t o  examine some of 
r e l i ab i l i t y ' s  developing vocabulary, t o  identify 
the  kinds of information we must col lect  during a 
system's evolution, and what we must do with it. 
A "oalance sheet" w i l l  be presented, t o  show what 
we get and what we pay for  correcting troubles 
detected i n  each successive developmental stage. 
First ,  l e t  us look a t  some of our specialized 
language. Let us examine some of the  words used 
i n  t h i s  ser ies  of papers, t o  see which ones have 
specific meanings and which may have meanings 
tha t  depend upon one ' s viewpoint. 
What do we mean by the words "field" and 
"user"? Clearly, t h i s  depends. upon where we 
stand. To the  military 'equipment manufacturer, 
the  only proper concept of a product's being 
"in the f i e ld"  should be tha t  the  product has 
been delivered into the hands of t he  ultimate 
user, the military operator working under 
t ac t i ca l  conditions. Unfortunately, there a re  
too many manufacturers who believe tha t  t h e i r  
equipment has reached t h i s  stage when a proto- 
type has passed i t s  performance t e s t s  and the  
customer has paid the b i l l .  As we hope t o  
demonstrate, there are serious dangers i n  the  
l a t t e r  at t i tude.  
The component manufacturer, i n  contrast 
with the equipment manufacturer, may fee l  
t ha t  h i s  product i s  "in the f ie ld"  as soon 
as he has shipped it t o  the  equipment manu- 
facturer.  From where he stands, anyone who 
handles (or  mishandles) h i s  product is a 4 
user. H i s  component actually may be exposed 
t o  worse conditions during equipment develop- 
ment than i n  any other stage. 
How about the word "system"? Very few 
systems consist only of hardware; most systems 
use men a s  essential  components within closed 
feedback loops. No man-machine system can 
ever perform a t  t he  required level  i f  proper 
attention has not been paid t o  the limitations, 
needs and capabil i t ies  of the human components. 
As mission times become very short and as 
t ac t i ca l  areas expand, weapons systems are re-  
quired t o  operate ever faster .  This requires 
t ha t  astronomical mounts of data be collected, 
assessed and used t o  produce exactly r ight  
decisions with blinding speed, and tha t  men must 
be eliminated as direct  functional links. 
Eliminated from system functions, man 
continues t o  be essential  for  monitoring 
troubles and for  employing correct and rapid 
repair procedures. We must not conclude from 
t h i s  tha t  human factors  engineering has l o s t  
importance; t o  the  contrary, i t s  importance has 
never been greater. There i s  a severe and urgent 
burden on equipment designers t o  provide main- 
tenance men with the  utmost i n  trouble detection 
a d  correction f ac i l i t i e s ,  and t o  arrange t h e i r  
designs for- instant  and economical repair by 
very ordinary kinds of men. 
The importance of exploiting fa i lure  data i n  
any system evaluation i s  obvious; l e s s  obvious 
i s  the importance and u t i l i t y  of success data. 
For each successful launching by a missile 
system, it i s  of v i t a l  importance tha t  records 
be kept of environmental conditions, ground 
equipment performance, telemetered data from 
missile, and tracking data i f  we are t o  assure 
the success of future launchings. For once a 
high degree of system re l i ab i l i t y  has been 
achieved, unremitting ef for t s  a re  required t o  
guard against deterioration. 
Data from f i r ings  must be compared with data 
from laboratory testing, t o  be sure tha t  the 
"margins" assumed i n  the  laboratory testing, 
compared t o  f i e l d  conditions, are rea l ly  there. 
This careful comparison has been made i n  the  
use of the  Bell Telephone Laboratories' Command 
Guidance System, designed fo r  TITAN I. This 
system has been used so f a r  for  guidance i n  over 
80 f i r ings  of ICBM's and space vehicles, without 
a single fa i lure  of the  ground o r  missile-borne 
equipment. 
.I . 
Figure I shows the  evolutionary phases of a 
typical  system, from ear l ies t  planning t o  f inal ,  
t ac t i ca l  use. It is interesting t o  consider 
t h i s  f romthe  standpoint of fa i lure  reporting and 
analysis. The following questions come t o  mind. 
Which blocks send information t o  the fa i lure  
analyst? In which phases can fai lure analysis 
pay the  greatest dividends? What do the  feedback 
loops look l ike?  Is there any stage a t  which 
fai lure analysis is  useless t o  the project? A t  
what point should we stop ha lyz ing  fai lures from 
a system? 
Trouble Data From Product Design Phase 
If a fai lure analysis program can be con- 
ducted during the  product design phase, with 
information from breadboard experiments, great 
benefits can be realized. There are the maximum 
opportunities t o  change t o  be t t e r  components and 
better  c i rcu i t  and mechanical design practices. 
There may even be time available i f  be t te r  com- 
ponents must be developed. And, of course, change 
are inexpensive and do not have big repercussions. 
Data From Model Program 
It i s  essential  t ha t  when an equipment is  i n  
the model or  prototype stage every trouble, 
however small, be reported t o  the r e l i ab i l i t y  
organization and tha t  it receive energetic 
treatment. If t he  models closely represent the  
f i n a l  design, and if they have been bu i l t  
according t o  the company's typical  fabrication 
processes, most of the  troubles should resemble 
those which might be encountered i n  f i n a l  
equipment. It i s  important tha t  the fai lure 
analyst 's findings be given qu ick ly to  responsi- 
b le  project personnel, before the  f i n a l  fa i lure  
analysis report has been written, printed and 
distributed. Any effective informal means should 
be used. The analyst often receives a reply from 
the project people, s tat ing what they have done 
i n  response t o  recommendations, and includes t h i s  
statement i n  h i s  f i na l  published report. :f all 
par t ies  have done the i r  jobs properly, t h i s  
trouble should not recur. In a large project, it 
i s  normal t o  have many design changes resulting 
f romtes t s  of model or  pbototype equipment. 
Data From Production 
It can be expected t h a t  t he  production phase 
w i l l  yield a whole s tr ing of new troubles, many 
of which do not resemble those from ea r l i e r  
phases. Again, it i s  urgent t h a t  fa i lure  analysis 
be done rapidly and tha t  the  preliminary findings 
be transmitted informally. 
Troubles occurring i n  production include 
( a )  defects i n  equipment design, 
(b) troubles caused by lack of s k i l l  i n  
production. These w i l l  not resu l t  in 
design changes, but i n  additional worker 
t raining and/or modifications i n  process 
instructions. 
(c )  Those resulting from changes i n  manu- 
f acturing processes, 
(d)  la ten t  troubles which can appear only 
a f t e r  a quantity of uni t s  has been bui l t .  
(e)  the need t o  select  components, by t r a i l  
and error  methods, fo r  proper c i rcu i t  
performance. This may be caused by inno- 
cent -looking, but important differences 
between tk construction of moaels and 
f i n a l  uni ts  (e  .g. wiring layout and 
methods) . It may be due t o  differences 
between the production and preproduction 
versions of certain special components. 
O r  it may indicate t ha t  proper circui t  
operation depends upon an uncontrolled 
component characteristic.  
s Data .from Instal lat ion 
I f  it could be assumed tha t  production equip- 
ments are instal led i n  exac t ly the  same way as 
model and prototype equipments, using the same 
materials, tools, methods and kinds of men, then 
most ins ta l la t ion  troubles should be those caused 
by errors  or  abuse. But there w i l l  be a need for  
some additional design changes. The need for  some 
of these changes may be apparent only a f t e r  pro- 
duction equipments have been handled, packed, 
transported over long distances, and sometimes 
stored i n  a harmful environment, pr ior  t o  instal-  
la t ion.  
Data From Use 
I f  a.system has been soundly planned and well 
designed, and i f  r e l i ab i l i ty  procedures have been 
exploited t o  the W e s t ,  there should not be many 
big troubles in'use. 
Our decisions and actions a t  t h i s  stage can 
have a very big effect (for better or worse) on 
future systems. Remembering that  all progress 
depends upon a study of past experience, we must 
realize that  a trouble-ridden system contains an 
exceedingly valuable l ibrary on what not t o  do. 
It i s  especially important that  all in-use troubles 
be carefully reported and analyzed. 
Analysis results  w i l l ,  i n  many cases, affect 
mture choices and/or applications of certain com- 
ponents and materials, system and equipment design 
procedures, manufacturing processes and instal la-  
t ion  methods. 
When there has been a l o t  of in-use trouble, 
we'd be wise t o  take a careful and skeptical look 
a t  the re l i ab i l i ty  procedures that  we used i n  the 
ear l ier  phases. It i s  possible that  we w i l l  find 
something wrong with our chosen re l iabi l i ty  tools, 
or with the way we used them. But there i s  another 
possibility; it i s  that  the project organization 
may not have recognized the importance of our 
recommendations. The burden i s  on the re l iabi l i ty  
organization t o  arrange feedback or  check-up rou- 
t ines  so that  it w i l l  know the consequences of i t s  
recommendations. I f  the project decides that  
action i s  unwarranted, the reason should be deter- 
mined and recorded. 
Data Collection 
We have talked a l o t  about the use of trouble 
data, but have not touched on the problems of 
c o l l e c t i q  it. The "success data" are not d i f f i -  
cult  t o  obtain; t h i s  i s  because of the i r  nature 
and because they are recoraed under the control of 
engineers who are responsible for thei r  use. The 
problem i s  most acute i n  the case of trouble, 
failure, replacement and readjustment information. 
How do you motivate a maintenance man so that  he 
w i l l  w& t o  give you a complete story? Sometimes 
we have diff iculty obtaining any story, however 
inadequate. 
Much of our most valuable data come from "R&D 
Field Sites'' where the environments and system use 
conditions might be called quasi-tactical. Perhaps 
the most successful method we have used for obtain- 
ing data i s  t o  have an experienced man assigned t o  
each site, Mth the primary duty of reporting the 
f u l l  story. This man goes t o  the place on the 
"reservation" where the trouble occurred, inter- 
views the people who coped with the trouble, looks 
a t  the i r  logs and prepares the report. In addition 
t o  all the obviously needed information, it i s  
v i t a l  that  he be specific about 
( a )  circuit positions of failed, replaced or 
readjusted components, 
(b) whether the replacement or readjustment 
resulted i n  cure, 
(c)  the number of operating hours accumulated 
on each replaced component, or up t o  the 
time when an adjustment was made, 
(d) complete statements of symptoms and 
events of possible significance. 
Many failures cannot be analyzed a t  all unless 
the amount of time accumulated on 'a replaced com- 
ponent i s  given. Of course, t h i s  means that  the 
re l i ab i l i ty  organization must assure i t se l f  that  
the system designers have included enough running- 
time meters, and t ' a t  they have been installed i n  
the right places. 
On the NIXE-ZEUS project, we had been receiv- 
ing many failed samples of a certain relay. The 
contacts looked as though they had been abused 
electr ically but, lacking estimates of the number 
of times these relays had been operated, we could 
not make a conclusive analysis. When, one day, 
one of these relays was accompanied by a statement 
of the number of operations, it was apparent that  
it had passed its expected l i f e .  The relay was 
not being overloaded, but it was being operated 
so often that  it would require frequent replace- 
ment. 
Whatever system i s  adopted for obtaining field 
fai lure data, it i s  invaluable t o  use the feedback 
principle so that  the maintenbnce man knows his  
report did not f a l l  into a bottomless p i t .  Send 
him a copy of your failure analysis report. You 
then have a vehicle for words of praise for a job 
well done; and you have the opportunity t o  do a 
l i t t l e  complaining i f  he has l e t  you down. 
Failure Analysis 
We have heard a great deal about the mechanics 
of component fai lure analysis. This a r t  has become 
well understood and has been thoroughly documented. 
The important thing t o  remember i s  that  our study 
must extend fa r  beyond the failed component (which 
ofien turns out t o  be perfectly good); it i s  only 
a part of the story. We must examine where and 
how it has been used (or abused), how it was housed, 
how it was applied. We must chaxt and study the 
frequencies of troubles according t o  thei r  posi- 
t ions in  circuits. And we must pay heed t o  those 
troubles that  are corrected only by the changing 
of adjustments, without component replacemeiits,. 
Of special interest t o  the fai lure analyst i s  
the case in  which the trouble disappears when a 
component i s  replaced, but no trouble can be found 
with the removed component. This'raises a number 
of possibil i t ies : 
(1) External connections t o  the removed com- 
ponent may have been faulty. 
(2) The removed component may contain an 
intermittent defect. It may be sensitive 
t o  some quantity such as temperature, 
moisture, shock, vibration, voltage, or 
a combination of them. 
( 3 )  The c i rcui t  design may be marginal, so 
tha t  it w i l l  not work when a component 
characteris t ic  i s  near a l i m i t .  
(4)  Proper operation of the c i rcu i t  may de- 
pend upon some "uncontrolled character- 
i s t i c "  of the component. This i s  not 
uncommon. 
(5)  When no other explanation can be found, 
it i s  possible tha t  some other action 
actually was taken, i n  addition t o  re- 
placement of the component. The person 
who prepared the trouble report may have 
been unaware of th is ,  he may have for-  
gotten it, o r  he may not be suff icient ly 
objective t o  report an error  which he 
may have made. 
Pr ior i t ies  
On the Command Guidance System project, 
the f i e l d  trouble report cards have a space for  
indicating whether t he  effect  of a trouble on sys- 
tem functioning was "cri t ical ,  " "ma jor1' or  "minor. " 
The terms are self-explanatory. Special e f for t s  are 
made t o  give pr ior i ty  attention t o  the c r i t i c a l  
cases. When the  analysis groups are overloaded, 
mino are deferred u n t i l  the work load drops. 
On other projects, degrees of severity a re  not 
usually Indicated. A l l  cases are hmdled, i n  the 
order of arr ival ,  a s  being of equal importance. 
However, our Systems Reliabi l i ty Department keeps 
a box score on each type of trouble and, from time 
t o  time, issues requests t o  the analysis groups t o  
pay special at tent ion t o  certain cases, or  t o  stop 
analyzing other kinds of troubles which have become 
well known and are receiving corrective action. 
Conclusions 
1. Reliabi l i ty i s  i n  t ransi t ion between art 
and science. Greater e f fo r t s  are needed 
t o  mix it with other disciplines. 
2 .  To increase understanding by project 
people, l e t ' s  not be ret icent  about our 
success. 
3 .  We must give balanced at tent ion t o  success 
and fa i lure  data and use both of them as 
tools .  
4. Failure analysis pays the greatest divi-  
dends when done i n  the ear l ies t  equipment 
design stage. 
6 .  Analysis of in-use fai lures i s  v i t a l  t o  
the greater r e l i ab i l i t y  of future systems. 
I f  we do not do th is ,  we sha l l  never stop 
committing the same old errors. 
7. I f  the demonstrated r e l i ab i l i t y  of a sys- 
tem f a l l s  f a r  short of predictions, we 
must look carefully a t  the tools  we used, 
and the  way we used them. 
8. Collection of trouble data is not easy. 
9. Component fai lure analysis must go f a r  
beyond a mere study of the  component. 
10. Effort expended in  fa i lure  analysis should 
be i n  proportion t o  the effect  of the 
troubie 
5. All troubles should be reported from el 
phases of a system's l i f e ,  including 
f i e ld  use. 
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17 'Lq Summary 
This paper presents a brief synopsis of 
representative techniques that a r e  used in the 
analysis and prediction of equipment reliability 
during the design phase. In particular, attention 
i s  directed to: (1) techniques commonly 
employed for the prediction of circuit or module 
reliability, given part reliability, circuit con- 
figuration, and environment; (21 techniques 
commonly employed for the pr ediction of equip- 
ment (or systems ) reliability, given module 
reliability, equipment configuration, and opera- 
tional and environmental r equir Bment s ; and (3) 
advanced statistical techniques which a r e  useful 
under certain conditions to supplement those 
techniques previously mentioned. 
Introduction 
Techniques useful in  the analysis and 
prediction of equipment reliability have developed 
rapidly during the past several years. Con- 
currently with this development, emphasis has 
been placed on the accumulation of failur e-rate 
data on parts and the measurement of reliability 
of existing equipments in order to provide 
numerical significance to the various mathemat- 
ical  expressions used in  describing reliability. 
These efforts have been accelerated by an 
increasing recognition of the value of applying an 
analysis and prediction technique during the 
design phase. Consequently, reliability engi - 
neers, and others in related activities, have 
been confronted with an ever -increasing number 
of llbestll techniques for analyzing and predicting 
equipment reliability. 
Under these circumstances, i t  became 
apparent that a survey of these techniques would 
prove valuable provided the survey elaborated on 
the recommended uses of a technique, i ts  
distinguishing features, and the sources of data. 
This paper i s  an effort to present such a 
compendium of information. No attempt has 
been made to evaluate, recommend, or criticize 
the methods or techniques either by the sequence 
of the presentation or by the descriptive details. 
Currently available techniques a r e  
classified in this paper according to application: 
(a)  Prediction of circuit or module 
reliability when part reliability, circuit con- 
figuration, and internal and external stresses 
a r e  given (discussed in Section 2); 
Richard M. Jacobs 
Sylvania Electric Products, Inc. 
Waltham, Mass . 
(b) Prediction of equipment or systems 
reliability when module reliability, equipment 
diagram, and op~rat ional  requirements a r e  
available (Section 3); 
(c)  Advanced mathematical/statistical 
techniques which supplement the preceding 
methods under certain prescribed co,nditions 
(Section 4). 
A few techniques which do not fall  into these 
categories but which may prove valuable for 
specific applications a r e  noted in  Section 5. The 
ways in  which these various methods may be 
employed, a s  well as an indication of their 
validity, i s  examined in Section 6 .  
Reliability prediction a s  considered here 
includes all methods used in  obtaining a 
numerical indication of the inherent reliability 
of the device, regardless of whether that 
numerical indication i s  intended as  a measure 
of conformance to specifications, a means for 
comparing similar devices, o r  for other 
purposes. The terms "part, " ~lmodulell, and 
"equipmentf1 a r e  used to represent the basic 
elements of a device, a collection of those 
elements which function together as a unit, and 
the final assemblage of those elements as  
required to accomplish a specific task, 
respectively. 
A literature search reveals that although 
a few papers on reliability prediction appeared 
during the 1940fs, the bulk of the material was 
published subsequent to that time. The authors 
have reviewed personally over 200 references. 
The bibliography at  the end of this paper lists 
those papers which have been cited in  the text 
as  well a s  others which may be of general 
interest. Also included a r e  references to 
several edited bibliographies which may be con- 
sulted for information on additional papers. 
(References 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 )  
Prediction of Module Reliability 
The prediction 'of electronic circuit or 
module reliability has been the subject of many 
papers;,however, essentially all  of these papers 
discuss the use of the basic technique of ob- 
taining the module reliability from the summa- 
tion of the failure rates of the constituent parts. 
Appropriate formulas may be applied to account 
for the series o r  parallel configuration of the 
parts which compose the module. The points of 
disagreement between the papers  a r e  what 
numerical data should be used for  the failure 
r a t e s  and the degree of detail that should be con- 
sidered in  defining the failure ra tes .  Several 
short  cuts and refinements i n  module prediction 
techniques have been discussed. Most of the 
papers  relate  to electronic equipment - the ex- 
tension to non- electronic equipment may be 
reasonably straightforward if the appropriate 
numerical  data a r e  available. 
Mathematical Models for  Module Reliability 
One of the ear l ies t  attempts t o  predict 
reliability for  electronic equipment was made 
shortly af ter  World War 11. Based on experience 
with World War I1 equipment (C2, Dl ,  HI), it 
was determined that the severa l  ways in  which 
equipment could fail  a r e :  (1) frequently repeated 
fai lures caused by pa r t s  either poor i n  quality 
or  overstressed,  ( 2 )  randomly occuring failures, 
( 3 )  degradation fai lures of various par t s .  It was 
thought that frequently repeated fai lures could 
be rectified by retrofi ts ,  and the  degradation 
fai lures could be prevented by appropriate 
maintenance pract ices.  At that time, however, 
methods to reduce the random fai lures were  not 
known. The data gathered indicated a total 
fai lure picture which could be approximated by 
the exponential law and established the fact that 
the probabilities of survival for the equipments 
were  influenced by the complexities. To p r  edict 
the magnitude of fai lures in equipment, typical 
fai lure ra tes  for  various par t  types were  
established. These fai lure ra tes ,  multiplied by 
the number of par t s  in  the equipment, were  
shown to  yield a n  est imate of equipment 
reliability. This basic technique en- 
compasses the concepts of many of the more  
elaborate methods i n  use today. 
As an extension to this ea r ly  work, the 
smatical  model giving the fai lure r a t e  of 
--~odule a s  the summation of the failure 
ra tes  of the constituent par t s  has  received wide 
acceptance, The reliability of the module, in 
turn, i s  computed f r o m  R = e - i t  where i s  the 
fai lure r a t e  of the module. 
The use of this mathematical model 
implies the acceptance of cer ta in  bas ic  
assumptions : 
(a)  All pa r t s  a r e  considered to  b e  
functionally independent, that i s ,  a fai lure of 
any one part  will  not affect the probability of 
fai lure of any other part .  
(b) The successful functioning of each 
and every par t  i s  required for  the successful 
functioning of the module 
(c)  Fa i lure- ra te  data for  the various 
pa r t s  a r e  available 
(d) The pa r t s  experience constant 
fai lure ra tes  during the period of module 
operation and hence the exponential distribution 
i s  applicable. 
The validity of these assumptions with 
respect to the module being studied should be 
considered i n  order  to avoid g ros s  e r r o r s .  
Recent work has  shown, for  example, that the 
assumption of constant failure r a t e s  and the 
exponential distribution may not be acceptable 
in  a l l  instances. Work i s  underway to determine 
the applicability of the Weibull, Gamma, Log 
Normal, Poisson, Binomial and normal  dis  - 
tributions to various elements of the over-al l  
problem. As additional data become available, 
confirmation of the  validity of part icular  dis-  
tributions in describing the reliability to 
specific pa r t s  and modules may be  expected. 
P a r t  Failure-Rate Data 
The principal distinction between 
methods reported for the prediction of module 
reliability i s  the par t  -out -failur e - ra te  data 
employed. It i s  recognized that failure ra tes  
vary  considerably due to the environment of 
internal and external s t resses .  These s t r e s ses  
a r e  derived f r o m  the way in  which the par t  i s  
used i n  the module, the way in  which it i s  
mounted or  packaged, the ultimate use  of the 
module, and operational procedures such a s  on- 
off cycling, In addition, failure r a t e s  vary  a s  
r e su l t s  of inherent design of par t s ,  conditions 
of manufacture and other factors .  
In using published fai lure-rate  data, the 
source of the data must be carefully considered. 
For  example, if i t  i s  obtained f r o m  field 
experience with shipboard equipment, i t  may 
not be directly applicable to airborne equipment 
or  to fixed ground-based equipment. Fur ther  - 
more, in  certain compilations of data, failure 
r a t e s  were  obtained directly a s  a function of the 
total field removals including preventive main- 
tenance actions; whereas, in  other instances, 
data supposedly resultin f rom human e r r o r ,  
secondary fai lures,  andfor other extraneous 
sources of malfunction were  removed before 
the computation of failure rates .  Fai lure - ra te  
data a l so  a r e  available f r o m  extensive pa r t s -  
testing programs conducted either by par t s  
manufacturers o r  par t s  users ;  but insufficient 
t ime h a s  elapsed to  permit high confidence 
correlation of the resul ts  of these t e s t s  with 
field data t o  establish the validity of the t e s t  
programs,  Other failure-rate data a r e  com- 
puted f r o m  par ts - tes t  data combined with 
controlled o r  uncontrolled field data. 
Under these circumstances, each user  
must apply caution in selecting the  data to be 
employed in his  particular prediction, 
Currently, insufficient information i s  available 
to permit  the selection of a "best" source of 
data - the choice must be made in  view of the 
requirements of the particular prediction 
program. 
The earl iest  sources of fai lure-rate  
data, of course, provided indications of only 
nominal failure ra tes  for broad categories of 
par t s .  As the collection of fai lure ra tes  has  
continued through the years ,  these data have 
been refined; and, currently, compilations 
provide many breakdowns into various cate- 
gor ies  of par t s  a s  well a s  indications of the 
effects of various s t r e s ses ,  The exact manner 
in  which reliability i s  related to s t r e s s  level 
var ies  considerably. 
One compilation of failure- rat  e data, 
which was updated recently, was drawn f r o m  
shipboard applications (57,  Vl, V2). This 
source  presents  single fai lure-rate  numbers for 
the majority of pa r t  categories. In the case of 
tubes, t rans is tors ,  res i s tors ,  capacitors, and 
severa l  other commonly used electronic par t s ,  
graphic data a r e  provided to permit  a modifica- 
tion of the basic fai lure r a t e  in  t e rms  of the 
severi ty of the application, measured a s  a 
function of the principal electr ical  parameter  
affecting reliability. The effects of other en- 
vironmental factors  a r e  not considered. Data 
in  this f o r m  a r e  useful in obtaining initial 
est imates of module reliability, before infor - 
mation i s  available on the part icular  environ- 
mental s t r e s ses  to be encountered. 
Perhaps the most widely used source of 
fa i lure- ra te  data (R3, R4, R8, R11) extends 
the concept of application severi ty levels to 
provide charts  and tables where fai lure r a t e  i s  
shown a s  a function of the principal electr ical  
s t r e s s  on the par t  and the principal external  
s t r e s s ,  usually ambient temperature.  Infor- 
mation presented in  this f o r m  i s  part icularly 
valuable a s  the design progresses  and becomes 
f i rm.  It provides the designer an opportunity 
to study trade-offs between reliability and 
ambient temperature,  electr ical  s t r e s s e s  on 
the pa r t s  (which when interpreted a s  per  cent 
of rated s t r e s s  often may be related t o  the s ize 
of the pa r t )  maintenance factors ,  cost  and other 
related considerations. These part icular  data 
reportedly a r e  derived f r o m  laboratory and 
field tes t s  of fixed station ground-based equip- 
ment together with theoretical considerations. 
It has  been proposed that fai lure r a t e s  obtained 
f r o m  this source be modified by multiplying by 
an  appropriate factor in  the range f r o m  1 to  80 
to account for the severi ty of the application 
environment (i. e,  , ground based, manned air- 
craft ,  missi le ,  etc. )(D4). 
The use  of adjustment factors ,  often 
called l1Kl1 factors ,  to  modify bas ic  fai lure ra te  
data also i s  recommended i n  severa l  publica- 
tions. In one of these (A3, BZO), the "K" 
factors  a r e  used mere ly  to modify basic failure 
r a t e s  to account for  certain circuit s t r e s ses ;  
for  example, the rat io of actual to rated 
voltage, temperature above recommended 
ambient, o r  on-off cycling. In another (HlO), 
the llK1l factors  a r e  used to account for  use  
environment a s  well a s  other factors  which a r e  
not directly reflected in the tabulations of basic 
failure ra tes .  
Another tabulation of failure data (EZ, 
E3, E4) provides a table of nominal o r  generic 
failure r a t e s  and application factors which a r e  
functions of both circuit and use environment, 
In the tabulation of failure ra tes ,  both the 
nominal values and the upper and lower ex- 
t r emes  a r e  given for over 400 i tems,  including 
many electronic par t  categories, over 70 tubes 
and semiconductors by pa r t  number, a variety 
of electromechanical par t s ,  and some frequently 
used subassemblies, Application factors  K A  
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se rve  a s  multipliers to adapt these fai lure 
ra tes  t o  account for  actual conditions of 
ambient temperature,  operating-to-rated 
wattage, w i r e  s ize  in  potentiometers and 
res is tors ,  and other measures of application 
severity. The product of the nominal fai lure 
ra tes  t&es the-application factors a r e  
multiplied, in  turn,  by a n  operational factor 
K which ranges f rom 1.0 for a laboratory 
OP 
computer to 2,000 for a booster engine com- 
partment (in flight), t o  adjust the fai lure r a t e s  
for  external s t r e s ses  which may be experienced 
during actual  usage. 
Only one significant source of data 
specifically on mechanical and electro-  
mechanical devices has  been noted (KlS). This 
reference provides not only basic data on par t s  
such a s  motors ,  synchros, and resolvers ,  I 
gear boxes, and hydraulic components but a l so  
an  indication of the methods of estimating the 
reliability of these devices during actual 
operation. Informal communications received 
by the authors indicate that several  groups have 
run tes t s  which tend to  validate the mater ia l  
presented in  this report.  
One author (P4) has suggested that the 
problem of obtaining specific fai lure-rate  
information for  the various par t s  of a module 
be avoided by defining for  each par t  a "rel i -  
abi l i ty index" which i s  the ratio of the failure 
ra te  of the part icular  par t  to  the failure r a t e  of 
a I1standardtt par t  that i s  chosen a s  the basis  
for  the normalization. This author reasons 
that it i s  much eas ier  to obtain an  accurate 
indication of the relative failure r a t e s  of pa r t s  
and ihat any prediction made using the "rel i -  
ability indexes" can easi ly be normalized for a 
particular situation through the choice of a n  
appropriate value for  the fai lure r a t e  of the 
lfstandardfl par t  
Other Predict ion Methods 
The active element group method (B9, 
R13, S 7 )  differs f rom the  basic method dis - 
cussed previously in that the par t s  population 
of the module i s  defined in  t e rms  of the number 
of active elements, i. e. , tubes and semi-  
conductor s .  By definition, an active element 
group (AEG) consists of a tube or  a t rans is tor  
with a proportionate sha re  of the res i s tors ,  
capacitors, coils, transistors, and other parts 
which form the module. The failure rates for 
various AEGIS may be obtained from published 
tables (B9, S7) or may be computed f rom the 
nominal failure rates of the constituent parts. 
The failure ra te  of the module i s  computed as  
the sum of the products of the number of AEGIS 
times the appropriate failure rates.  This method 
of analysis provides an easy means for com- 
paring the effects of complexity on reliability. 
For example, if a designer wishes to add one 
stage of amplification to a three-stage amplifier, 
he can readily determine the loss of reliability 
versus the gain i n  system performance. Thus 
the engineer can evaluate easily a number of the 
factors which he must consider in a grace-off 
determination. L - 
' . . . I  
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In situations where the reliability of a 
large number of modules must be predicted, 
sampling procedures may be used to advantage. 
The use of such procedures does not affect the 
basic technique used in  prediction but rather leads 
to the stipulation that a detailed prediction of 
reliability will be  made for only the selected 
sample modules whereas merely a quick analysis, 
if any at  all, of the estimated reliability will be 
made for the other modules. The use of sampling 
procedures introduces r isk  factors for both the 
user and manufacturer of the modules; however, 
these factors may not be  significant in terms of 
the degree of e r ro r  that i s  expected when using 
usual prediction methods. 
Several groups a r e  currently studying the 
potential value of predicting reliability of 
standard or  preferred circuits packaged in  pre-  
selected configurations i. e., weldpack, micro - 
miniaturized wafers, microelectronic wafers, etc. 
Unfortunately, the results of these studies are  
not available at this time. 
Effects of Par t  Variability 
. . 
In the preceding discussion, i t  has been 
assumed $hat the various parts in a given module 
can be assigned specific failure rates from 
appropriate data sources. In actuality, of 
course, even if the assumption of a constant 
failure ra te  i s  accepted, it i s  recognized that the 
reliabilities of the parts employed in a group of 
similar modules will lie within some specified or 
assumed range about the nominal values. 
Furthermore, in establishing a true measure of 
the inherent reliability of a module, attention 
must be given not only to the effects of cata- 
strophic failure but also to the effects of degra- 
dation resulting from changes and variations in 
the characteristics of the parts. 
Several authors have considered various 
techniques which may be employed in obtaining a 
realistic picture of the variations in reliability 
which may be expected from variations in parts. 
The methods considered include the use of 
analysis of variance to obtain the expressions for 
the module reliabilitv in terms of random 
(B6, M10) and the derivation of expressions 
relating output tolerance to part tolerances (D7, 
D8, M16) as  well a s  the application of other 
statistical techniques (M7). An analysis of the 
effects of part variations can lead to the 
recognition of areas  where improvement i s  
desirable or where changes can be made that will 
aid in optimizing the reliability of the design, 
Prediction of Equipment Reliability 
A survey of the current literature reveals 
a variety of appraaches to the prediction of 
equipment and systems reliability. An analysis 
of these approaches discloses many points in 
common and also shows that i n  some instances 
several of these approaches must be combined to 
obtain a valid prediction for a complex equip- 
ment. To achieve greatest effectiveness in the 
use of these techniques, one must define care-  
fully the type of prediction desired and then 
select the one or  more approaches necessary. 
The ways in which the use of prediction tech- 
niques may aid in improvement of equipment, a s  
well a s  the results of having employed pre- 
diction in the development of certain equipments 
are  discussed in Section 6. 
Selection of Prediction Techniaue 
The selection of the preferred technique 
for a particular reliability analysis may be 
resolved on the basis of the following consider- 
ations : 
(a) Project Requirements - Does the 
project require that a specified technique be 
employed ? 
(b) Purpose of Prediction - Reliability 
predictions may be used to establish adequacy 
of proposed designs at  time of bidding, to 
measure compliance with reliability specifica- 
tions, and to analyze design improvements. 
The first  two uses require an absolute estimate 
of the inherent reliability, which i s  the most 
difficult type to make with high accuracy. When 
the purpose of the analysis i s  to obtain a r ela- 
tive evaluation of alternative designs or to 
locate major weak links, simplifying assump - 
tions often may be made, 
(c) Type of Equipment or System - 
Several classes of techniques, each relating to 
,, particular types of equipment, a r e  available. 
Some of these techniques a r e  especially useful 
, 
where a switching -circuit analogy i s  applicable. 
Mher techniques apply to situations where 
degradation-type failures m u ~ t  be considered 
or where the consequence of failure of a part  
differ according to i ts  mode of failure. 
(d) Phase of Design - The phase of the 
design process determines the amount ofdetail 
information available about the equipment and 
thus which technique may be appropriate. 
variables representing the part characteristics . 
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(e) Reliability versus Other Parameters 
- In many complex equipments and systems such 
a s  those which include alternate modes of oper- 
ations, the more advanced concept of system 
effectiveness or system worth (which includes 
consideration of reliability, maintainability, 
and related factors) must be employed in ob- 
taining a measure of probability of successful 
performance 
(f) Degree of Accuracy Desired - The 
refinement of a prediction to include consider- 
ations, such as ,  confidence limits associated 
with estimates and variations in operational 
requirements for success during a given 
mission, naturally leads to the use of more 
advanced prediction techniques. 
Elementary Prediction Techniques 
The oldest technique for the numerical 
Gr ediction of equipment reliability i s  based on 
the application of the product rule and simple 
redundancy considerations. This technique is 
valid and extremely useful where the modules 
composing an equipment operate in a simple 
series and/or redundant configuration with 
respect to reliability. One of the more mathe- 
matical treatments of reliability analysis tech- 
niques (A6) discusses the product rule and shows 
that actually it can be applied with reasonable 
validity to a variety of situations. A recent 
publication (C4) provides an excellent descrip- 
tion of this technique. 
Another approach i s  the prediction by 
equipment function. One handbook (S7) pre- 
scribes the use of this technique a s  the first 
step in a reliability analysis. In this technique, 
the reliability of a new equipment or system i s  
developed by comparing the function of the new 
device, or portions thereof, with that of existing 
devices of similar function and complexity and 
known reliability. Other activities have recog- 
nized the value of this approach and a research 
study directed a t  extending the applicability of 
the technique and provision of backup data i s  
currently contemplated (R 12). 
A technique useful in the early stages of 
the design of electronic equipment i s  based on 
the active-element-group (AEG) concept which i s  
described in Section 2.3. If simple redundancies 
a re  evident in the equipment, the AEG prediction, 
of course, should be made on a module basis and 
the module reliabilities combined using the tech- 
nique considered above. 
A fourth technique (B 14), sometimes' 
termed "Cause and Effect Analysis", i s  more 
qualitative than quantitative. However, when it 
is  applied systematically, it can lead to realis- 
tic appraisal of possible sources of unreliability 
and of the merits of alternative approaches to 
correct such unr eliability. The application of 
this technique results in a detailed, systematic 
analysis of the relationship of various parts to 
the whole; identification of modes of failure and 
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the effects of such failures; analyeis of means of 
eliminating failures; and a summarization of 
necessary. design improvements and expected 
success of the device in the intended application. 
Use of Switching-Circuit Analogy 
A number of the earliest paperg on the 
subject of reliability prediction relate to the 
reliability of switching circuits (B2 1, F7, GI). 
Since the switch i s  a two-state device - either 
open or closed - i t  was soon evident that a 
switching circuit ~ o u l d  be considered an ana- 
logue of any group of interconnected elements 
where the operation of each element could be 
described a s  either a success or a failure. 
Thus, the analogy i s  particularly applicable to 
equipment such a s  a missile wheze the success 
of the flight depends on the success or failure of 
the constituent components during the flight 
interval. 
Three steps a re  essential in the appli- 
cation of the switching-circuit analogy to the 
prediction of reliability: 
(a) Preparation of a circuit diagram 
where each component i s  represented by a 
switch, the open position being analogous to 
failure and closed position analogous to success. 
(b) Derivation of a formula (transfer 
function) for transmission through the circuit 
showing all combinations of switch closures 
which can lead to success. 
(c) Interpretation of the formula for 
successful transmission in terms of probability 
of success by substituting for symbols denoting 
switch closure, the probability of such closure; 
and for symbols denoting open switches, the 
probability of failure. 
In this procedure, the .principal effort 
centers around step (b), the derivation of the 
formula. Early papers suggest the development 
of complete tables of all of the independent ways 
in which success could be obtained and the sum- 
mation of these terms to achieve the desired 
formula, Later, symbolic logic (K7, S3) and 
Boolean algebra were recognized (F7, GI) a s  
valuable aids in the derivation of the required 
formula. 
Extensions of this technique to switches 
or components which exhibit three distinct states 
(F7) and to complex milti-element, series - 
parallel networks' (L3) .have been described. A 
more recent paper treats the application to sys- 
tems which include requirements for sequential 
operation of its components (K15). 
Use of Reliability Block Diagrams 
An examination of the usual engineering 
block diagram for an equipment reveals that the 
diagram generally depicts the interrelationship 
between modules or other subportions of the 
equipment which must perform successfully if 
the equipment i s  to operate successfully. Based 
on this observation, the idea of preparing a 
r eliability block diagram" which would show 
clearly the reliability interrelations, was devel- 
oped (B12, F9, H13, K10). The principal dis- 
tinction between a reliability block diagram and 
the conventional engineering block diagram is 
that the reliability diagram must include blocks 
representing power supplies and similar auxil- 
ia ry  devices, the functioning of which contributes 
directly to the success of the equipment, a s  well 
a s  blocks for those portions of the equipment that 
perform a primary service in fulfilling the in- 
tended function. 
The reliatiliby block diagram often may be 
developed directly f rom the engineering block 
diagram through the addition of blocks to repre-  
sent power supplies and similar units (BIZ). 
Another approach (H13) consists of starting with 
a block labeledttThis equipment will perform 
successfully if" and connecting to that block by 
appropriate se r i e s  or series-parallel arrange- 
ments blocks describing operations which must 
be successful if the equipment i s  to operate 
successfully. Series blocks a r e  connected with 
lines bearing the words "and if" and parallel 
blocks a r e  connected with lines bearing the word 
"or. l1 Thus i t  becomes possible to start  a t  the 
f i rs t  block and read, "This equipment will per-  
form successfully if. . . and if. . . and i f .  . . or.  . . 
etc. , " where the resulting sentence provides a 
complete description of modes of successful 
operation. The purpose of either of these 
approaches i s  to establish a clear means of 
communicating engineering knowledge concerning 
the equipment to the mathematician who i s  to 
derive the reliability formula. The reliability 
block diagram often should be accompanied by 
either a definition of the requirements for 
equipment success or a tabulation of those 
minimum combinations of portions of the 
equipment that will lead to successful equipment 
operation if they a r e  simultaneously successful. 
The next step after  obtaining the reliability 
diagram i s  to derive the reliability formula de- 
scribing the probability of successful operation. 
For  equipments where the diagram indicates 
that the elements a r e  in  a simple series-parallel 
arrangement, the procedures described in Section 
3 .2  may be employed for the more complex 
equipments, several procedures based on easy to 
follow rules that lead to the derivation of valid 
formulas have been proposed (B12, F9, K10). 
Boolean algebra may prove useful in  this regard, 
but i t  i s  not clear from the literature if this 
algebra i s  sufficiently powerful to lead to the 
derivation of the desired formula without the use 
of several supplementary rules (B12, H13, K10, 
R2). 
Refinement of Prediction 
The techniques discussed so far  in this 
section have related to the problem of deriving a 
formula, or mathematical model, for the rel i-  
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ability of an equipment under the conditions 
where a single reliability block diagram or 
switching-circuit analogue i s  applicable to  the 
entire period of operation, and the reliability of 
each portion of the equipment i s  a constant for 
that period of operation. Many authors have 
recognized that such conditions often do not 
exist; thus, extensions or refinements i n  the 
prediction techniques a r e  desirable in order to 
obtain greater accuracy in the results. 
Several papers have discussed the matter 
of obtaining a n  estimate of possible variations 
in equipment reliability due to variations in  the 
reliability of the Constituent parts  (Bb, K10, 
M10); however, the need for further work i s  
acknowledged (A6) . Useful indications of 
possible variations in equipment reliability may 
be obtained by making three computations where, 
respectively, optimistic, expected, and pessi- 
mistic values of reliability a r e  assumed for the 
various parts  of the equipment (T5). Another 
approach i s  to analyze the variations in equip- 
ment reliability with respect to the variations in 
reliability of the constituent par ts  through the 
use of partial derivatives of the reliability for-  
mula (B 13). Several more advanced techniques 
a r e  discussed in Section 4. 
As  the prediction techniques were ex- 
tended to more  complex equipment and systems, 
i t  became apparent that some measure of good- 
ness which i s  more comprehensive than the con- 
cept of reliability, a s  usually employed, would 
be desirable. One concept (F9, H14, 53) - often 
called system effectiveness - makes provisions 
for incorporating considerations such a s  the 
relative significance of alternate modes of oper- 
ation and the effects of maintenance (R12). A 
recently proposed system-value concept would 
include not only system effectiveness but also 
such basic factors a s  production time, support 
requirements, and an evaluation of the effective- 
ness of the equipment i n  accomplishing the de- 
sired function so  a s  to provide an accurate 
numerical means of choosing between alternative 
equipments for the same task (K13). The tech- 
niques of reliability prediction, perhaps with 
slight alterations, a r e  basic to both system- 
effectiveness and system-value calculations. 
Other techniques necessary in  these calculations 
a r e  beyond the scope of this paper. 
Another problem concerns the prediction 
of reliability for an  equipment which during a 
given period of use may pass through successive 
intervals where requirements for successful 
performance vary significantly. In some in- 
stances, the desired over -all reliability figure 
may be obtained from a combination of the 
reliabilities for the separate nitervals (P2) and 
in others, the need for techniques of higher 
mathematics (Klb) become apparent. 
An excellent means of refining any rel i-  
ability prediction i s  to make use of such limited 
test data a s  may come available early in the 
development of the equipment. A recently 
reported non-linear estimation technique for 
obtaining an approximation of the expected value 
of the constant failure rate of an  item of equip- 
ment from data obtained during the "debugging" 
period (R17) i s  typical of the current  effort in 
this regard. 
Advanced ~athematical /~tat is t ical  Techniques 
Besides the techniques described in  the 
preceding sections, many new ones a r e  being 
developed in an effort to obtain means for  
achieving valid predictions of reliability, par-  
ticularly in  complex situations. These new 
techniques often a r e  derived from the application 
of advanced mathematical and statistical proce- 
dures based on information theory, Monte Carlo 
methods, l inear programing, queuing theory, 
Boolean algebra, Bayels theorem, and various 
distribution theories such a s  exponential, 
Weibull, gamma, normal, log-normal, chi- 
square, Poisson, and binomial. In order to 
apply each of these theories or distributions, 
appropriate raw failure, usage, replacement, 
and maintenance-time data, a s  well a s  an  under- 
standing of the inferences that can be drawn. from 
the ensuing analysis, must be available. 
A problem often encountered in reliability 
studies i s  that of predicting the probability dis- 
tribution of some performance parameter. In 
most cases,  an exact analytical solution i s  not 
feasible because of the difficulty in  the required 
integration. The distribution of the performance 
parameter can be obtained, however, by mathe- 
matical simulation based on the Monte Carlo 
method (B16, D10, F2, F4, Ul) .  This method 
constitutes a "cut and try" approach where the 
working mechanisms of the equipment a r e  sim- 
ulated based on the general mathematical model 
of that equipment. 
As an example of this method, consider 
a simple ser ies  circuit configuration expressed 
by the equation 
where ed i s  the voltage drop across  the LCR 
circuit a s  a function of t .  It i s  recognized that 
the response e for a succession of identical d pulses of i will not always be the same but rather 
will have some probability distribution with 
respect to time. Monte Carlo simulation i s  one 
means of defining the distribution of ed so that 
realistic safety margins can be established 
without actual test  of the circuit. Appropriate 
random numbers a r e  used to simulate the dis- 
tribution of each circuit characteristic, R ,  L,  
and C,  with respect to time. A cumulative 
probability distribution then i s  computed for ed 
to obtain the probabilities of exceeding certain 
limits or safety margins. 
performance parameters can be established. 
Safety margins may be apportioned to the various 
stages of a design if not to the par ts  themselves. 
Since these analyses a r e  only a s  accurate a s  the 
mathematical model used in the simulation, con- 
sideration must  be given to the possible effect of 
nonlinearities and interactions that a r e  not in- 
cluded. 
In employing Monte Carlo o r  other sim- 
ulation techniques, the appropriate distributions 
for describing the performance parameters must 
be selected and random numbers with the same 
underlying distri6utions generated. (B16, Rl) .  
The appropriate distribution, of course, must  be 
selected on the basis of historical knowledge 
about the expected distribution of a process. A 
method for programing uniformly distributed 
random numbers and also random numbers from 
the exponential, Weibull, log-normal, Poisson, 
and Chi-square distributions has  been developed 
(J6). 
Another tool in  today's technology which 
i s  finding usefulness in system availability and 
maintainability studies i s  queuing theory (B 16, 
B7, K6, M12). Basically this theory i s  con- 
cerned with the optimization of the waiting t ime 
(time to repair  or replace) subject to random 
times of ar r ival  (random times to failure). The 
object i s  to establish the procedure for servicing 
the maximum number of arrivals i n  the shortest 
possible. time. 
To  illustrate, consider the equipment 
that experiences random failures over i t s  operatin 
and storage life. Certain periods of t ime a r e  
required to search for and replace various 
failed parts .  The design goal i s  to  establish the 
equipment configuration that minimizes down 
time. Queuing theory seeks the best combination 
of search time and replacement time. If data a r e  
available on time to failure, search time, and 
replacement time, these analyses may be c a r  - 
ried out effectively. If appropriate data a r e  
unavailable, realistic results often may be 
obtained by simulating distributions based on the 
failure r a tes  of the parts or  modules. 
If the future probability states of a n  equip- 
ment depend only on the immediate past history, 
then the process i s  Markovian (BZ). Any equip- 
ment whose parts  fail approximately according to 
a n  exponential distribution can be described a s  a 
stationary Markov process. A non-stationary 
Markov process exists where the failure ra tes  
change with time. Markovian techniques can be 
used to consider the effects of both component 
drift and catastrophic failure (B19, Kl6). 
Among other advanced analysis proce- 
dures which might be mentioned are :  
(a) The use of vector analysis techniques 
to study the reliability of multicomponent struc- 
tures i n  ser ies  and parallel configurations (BIO). 
Thus, through the use of random numbers 
and circuit equations, distributions of output 
3 ,  
(b) The application of Bayets theorem 
to reliability (B3, M15). 
(c) The application of various distri- 
butions, their density functions and variances, 
means, failure rates, etc. (H6). 
The advanced mathematical and statistic- 
a l  techniques useful in reliability prediction are  
generally so complex that it i s  impossible to 
present an adequate description of their appli- 
cation, function and value in this survey paper. 
The reference documents cited can provide the 
reader with more information on these methods. 
Other Prediction Techniques 
The literature survey carried out in con- 
junction with the preparation of this paper re- 
veals that almost all the prediction techniques 
fall into the categories discussed in Sections 2, 
3, and 4. Of the remaining techniques, several 
deserve mention because of their unique approach 
and possible application to various situations 
which the engineer may encounter. 
One paper (K5) describes three techniques, 
the first two of which a re  reported to be in cur- 
rent use. The first of these, "Predicting Reli- 
ability by Using a Standard, t~ leads to the devel- 
opment of "Relative' Complexity Factorsft which 
serve a s  a measure of the relative unreliability 
of specific parts a s  compared to the unreliability 
of some standard, unity-complexity-factor part. 
The second method, "Predicting Reliability by 
Using Rating Factor s t t  results in the tabulation 
of rating factors based on engineering judgment, 
manufacturing complexity, mean-life data, 
state-of -the-art, and other information which 
might affect reliability. It i s  suggested that 
several groups of engineers be asked to develop 
rating factors for the same parts and then a 
composite set of average values be derived for 
use in prediction studies. The third method, 
"Predicting Reliability by Relative Utility Eval- 
uation, It i s  based on the computation of a "KM 
factor for each device where K i s  the product of 
cost times weight times volume. Failure data 
from a variety of electronic and mechanical 
subsystems a r e  used to demonstrate that the 
associated ItKtt factors a r e  useful predictors of 
relative reliability. 
Another approach to predictions(P5) i s  to 
compute the over-all reliability as  a product of 
the design reliability times the component reli- 
ability times the reliability of fabrication. Tech- 
niques for estimating the.latter two expressions 
in this product a re  described. 
A third paper (R14), which perhaps could 
have been included in Section 4 of this survey, 
suggests an approach to system analysis which 
would organize engineering design information 
and data on component performance in a way 
suitable for the application of probability theory 
and the techniques of mathematical statistics. 
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This approach i s  shown to be particularly signif- 
icant when effects such a s  combined environinent, 
interdependence of failures, and confidence 
intervals for performance characteristics must 
be considered. 
Use and Validity of Reliability Prediction I 
(a) An absolute estimate of the inherent 
reliability of equipment. 
Throughout this paper, it has been 
tacitly assumed that the development of a. reli- 
ability prediction results in valid information 
that i s  distinctly useful in a design program. 
Several authors (B18, L6, W8, W9) have 
questioned this assumption; but with the excep- 
tion of one, they have concluded that ,when pre- 
dictions a r e  developed properly, using suffi- 
ciently accurate basic informati,on, the results 
a r e  useful. Others (B8, F1, T6) have pointed 
to the conditions for making a useful prediction 
and their resulting value in system analysis. 
Briefly, predictions have been found to be useful 
and valid, from a designer's point of view, for 
obtaining: 
(b) Relative evaluations of the reliability 
of alternative design approaches . 
- 
(c) Information on "weak links, a s  an 
aid to design improvement. 
From a manager's point of view, predictions 
a r e  useful for: 
( 1) Establishing adequacy of proposed 
design at time of bidding. 
(2) Measuring conformance to reliability 
specifications~ 
(3) Planning reliability test programs; 
in particular, estimating duration of test programs 
a s  an aid in preparation of schedules and 
budgets, 
(4) Analyzing design improvements. 
Uses (1). (2). and (3) relate generally to (a), or 1 the obtainment of an absolute estimate of the 
inherent reliability, whereas (4) relates to 8 \ 
items (b) and (c). 
One of the basic reasons for developing 
reliability prediction techniques was to provide 
means for estimating the reliability of a device 
from design data in order to obtain a reasonable 
measure of the adequacy of the design in terms 
of the specification or use requir.ements. To 
achieve a prediction useful for this purpose, 
great care must be employed in both the devel- 
opment of the mathematical model and the 
choice of the numerical reliability data for use 
in the model. The data must be appropriate to 
the specific parts, the circuit and environmental 
stresses, and such other factors as  may affect 
the ultimate reliability. Several investigations 
nave shown that agreement between predicted and 
measured reliabilities may be within assigned 
confidence limits. More typical of the results 
a r e  situations where the measured reliability, in 
terms of mean-time-between-failure, ranges 
from one-third to two times the predicted value. 
A variety of comparisons a re  discussed in the 
literature (A7, B20, D2, G1, H2, N1, R6, V2, 
V3). 
I Another use of reliability prediction i s  to 
1 obtain comparative evaluations of alternate 
I designs, or of an  existing design and a proposed 
improvement. In situations such a s  these, i f  
the emphasis i s  put on the comparison and not on 
the estimation of the absolute value of the reli- 
ability, the requirements for prediction a r e  
relaxed and greater accuracy may be expected. 
To obtain this accuracy, the same basic rules 
must be followed in the analysis of the alternate 
designs; and comparable reliability data must be 
used. Of course, many variations in design may 
be studied; the literature gives particular atten- 
tion to the use of prediction techniques in the 
analysis of the effects of redundancy (Bl, K12, 
M9). 
Perhaps the most valuable use of reli- 
ability prediction i s  in the analysis of a design to 
establish its weakest links from the point of view 
of reliability, a s  an aid in design improvement. 
The simplest approach in this regard is merely 
to make gross comparisons between the reli- 
ability of various modules in the equipment to 
establish those modules which exhibit the lowest 
reliability. As the complexity of a system grows, 
a simple inspection of the results of the predic- 
tion may not be adequate. Under these circum- 
stances, a useful procedure i s  to evaluate the 
partial derivatives of the reliability formula for 
the equipment,with respect to the reliability of 
i ts constituent parts to establish which module 
reliabilities can cause the greatest change in 
equipment reliability (B 13, L3). More advanced 
mathematical techniques, some of which a r e  
described briefly in Section 4, also a re  useful in 
this regard either singly or in conjunction with 
computer studies. 
, Concluding Remarks 
As noted in the introduction, the purpose 
of this paper i s  to provide a compendium of in- 
formation useful to an engineer in selecting the 
reliability prediction technique appropriate to 
his requirements. In fulfilling this purpose we 
have evolved a guide to those basic techniques 
which have received reasonably wide acceptance 
and have listed a considerable number of refer- 
ences which have received reasonably wide 
acceptance and have listed a considerable number 
of references which may be consulted for further 
information. 
hypothesized and older techniques a r e  being 
substantiated a n d o r  improved. Therefore, we 
offer this work a s  a stepping stone from the old 
to the new with the hope that it will aid many 
groups in obtaining maximum benefit from the 
current technology a s  the need for reliability 
prediction increases for both military and com- 
mercial products. 
The authors will welcome correspondence 
from any who wish to aid in maintaining this 
compendium complete and up to date. To facil- 
itate the utilization of correspondence, it i s  
requested that a copy of any communication, 
including enclosures thereto, be sent to each 
author. 
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HYDRAULIC CONTROL R E L l A B l L l T Y  I N  S P A C E  VEHICLES 
B Y 
A. B. B I L L E T  
SENIOR S T A F F  ENGINEER 
V I C K E R S  INCORPORATED 
DETROIT, M I C H I G A N  
SUMMARY IT  I S  H I G H L Y  S I G N I F I C A N T  T O  THESE V I T A L  
SPACE PROGRAMS T H A T  THE A E R O S P A C E  INDUSTRY 
T H I S  PAPER I S  C O N C E R N E D  W I T H  THE R E L I A -  NOW R E C O G N I Z E S  T H A T  R E L I A B I L I T Y  I S  ONE OF 
B I L I T Y  OF H Y D R A U L I C  C O N T R O L S  ON P R E S E N T  T H E  MOST P E R T I N E N T  P A R T S  O F  T H E S E  PROGRAMS. 
M I S S I L E S  AND S P A C E  VEHICLES.  THE S P E C I A L  
TECHNIQUES AND PROBLEMS T H A T  REQUIRED HYDRAULIC C O N T R O L S  IN S P A C E  ENVIRONMENTS 
S O L V I N G  ARE R E V I E W E D  TO M E E T  T H E  H l G H  
R E L I A B I L I T Y  R E Q U I R E M E N T S  OF T H E  CONTROL IN R E S P E C T  TO T H E  NEW P R O B L E M S  A N D  NEW 
S Y S T E M S  O F  THE MINUTEMAN, ATLAS, POLARIS, ENVIRONMENT STUDIES T H A T  S P A C E  T R A V E L  H A S  
AND SKYBOLT  VEHICLES.  BROUGHT ABOUT, SPECIAL CONSIDERATION H A S  
B E E N  G I V E N  T O  F U R T H E R  T H E  D E V E L O P M E N T  A N D  
T H I S  H A S  R E S U L T E D  I N  THE DEVELOPMENT O F  FURTHER I N C R E A S E  T H E  R E L I A B I L I T Y  OF HYD-  
NEW R E L I A B I L I T Y  T E C H N I Q U E S  A N D  A N A L Y S E S  R A U L I C  C O N T R O L S  F O R  T H E S E  S P A C E  V E H I C L E S .  
T O  M E E T  T H E S E  R E Q U I R E M E N T S .  
FIGURE 1 SHOWS A  SUMMARY O F  T H E  M A J O R  
~ N T R O D U C T I O N  E N V I R O N M E N T A L  C O N D I T I O N S  T H A T  M I G H T  B E  
E X P E C T E D  I N  T H E  N E X T  T E N  Y E A R S  O F  S P A C E  
I T  IS  H I G H L Y  S I G N I F I C A N T  T H A T  A S  WE FL IGHT.  THE P R E L I M I N A R Y  I N S T R U M E N T A T I O N  
E N T E R  OUR F I F T H  YEAR OF S P A C E  E X P L O R A T I O N  S A T E L L I T E S  H A V E  SHOWN T H A T  I N  SOME C A S E S  
WE S E E  C O N T I N U A L  A D D E D  E M P H A S I S  B E I N G  SOME O F  T H E  A C T U A L  E N V I R O N M E N T S  E N C O U N T E R E D  
P L A C E D  UPON T H E  R E L I A B I L I T Y  O F  S P A C E  WERE C O N S I D E R A B L Y  D I F F E R E N T  T H A N  T H A T  
V E H I C L E S .  P R E V I O U S L Y  THOUGHT TO E X I S T .  1 B E L I E V E  
T H A T  MUCH O F  OUR F U T U R E  E X P L O R A T I O N  O F  
W I T H  THE E N T R Y  OF MAN INTO THE S P A C E  S P A C E  W I L L  BE B A S E D  UPON THE F A C T  T H A T  IN  
ENVIRONMENT THE NEED FOR R E L I A B I L I T Y  H A S  A P A S T  THREE Y E A R  PERIOD T H E  UNITED S T A T E S  
BECOME E V E N  G R E A T E R .  W E  A R E  NOT O N L Y  CON- H A S  L A U N C H E D  66 I N S T R U M E N T A T I O N  S A T E L L I T E S .  
C E R N E D  W l T H  T H E  MANY M I L L I O N  D O L L A R S  OF 
MONEY E X P E N D I T U R E S ,  B U T  NOW WE ARE CON- THE H Y P E R - E N V I R O N M E N T S  T H A T  T H E  C O N T R O L  
C E R N E D  W l T H  R E L I A B I L I T Y  I N  R E G A R D  TO HUMAN E Q U I P M E N T  MUST B E  D E S I G N E D  TO E I T H E R  
LIFE.  DURING THE L A T T E R  P A R T  OF T H I S  OPERATE IN, OR BE I N  S A T I S F A C T O R Y  S T A T I C  
D E C A D E  WE W I L L  SEE T H E  B E G I N N I N G  O F  L U N A R  C O N D I T I O N  I N ,  I N C L U D E  T H E  N A T U R A L  E N V I R O N -  
E X P L O R A T  1  ON. M E N T S  S U C H  A S  H I G H  T E M P E R A T U R E  A N D  T E M P -  
E R A T U R E  SHOCK, LOW AMB I E N T  PRESSURE,  OZONE 
I T  S P E A K S  W E L L  F O R  R E L I A B I L I T Y  T H A T  T H E  CONTENT,  R A D I A T I O N ,  C O S M I C  R A Y S ,  D I S A S S O C I -  
UNITED S T A T E S )  F I R S T  S P A C E  EFFORT,  EXPLORER A T I O N  ( A T O M I C  O X Y G E N ) ,  AND OTHERS.  
1, A 31 LB. C Y L I N D E R )  W H I C H  W A S  LAUNCHED O N  
JANUARY 31, 1958, I S  S T I L L  I N  O R B I T .  I T  FIGURE 2 SHOWS P O S S I B L E  P R O J E C T E D  S P A C E  
I S  T R U L Y  S I G N I F I C A N T  R E L I A B I L I T Y - W I S E  T H A T  V E H I C L E S  D U R I N G  THE N E X T  S E V E N  YEARS, 
T H I S  P I O N E E R  S P A C E C R A F T  MAY S T I L L  B E  I N  TOGETHER W I T H  T H O S E  O F  T H E  P A S T  F I V E  YEARS. 
O R B I T  WHEN MAN F I R S T  S E T S  F O O T  ON T H E  MOON 
D U R I N G  THE L A T T E R  P A R T  O F  T H I S  DECADE.  MINIMIZING S P A C E  ENVIRONMENTS 
I B E L I E V E  T H A T  1962 W I L L  PROVE TO B E  ONE 
O F  T H E  MOST P H E N O M E N A L  A N D  A C T I V E  Y E A R S  I N  
THE GOLDEN DECADE, 1960 T O  1970, OF S P A C E  
E X P L O R A T I O N .  THE Y E A R  1962 WILL P R O B A B L Y  
SEE A T O T A L  O F  5 T O  6 MANNED O R B I T A L  S P A C E  
F L I G H T S  W l T H  TWO OF T H E S E  P R O B A B L Y  B E I N G  
OF T H E  18 O R B I T A L  T Y P E .  THIS  SAME Y E A R  W I L L  
P R O B A B L Y  S E E  MORE T H A N  10 M A J O R  L A U N C H  
V E H I C L E  T E S T S  I N C L U D I N G  T H O S E  OF THE  SCOUT^ 
C E N T A U R ,  A N D  S A T U R N  V E H I C L E S .  
O T H E R  S P A C E  E F F O R T S  W I L L  P R O B A B L Y  INCLUDE 
S I X  C O M M U N I C A T I O N  V E H I C L E S )  F l V E  METEOROLOG- 
I C A L )  A N D  P E R H A P S  T H E  MOST S I G N I F I C A N T  OF 
A L L ,  THE B E G I N N I N G  O F  OUR L U N A R  E X P L O R A T I O N  
WORK ON T H E  RANGER PROGRAM* 
ONE O F  T H E  MAJOR W A Y S  OF R E D U C I N G  THE 
E F F E C T S  OF T H E S E  C O M B I N E D  E N V I R O N M E N T S  I S  
T H E  I N T E G R A T E D  P A C K A G I N G  OF T H E S E  H Y D R A U L I C  
C O N T R O L S  FOR S P A C E  O P E R A T I O N .  T Y P I C A L  O F  
T H I S  P A C K A G I N G  OF E Q U I P M E N T  I S  SHOWN I N  
FIGURE 3, S H O W I N G  THE C U T A W A Y  O F  A M O T O R -  
PUMP U S E D  IN THE MINUTEMAN M I S S I L E  A P P L I -  
C A T I O N .  
T H E  P A C K A G I N G  O F  C O M P O N E N T S  M I N I M I Z E S  
OR E L I M I N A T E S  SUCH P R O B L E M S  A S  E X T E R N A L  
L E A K A G E ,  V A R Y I N G  E F F E C T S  O F  G R A V I T Y  I N  
W I D E L Y  S P A C E D  COMPONENTS, A N D  OTHER PROBLEMS.  
THE FIGURE 3 P A C K A G I N G  C O N T A I N S  A N  E L E C T R I C  
MOTOR, H Y D R A U L I C  PUMP, R E S E R V O I R ,  H Y D R A U L I C  
F I L T E R )  CHECK V A L V E  P R E S S U R E  TRANSDUCER,  
PRESSURE S W I T C H ,  F I ~ L  AND B L E E D  D I S C O N N E C T S .  
FOR MINIMIZING TEMPERATURE EFFECTS IN 
MANY H Y D R A U L I C  SYSTEM COMPONENTS USED I N  
OUTER SPACE, S T A I N L E S S  S T E E L  "0" R I N G S  ARE 
USED I N  PLACE OF S E A L S  MADE FROM ELASTOMERIC 
MATERIAL .  IN THE CASE OF THE E L E C T R I C  
D R I V E  MOTOR, A THERMISTOR I S  IMBEDDED I N  
THE MOTOR F I E L D  C O I L  TO MEASURE C R I T I C A L  
OPERATING TEMPERATURES OF THE MOTOR AND 
PREVENT I N A D V E R T E N T  OVERHEATING DURING 
OPERATION.  THE THERMISTOR CAN B E  USED I N  
AN E L E C T R I C A L  B R I D G E  C I R C U I T  TO AUTOMATI -  
C A L L Y  CUT OR REDUCE POWER I N  THE EVENT THAT 
OVERHEATING OCCURS. 
FOR M I N I M I Z A T I O N  OF THE E F F E C T S  OF LOW 
AMBIENT  PRESSURES AND WEIGHTLESSNESS,  THE 
I N T E G R A T E D  H Y D R A U L I C  SYSTEM PACKAGE I S  
THE MOST E F F E C T I V E  MEANS I N  REDUCING THESE 
EFFECTS.  A S  I N  THE CASE OF THE MOTORPUMP 
SHOWN I N  FIGURE 3, A S E A L E D  S T E E L  BELLOWS 
"BOOTSTRAP"  TYPE RESERVOIR IS  USED FOR 
P R E S S U R I Z I N G  THE I N L E T  S I D E  OF THE SYSTEM. 
THE w ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ n  T Y P E  RESERVOIR USES HIGH 
SYSTEM PRESSURE ON A D I F F E R E N T I A L  AREA TO 
P R E S S U R I Z E  THE LOW PRESSURE PART OF THE 
SYSTEM. 
A S  A R E S U L T  OF THE COMBINED ENVIRON-  
MENTAL O P E R A T I N G  C O N D I T I O N S  AND THE RESULT-  
ANT E X P E N D I T U R E S  OF M I L L I O N S  OF DOLLARS 
FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THESE SPACE V E H I C L E S  
AND T H E I R  COMPONENTS, EXTREME E M P H A S I S  
HAS BEEN PLACED D U R I N G  THE PAST  FEW YEARS 
ON I N - F L I G H T  R E L I A B I L I T Y .  THIS IMPORTANCE 
I S  FURTHER E M P H A S I Z E D  W l T H  THE CARRYING OF 
MAN I N T O  SPACE. THIS HAS RESULTED I N  NEW 
CONTROLS AND NEW TECHNIQUES B E I N G  A P P L I E D  
TO O B T A I N  THE D E S I R E D  R E L I A B I L I T Y .  SOME OF 
THE S P E C I A L  PROCEDURES FOR THE H Y D R A U L I C  
COMPONENTS USED I N  SUCH V E H I C L E S  AS THE 
MINUTEMAN, POLARIS, A T L A S ,  AND SKYBOLT  
M I S S I L E S  ARE B R I E F L Y  SUMMARIZED. 
THE A U X I L I A R Y  POWER S Y S T E M  SHOWN I N  
FIGURE 3 I S  USED I N  THE CONTROL SYSTEM OF 
THE MINUTEMAN MISSILE. THE F I R S T  STAGE 
COMPONENT HAS A V A R I A B L E  D I S P L A C E M E N T  PUMP 
THAT PRODUCES 3.7 GALLONS PER M I N U T E  AT 
12,000 RPM PUMP SPEED. A T  3000 P S I ,  T H l S  
IS  6-1/2 HORSEPOWER. SIMILAR UNITS  OF 
SMALLER C A P A C I T Y  ARE USED I N  THE SECOND 
AND THIRD S T A G E S  OF THE MINUTEMAN VEHICLE,  
W H I C H  IS  SHOWN IN FIGURE 4. 
THE EQUIPMENT ON TH IS  PROGRAM HAS A 
R E L I A B I L I T Y  REQUIREMENT OF 0.9998 FOR A 
F L I G H T  DUTY CYCLE. PREVIOUSLY, I N  THE 
NORMAL LONG L I F E  U N I T S  THE T E S T  DATA 
R E Q U I R E D  TO S U B S T A N T I A T E  R E L I A B I L I T Y  
F I G U R E S  WERE OFTEN OF AN EXTREMELY P R O H I B -  
I T I V E  NATURE I N  RESPECT TO BOTH MONEY AND 
TIME. HOWEVER, W I T H  MANY OF THE MORE 
RECENT M I S S I L E  A P P L I C A T I O N S  I N  WHICH A 
SHORT LIFE T ~ I  ME 1 s t  SPECIFIED, SYCH A S  OF 
100 T O  200 HOUR MEAN TIME BETWEEN FAILURES, 
ACTUAL  T E S T I N G  PROGRAMS TO I N D I C A T E  R E L I A -  
B I L I T Y  ARE NOW W I T H I N  THE SCOPE OF A V A I L A B L E  
MONEY. 
TO P E R M I T  THE A S C E R T A T I O N  OF T H l S  DATA 
W I T H I N  A REASONABLE T I M E  P E R I O D  AND AT  A 
REASONABLE COST, CONFIDENCE FACTORS I N  
THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF 60 PERCENT T O  70 PERCENT 
ARE NOW USED I N S T E A D  OF THE P R E V I O U S L Y  
D I C T A T E D  90 PERCENT OR HIGHER. 
THE MINUTEMAN A U X I L I A R Y  POWER SYSTEM 
R E L I A B I L I T Y  PROGRAM C O N S I S T S  OF A VERY 
S P E C I A L I Z E D  ADVANCED R E L I A B I L I T Y  CONCEPT. 
ONE OF THE ITEMS ON THIS PROGRAM T H A T  HAS 
B E E N  G I V E N  I N T E N S I V E  A T T E N T I O N  I S  THE VERY 
E X T E N S I V E  MANAGEMENT CONTROL I N  RESPECT 
TO R E L I A B I L I T Y .  THIS HAS I N C L U D E D  A L L  
PHASES O F  MANAGEMENT I N C L U D I N G  THAT  OF 
MANUFACTURING, ENGINEERING,  PURCHASIN,G, 
AND SERVICE .  
ONE OF THE TOP FACTORS OF T H l S  PHASE 
OF THE PROGRAM I S  AN E X C E L L E N T  DATA AND 
I N F O R M A T I O N  V I S I B I L I T Y  C O N D I T I O N  FOR TOP 
MANAGEMENT TO WHERE THEY CONTINUOUSLY 
HAVE THE UPDATED I N F O R M A T I O N  ON THE PROGRAM 
WITHOUT H A V I N G  TO GO THROUGH TWO OR THREE 
LOWER ECHELONS TO O B T A I N  T H l S  M A T E R I A L .  
THIS HAS BROUGHT ABOUT THE E X T E N S I V E  
USE OF THE PROGRAM EVALUATION AND R E V I E W  
TECHNIQUE (PERT) CONCEPT AND W l T H  E V E N  A 
T A I L O R I N G  O F  T H l S  CONCEPT FOR THE S P E C I F I C  
A P P L I C A T I O N .  
FIGURE 5 SHOWS A CONDENSED VERSION OF 
THE PERT NETWORK USED ON T H l S  PROGRAM. 
AS MANY OF YOU ARE ACQUAINTED,  THE O R I G I N A L  
PERT 1 PROGRAM W A S  E V E N T  O R I E N T A T E D  AND 
CONCERNED I T S E L F  ALMOST SOLELY  W l T H  
SCHEDULING.  
THE PROGRAM USED HERE,,' WHICH I S  A 
M O D I F I C A T I O N  OF PERT n, I S  A C T I V I T Y  
O R I E N T A T E D  AND NOT ONLY G I V E S  MAJOR CON- 
CERN FOR SCHEDUL ING B U T  ALSO P R O V I D E S  FOR 
F I N A N C I A L  CONTROL AND A N A L Y S I S  B Y  MANAGE- 
MENT. WITH I T  B E I N G  A C T I V I T Y  ORIENTATED,  
MORE D E T A I L E D  PERT CHARTS SHOW A VERY 
F I N E  A C T I V I T Y  SCHEDUL ING OF T H I N G S  THAT  
HAVE TO B E  DONE. W I T H  T H l S  METHOD I T  I S  
VERY D I F F I C U L T  TO O M I T  SOMETHING U N I N T E N -  
T I O N A L L Y  D U R I N G  THE PROGRAM. THIS  AND 
OTHER PERT NETWORKS ARE WORKING TOOLS TO 
PREPARE A D D l T  I O N A L  I N F O R M A T I O N  FOR MANAGE- 
MENT REVIEW.  
ONE OF THE STRONG POINTS OF T H I ~  PROGRAM 
HAS B E E N  VERY HEAVY E X C E L L E N T  DOCUMENTATION 
FOR EVERY SUB-PHASE OF T H l S  PROGRAM. THIS 
P E R M I T S  A CONTINUOUS M O N I T O R I N G  ON A D A I L Y  
AND WEEKLY B A S I S  AND E L I M I N A T E S  P A S T  . 
D I F F I C U L T I E S  OF H A V I N G  TO GO BACK THROUGH 
H I S T O R Y  AND DOCUMENT THE PROGRAM FROM AN 
AFTER-THE-FACT A C T I V I T Y .  
CORRECTION A C T I O N  BY  MANAGEMENT ON A 
BEFORE-THE-FACT B A S I S  RATHER THAN ON AN 
AFTER-THE-FACT BASIS. THIS IS  ONE OF THE 
STRONGEST P O I N T S  OF T H I S  PHASE O F  THE 
REL IAB IL ITY  PROGRAM. THIS PART OF THE 
PROGRAM HAS PROVED EXTREMELY VALUABLE  WHEN 
A M U L T I - P L A N T  MANUFACTURING A C T I V I T Y  I S  
I N V O L V E D  TOGETHER W l T H  MANY VENDORS. 
UNDER THE PREVIOUS CONVENTIONAL METHODS, 
I N F O R M A T I O N  R E P O R T I N G  BETWEEN PLANTS AND 
VENDORS O F T E N  LAGGED B Y  SEVERAL  WEEKS OR 
S E V E R A L  MONTHS. 
'!I . ? ; - 
TRAIN I NG 0 ,  i. ? . 
A SECOND MAJOR A R E A  IN THE MINUTEMAN 
APU R E L I A B I L I T Y  PROGRAM HAS BEEN A VERY 
COMPREHENSIVE TRAINING A C T I V I T Y .  THIS 
T R A I N I N G  A C T I V I T Y  HAS BEEN VERY E X T E N S I V E  
TO COVER TOP MANAGEMENT DOWN THROUGH A L L  
ELEMENTS OcF S U P E R V I S I O N  TO THE ACTUAL 
WORKER ON THE JOB. 
t 
1 
ONE ~ P E C T  OF THE T R A I N I N G  PROGRAM 
U T I L I Z E S  M O T I V A T I O N  T R A I N I N G  D E S C R I B I N G  
TO EACH L E V E L  T H E I R  PART I N  THE R E L l  A B I L I T Y  
T E A M  EFFORT. T H I S  H A S  BEEN APPROACHED 
FROM A WEAPONS SYSTEMS STANDPOINT. THE 
SECOND PHASE O F  THE T R A I N I N G  APPROACH HAS 
B E E N  THROUGH ON-THE-JOB T R A I N I N G ;  WHICH 
NOT ONLY F A M I L I A R I Z E S  EACH EMPLOYEE I N -  
VOLVED W I T H  T H E I R  S P E C I F I C  D U T I E S ,  BUT  
ENSURES FROM A MANAGEMENT V I S I B I L I T Y  
S T A N D P O I N T  THE ADEQUACY O F  S K I L L S  AND 
NECESSARY PROCEDURAL I N S T R U C T I O N S  SO THAT  
THE PRODUCT CAN B E  PRODUCED I N  A CONTROLLED 
AND F U N C T I O N A L  MANNER. 
THE TRAINING SESSIONS H A V E  INCLUDED 
M O V I E  M A T E R I A L  S U P P L I E D  B Y  BOTH THE P R I M E  
CONTRACTOR AS WELL AS  GOVERNMENT SOURCES 
AND ACTUAL CLASSROOM I N S T R U C T I O N  WORK* 
ONE OF THE FOCAL P O I N T S  O F  THE T R A I N I N G  
PROGRAM I S  THE REQUIREMENT THAT  A L L  PER- 
SONNEL I N  THE MAJOR MANUFACTURING AREAS 
WORKING ON THE MINUTEMAN PROGRAM ARE 
C E R T I F I E D .  THIS C E R T I F I C A T I O N  COMES ABOUT 
ONLY AFTER THE I N T E N S I V E  T R A I N I N G  PROGRAM 
AND UPON THE COMPLET ION O F  P A S S I N G  A 
W R I T T E N  TEST  I N  RESPECT TO T H l S  PROGRAM. 
ANOTHER MAJOR PHASE OF T H l S  R E L I A B I L I T Y  
IS  THE S E R I A L I Z A T I O N  PROGRAM. THIS PRO- 
GRAM I N V O L V E S  THE D E T A I L E D  DOCUMENTATION 
O F  A L L  MAJOR D I M E N S I O N S  AND M E T A L L U R G I C A L  
C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S  OF EACH MAJOR PART AND 
SUB-ASSEMBLY OF THE APU. 
THIS DETAIL  INCLUDES METALLURGICAL MELT 
I N F O R M A T I O N  ON B E A R I N G  BALLS ,  COMPLETE 
DOCUMENTATION ON HEAT  TREAT  C O N D I T I O N S  O F  
V A R I O U S  PARTS, AS WELL AS THE NORMAL D I M E N -  
S I O N A L  AND HARDNESS INFORMATION.  - - 
! I+ .  1 1  ? A  
W I T H  THE S E R I A L I Z A T I O N  D A T A ,  A " B A B Y  
 BOOK^^ I S  COMPILED ON E A C H  APU H A V I N G  THE 
TOTAL  I N F O R M A T I O N  P R E V I O U S L Y  O U T L I N E D .  IN 
T H I S  BOOK I S  ALSO THE PRODUCTION PERFORMANCE 
DATA. 
W I T H  THE C E N T R A L I Z I N G  OF T H I S  TOTAL  
I N F O R M A T I O N  ON EACH S P E C I F I C  COMPONENT, 
MANY R E L I A B I L I T Y  S T U D I E S  CAN THEN B E  MADE 
WITH THIS MATERIAL. ONE OF THE MAJOR 
S T U D I E S  DONE W l T H  T H l S  M A T E R I A L  I S  PRODUCT 
HOMOGENEITY. IN T H l S  PROGRAM, S T U D I E S  ARE 
MADE TO D E T E R M I N E  THE PATTERN OF D I M E N S I O N S  
PRODUCED B Y  THE M A C H I N I N G  PROCESS. 
THIS SYSTEM MAKES P O S S I B L E  THE ACTUAL  
L O C A T I O N  OF THE MOST IMPORTANT D I M E N S I O N A L  
AND P H Y S I C A L  C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S  I N  EVERY APU. 
THE BENEFIT FROM THIS KNOWLEDGE M A K E S  MOST 
E F F I C I E N T  ANY NECESSARY R E T R O F I T  I N V O L V I N G  
A M INOR M O D l F l C A T l O N  OF D I M E N S I O N A L  OR 
M E T A L L U R G I C A L  CHARACTERIST ICS . ,  
BY  PREVIOUS METHOD, IF A DECISION W A S  
MADE TO F I E L D  R E T R O F I T  U N I T S  W I T H  A 
D I F F E R E N T  PART AS A RESULT  OF A D I M E N S I O N A L  
CHANGE, I T  WAS NECESSARY TO D I S A S S E M B L E  
AND I N S P E C T  A L L  U N I T S  TO P I C K  OUT THE 
S P E C I F I C  R E Q U I R E D  U N I T S  R E Q U I R I N G  R E T R O F I T .  
W I T H  T H I S  PROGRAM U N I T S ' C A N  BE I M M E D I A T E L Y  
I D E N T I F I E D  B Y  S E R I A L  NUMBER FOR F I E L D  
R E T R O F I  T o  
W I T H  THIS S E R I A L I Z A T I O N  INFORMATION 
THE A N A L Y S I S  OF CAUSE AND E F F E C T  THAT 
E X I S T S  BETWEEN D I M E N S I O N S  AND CHARACTER-  
I S T I C S  AND THE PERFORMANCE OF THE APU CAN 
B E  A S C E R T A I N E D  BY  CORRELAT ION A N A L Y S I S .  
A R E L A T I V E L Y  NEW APPROACH TO T H l S  CONCEPT 
I S  B E I N G  U T I L I Z E D  W l T H  THE USE OF EDGE 
CODED CARD MULT I -FACTOR A N A L Y S I S .  
I N  ESSENCE, T H l S  A N A L Y T I C A L  T E C H N I Q U E  
RECORDS C H A R A C T E R I S T I C  AND D I M E N S I O N A L  
DATA I N  THE FORM Of NOTCHES ON THE P E R I P H E R Y  
OF A RECORD CARD, A S  SHOWN IN FIGURE 6, 
W H I L E  THE PERFORMANCE OUTPUT I S  RECORDED 
ON THE F A C E  OF THE CARD. STACKING OF THE 
P E R T I N E N T  CARDS I N  ASCENDING ORDER OF A 
G I V E N  PERFORMANCE PARAMETER AND A N A L Y Z I N G  
THE PATTERN OF NOTCHES THAT RESULT  WHEN 
V I E W I N G  THE EDGE OF THE STACKED DECK 
P E R M I T S  R A P I D  I D E N T I F I C A T I O N  O F  S I G N I F I -  
CANT C O R R E L A T I O N  BETWEEN C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S  
AND PERFORMANCE. THESE IDENTIFIED 
C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S  CAN THEN B E  A T O P I C  OF 
A D E T A I L E D  STUDY. 
DESIGN REVIEWS . 
IN A D D I T I O N  TO THE S P E C I A L I Z E D  R E L I A -  
B I L I T Y  PHASES O U T L I N E D  ABOVE, THE NORMAL 
STANDARD , R E L I A B I L I T Y  PROGRAMS ARE ALSO 
USED. THESE I N C L U D E  SUCH I T E M S  AS D E T A I L E D  
DESIGN REVIEWS, A S  OUTLINED IN FIGURE 7. 
THERE ARE A C T U A L L Y  THREE SEPARATE D E S I G N  
REVIEWS;  THE F I R S T  B E I N G  W I T H I N  THE E N G I -  
N E E R I N G  S E C T I O N  W l T H  A COMPREHENSIVE 
REVIEW BEING MADE B Y  BOTH THE GROUP 
SUPERVISOR AND THE SECTION HEAD. As 
OUTLINED IN FIGURE 7, IN TH IS  PHASE OF 
THE D E S I G N  R E V I E W  THERE ARE AT L E A S T  SEVEN 
R E L I A B I L I T Y  CHECK POINTS .  
A SECOND D E S I G N  R E V I E W  I S  MADE B Y  A 
D E S I G N  R E V I E W  S P E C I A L I S T  THAT  REPORTS ONLY 
TO THE CHIEF ENGINEER. PRIOR TO THE 
R E L E A S E  O F  THE DESIGN,  T H l S  S P E C I A L I S T  I S  
R E Q U I R E D  TO S I G N  O F F  THE PROJECT AS B E I N G  
S A T I S F A C T O R Y  FROM A D E S I G N  AND R E L I A B I L I T Y  
STANDPOINT .  
A T H I R D  R E V I E W  I S  MADE BY  AN I M P A R T I A L  
D E S I G N  R E V I E W  COMMITTEE MADE U P  OF NOT 
ONLY PROJECT E N G I N E E R I N G  PERSONNEL, B U T  ALSO 
R E P R E S E N T A T I O N  FROM PURCHASING, MANUFAC- 
TURING,  Q U A L I T Y  AND STANDARDS. 
OTHER STANDARD R E L I A B I L I T Y  PHASES INCLUDE 
F A 1  LURE MODE A N A L Y S I S  AND APPORTIONMENT. 
IN T H I S  L A T T E R  WORK THE BREAKDOWN OF THE 
R E L I A B I L I T Y  R E Q U I R E M E N T  I S  MADE FOR S P E C I -  
F I C  S U B - A S S E M B L I E S  AND S P E C I F I C  PARTS. 
ALSO D E T E R M I N E D  I N  THESE OTHER PHASES I S  
THE E S T A B L I S H M E N T  OF A VENDOR SUPPLY  R E L I A -  
B I L I T Y  PROGRAM AND A M O N I T O R I N G  OF SUCH. 
A SECOND M I S S I L E  H Y D R A U L I C  U N I T  THAT  I S  
R E C E I V I N G  C O N S I D E R A B L E  R E L I A B I L I T Y  ATTEN-  
T ION I S  THE AA-19566 MOTORPUMP, WHICH I S  
USED I N  THE F L I G H T  CONTROL SYSTEMS OF THE 
POLARIS MISSILE, WHICH IS SHOWN IN FIGURE 
8. THIS E L E C T R I C  MOTOR DRIVEN PUMP I S  A 
V A R I A B L E  D I S P L A C E M E N T  PUMP PRODUCING 
APPROXIMATELY  1 G A L L O N  PER M I N U T E  FLOW AT 
11,400 RPM, AND A T  3000 PSI PRESSURE. 
THIS U N I T ,  AS SHOWN I N  FIGURE 9, I S  D R I V E N  
BY D I R E C T  CURRENT E L E C T R I C  MOTOR. A S  
INDICATED IN FIGURE 9, THE UNIT IS  PAR- 
T I A L L Y  ENCLOSED I N  A S I L I C O N E  RUBBER I N -  
S U L A T I O N  B L A N K E T  BONDED TO I T  FOR HEAT  
BARR I E R  PROPERTIES .  
T H I S  I N S U L A T I O N  I S  L E F T  I N  THE UNCURED 
STATE, AND CURES A S  I T  AGES. THE RUBBER 
WILL WITHSTAND APPROXIMATELY 6000F TO 
100O0F TEMPERATURES. ONE U N I T  I S  KNOWN 
TO HAVE R E C E I V E D  THE D I R E C T  B L A S T  OF THE 
NOZZLE,AND SAW TEMPERATURES OVER 2000°F, 
AND S T I L L  OPERATED. 
TH l s MOTORPUMP DEVELOPMENT AND MANU- 
F A C T U R I N G  PROGRAM USES MANY OF THE T E C H N I -  
QUES D E S C R I B E D  P R E V I O U S L Y  FOR THE P R E V I O U S  
APS PROGRAM. 
ONE OF THE P A R T S  OF THE POLARIS RELIA-  
B I L I T Y  PROGRAM HAS B E E N  A WEAPON SYSTEM 
COST E F F E C T  l VENESS PH I LOSOPHY. TH 1 s 
PROGRAM CONCENTRATES THE R E L I A B I L I T Y  
DOLLARS I N  THOSE AREAS WHICH COULD Y I E L D  
THE H I G H E S T  R A T I O  OF R E L I A B I L I T Y  IMPROVEMENT 
PER DOLLARTSPENT.  TYPICAL OF THIS PART OF 
THE PROGRAbR I S  THE USE OF A V I S U A L  PATCH 
STANDARD.PIN D E T E R M I N I N G  THE E A R L Y  TEST  
PHASE C&ANLINESS LEVEL OF THE COMPONENTS. 
THE V I S U A L  PATCH STANDARD FOLLOWS THE 
SOCIETY OF AUTOMOTIVE ENGINEERS ARP-575 
DOCUMENT W I T H  C E R T A I N  M O D I F I C A T I O N S .  T H I S  
METHOD COLLECTS A L L  OF THE C O N T A M I N A T I O N  
I N  H Y D R A U L I C  F I L T E R S  AFTER A C E R T A I N  RUNNING 
PERIOD,  AND THEN HAS THE C O N T A M I N A T I O N  PUT 
ON A F ILTER PAPER. THE F ILTER PAPER THEN 
HOLDS THE T O T A L  C O N T A M I N A T I O N  T A K E N  FROM 
A SYSTEM OVER A S P E C I F I C  T I M E  PERIOD,  SUCH 
A S  A ONE-HALF HOUR TEST. THE FILTER PAPER 
SAMPLE I S  THEN COMPARED V I S U A L L Y  TO A 
STANDARD SAMPLE. A T Y P I C A L  PATCH STANDARD 
I S  SHOWN I N  FIGURE 10. THE AMOUNT OF 
CONTAMINANT COLLECTED I S  D E T E R M I N E D  B Y  
V I S U A L  I N S P E C T I O N  AS TO L I G H T  COLOR 
D I F F E R E N C E S  AS WELL AS I ~ $ S I P E C T I O N  FOR 
l N D l  V I D U A L  PART 1CLE.S; TH T H  METHOD 
A SYSTEM C O N T A M I N A T I O N  
USUALLY  B E  MADE W I T H I N  
ONE-HALF HOUR. 
IT I S  ONLY D U R I N G  THE F I N A L  TEST  PHASES 
THAT THE MORE E X P E N S I V E  P A R T I C L E  C,O#NT I S  
USED I N  D E T E R M I N I N G  F I N A L  U N I T  C L E A N L I N E S S  
LEVEL.  T H I S  METHOD USES THE SAE ARP 598 
PROCEDURE, WHICH TAKES A S M A L L  SAMPLE OF 
HYDRAULIC FLUID FROM A ' S Y S T E M .  THIS FLUID 
I S  THEN F I L T E R E D  THROUGH A VERY F I N E  
MILLIPORE F I L T E R  MEMBRANE AND THE NUMBER 
OF I N D I V I D U A L  P A R T I C L E S  ARE THEN COUNTED 
W l T H  A MICROSCOPE AND C L A S S I F I E D  AS TO 
S I Z E  AND O C C A S I O N A L L Y  TYPE. THIS TYPE OF 
PROCEDURE USUALLY  T A K E S  SEVERAL  HOURS. 
MUCH OF THE F I N A L  ASSEMBLY AND TEST  WORK 
OF M I S S I L E  U N I T S  OF T H l S  TYPE THAT R E Q U I R E  
A VERY H I G H  DEGREE OF C L E A N L I N E S S  I S  DONE 
IN A CLEAN T Y P E  ROOM, A S  SHOWN IN FIGURE 
11. 
i 
RELIABILITY GONTROLS FOR T H E  O P E R A T I O N  
O F  T H l S  TYPE OF ROOM ARE VERY S T R I C T  AND 
R E Q U I R E  ONLY C E R T I F I E D  PERSONNEL THAT ARE 
F A M I L I A R  W l T H  C L E A N  ROOM O P E R A T I O N  TO WORK 
I N  T H l S  AREA. THIS ROOM I S  T Y P I C A L ,  I N  
WHICH AT  L E A S T  TWO ANTI -ROOMS ARE USED; 
ONE FOR DRESSING,  AND THE SECOND FOR 
VACUUMING AND C L E A N I N G  OF PERSONNEL AS  
THEY GO I N T O  THE M A I N  C L E A N  ROOM AREA. 
THIS ' P A R T I C U L A R  ROOM I S  COMPLETELY VACUUMED 
I N C L U D I N G  WALLS, C E I L I N G ,  FLOORS, AND SO 
FORTH, EACH DAY. , . - a  . m t .  - 
, . 
- - .  
TH I s MOTORPUMP REL I AB I L I T Y  PROGRAM 
I 
CONSISTS,  AT THE PRESENT T IME,  O F  A MANU- 
F A C T U R I N G  CONCENTRATION OF R E L I A B I L I T Y  
AND A N A L Y T I C A L  APPROACH TO M E E T I N G  THE 
CONTRACTUALLY R E Q U I R E D  Q U A N T I T A T I V E  R E L I A -  
B I L I T Y  MEASURE. THIS TAKES FORM I N  THE 
U T I L I Z A T I O N  OF A Q U A L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S  F U N C T I O N  
D I R E C T E D  TOWARD ASCERTAINMENT OF M A R G I N A L  
AND SUB-MARGINAL PRODUCT. THIS APPROACH 
U T I L I Z E S  THE A V A I L A B L E  STATE-OF-THE ART 
T E C H N I Q U E S  O F  R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S )  A S  
W E L L  AS MANY S T A T I S T I C A L  TOOLS.  
THE V A R I A B L E  D I S P L A C E M E N T  PUMPS U S E D  
I N  THE A T L A S  MISSILE, FIGURE 12) PROGRAM 
A L S O  R E C E I V E S  MANY R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N D  C L E A N -  
L I N E S S  T E S T  P H A S E S  AS P R E V I O U S L Y  D E S C R I B E D .  
W O R K I N G  IN  CONJUNCTION W I T H  THE MISSILE 
A I R F R A M E  M A N U F A C T U R E R  C O N S I D E R A B L E  D E V E L O P -  
MENT W O R K  W A S  C O N D U C T E D  A S  E A R L Y  A S  1956 
AND 1957 IN  P A R T I C L E  COUNTING TECHNIQUES 
F O R  C O N T A M I N A T I O N  CONTROL O F  M I S S I L E  S Y S T E M  
COMPONENTS. T H I S  WORK A C T U A L L Y  PRECEDED 
T H E  P R E S E N T  P A R T I C L E  COUNT S T A N D A R D  ARP 
598 e y  THREE Y E A R S .  M A N Y  O F  T H E  T E C H N I Q U E S  
I N I T I A L L Y  D E V I S E D  F O R  T H I S  PROGRAM L A T E R  
B E C A M E  A  P A R T  O F  T H I S  C L E A N L I N E S S  STANDARD.  
M A N Y  U N I Q U E  T E C H N I Q U E S  FOR CONTROL 
S Y S T E M  COMPONENTS WERE U S E D  TO O B T A I N  T H E  
RIGID CLEANL INESS REQUIREMENTS. THESE 
I N C L U D E D  NOT O N L Y  T H E  U L T R A - S O N I C  C L E A N -  
I N G  O F  T H E  COMPONENTS O F  T H E  CONTROL PUMP9 
B U T  A L S O  l N C L U D E D  U L T R A - S O N  I C  C L E A N  I NG OF 
T H E  C O M P L E T E L Y  A S S E M B L E D  PUMP A N D  MECHAN I - 
C A L  S H A K I N G  O F  C O M P L E T E L Y  A S S E M B L E D  PUMPS 
ON A  P R O D U C T I O N  B A S I S .  
T H I S  P R O B A B L Y  W A S  THE I N I T I A L  P H A S E  
A N D  D E V E L O P M E N T  A C T I V I T Y  OF S T R I C T  CON- 
T A M I N A T I O N  C O N T R O L  O F  M I S S I L E  S Y S T E M  
H Y D R A U L I C  COMPONENTS I N  T H l S  COUNTRY. A S  
A R E S U L T  O F  T H E S E  U N U S U A L  C L E A N L I N E S S  
T E C H N I Q U E S  D E V E L O P E D ,  T H E  COMPONENT C L E A N -  
L I N E S S  L E V E L  C O U L D  T H E N  B E  C O N F I R M E D  B Y  
T H E  M I S S I L E  M A N U F A C T U R E R  UPON R E C E I V I N G  
THE COMPONENT, AS W E L L  AS I T  B E I N G  D E T E R -  
M I N E D  A N D  M A I N T A I N E D  D U R I N G  A  NUMBER OF 
M I S S I L E  S Y S T E M  CHECK-OUTS.  
IN A D D I T I O N  TO T H E  NORMAL E N G I N E E R I N G  
Q U A L I F I C A T I O N  A N D  R E L I A B I L I T Y  M O N I T O R I N G  
T E S T S ,  SEARCH FOR C R I T I C A L  WEAKNESS T E S T S  
ARE C O N D U C T E D  ON T H E S E  CONTROL PUMPS UNDER 
O P E R A T I N G  C O N D I T I O N S  T H A T  O F T E N  E X C E E D  T H E  
P R E V I O U S  E N G I N E E R I N G  Q U A L I F I C A T I O N  P H A S E S  
B Y  A F A C T O R  O F  TWO. 
T H E  R E L I A B I L I T Y  FOR THE C O N T R O L S  OF 
T H l S  M I S S I L E  H A V E  R E C E I V E D  A D D I T I O N A L  
I N P U T S  A S  A R E S U L T  OF T H E  MERCURY S P A C E  
F L I G H T S .  A L L  OF T H E  M E R C U R Y  M I S S I L E  
COMPONENTS, I N C L U D I N G  T H E  C O N T R O L  PUMPS, 
ARE G I V E N  S P E C I A L  GROUPS O F  I N S P E C T I O N S  
A N D  T E S T S  I N  A D D I T I O N  TO THOSE R E C E I V E D  
I N  T H E  NORMAL A T L A S  PROGRAM. THESE 
I N C L U D E  NOT O N L Y  A D D I T I O N A L  D I M E N S I O N A L  
A N D  M E T A L L U R G I C A L  I N S P E C T I O N S ,  B U T  I N C L U D E  
A L A R G E  NUMBER O F  F U N C T I O N A L  T E S T S .  THERE 
I S  A  M A J O R  R E L I A B I L I T Y  R E V I E W  A N D  A N A L Y S I S  
O F  THE H Y D R A U L I C  COMPONENTS B Y  S E R I A L  
NUMBER, W H I C H  I S  M A I N T A I N E D  THROUGHOUT 
T H E  L I F E  OF T H E  U N I T  IN  T H E  M E R C U R Y  
PROGRAM. 
S K Y B O L T  HOT G A S  APU 
A S  A N  E X T E N S I O N  O F  H Y D R A U L I C  C O N T R O L S  
F O R  S P A C E  V E H I C L E S ,  S T U D Y  A N D  D E V E L O P M E N T  
OF HOT G A S  S E R V O  A N D  A C T U A T I N G  S Y S T E M S  H A S  
BEEN U N D E R W A Y  A T  V I C K E R S  FOR THE P A S T  
A P P R O X I M A T E  S I X  Y E A R S *  
THESE HOT G A S E S  ARE U S E D  TO D R I V E  A G A S  
MOTOR S I M I L A R  TO A  H Y D R A U L I C  MOTOR, W H I C H  
T H E N  D I R E C T L Y  D R I V E S  A  H Y D R A U L I C  PUMQ, 
T H U S  P R O V I D I N G  H Y D R A U L I C  F L I G H T  C O N T R O L  
POWER. 
THESE H O T  G A S E S  A R E  O B T A I N E D  B Y  A NUMBER 
OF M E A N S  S U C H  A S  E I T H E R  B L E E D I N G  O F F  THE 
M A I N  R O C K E T  E N G I N E  OR U S I N G  A  S O L I D  PRO- 
P E L L A N T  G A S  GENERATOR. I T  I S  T H l S  L A T T E R  
C A S E  T H A T  I S  USED I N  THE S K Y B O L T  S Y S T E M ,  
AS I N D I C A T E D  I N  T H E  C I R C U I T  D R A W I N G  I N  
FIGURE 13. A S  I N D I C A T E D ,  A  S O L I D  P R O P E L L A N T  
I S  I G N I T E D  P R O D U C I N G  HOT G A S  W H I C H  M O T O R I Z E S  
THE P I S T O N  MOTOR, W H I C H  T H E N  M E C H A N I C A L L Y  
D R I V E S  T H E  H Y D R A U L I C  PUMP. 
FIGURE 14 SHOWS A C U T A W A Y  O F  THE H O T  
G A S  MOTORPUMP. A S  I N D I C A T E D ,  T H l S  I S  AN 
I N T E G R A T E D  P A C K A G E )  W I T H  THE G A S  S E C T I O N  
ON T H E  R I G H T .  THIS P A R T I C U L A R  D E V I C E  W I L L  
PRODUCE A  12 G A L L O N  P E R  M I N U T E  FLOW F O R  
AN I N I T I A L  P E A K  P E R I O D  A N D  T H E N  B E  R E D U C E D  
TO A P P R O X I M A T E L Y  H A L F  O F  T H l S  F I G U R E  F O R  
THE REMAINDER OF THE RUN A T  3000 P S I  
H Y D R A U L I C  PRESSURE.  THE T O T A L  O P E R A T I N G  
T I M E  I S  S O M E T H I N G  L E S S  T H A N  2 M I N U T E S  FOR 
T H l S  APU I N  T H I S  S K Y B O L T  A P P L I C A T I O N 9  
WHICH I S  SHOWN I N  FIGURE 15. 
W I T H  T H E  A S P E C T  O F  C O M B I N I N G  HOT GAS 
C O N T R O L S  W I T H  THE MORE S T A N D A R D  H Y D R A U L I C  
C O N T R O L S  A N D  T H E  MORE L I M I T E D  L I F E  A S P E C T ,  
A D D I T I O N A L  CHANGES I N  THE S T A N D A R D  R E L I A -  
B  I L I T Y  PROGRAM ARE MADE T O O B T A I N  THE 
G R E A T E S T  B E N E F I T  FROM T H E  E X P E N D I T U R E .  
W H I L E  WE C A N  DRAW UPON T W E N T Y - F I V E  
Y E A R S  E X P E R I E N C E  FOR R E L I A B I L I T Y  S T U D I E S  
I N  T H E  H Y D R A U L I C  S E C T I O N  OF T H l S  APU, I N  
T H E  G A S  S E C T I O N  R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S  
F A I L U R E  I S  DONE ON A  D I F F E R E N T  B A S I S .  
W I T H  A  U N I T  OF T H l S  T Y P E ,  AS SHOWN I N  
FIGURE 16, WHICH S H O W S  T H E  D I S A S S E M B L E D  
V I E W ,  G A S  T E M P E R A T U R E S  UP  T O  2 0 0 0 ~ ~  A R E  
U S E D  THROUGH THE B U R N t N G  O F  T H E  AMMONIUM 
N I T R A T E  P R O P E L L A N T .  IN A  R E L I A B I L I T Y  
PROGRAM OF T H I S  T Y P E  E X T R E M E  A T T E N T I O N  
I S  G I V E N  TO THE S E L E C T I O N  O F  H I G H  T E M P -  
E R A T U R E  M A T E R I A L S .  
STUDIES AND DEVELOPMENTS OF S P A C E  
V E H I C L E  C O N T R O L  S Y S T E M S  D U R I N G  T H E  P A S T  
FEW Y E A R S  H A V E  I N D I C A T E D  T H A T  R E L I A B I L I T Y  
OF T H E S E  S Y S T E M S  MUST F I R S T  B E  D E S I G N E D  
I N T O  THE E Q U I P M E N T ,  A N D  T H E N  THROUGH CON- 
T I N U E D  M O N I T O R I N G  B E  B U I L T  I N T O  THE E Q U I P -  
MENT. 
IN SUMMARY, I WISH TO SAY THAT  R E L I A -  
B I L I T Y  S T U D I E S  COULD AND SHOULD B E  B A S E D  
UPON AS MUCH PAST  E X P E R I E N C E  AS P O S S I B L E ;  
B U T  I N  OUR R A P I D L Y  CHANGING SPACE TECHNOLOGY 
T H I S  I S  ALWAYS THE F I R S T  S T E P  ONLY, AND 
I T  I S  NECESSARV TO T A I L O R  R E L I A B I L I T Y  
S T U D I E S  AND A C T I V I T I E S  FOR EACH NEW CON- 
CEPT AS I T  I S  DEVELOPED. 
I B E L I E V E  A M E R I C A ~ S  SPACE E X P L O R A T I O N  
D U R I N G  THE PAST TWO YEARS HAVE I N D I C A T E D  
THAT THESE SPACE V E H I C L E S  AND T H E I R  CONTROL 
SYSTEMS HAVE B E E N  DEVELOPED W I T H  R E L I A B I L -  
I T Y  B E I N G  ONE OF THE FOREMOST FACTORS. 
Terrestrial snace 
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RELIABILITY I N  PROCUREMENT 
F-105 AIRCRAFT ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS 
Arthur P, Co le t t a  
Joseph A. Cravero 
Charles W. Russell  
Republic Aviation corporation 
Farmingdale, New York 
The space e f f o r t  has emphasized t h e  import- 
ance of having r e l i a b l e  equipment by highl ight -  
ing  t h e  c o s t  of f a i l u r e .  However, t he re  i s  
r e a l l y  l i t t l e  d i f f e rence  between t h e  cos t  of low 
r e l i a b i l i t y  i n  a space e f f o r t  and t h e  c o s t  of 
low r e l i a b i l i t y  i n  an opera t ional  manned weapon 
system. The in t ense  r e a l i z a t i o n  of t h i s  cos t  i n  
a space e f f o r t  is  due t o  the  concentration of 
l o s s  i n  one dramatic f a i l u r e .  
Design of new weapon systems now includes 
r e l i a b i l i t y  o r i en ta t ion ,  but t h e  i n i t i a l  design 
of  many e x i s t i n g  weapon systems did not include 
r e l i a b i l i t y  o r i e n t a t i o n  as we th ink of i t  today. 
The requirement f o r  a s p e c i f i c ,  proven r e l i a b i -  
l i t y  under a s p e c i f i c  environment was not gen- 
e r a l l y  included i n  t h e  procurement con t rac t s  f o r  
high volume production. 
Studies generated t o  suggest means of i m -  
proving t h e  r e l T a b i l i t y  of ex i s t ing  equipments 
have shown t h a t  t h e  c o s t  is  very high. The r e -  
s u l t  of t h e  improvement has been expressed a s  
bene f i t s  which include reduction i n  maintenance 
requirements and improvement i n  p robab i l i ty  of 
completing a mission; bu t  it i s  questionable 
whether t h e  bene f i t s  have ever j u s t i f i e d  t h e  
c o s t  of improvement i n  terms of d o l l a r s  and 
cen t s ,  t h e  terms most understood by t h e  manage- 
ment who must make t h e  decis ion t o  expend t h e  
required funds. 
This paper descr ibes  a technique, applied 
t o  an e x i s t i n g  production program, which j u s t i -  
f i e s  t h e  c o s t  of  r e l i a b i l i t y  improvement by ex- 
press ing t h e  r e s u l t i n g  bene f i t s  i n  terms of 
d o l l a r s  and c e n t s  and a l s o  s t u d i e s  t h e  sens i -  
t i v i t y  of t h e  est imated savings t o  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  
t h e  bas ic  assumptions. This makes it poss ib le  
t o  evaluate  t h e  program i n  terms of an investment 
having spec i f i ed  r i s k s  and a s i g n i f i c a n t  r e tu rn ,  
br inging it c l o s e r  t o  a s t r i c t  management- 
accounting type  of decision.  
INTRODUCTION 
In  t h e  d iscuss ion of R e l i a b i l i t y  a t  sympo- 
siums and i n  l i t e r a t u r e ,  c e r t a i n  axioms have been 
emphasized many times. lbo  of these  are :  
1. r e l i a b i l i t y  must begin with design, and 
2 .  r e l i a b i l i t y  adds t o  i n i t i a l  cos t  but  r e -  
duces maintenance cos t .  
These axioms were substant ia ted  i n  a program 
recen t ly  completed a t  RAC. Techniques of e s t i -  
mating savings due t o  r e l i a b i l i t y  improvement, 
s o  o f t en  advocated i n  general  terms, were 
applied t o  a s p e c i f i c  production program with 
r e s u l t s  ind ica t ing  t h a t  high r e l i a b i l i t y  r e tu rns  
tremendous savings t o  t h e  customer. The program 
t h a t  w i l l  be discussed had one l a r g e  drawback, 
and t h a t  is, d e s p i t e  t h e  estimated savings,  t h e  
program came too l a t e  i n  t h e  weapon system pro- 
curement cycle.  I f  t h e  considera t ions  given t o  
t h e  sub jec t  program had been given t o  t h e  
o r i g i n a l  design and procurement of t h e  various 
sub-systems, t h e  ove ra l l  savings t o  t h e  customer 
would have been much g rea te r .  
I n  t h e  case  of t h e  F-105 Weapon System, t h e  
o r i g i n a l  spec i f i ca t ions  f o r  both GFE and CFE 
e l e c t r o n i c  systems were wr i t t en  e a r l y  i n  t h e  
pas t  decade, omitt ing t h e  present emphasis on 
s p e c i f i c  r e l i a b i l i t y  requirements. The Ai rc ra f t  
Industry received its g rea te s t  impetus t o  apply 
s p e c i f i c  r e l i a b i l i t y  e f f o r t s  a t  t h e  Santa 
Barbara R e l i a b i l i t y  symposium i n  1957, There 
is ,  of  course, no d e f i n i t e  proof t h a t  such 
e f f o r t ,  i n i t i a l l y  applied t o  t h e  F105 e l ec t ron ic  
systems, would have r e su l t ed  i n  systems with 
p resen t ly  achieveable r e l i a b i l i t y .  However, it 
is f e l t  t h a t  formal r e l i a b i l i t y  ana lys i s ,  design 
review procedures and r e l i a b i l i t y  demonstration 
t e s t i n g  would have r e su l t ed  i n  more r e l i a b i l i t y  
i n  t h e  e a r l y  systems. In  a l l  f a i r n e s s  t o  t h e  
equipment manufacturers,most of t h e  F105 @.lee- 
t r o n i c  equipment was, even i n  t h e  e a r l y  s t ages ,  
considerably more r e l i a b l e  than s i m i l a r  systems 
of comparable complexity. 
The r e l i a b i l i t y  problem associa ted  with 
these  complex in tegra ted  e l e c t r o n i c  systems is 
well  known. I t  is t h e  problem created  by t h e  
product r u l e  which r equ i re s  t h a t  a high degree 
of r e l i a b i l i t y  be achieved i n  each individual 
system t o  assure  s u f f i c i e n t  r e l i a b i l i t y  of t h e  
in t eg ra ted  e l ec t ron ics  system, I t  became appar- 
ent  very e a r l y  i n  t h e  production of  t h e  F105 
t h a t  t o  achieve t h e  required e f fec t iveness  of 
t h e  weapon system, t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  of t h e  in t e -  
gra ted  e l ec t ron ics  system should be  increased,  
while t h e  non-electronic systems evidenced an 
acceptable r e l i a b i l i t y  growth and the re fo re  did 
not r equ i re  an in t ense  improvement e f f o r t .  
RELIABILITY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM 
The subject  program, designated "RIP", in-  
volved : 
1. t h e  determination of t h e  optimum MTBF 
t h a t  cou ld  be o b t a i n e d  i n  t h e  v a r i o u s  systems,  
2 ,  t h t  s o l i c i t a t i o n  o f  t e c h n i c a l  and c o s t  
p r o p o s a l s  from t h e  v a r i o u s  a f f e c t e d  s u p p l i e r s ,  
and 
3 .  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  s p a r e s  
and r e p a i r  c o s t s  t h a t  would r e s u l t  from t h i s  i m -  
proved MTBF. 
Of c o u r s e  t h e r e  a r e  o t h e r  r e a s o n s  f o r  i m -  
p rov ing  r e l i a b i l i t y ,  f o r  example, t o  improve 
m i s s i o n  comple t ion  c a p a b i l i t y .  However, i f  r e l -  
i a b i l i t y  i s  des igned  i n t o  t h e  system t o  minimize 
o p e r a t i n g  expenses d u r i n g  peacet ime o p e r a t i o n ,  a 
h i g h  miss ion  comple t ion  r e l i a b i l i t y  w i l l  
normally r e s u l t .  Most of  you a r e  involved  i n  
d e s i g n i n g  and b u i l d i n g  systems which, it i s  
hoped, w i l l  spend t h e i r  u s e f u l  l i v e s  i n  defend-  
i n g  t h e  peace.  If t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  job i s  done 
adequa te ly  f o r  t h i s  purpose;  t h a t  i s ,  t h e  equip-  
ment i s  des igned  t o  b e  r e l i a b l y  s t o r e d ,  t r a n s -  
p o r t e d ,  ground checked, f l i g h t  t e s t e d ,  e t c . ,  n o t  
on ly  w i l l  i t  pay o f f  economical ly,  b u t  t h e  r e l -  
i a b i l i t y  p o t e n t i a l  w i l l  be  o f  s u f f i c i e n t  d e g r e e  
t o  s a t i s f y  m i s s i o n  requi rements .  
Economics o f  R e l i a b i l i t y  
The e x a c t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  of r e l i a b i l i t y  t o  
economics i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  determine.  You a r e  
undoubtedly f a m i l i a r  wi th  t h e  g e n e r a l  r e l i a b i -  
l i t y  c o s t  r e l a t i o n  which h a s  been p u b l i s h e d  
many t imes  i n  t h e  p a s t  ( F i g u r e  1 ) .  As r e l i a b i -  
l i t y  i s  i n c r e a s e d ,  t h e  i n i t i a l  c o s t  w i l l  i n -  
c r e a s e  t o  some p o i n t  where f u r t h e r  improvement 
cou ld  o n l y  be o b t a i n e d  a t  tremendous c o s t .  
S i m i l a r l y ,  a s  r e l i a b i l i t y  is  i n c r e a s e d ,  t h e  c o s t  
of maintenance s u p p o r t  i s  reduced t o  some p o i n t  
where f u r t h e r  i n c r e a s e  i n  r e l i a b i l i t y  h a s  a  
n e g l i g i b l e  e f f e c t  i n  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  o f  mainten- 
ance c o s t .  The t o t a l  c o s t  i s  r e p r e s e n t e d  by  t h e  
curve  p l o t t e d  from t h e  summation o f  t h e  f i r s t  
two curves .  The optimum i s  t h e  low p o i n t  of t h e  
t o t a l  c o s t  c u r v e ,  where maximum r e l i a b i l i t y  is  
ob ta ined  f o r  t h e  lowest  c o s t .  
I f  improved r e l i a b i l i t y  can have a  b e n e f i c -  
i a l  e f fec t ,  t h e n  low r e l i a b i l i t y  can  have an ad- 
v e r s e  e f f e c t .  Low r e l i a b i l i t y  a f f e c t s  t h e  pr ime 
and s u b - c o n t r a c t o r  by i n c r e a s i n g :  
1. t e s t i n g  r e q u i r e d  b e f o r e  accep tance ,  
2. equipment removals d u r i n g  t h e  manufac- 
t u r i n g  process ,  
3 .  r e p a i r s  and maintenance a t  t h e  f a c t o r y ,  
4. s t o c k  requi rements  d u r i n g  manufacture,  
5. p roduc t ion  f low t ime ,  
6 .  f i e l d  l i a i s o n ,  and 
7. o b l i g a t i o n  o f  rework under  c o n t r a c t  
war ran ty  c l a u s e s ,  o r  l o s s  o f  p r o f i t  under  con- 
t r a c t  i n c e n t i v e - p e n a l t y  c l a u s e s , e a c h  o f  which 
i n c r e a s e s  p roduc t ion  c o s t s .  
Low r e l i a b i l i t y  a f f e c t s  t h e  customer by 
i n c r e a s i n g :  
1. s p a r e s  requ i rements ,  
2 .  r e p a i r  f a c i l i t y  requ i rements  a t  t h e  
base  and depot  l e v e l s ,  
3 ,  manpower requ i rements ,  and 
4 ,  q u a n t i t y  requ i rements  f o r  c r i t i c a l  
s k i l l s .  
Each o f  t h e  above reduces  weapon system 
u t i l i z a t i o n  r a t e  and t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  complet- 
i n g  a  miss ion .  
F105 I n t e g r a t e d  E l e c t r o n i c s  
The i n t e g r a t e d  e l e c t r o n i c s  system of  t h e  
F105 c o n s i s t s  o f  seven i n d i v i d u a l  e l e c t r o n i c  
sub-systems : 
1. Auto P i l o t  
2.  Doppler Navigat ion System 
3. CIN 
4 .  A l l  A t t i t u d e  Reference System 
5 .  I n t e g r a t e d  Ins t ruments  
6 ,  C e n t r a l  A i r  Data Computer, and 
7 .  F i r e  Cont ro l  System. 
I n  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  t h a t  fo l lows ,  MTBF f i g u r e s  
have been a l t e r e d  t o  avo id  s e c u r i t y  v i o l a t i o n s ;  
changes have a l s o  been made i n  t h e  c o s t  f i g u r e s  
t o  avoid d i s c l o s u r e  o f  p r o p r i e t a r y  in format ion .  
The paper  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  t echnique  used t o  e s t i -  
mate t h e  magnitude of  sav ings  t h a t  can r e s u l t  
from a c h i e v i n g  h igh  r e l i a b i l i t y  i n  t h e  equ ip-  
ment. The e x a c t  in format ion  can  b e  made a v a i l -  
a b l e  upon r e q u e s t  through proper  channe ls .  
F igure  2 l is ts  t h e  MTBF o f  each system when 
t h e  program was i n i t i a t e d  i n  January 1961; and 
t h e  MTBF t h a t  was expected t o  be  ach ieved  t h r u  
normal growth by  J u l y  1963, such growth be ing  
a t t a i n e d  th rough  t h e  normal changes t o  t h e  s y s -  
tem r e s u l t i n g  from ECP's, e t c .  Also i n d i c a t e d  
i n  t h i s  f i g u r e  i s  t h e  u l t i m a t e  MTBF g o a l  t h a t  
was d e s i r e d  f o r  each o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  systems.  
This  goa l  was e s t a b l i s h e d  t o  ach ieve  a  98% r e l -  
i a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  i n t e g r a t e d  e l e c t r o n i c s  system 
f o r  a  2 hour  m i s s i o n  w i t h  a l l  subsystems oper -  
a t i n g .  I t  should  b e  noted t h a t  t h i s  requ i rement  
does n o t  r e f l e c t  a  miss ion  complet ion r e q u i r e -  
ment s i n c e  redundancy w i t h i n  systems and redund- 
ancy between systems would become a p p l i c a b l e .  
However, f u l l  o p e r a t i o n  of  a l l  subsystems i s  a 
requirement  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  f o r  d e l i v e r y  o f  
t h e  weapon system. Therefore ,  a  goa l  was e s t a b -  
l i s h e d  t o  have no more t h a n  two f a i l u r e s  i n  t h e  
e l e c t r o n i c  systems o u t  of  every  100 p r o d u c t i o n  
f l i g h t  t e s t s .  
The Mean Time Between F a i l u r e s  a l l o c a t i o n  
t o  t h e  v a r i o u s  subsystems was based on system 
complexi ty,  s t a t e  of t h e  a r t  i n  t h e  development 
o f  t h e  system, and t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  each sub- 
system h a s  on  t h e  m i s s i o n  comple t ion  c a p a b i l i t y  
o f  t h e  a i r c r a f t .  
Ground Rules f o r  ImDrovement 
The nex t  s t e p  i n  t h e  program was t o  c o n t a c t  
each of t h e  equipment vendors  (seven GFE and one 
CFE), i n  r e g a r d  t o  improving t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  of  
each  o f  t h e  systems.  C e r t a i n  ground r u l e s  were 
e s t a b l i s h e d ,  which l i m i t e d  t h e  t y p e  and d e g r e e  
o f  change t h a t  cou ld  b e  made. 
1. Each of  t h e  vendors  was reques ted  t o  
p r o v i d e  c o s t  and s c h e d u l e s  t o  a c h i e v e  loo%, 75%, 
50%, and 25% o f  t h e  u l t i m a t e  MTBF g o a l .  
2. Any improvement i n  r e l i a b i l i t y  would 
have t o  b e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  i n s t a l l a t i o n  i n  t h e  
a i r c r a f t  18 months a f t e r  c o n t r a c t .  
3.  The redes igned  systems must be  i n t e r -  
changeable  w i t h  t h e  e x i s t i n g  sys tems;  i , e . ,  no 
major  a i r c r a f t  r e d e s i g n  r e q u i r e d .  
4. Any MTBF t h a t  was p r e d i c t e d  would have 
t o  b e  demonstrated by an environmental  t e s t  
s i m i l a r  t o  AGREE b u t  modif ied t o  r e p r e s e n t  F105 
requi rements .  
Each o f  t h e  vendors  submi t ted  p r o p o s a l s  t o  
accomplish t h e  improved r e l i a b i l i t y  g i v i n g  c o s t s  
and schedules  t o  ach ieve  v a r i o u s  l e v e l s  t o  per -  
m i t  a n a l y s i s  o f  c o s t  v s .  r e l i a b i l i t y  t r a d e - o f f s .  
The l e v e l  t h a t  was s e l e c t e d  f o r  each of  t h e  
v a r i o u s  systems i s  shown i n  F igure  2 .  These 
l e v e l s  were s e l e c t e d  a f t e r  ana lyz ing  each pro-  
p o s a l  f o r  i t s  e f f e c t  on c o s t s ,  s c h e d u l e s ,  over-  
a l l  c a p a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  weapon sys tems ,  and t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a t t a i n i n g  t h e  l e v e l  s p e c i f i e d .  
In  some c a s e s ,  h i g h e r  MTBF l e v e l s  cou ld  have 
been o b t a i n e d  a t  t h e  expense of  reduc ing  weapon 
system c a p a b i l i t y  o r  a t  t h e  expense o f  cons ider -  
a b l e  r e d e s i g n  of  t h e  a i r c r a f t  and AGE. 
Having c o n s i d e r a b l e  o p e r a t i o n a l  exper ience  
w i t h  t h e s e  systems provided t h e  pr ime and sub- 
c o n t r a c t o r  w i t h  some advantages i n  t h i s  program. 
One o f  t h e s e  advantages was t h a t  t h e r e  were 
considerable d a t a  a v a i l a b l e  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e  
a r e a s  i n  each system t h a t  should b e  redes igned  
o r  modi f ied  f o r  r e l i a b i l i t y  improvement. 
Improvement Techniques 
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  c e r t a i n  s p e c i f i c  improve- 
ments ,  most o f  t h e  s u b - c o n t r a c t o r s  fol lowed t h e  
g e n e r a l  approach shown below: 
1. 
2 .  
p o t s .  
3. 
4 ,  
5. 
6. 
i a b i l i t y  
7.  
Use of  h i g h e r  r e l i a b i l i t y  p i e c e  p a r t s .  
E l i m i n a t i o n  o f  ad jus tments  and t r i m  
Replacement of  t u b e s  w i t h  t r a n s i s t o r s .  
I n c o r p o r a t i o n  of  c i r c u i t  redundancy. 
S i m p l i f i c a t i o n  o f  many o f  t h e  c i r c u i t s  
Performing environmental  t y p e  r e l -  
t e s t s .  
G r e a t e r  d e r a t i n g  of  p i e c e  p a r t s .  
E f f e c t  on R e l i a b i l i t y  
A comparison o f  system r e l i a b i l i t y ,  b e f o r e  
and a f t e r  improvement, can b e  seen  i n  F igure  3.  
T h i s  c h a r t  i n d i c a t e s  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  each 
i n d i v i d u a l  system, f o r  a  two hour m i s s i o n ,  and 
t h e  o v e r a l l  r e l i a b i l i t y  o b t a i n e d  from t h e  pro- 
d u c t  o f  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  t h g  i n d i v i d u a l  s y s -  
tems. The t o t a l  r e l i a b i l i t y  i n  January 1961 
was about  5996, t h e  p r e d i c t e d  qrowth r e l i a b i l i t y  
was 78% and t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  t h a t  would r e s u l t  
from t h e  R e l i a b i l i t y  Improvement Proqram i s  90%. 
PROGRAIV biANAGEMEMT 
In  a  program such a s  t h i s ,  t h e  weapon system 
prime c o n t r a c t o r  (Program Manager, F igure  4)  
must 
1 ,  f u r n i s h  a l l  s t a t i s t i c a l  f a i l u r e  d a t a  
a v a i l a b l e  t h a t  w i l l  a i d  i n  s e l e c t i n g  a r e a s  i n  
need o f  improvement: 
2 .  moni tor  a l l  t e s t s  t h a t  a r e  r e q u i r e d ,  
3 .  p r e p a r e  equipment s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  r e -  
g a r d l e s s  o f  whether  t h e  a f f e c t e d  equipment is 
CFE o r  GFE, 
4. c o - o r d i n a t e  t h e  p r e p a r a t i o n  o f  t e s t  
b u l l e t i n s ,  o p e r a t i o n s  s h e e t s ,  t e c h n i c a l  o r d e r s ,  
e t c ,  t o  a s s u r e  t h a t  changes t o  t h e  systems a r e  
conveyed t o  maintenance and o p e r a t i n g  p e r s o n n e l  
a s  wel l  a s  f a c t o r y  p e r s o n n e l ;  
5 ,  e v a l u a t e  r e l i a b i l i t y  demons t ra t ion  
t e s t s ,  
6. s t a n d a r d i z e  on a  t i m e  and f a i l u r e  r e -  
p o r t i n g  program f o r  a l l  vendors ,  
7. a s s u r e  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  between t h e  i m -  
proved e l e c t r o n i c  system and t h e  a i re rame,  and 
8, monitor  equipment i n  t h e  f i e l d .  
I t  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  impor tan t  t h a t  i n t e r a c t -  
i n g  systems b e  f u l l y  t e s t e d  and i n t e g r a t e d  
p r i o r  t o  i n s t a l l a t i o n  i n  t h e  a i r f r a m e .  Every 
produc t ion  program h a s  a  c a r e f u l l y  planned 
d e l i v e r y  s c h e d u l e ;  chanpes must n o t  be  i n t r o -  
duced t h a t  woulcl d e l a y  t h a t  schedule .  S t r i c t  
a t t e n t i o n  t o  d e t a i l s  must be  main ta ined ,  s i n c e  
v e r y  o f t e n  newly des igned  o r  modif ied u n i t s  can 
cause  more d i f f i c u l t y  t h a n  t h e  o r i g i n a l  u n i t s .  
A program a s  complex a s  t h e  R e l i a b i l i t y  Im-  
provement Program t h e r e f o r e  must have c l o s e  
c o o r d i n a t i o n  and thorough r e l i a b i l i t y  t e s t i n g .  
JUSTIFICATION 
The c o s t  of  such a  program i s  j u s t i f i e d  i n  
terms o f  b e n e f i t s  e i t h e r  d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y  
r e l a t e d  t o  d o l l a r s .  
I n  ana lyz ing  t h e  b e n e f i t s  t o  any s u p p l i e r  
(prime o r  sub-contractor) ,  t h e y  may b e  s e p a r a t e d  
i n t o  t h r e e  g e n e r a l  c a t e g o r i e s ;  D o l l a r s ,  Reputa- 
t i o n ,  and Proclrlct . The improvement i n  r e l i a b i -  
l i t y  a f f e c t s  procluction c o s t s ,  r e n e r a l l y  r e -  
s u l t s  i n  a  l e s s  expens ive  b u t  always improved 
product  which i n  t u r n  improves t h e  c o n t r a c t o r t s  
r e p u t a t i o n  f o r  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  h i g h l y  r e l i a b l e  
equipment. 
To t h e  customer, improvement i n  r e l i a b i l i t y  
of  t h e  i n t e g r a t e d  e l e c t r o n i c  systems w i l l  have 
a  b e n e f i c i a l  e f f e c t  i n  s e v e r a l  a r e a s ,  a l l  o f  
which reduce  t h e  c o s t  o f  f l e e t  s u p p o r t .  I n  
q e n e r a l ,  t h e  a r e a s  which b e n e f i t  i n c l u d e  t h e  
fo l lowing:  
1. Peacet ime s p a r e s  requ i rements  a r e  r e -  
duced, t o g e t h e r  w i t h  r e p a i r  f a c i l i t i e s  and per -  
sonnel  workload, 
2. Personnel requirements are  reduced, 
favorably affecting quantity requirements f o r  
c r i t i c a l  sk i l l s .  
3. War reserve requirements a re  drast ic-  
a l l y  reduced while maintaining a t  l eas t  the same 
f l e e t  support capabi l i ty  as without the improve- 
ment in r e l i ab i l i t y .  
4. Size and weight of flyaway k i t s  are  
dras t ica l ly  reduced, resul t ing not only i n  a 
decrease in  cost but an increase i n  f l e e t  
mobility while maintaining the  same support 
capability.  
5. Aircraft  u t i l i z a t i on  is  increased and 
turn-around time reduced resul t ing i n  more a i r -  
c r a f t  i n  serviceable s t a tu s  with the same main- 
tenance e f for t  o r  the  same number of serviceable 
a i r c r a f t  attained with l e s s  maintenance e f for t .  
6 .  The prpbability of successfully com- 
pleting a mission is  increased. 
The basic "ground rule" f o r  t h i s  study has 
been that  the non-recurring cost of implementing 
such a program must be recoverable within 2 years 
through the  resul t ing savings i n  peacetime 
spares requirements, l e s s  recurring costs. 
No benefits other than peacetime savings 
in  spares have been considered. The limitation 
t o  peacetime savings was made a f t e r  an attempt 
t o  obtain data f o r  t he  determination of savings 
i n  war reserve materiel indicated tha t  no one 
acceptable technique fo r  requirements computa- 
t i on  could be established. Similar problems 
were encountered i n  attempting t o  investigate 
savings i n  personnel, warehousing, and trans- 
portation. It is obvious tha t  l imitat ion of 
e.stimated savings t o  peacetime spares leads t o  
a conservative estimate of t o t a l  savings t o  the 
customer. * 
The cost of r e l i a b i l i t y  improvement e f for t  
t o  be applied t o  individual systems was optimiz- 
ed by comparing the potent ial  peacetime savings 
with program cost. The en t i r e  packa e was then 
reviewed t o  assure tha t  r-+- t l e  t o t a  savings f o r  
improvement i n  r e l i a b i l i t y  was suf f ic ien t  t o  
recover, within two years, the cost of imple- 
menting the program. The sens i t iv i ty  of e s t i -  
mated savings t o  (a) reduction i n  t o t a l  equip- 
ment operating time and (b) pa r t i a l  accomplish- 
ment of predicted ~ e l i a b i l i t y  ,improvement was 
also prepared t o  indicate systems most l ikely 
t o  c6ntribute substantial savings i n  peacetime 
spares. 
Logistics 
Annual reports of the A i r  Force Spares 
Study Group outlined i n  general the effect  of 
present war plans on l ~ g i s t i c s  requirements. 
Implicit in  the war plan i s  the concept that  any 
future war will  be fought wi t11  materials, wea- 
pons, and resources "in being" and deployed 
with combat forces. A s  a resu l t ,  i t  has been 
decided t o  implement t h i s  concept with a drive 
t o  improve base self-sufficiency, minimize the 
base and depot repair  cycles and improve a i r -  
c r a f t  u t i l i za t ion .  Each of these goals must be 
accomplished i n  peacetime i n  preparation for a 
war s i tuat ion.  
The improvement of base self-sufficiency 
and repair  cycle time is  primarily an A i r  Force 
in-house problem which can be considerably en- 
hanced by the various manufacturers through 
simplification of airborne equipment and the  
incorporation of maintainability.princip1es. 
Every e f fo r t  should be made t o  improve main- 
t a inab i l i t y  a t  the same time tha t  an improvement 
in  r e l i a b i l i t y  is  incorporated through redesign. 
However, the  benefit  gained from increased base 
repa i r  capability was not considered i n  calculat- 
ing the resul t ing savings i n  support requirements. 
The improvement i n  a i r c r a f t  u t i l i z a t i on  is 
very def in i te ly  affected by an improvement i n  
r e l i a b i l i t y  (or mean time t o  fa i lu re ) ,  since the  
number of equipment f a i l u r e s  is  d i rec t ly  re- 
duced, 
Peacetime Stock 
Neglecting War Reserve Materiel, the stock- 
age objective consists of a peacetime stock . 
level (Operating Stock Level) suf f ic ien t  t o  
maintain the  f l e e t  i n  planned peacetime ac t iv i ty  
f o r  a period of 45 days without regard t o  re- 
parables returned. In addition t o  the stock 
level,  t he  supply pipeline must be f u l l  i n  order 
t o  achieve a constant return flow of reparables 
t o  the using command (Operating Requirement). 
The purpose of the  peacetime stock level  i s  t o  
absorb any sudden fluctuations in  demand due t o  
an unanticipated increase in  flying ac t iv i ty  o r  
a sudden decrease i n  the  flow of reparables re- 
turned. 
Sensi t ivi ty  of the  number of spares i n  the 
supply pipeline (Figure 5) t o  an increase i n  
MTBF is dependent upon the basearepair  capabi- 
l i t y  associated with the  part icular  component t o  
be repaired. Spares requirements f o r  components 
with a low base repa i r  capabi l i ty  are  extremely 
sensi t ive t o  an increase i n  mean time between 
fa i lu re ,  resul t ing in  extensive savings. 
Items i n  the  repair pipeline not only add 
t o  peacetime costs but are  useless i n  the present 
war concept which depends upon materiel and 
forces "in being". The number of items i n  the  
supply pipeline can be reduced by increasing base 
repair  capability,  reducing repair  cycle time, o r  
increasing MTBF. 
The peacetime stock level,  which does not 
consider reparables returned, i ~ ~ i n v e r s e l y  re- 
lated t o  mean time betweeen fa i lu re .  For ex- 
ample, i f  MTBF i s  doubled, the peacetime stock 
level can be cut i n  half .  
The repa i r  pipeline and the peacetime stock 
level ,  then, are  two f e r t i l e  arqas fo r  potent ial  
spares savings. . 
The technique used t o  estimate the savings 
i n  peacetime spares i s  based upon an analysis 
which does not consider  random v a r i a t i o n  i n  de- 
mand f o r  spares.  This does no t  ma te r i a l ly  a f f e c t  
t h e  accuracy of  t h e  ana lys i s ,  s i n c e  t h e  f a i l u r e  
r a t e  base was Mean Time Between Fa i lu re ,  r e s u l t -  
i ng  i n  an est imated demand which i s  a mean f o r  
t h e  random var i a t ion .  As a r e s u l t ,  t h x d i c a t -  
ed savings f o r  tlie f i r s t  qua r t e r  shown i n  t h e  
sample computation below, may not be  r e a l i z e d  
the- f i r s t  qua r t e r .  
Conservative Estimate 
The components under inves t iga t ion  a r e  
l imi t ed  t o  major sub-assemblies only (black box 
l e v e l ) .  That is, t h e  savings i n  requirements 
f o r  spare  modules (lower than black-box level )  
was not  included. In  addi t ion ,  i t  was assumed 
t h a t  t h e  condenmation and wearout r a t e s  were 
s u f f i c i e n t l y  neg l ig ib le  ( l e s s  than 1%) t h a t  
omission of  these  requirements would have l i t t l e  
e f f e c t  on t h e  f i n a l  r e s u l t .  
The omission of spares  support  requirements 
f o r  
- base p ipe l ine  
- equipment lower than black-box l eve l  
- equipment condemned 
- equipment worn-out 
leads t o  add i t iona l  conservatism i n  t h e  
es t imate  of d o l l a r  savings i n  peacetime spares 
support .  
Basic Assumptions 
For t h e  purpose of  t h i s  ana lys i s ,  spares 
requirements and spares  a v a i l a b i l i t y  were assum- 
ed t o  be i n  constant  equil ibrium. In  o ther  
words, i f  a comparison of  requirement and ava i l -  
a b i l i t y  indicated  t h e  need f o r  add i t iona l  spares  
f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  quar ter ,  t he  needed spares  were 
considered t o  be immediately ava i l ab le ;  t h e  cos t  
of t h i s  pre-planned purchase was then charged t o  
t h e  associa ted  f l e e t  conf igura t ion f o r  t h e  
qua r t e r  i n  which t h e  requirement appeared. This 
assumption f u r t h e r  ind ica te s  t h a t  t h e  r e p a i r  
' p ipe l ine  is  always f u l l  and t h a t  t h e  peacetime 
s tock l eve l  is  always adequate f o r  each qua r t e r  
t h ~ o u g h  advanced planned purchases (Provisioning 
Conferences and Replenishment Planning). The 
only reason f o r  increased requirements i n  
succeeding qua r t e r s  is  t h e  increased number of 1 f l y i n g  hours due t o  t h e  inc rease  i n  f l e e t  s i ze .  
' The same need could r e s u l t  from a s t a b l e  f l e e t  1 s i z e  but  an increase  i n  f l y i n g  a c t i v i t y .  Since 
I wearout and condemnation were not  considered, 
' should t h e  f l e e t  f l y i n g  hour r a t e  be held  con- 
s t a n t  t h e r e  would be no need f o r  add i t iona l  1 purchase of spares.  
The es t imate  of p o t e n t i a l  savings i n  spares  
requirements was concentrated i n  t h e  two areas  
s t r e s s e d  above, namely, t h e  peacetime s tock 
l e v e l  and t h e  supply p ipel ine .  The technique 
used was t o  compare t h e  requirements f o r  a 
f l e e t  having t h e  RIP conf igura t ion with t h e  re-  
quirements f o r  a f l e e t  which does not have t h e  
bene f i t  of an in t ense  r e l i a b i l i t y  improvement 
program. 
In  t h e  assumed s i t u a t i o n ,  F1050 RIP a i r c r a f t  
a r e  del ivered t o  t h e  A i r  Force s t a r t i n g  i n  
January 1964 a t  a r a t e  of 60 a i r c r a f t  per  
qua r t e r ,  o r  240 a i r c r a f t  per  year,  f o r  a period 
of two years .  Spares requirements f o r  t h e  RIP 
f l e e t  a r e  based upon t h e  MTBF estimated by t h e  
var ious  srippliers a s  achieveable by 1964 through 
t h e  concentrated R e l i a b i l i t y  Improvement Program. 
The non-RIP f l e e t  c o n s i s t s  of F105D a i r -  
c r a f t ,  of t h e  present  bas ic  conf igura t ion,  each 
a i r c r a f t  containing an in tegra ted  e l ec t ron ic  . 
system improved only  through normal growth (ECP 
ac t ion) .  The production r a t e  was a l s o  60 pe r  
qua r t e r  o r  240 a i r c r a f t  p e r  year,  f o r  a period 
of two years .  Spares requirements f o r  t h e  
"growth" f l e e t  were based upon t h e  MTBF e s t i -  
mated a s  achieveable through normal growth by 
1964. This projec ted  BlTBF was extrapolated 
from a 5 year h i s t o r y  of F105D e lec t ron ic  equip- 
ment measured MTBF, and system r e l i a b i l i t y  
growth p o t e n t i a l .  In  both cases ,  t h a t  i s  f o r  
t h e  "growth" and RIP f l e e t s ,  it was assumed t h a t  
1. t h e  f l y i n g  hour program i s  75 hours per 
a i r c r a f t  pe r  qua r t e r  and 
2. t h e  peacetime a t t r i t i o n  r a t e  is  12 a i r -  
c r a f t  per 100,000 f ly ing  hours. 
Power-on operating time is t h e  only base f o r  
acceptable measure of mean t ime between f a i l u r e  
f o r  e l e c t r o n i c  equipment. I t  is assumed t h a t  a l l  
e l ec t ron ic  equipment is i n  opera t ion during a l l  
f l i g h t s ,  and t h a t  t h e  r a t i o  of ground t o  f l i g h t  
operating time f o r  a l l  e l ec t ron ic  systems i s  
3: 1 ( the  r a t i o  a t  t h e  RAC production f l i g h t  l i n e  
v a r i e s  from 6 : l  t o  15: 1 depending upon t h e  
p a r t i c u l a r  system i n  question).  The s i g n i f i c -  
ance of t h i s  r a t i o  i s  t h a t  each piece  of equip- 
ment i s  operated t h r e e  hours on t h e  ground f o r  
each hour of f l i g h t .  Computations were then 
repeated f o r  r a t i o s  of 2:l  and 1 : l .  
A l l  items i n  base r e p a i r  were considered t o  
be returned wi th in  t h e  quar ter ,  thus  requir ing 
no spares  t o  support t h e  base r e p a i r  p ipel ine .  
The depot r e p a i r  cycle  was assumed t o  be 38 days 
f o r  a l l  components, r e s u l t i n g  i n  t h e  r e tu rn  of 
58% of a l l  depot reparables  within t h e  qua r t e r  
i n  which t h e  components f a i l e d ,  and 42% returned 
i n  t h e  succeeding quar ter .  Each component was 
evaluated a s  t o  i t s  capab i l i ty  of being repai red  
a t  base l eve l  through use of t h e  l a t e s t  appl ic-  
able  High Value Review Board Check Sheet (AMC 
Form 231) and discuss ion with Fie ld  Service 
s p e c i a l i s t s  thoroughly f ami l i a r  with t h e  a i r -  
borne equipment and A i r  Force base r e p a i r  
capab i l i ty .  Base r e p a i r  capab i l i ty  i s  expressed 
a s  a percent of a l l  f a i l u r e s  estimated t o  be re-  
parable a t  organization o r  f i e l d  l eve l .  
Estimating Technique 
The number of f a i l u r e s  per  component pe r  
q u a r t e r  year was determined by d iv id ing t h e  e s t -  
imated average number of equipment opera t ing  
hours accumulated by t h e  i n s t a l l e d  equipment i n  
f l e e t  inventory dur ing  t h e  qua r t e r  under inves t -  
i ga t ion ,  by t h e  biean Time Between Fa i lu re  of t h e  
component i n  ques t ion .  The quan t i ty  of s e rv i ce -  
ab le  components ava i l ab le  within t h e  cu r ren t  
qua r t e r  was determined through app l i ca t ion  of 
t he  base and depot r e p a i r  c a p a b i l i t y  es t imates  
together  with t h e  est imated percent  of  depot r e -  
parables  re turned within t h e  quar ter .  The t o t a l  
depot r epa rab le s  re turned cons i s t s  of 42% of 
those  f a i l e d  components returned t o  the  depot 
during the  preceeding q u a r t e r  a s  well  as  58% of 
those  re turned t o  t h e  depot during the  cu r ren t  
qua r t e r .  
The e n t i r e  ana lys i s  i s  based upon t h e  tech- 
niques descr ibed i n  AMCPI 400-1 and Spares Study 
Group Report No. 8 (December 1958) and ou t l ined  
i n  AMC Form 326. Only those  ca l cu la t ions  were 
used which a r e  involved i n  determining t h e  peace- 
time s tock l e v e l  and depot r e p a i r  p ipe l ine  r e -  
quirements. With t h i s  l i m i t a t i o n ,  i n  addi t ion  
t o  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  imposed by the  bas i c  assump- 
t i o n s  previous ly  descr ibed,  it was poss ib le  t o  
e l iminate  t h e  following computations: 
llRM replacements. (War Reserve Materiel)  
FAK requirements (Flyaway Ki ts )  
Overhaul support requirements 
Condemnation and wearout replacements 
Support of  non-recurring requirements 
Planning of t h e  Ka te r i a l  Repair System 
Planning f o r  Procurement 
Spares d i s t r i b u t i o n  t o  use r  bases 
Retention l e v e l  planning 
Typical Computation 
A sample spa res  requirement computation is 
shown i n  Figures 6 and 7 f o r  an Autopilot  
"Black Box", The computation e s s e n t i a l l y  
follows t h e  procedure ou t l ined  in  AMC Form 326, 
a s  previous ly  s t a t e d .  This s i n g l e  computation, 
f o r  only one sub-assembly within t h e  a u t o p i l o t  
subsystem, i n a i c a t e s  t h e  tremendous p o t e n t i a l  
f o r  savings i n  spares  requirements, f o r  a 
qua r t e r ly  saving of over $88,000 (25 pcs) i s  
est imated t o  be r ea l i zed .  The same technique 
was repeated f o r  a l l  major components of each 
subsystem t o  produce t h e  t o t a l  est imated annual 
savings of $54,0OO,C)00 compared t o  an est imated 
R e l i a b i l i t y  Improvement Program non-recurring 
c o s t  of  some $25,500,000 (Figure 8 ) .  
S e n s i t i v i t y  Tes ts  
In computing t h e  savings i n  spares  requi re-  
ments due t o  t h e  improvement i n  r e l i a b i l i t y  of 
t h e  a i rborne  e l e c t r o n i c  equipment, s eve ra l  
assumptions were made, a l l  of  which have been 
discussed i n  previous sec t ions  of t h i s  paper. 
A l l  of t h e  assumptions a r e  considered t o  be in  
the  d i r e c t i o n  r e s u l t i n g  i n  a conservative e s t i -  
mate of savings.  Two assumptions which may not 
appear t o  be conservat ive  a re :  
a .  t h a t  t h e  estimated r e l i a b i l i t y  achieve- 
ment will i n  f a c t ,  be achieved, and 
b. t h a t  t h e  r a t i o  of ground opera t ing  
time t o  f l i g h t  time i s  3 hours on t h e   round t o  
each hour of f l i g h t .  
Since computed savings a r e  a f f e c t e d  by these  
parameters, t he  computation of savings  was r e -  
peated t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e  s e n s i t i v i t y  of savings t o  
p a r t i a l  achievement of est imated r e l i a b i l i t y  
improvement and t o  a reduction i n  equipment t o t a l  
opera t ing  time ( e s s e n t i a l l y  a reduct ion  i n  t h e  
r a t i o  of ground time t o  f l i g h t  t ime) .  Figures 8, 
9, and 10 include the  r e s u l t s  of  a computation 
of est imated savinqs with ground time t o  f l i g h t  
time opera t ing  r a t i o s  of 3:1, 2:1, and 1:l; i n  
add i t ion  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  of achieving loo%, 75%, 
SO%, and 25% of t h e  est imated improvement i n  
r e l i a b i l i t y .  
The r e s u l t s  of t h i s  ana lys i s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  
t h e  Doppler Navigator, Central  A i r  Data Com- 
pu te r  and NASARR Radar have t h e  most p o t e n t i a l  
f o r  d o l l a r  savings i n  peacetime spares .  I n  
p a r t i c u l a r ,  the  Doppler system improvement re-  
su l t ed  i n  not only an improvement i n  r e l i a b i l i t y  
but a s u b s t a n t i a l  reduction i n  es t imated  p r i c e ,  
such t h a t  s i g n i f i c a n t  savings a r e  r e a l i z e d  
even i f  no r e l i a b i l i t y  improvement i s  achieved, 
Proposed improvement of t h e  Ver t i ca l  Tapes6 
( In tegra ted  Instruments) and A l l  A t t i t ude  
Platform do not i nd ica t e  a s  dramatic a saving 
a s  with t h e  systems discussed above. Proposed 
improvement of t h e  Automatic F l igh t  Control ,  
Communication-Information-Navigation and Toss 
Bomb Computer/Sight Display systems show ex- 
treme s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  p a r t i a l  accomplishment of 
est imated improvement and reduct ion  i n  equipment 
opera t ing  hours,  
Although l a r g e  peacetime savings  a r e  not  in-  
d i ca t ed  f o r  every subsystem, the  non-assessed 
b e n e f i t s ,  such a s  increased a i r c r a f t  u t i l i z a t i o n ,  
improved mobi l i ty  of flyaway k i t s ,  increased 
p robab i l i t y  of completing a mission and reduced 
maintenance requirements, may, i n  t h e  opinion of 
t h e  customer, counterbalance comparatively small 
peacetime savings s u f f i c i e n t l y  t o  make t h e  i m -  
provement i n  r e l i a b i l i t y  worthy o f  t h e  inves t -  
ment requi red .  
MISSION COMPLETION CAPABILITY 
One of t h e  primary e f f e c t s  of  improving t h e  
r e l i a b i l i t y  of t h e  F105D e l e c t r o n i c  systems i s  
t h e  corresponding increase  i n  mission completion 
p robab i l i t y .  That i s ,  the  l ike l ihood t h a t  t h e  
weapon system w i l l  funct ion  i n  such a manner 
t h a t  t h e  mission ob jec t ive  w i l l  be  achieved. 
There a r e  two e s s e n t i a l  mission ob jec t ives  which 
must be s a t i s f i e d ;  t h a t  of t h e  Contrac tor  and 
t h a t  of  t he  using agency. 
The Contrac tor ' s  objec t ive  i s  t o  d e l i v e r  
t he  weapon system t o  the  customer wi th  a l l  sub- 
systems f u l l y  opera t ional .  The A i r  Force ob- 
j e c t i v e  i s  t o  s u c c e s s f u l l y  complete  a combat 
m i s s i o n  wi th  t h e  weapon system. Consequently 
t h e  A i r  Force i s  concerned wi th  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
t h a t  each sub-system w i l l  o p e r a t e  normally f o r  
t h e  t i m e  r e q u i r e d  t o  f u l f i l l  i t s  f u n c t i o n  i n  t h e  
c o u r s e  o f  t h e  miss ion .  While c e r t a i n  equipment 
f a i l u r e s  can occur  w i t h o u t  a f f e c t i n g  combat 
m i s s i o n  complet ion,  A i r  Force accep tance  o f  t h e  
weapon system r e q u i r e s  t h a t  t h e  C o n t r a c t o r  de- 
m o n s t r a t e  f u l l  o p e r a t i o n  o f  a l l  systems p r i o r  
t o  d e l i v e r y .  S i n c e  t h e  two T e c t i v e s  a r e  
a p p a r e n t l y  incompat ib le ,  t h e y  s h a l l  be cons idered  
s e p a r a t e l y  t o  demons t ra te  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  e f f e c t s  
o f  improving system and component r e l i a b i l i t y ,  
Republ ic ' s  t i m e  and F a i l u r e  Report ing Pro- 
gram h a s  produced a wea l th  o f  p roduc t ion  l i n e  
r e l i a b i l i t y  d a t a  w i t h  which t o  d i r e c t l y  compute 
t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  accep tance  o f  t h e  
F105D e l e c t r o n i c  systems.  By apply ing  t h i s  d a t a  
t o  t y p i c a l  combat m i s s i o n  p r o f i l e s ,  t h e  prob- 
a b i l i t y  of  m i s s i o n  complet ion can a l s o  b e  r e a d i l y  
computed. The f o l l o w i n g  i s  a d e s c r i p t i o n  of  t h e  
methods used i n  d e r i v i n g  t h e s e  two p r o b a b i l i t i e s .  
Three s t a g e s  o f  system and component r e l -  
i a b i l i t y ,  expressed  a s  Mean Time Between F a i l -  
u r e s ,  were used a s  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  t h e  a n a l y s i s ,  
The  f i r s t  s t a g e  is  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  systems 
now be ing  produced. The second s t a g e  r e p r e s e n t s  
t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  a c h i e v a b l e  i n  two y e a r s  through 
normal growth, based upon p r o j e c t e d  system i m -  
provements brought  about  through ECP a c t i o n ,  
normal component r e f i n e m e n t ,  and advancement on 
t h e  " l e a r n i n g  curve",  T h i s  i s  u s u a l l y  accomp- 
l i s h e d  wi thout  s i g n i f i c a n t  change i n  b a s i c  sys -  
t e m  des ign .  The t h i r d  s t a g e  i s  t h a t  l e v e l  pro- 
posed by t h e  system s u b - c o n t r a c t o r s  f o r  s i g n i -  
f i c a n t  system improvement. 
Produc t ion  Acceptance 
USAF accep tance  o f  t h e  weapon system from 
t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  h a s  been assumed t o  r e q u i r e  t h a t  
e v e r y  subsystem o f  t h e  F105D e l e c t r o n i c  system 
o p e r a t e  wi thout  f a i l u r e  f o r  a two hour f l i g h t ,  
Using t h e  system f a i l u r e  r a t e s  descr ibed  i n  t h e  
f o r e g o i n g  s e c t i o n  and t h e  e q u a t i o n  o f  t h e  ex- 
p o n e n t i a l  f u n c t i o n ,  
P = p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s u c c e s s f u l  complet ion 
e = Naperian Base, 2.7183, 
t = equipment o p e r a t i n g  t i m e  = 2 hours ,  
T = Mean Time Between F a i l u r e s ,  hours  and 
1/T = F a i l u r e  Kate,  
t h e  improvement i n  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  an A i r  Force 
accep tance  p i l o t  e x p e r i e n c i n g  no e l e c t r o n i c  s y s -  
tem f a i l u r e s  d u r i n g  a t o t a l  o f  two f l i g h t  hours  
on one a i r c r a f t  was found t o  b e  a 9% i n c r e a s e  i n  
accep tance  p r o b a b i l i t y  a t  t h e  end o f  two y e a r s  
through n o G a l  p roduc t  improvement. I f ,  however, 
t h e  proposed R e l i a b i l i t y  Improvement Program is  
undertaken,  a n  i n c r e a s e  o f  36% i n  a c c e p t a n c e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  is  a c h i e v e a b l e  i n  t h e  same t i m e  
p e r i o d .  
bl iss ion Completion 
The p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  accep tance  g i v e n  i n  t h e  
p reced ing  s e c t i o n  is a convenient  measure of 
t h e  t o t a l  r e l i a h i l i t y  of  t h e  FlOSD i n t e g r a t e d  
e l e c t r o n i c  systems o p e r a t i n g  For two hours  i n  
f l i g h t .  However, a n  i n d i c a t i o n  of  weapon s y s -  
tem combat e f f e c t i v e n e s s  i s  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of  
t h e  e l e c t r o n i c  systems o p e r a t i n g  p r o p e r l y  dur -  
i n g  t h e  m i s s i o n  f o r  which t h e  weapon system was 
designed.  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  b a s i c  m i s s i o n s  o f  t h e  
FlOSD (2 h o u r s  d u r a t i o n )  were analyzed f o r  
v a r i o u s  wea ther ,  weapon and d e l i v e r y  modes t o  
de te rmine  e l e c t r o n i c  system miss ion  comple t ion  
p r o b a b i l i t y .  Subsystems inc luded  i n  each 
m i s s i o n  a n a l y s i s  were l i m i t e d  t o  t h o s e  r e q u i r e d  
t o  accomplish t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  miss ion  under  
s t u d y ,  each o f  which were assumed t o  o p e r a t e  
f o r  t h e  f u l l  d u r a t i o n  of t h e  miss ion .  
The t h r e e  s t a g e s  of system r e l i a b i l i t y  and 
t h e  e q u a t i o n  p r e v i o u s l y  descr ibed  were used  i n  
t h e  computat ion of e l e c t r o n i c  system miss ion  
complet ion p r o b a b i l i t i e s  w i t h  t h e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  
t h a t  o n l y  system modes were inc luded  which were 
r e q u i r e d  f o r  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  miss ion .  
The normal growth improvement i n  e l e c t r o n i c  
system p r o b a b i l i t y  of  miss ion  complet ion i s  
t h u s  e s t i m a t e d  t o  be 6 % ,  whi le  t h e  RIP program 
would y i e l d  a corresponding improvement o f  18%. 
These f i g u r e s  were found t o  be  approximate ly  
t h e  same f o r  b o t h  t h e  LO-LO-LO-Hi and t h e  H I -  
LO-LO-I11 m i s s i o n  p r o f i l e s ,  under  b l i n d  wea ther  
c o n d i t i o n s .  I n  c l e a r  weather ,  t h e  MTBFts a r e  
h i g h e r ,  b u t  t h e  p e r c e n t  improvement i s  about  t h e  
same. 
CONCLUSION 
R e l i a b i l i t y  i s  an investment  t h a t  r e t u r n s  
d o l l a r s  t o  t h e  customer i n  t h e  form of  reduced 
c o s t  of  maintenance suppor t  and i n c r e a s e d  
e f f i c i e n c y  o f  t h e  weapon system, However, i f  
t h e  investment  is  de layed  s o  t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t  
appears  l a t e  i n  t h e  o p e r a t i o n a l  l i f e  o f  t h e  
weapon system, t h e  necessary  investment  t o  
ach ieve  t h e  same r e s u l t ,  w i l l  i n c r e a s e .  This  i s  
due t o  t h e  necessary  r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  f l e x i b i -  
l i t y  o f  permissab le  changes a s  t h e  q u a n t i t y  o f  
e x i s t i n g  systems i n c r e a s e s  and t h e  q u a n t i t y  of  
f u t u r e  p roduc t ion  decreases .  In a d d i t i o n ,  
f l e x i b i l i t y  i s  f u r t h e r  reduced a s  more Aero 
Ground Equipment is in t roduced  which r e q u i r e s  
a d d i t i o n a l  e x p e n d i t u r e  of  funds t o  make t h e  
equipment compatible  w i t h  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  t o  t h e  
a i r b o r n e  equipment. 
S t u d i e s  have f u r t h e r  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  it i s  
ex t remely  d i f f i c u l t ,  i f  no t  imposs ib le ,  t o  f i n -  
a n c i a l l y  j u s t i f y  r e t r o f i t  c o s t s ,  f o r  t h e  c o s t  of 
r e t r o f i t  i s  a d i r e c t  expendi tu re  t h a t  cannot  be  
compared w i t h  anything b u t  t h e  c o s t  o f  n o t  per -  
forming r e t r o f i t ,  which is no cost  a t  a l l .  In  
addition, supporting spares a re  scheduled t o  be 
on hand p r i o r  t o  del ivery of the  equipment t o  
be maintained. Therefore, if suf f i c ien t  spares 
were procured, an improvement i n  r e l i a b i l i t y  
of the  bas ic  equipment w i l l  c rea te  a surplus of 
supporting spares,  r a t h e r  than a saving i n  
fu tu re  procurement. The only saving tha t  can 
be rea l i zed  i n  a r e t r o f i t  program t o  improve 
r e l i a b i l i t y  is  i n  the  area of reduced manpower 
requirements, reduced requirement f o r  replace- 
ment b i t s  and pieces and, reduced requirement 
f o r  addi t ional  spares ( i f  addi t ional  spares 
must be procured). 
In  summary, maximum benef i t  is obtained 
from ear ly  investment i n  r e l i a b i l i t y ,  which 
w i l l  increase f i r s t  cost ,  but which must be con- 
sidered a s  an investment with a v i r t u a l l y  guar- 
anteed re turn.  
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RELIABILITY MONITORING BY OPTIONAL STOPPING SAMPLING 
Noman R. Garner 
Aero jetGenera1 Corporation 
Azusa, California 
99 j - p  1 Abstract -
An optional stopping sampling procedure i s  
recommended fo r  r e l i ab i l i t y  monitoring. This 
procedure allows test ing t o  continue u n t i l  k de- 
f ec t s  a re  observed. A t  t h i s  time one of three 
decisions are  made. I f  the number of t r i a l s  is 
too small, tes t ing  i s  stopped and an engineering 
change i s  required. I f  the number of t r i a l s  i s  
too large, then a new re l i ab i l i t y  plateau has 
been achieved. If the  number of runs i s  neither 
too small nor too large a new sequence of tes t ing  
begins. Thus, only a minimum amount of tes t ing  
would be perfomed on unreliable systems - a very 
desirable characteris t ic  for  the  proper monitor- 
ing of re l iab i l i ty .  On the other hand, i f  an en- 
gineering design change was made which improved 
r e l i a b i l i t y  appreciably, the length of t r i a l s  
would become longer and, so, a more ef f ic ien t  es- 
timate of r e l i a b i l i t y  would be made fo r  the im- 
proved system. This is  precisely what is  desired 
by a monitoring system. The mathematical model 
i s  discussed, cumulative probabilities are given 
so tha t  control charts can be established, and, 
finally, an example i s  presented. 
Reliabi l i ty Monitoring Requirements 
Every development program can be considered 
a s  an evolutionary process; a process which re- 
quires a continuous series  of engineering changes. 
A s  these changes are  made, it i s  desirable t o  
continuously monitor the development program t o  
determine which engineering changes are  beneficial 
and which are detrimental. It i s  essential, 
therefore, t ha t  a monitoring procedure be de- 
veloped which allows rejection of an engineering 
change as soon as possible i f  it is detrimental 
but allows tes t ing  t o  'continue i f  it i s  benef i- 
cial .  This i s  consistent with the ideas of 
(1) minimum coot since it w i l l  minimize testing, 
(2) eliminating causes of non-improvement, and 
(3) obtaining t e s t  resul ts  which convey most 
e f f ic ien t ly  the current estimate of re l iab i l i ty .  
I n  essence, at leas t  a three decision pro- 
cess is required. One decision says stop testing, 
r e l i a b i l i t y  has decreased and no more test ing 
should be perfomed u n t i l  an engineering change 
i s  made, A second decision says tha t  the en- 
gineering changes have increased r e l i ab i l i t y  and, 
so, a new re l i ab i l i t y  plateau has been achieved. 
A t h i rd  decision is ,  of course, continue testing, 
insufficient evidence t o  determine (1) o r  (2). 
A sampling procedure, commonly called optional 
stopping o r  inverse sampling, can f u l f i l l  a l l  of 
these requirements. 
Optional Stopping Sampling Procedure 
The optional stopping sampling procedure 
tabulates the number of t r i a l s  up t o  and in- 
cluding k failures, where k i s  a preassigned 
number of allowable defects. Thus, a s  the suc- 
cess runs or  number of t r i a l s  become larger, it 
would be assumed tha t  the r e l i ab i l i t y  has i m -  
proved; a s  the success runs become smaller, it 
would be assumed tha t  the r e l i ab i l i t y  has de- 
graded. So, it i s  possible t o  control develop- 
mental decisions by observing the length of runs; 
tha t  is,  the number of t r i a l s  required up t o  and 
including k fai lures.  For example, i f  an en- 
gineering change caused a degradation i n  r e l i a -  
b i l i ty ,  or  i f  wearout were becoming an important 
r e l i ab i l i t y  variable, the observed lengths of 
t r i a l s  would decrease significantly. This would 
c a l l  for  a stopping of tes t ing  u n t i l  an engin- 
eering change were made. Thus, only a minimum 
amount of tes t ing  would be performed on unrelia- 
ble  systems - a very desirable characteris t ic  for  
the  proper monitoring of re l iab i l i ty .  On the 
other hand, i f  an engineel lesign was made 
which improved the r e l i a b i ~ i c ,  appreciably, the 
lengths of t r i a l s  would become longer and, so, a 
more eff icient  estimate of r e l i ab i l i t y  would be 
made for  the improved system. This is  precisely 
what i s  desired by a monitoring system. This 
procedure i s  i n  effect  continuous surveillance on 
the development program and when k defectives are 
observed a decision i s  t o  be made. It is, of 
course, a form of sequential sampling. That i s ,  
i n  contrast t o  fixed sampling programs, the sam- 
ple size, n, i s  a random variable. 
Mathematical Model for  the 
Optional Stopping Sampling Procedure 
The mathematical model for  t h i s  procedure 
i s  given i n  Fe l le r  as  
where P ( x = ~ )  i s  the probability of a run of n 
t r i a l s  up t o  and including the kt& fa i lure  (the 
number of fai lures allowed before sampling i s  
stopped); and R i s  the current r e l i ab i l i t y  of the 
system. This model i s  known as the Pascal or, 
more popularly, the negative binomial distribu- 
tion. 
Fel ler  also shows tha t  the mean o r  expected 
number of t r i a l s  up t o  and includingthe k z  de- 
fec t  i s  
and i t s  variance i s  
I f  k is preassigned as unity then Pascal's 
distribution reduces t o  the well known geometric 
distribution 
with the expected number of t r i a l s  up t o  and in- 
cluding the first defect 
and its variance 
When it becomes necessary t o  estimate R from 
a series of trials when k has been assigned, Hal- 
dane has sham that  an unbiased estimate of R i s  
A n-k R = -  n-1 
and Finney has shown that  an unbiased estimate of 
i t s  variance is  
Finney recognized that  the standard error i s  a 
satisfactory estimate of the error of estimation 
of R only when k is large and states that  for  
small k limits of error can be computed frcan bi- 
nomial tables by the following Pules: 
1. The lower l i m i t  i s  one minus the upper 
limit for a direct binomial sample which 
has k-1 failures i n  n-1 t r ia ls .  
2. The upper l i m i t  i s  one minus the lower 
limit for a direct binomla1 sample which 
has k failures in n t r i a l s .  
These limits are the highest and lowest values of 
R which just f a i l  t o  be contradicted by the sam- 
ple i n  a significance t e s t  based upon a chosen 
level of the probability. 
Establishing the Control Chart 
The cumulative probabilities have been 
summarized for k=lO and for re l iabi l i t ies  of 
.85 (1) .99 for control chart limits i n  Table I. 
The median value i s  also given. In  the body of 
the table are the allowed number of t e s t s  up t o  
and including the k t t  fai lure before a decision 
is t o  be made. For example, with k=10 and an 
assumed re l iabi l i ty  of .90, i f  56 or less t e s t s  
were observed up t o  and includingthe 10th fa i l -  
ure, testing would stop and would not continue 
unt i l  an engineering change were made. On the 
other hand, i f  154 or more t e s t s  were observed, 
it would be decided that  a new plateau or a new 
re l iabi l i ty  had been obtained. A new estimate of 
re l iabi l i ty  would be assumed and new limits de- 
termined. Otherwise, a new seriecs of t e s t s  is 
conmeneed. These limits are chosen with a 5$ 
error of making a false change in  the current re- 
l i ab i l i ty  status. 
A question which arises i s  the level of con- 
t r o l  required. Conventional control charts cus- 
tomarily use the 95$ (2a) or  99.@ (30) limits. 
However, optional stopping sampling charts are 
for detecting changes of two independent events 
t o  provide a basis for independent decisions. For 
example, if a point goes out on the low side no 
revision is made t o  the limits, but a change i s  
made t o  the process. I n  other words, these charts 
are for the purpose of detecting changes i n  rel ia-  
b i l i t y  on a product Which is continually altered 
by engineering changes, not t o  maintain the pro- 
duct in stable control or i t s  normal pattern of 
variation. This is perhaps the difference between 
control charts for developmental work contrasted 
with mase production. Therefore, it i s  recommen- 
ded that the 90$ control limits be used. That is, 
5$ for each side, or each decision. 
When it is decided that a new plateau has 
been achieved, a problem arises i n  determining the 
new reliability; however, it is suggested that 
only points on the upturn be used t o  determine 
th i s  value for control limits. This value, of 
course, could be adjust& as evidence is  accumu- 
lated. These charts should be studiea just as 
regular control charts. For example, they should 
be watched for significant gaps, trends, or runs 
above or below the median value. A skilled sta- 
t i s t ic ian should be available for consultation. 
The choice of k i s  more or  less arbitrary. 
One should choose k according t o  a desirable 
operating characteristic curve, financial avail- 
ability, or both. If the re l iabi l i ty  is assumed 
t o  be rather low perhaps values of k& t o  10 could 
be used. However, as the re l iabi l i t ies  get higher 
an8 higher, the only choice is t o  l e t  k=l or 2. 
A control chaxt for the 762 consecutive de- 
velopment t e s t s  on an Auxiliary Power Supply is 
shown on Figure 1 for  k=10. The results are also 
presented i n  Table 11. The initial re l iabi l i ty  
was assumed t o  be .85 and so, from Table I the 
lower control limit i s  38 tests, the median number 
of t e s t s  is  64, and the upper control l i m i t  i s  
102 tests .  On the f i f t h  sequence of 10 failures, 
a run of ~ & e s t s  was observed which i s  out of 
control for a re l iabi l i ty  of .85. It i s  therefore 
decided that a new re l iabi l i ty  is  t o  be assumed 
and revised control limits determined. Since 
there is only one point on the upturn the new es- 
timate of re l iabi l i ty  is 
Therefore, -93 is  the assumed current re l iabi l i ty  
and the limits are revised accordingly. Obviously 
these control limits do not take into considera- 
t ion  the sampling variation of the new estimate 
of rel iabil i ty.  This, however, is of minor im- 
portance. 
The procedure recommended for the best es t i -  
mate of current re l iabi l i ty  is by grand lot t ing 
al l  data applicable t o  the  current control chart 
and using the ordinary binomial rel iabil i ty.  
Thus, the best estimate of current re l iabi l i ty  is 
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OPTIONAL STOPPING SAMPLING CONTROL CHART 
FOR THE APS DEVELOPMENTAL PROGRAM 
C u m u l a t i v e  N u m b e r  of D e f e c t s  
TABLE I 
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STATISTICAL CIRCUIT ANALYSIS I N  PRACTICE 
F. A. Applegate - N.  A .  Scianna 
Light Mili tary Electronics Department 
General Elect r ic  Company 
Utica, New York 
(7363 Abstract 
I n  recent years several  methods of re- 
l a t i n g  component pa r t  behavior t o  c i r cu i t  
behavior have been described; however, 
the author knows of no papers re la t ing 
the so-called s t a t i s t i c a l  c i r c u i t  analysis 
t o  a component-part t e s t  program. 
Assuming a correct  model, c i r cu i t  syn- 
thes i s  is  only as  good as the component 
pa r t  data  used. Because of t h i s  depend- 
ence upon accurate component par t  data, 
considerable e f f o r t  must be expended i n  
designing an accurate and e f f i c i en t  
component-part t e s t ing  program. The re- 
s u l t s  of this t e s t  program must lend them- 
selves -to any analysis  model selected.  
This paper, then, describes a program 
f o r  the col lec t ion and use of component- 
- par t  t e s t  data f o r  r e l i a b i l i t y  i n  general 
and f o r  s t a t i s t i c a l  c i r cu i t  analysis i n  
pa r t i cu la r .  
Introduction 
One of the long-standing problems i n  
r e l i a b i l i t y  has been the se lect ion of the 
component pa r t  of highest r e l i a b i l i t y  f o r  
a given applicat ion.  The solution of t h i s  
problem has followed a somewhat lengthy 
evolution. From the ear ly  simple quali- 
f i c a t i on  t e s t s  we have progressed t o  a 
stage where we now t e s t  f o r  the speci f ic  
r e l i a b i l i t y  of each par t  and vendor with 
the most re l i ab le  one selected f o r  the 
applicat ion.  
Needless t o  say, a l l  of thsse methods 
f o r  se lect ing par t s  and vendors are  ex- 
tremely expensive. Besides the expense, 
i t  is necessary t o  keep large samples on 
t e s t  f o r  long periods of time t o  demon- 
s t r a t e  high r e l i a b i l i t i e s .  
The par t  and c i r c u i t  standardization 
of d i g i t a l  equipment persuaded many com- 
panies t o  t e s t  a few par t s  and c i r cu i t s  
intensively.  These same companies soon 
realized, however, tha t  it was extremely 
wasteful t o  t e s t  jus t  f o r  the sake of re-  
l i a b i l i t y  numbers, and they began t o  
measure some of the more important pa r t  
parameters. Unfortunately, most companies, 
vendor and user  a l ike ,  continue t o  t e s t  
a t  maximum operating conditions only. 
Some--in hopes of achieving an accelerated 
test--operate the par t  i n  excess of r a t -  
ing. In  any event, component-part para- 
meter data i n  d i s t r ibu t ion  form have now 
became available.  
With t h i s  data i n  existence f o r  
various temperature, e l e c t r i c a l ,  and en- 
vironmental conditions, it was natural  t o  
s t a r t  designing c i r cu i t s  which would oper- 
a t e  a t  the worst case combinations. 
Several objections were found t o  t h i s  
"worst case" design. In some cases, a 
worst case design could not be found. I n  
others worst case design was found t o  be 
unduly pessimistic. Some worst case com- 
binations just  could not ex i s t ,  and 
even the very def in i t ion of what con- 
s t i t u t ed  a worst case value was ques- 
tionable. 
Most of the d i f f i c u l t i e s  can be over- 
come, however, and useful worst case c i r -  
cu i t s  can be designed. These designs can 
be improved by considering the s t a t i s t i c a l  
implications of the worst case l i m i t s .  I n  
other words, the approach t o  design is  
changed t o  to le ra te  speci f ic  areas of pa r t  
parameter d is t r ibut ions .  
With a s t a t i s t i c a l  c i r c u i t  analysis, 
i t  is  readily apparent i f  a design requires 
improveme,nt .- In  f a c t  i f  the analysis is 
made properly, i t  can even reveal the 
speci f ic  pa r t  parameters tha t  need t o  be 
improved. 
General Plan 
Because the general r e l i a b i l i t y  pro- 
gram which follows i s  dependent upon the 
degree of pa r t  and c i r cu i t  standardization 
realized,  the f i r s t  r e l i a b i l i t y  objective 
is  t o  meet the required standardization. 
Experience has shown that  t h i s  must be 
accomplished i n  the proposal phase i f  
standardization is  t o  become a r e a l i t y .  
Today's d i g i t a l  equipment permits ex- 
tensive use of standard par t s  and c i r -  
cui ts ,  but what of those equipments which 
w i l l  not permit such standardization? The 
same general r e l i a b i l i t y  program can be 
applied, but i t  w i l l  be extremely expen- 
sive i f  followed t o  the extent described 
here. The approach described i s  f o r  
d i g i t a l  equipment; f o r  other designs the 
program w i l l  usually have t o  be f a r  l e s s  
extensive. 
I n i t i a l  c i r cu i t  design can be accom- . 
plished by using worst case values which are  
e i t he r  calculated from pr io r  data o r  
obtained from vendor data .  This is  done 
t o  achieve a working design as ea r ly  as 
possible so t ha t  other design work may 
proceed. I n  actuali ty,  many of the c i r -  
cu i t  designs based upon the design pro- 
cedures described-here w i l l  already ex i s t  
f rom pr ior  development. 
Following the initial design a de- 
tailed circuit analysis is started on all 
new circuit designs. This analysis is 
begun at the same time as the parts test- 
ing program. The purpose of the circuit 
analysis is to derive an expression in 
terms of measurable part parameters for 
each circuit parameter. The fact that 
measurable part parameters must be used 
in the derived expression eliminates many 
possible expressions. This is the major 
problem in finding ac-circuit expressions 
Considerable effort must be expended 
to make the part-testing program efficient 
for this activity is the most expensive 
portion of a reliability program. The 
circuit synthesis which follows the part- 
test program is only as accurate as the 
component-part data used. Accuracy,there- 
fore, is a continual concern in part 
testing. The results of the test program 
must be put into a form so that any cir- 
/wit synthesis method may be used. The 
data must also permit determination of 
worst case values. Simultaneously with 
the generatlon of part parameter data, 
vendors are ranked for quality, and actiol 
is initiated to correct for any component 
part deficiencies. 
Following the generation of component 
part parameter distributions, this data 
is combined with the circuit parameter 
expression derived from the circuit anal- 
ysis. Several methods exist for this 
procedure, the most common of which is 
the "~onte-Carlo" or random-sampling 
technique. The result of any of these 
procedures is a distribution of the cir- 
cuit parameter according to the individ- 
ual component-part parameter variations. 
Using the circuit parameter distri- 
bution along with some criteria of satis- 
factory circuit parameter performance, it 
is possible to determine which designs 
are satisfactory and which are not. De- 
sign improvements can then be initiated 
where the need exists. 
Part Test Program 
Although the part test program func- 
tions as a tool for vendor selection as 
well as the source of part parameter de- 
sign data, this discussion will be limited 
to the testing program for a single ven- 
dor. Other vendors require essentially 
a duplication of the described effort. 
Before subjecting a part to an ex- 
tensive test program, it is first ascer- 
tained that the part does exhibit the 
electrical characteristics desired. This 
is determined through a series of meas- 
urements on separate samples from those 
later subjected to reliability testing. 
Sample sizes are determined to pro- 
vide statistically valid results from all 
testing. To minimize sample sizes prior 
information including vendor data is used 
whenever it is available. No fixed sam- 
ple size is correct for all tests, but 
the size usually varies between 25 and 300 
with 50 being the most common. It is sig- 
nificant that failure rates are not a 
product of this testing, but detailed 
parameter data. This accounts for the 
relatively small sample sizes. 
The part test program is designed to 
investigate many different considerations, 
from environmental to electrical. No 
test program can be the final answer in 
test techniques. The procedures are con- 
tinually being improved upon as new 
methods are found to conduct more accurate 
tests, more economically. The only fixed 
requirement is to obtain data describing 
the variation of the part parameter under 
environmental and electrical conditions, 
and over the intended operational life. 
Usually a vendor's samples are divided 
into at least three groups. One sample 
is subjected sequentially to each of the 
environmental conditions to be encountered 
in operation. The order of sequencing is 
normally selected at random except where 
several vendors are being compared, in 
which case identical order is followed. 
The second sample is placed directly on 
an operating life test. The third sam- 
ple is subjected to an environmental ex- 
posure which is suspected of being de- 
trimental to the part. This sample is 
then placed on an operating life test 
identical to the second sample. 
The life tests can be either a steady 
state test, an on-off cycled test, a 
temperature-cycled test or both. The 
type depends upon the intended operational 
use of the equipment. The fact that life 
tests are conducted under actual elec- 
trical conditions expected in operation 
is a significant departure from most part 
testing and is desirable for two reasons: 
(1) Semiconductors can be less stable at 
low levels of operatioq than they are at 
rated conditions (2) We are looking for 
accurate answers in the circuit synthesis 
described in this paper, and therefore, 
we want to minimize errors introduced in- 
to the calculations. The life test is 
conducted (if non-cycled) at the maximum 
expected operating temperature, but meas- 
urements are taken at room temperature 
and low temperature as well. 
In addition to the testing described, 
data is gathered so as to construct fami- 
lies of curves wherever vendor data does 
not furnish adequate results. These 
families of curves include electrical and 
temperature variations. 
By data reduction we attempt to pro- 
vide maximum information in simplest 
form. The data is directed at two groups 
ofpeople. Curveswithbrief 
t a b l e s  of worst case values a r e  con- 
s t r u c t e d  f o r  design engineers .  Additional 
t a b l e s  providing the s t a t i s t i c s  
used i n  r e l i a b i l i t y  c i r c u i t  ana lys i s  a r e  
constructed f o r  r e l i a b i l i t y  engineers.  
An example of curves prepared f o r  de- 
s igne r s  i s  the  t r a n s i s t o r  curves i n  Figure 
1. Figure 2 i s  a spec i f i c  t r a n s i s t o r  
parameter showing the mean and a measure 
of d i spe r s ion .  Figure 3 presents  the re -  
s u l t s  of a t yp ica l  l i f e  t e s t  with t h e  25°C 
measurements. 
Figure 4 is  another p l o t  of the same 
d a t a  shown i n  Figure 3 .  But t h i s  time i t  
i s  ineended f o r  r e l i a b i l i t y  engineers .  
Another vers ion  of t h i s  p l o t ,  which i s  
used f o r  quick communication of sample 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  changes, uses the  sample 
item number t o  check indiv idua l  i tems.  
Table 1 presents  the sample s t a t i s t i c s  
recorded from a t y p i c a l  t e s t .  These 
t a b l e s  which a r e  re ta ined  by R e l i a b i l i t y  
Engineering a r e  intended t o  provide the 
s t a t i s t i c s  which might be required by any 
group. Defini t ions a r e  shown i n  Appendix 
A .  A s imi l a r  t ab l e  represents  percent  
changes , 
Each t ab l e  and graph records spec i f i c  
vendor and p a r t  type except f o r  those 
cases  where c o l l e c t i v e  d a t a  represent  a 
p a r t  type made by seve ra l  vendors. Besides 
the t a b l e s  and graphs re ta ined  by r e l i a -  
b i l i t y ,  the r a w  da t a  is  kept  u n t i l  the 
p a r t  type is  obsole te .  
Another t a b l e  provided designers  f o r  
use with a s p e c i f i c  design i s  a t a b l e  of 
worst case l i m i t s .  These l i m i t s  a r e  
s p e c i f i c  f o r  each design because of vary- 
ing temperature, l i f e ,  and environmental 
requirements.  Table 2 i s  a b r i e f  example 
of such a t a b l e .  
I n  add i t i on  t o  the d a t a  reduct ion 
a l ready  descr ibed,  various ana lys is  tech- 
niques a r e  used i n  forming inferences 
about the populat ions.  Regression anal- 
y s i s  i s  performed wherever ca l l ed  f o r ,  
and o f t en  spec i a l  c o r r e l a t i o n  s tud ie s  a r e  
made f o r  use i n  the s t a t i s t i c a l  c i r c u i t  
ana lys i s  described below. Various t e s t s  
of hypotheses a r e  made i n  s e l e c t i n g  ven- 
dors ,  evaluat ing p a r t  improvement, and so 
on. Generally, besides being sc ru t in i zed  
f o r  the s p e c i f i c  purpose of the t e s t ,  the 
d a t a  i s  ca re fu l ly  analyzed f o r  whatever 
o the r  information i t  might y i e l d .  
S t a t i s t i c a l  C i r cu i t  Analysis 
The first  s t e p  i n  performing a s t a -  
t i s t i c a l  c i r c u i t  ana lys i s  o r  a worst case 
ana lys is ,  i s  t o  f i n d  an expression f o r  
each c i r c u i t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  i n  terms of 
measurable p a r t  parameters.  A c r i t e r i o n  
must a lqo be es tab l i shed  f o r  the unsa t i s -  
f a c t o r y  performance of each c i r c u i t  char- 
a c t e r i s t i c .  
As an  example of the de r iva t ion  of 
c i r c u i t  equations used i n  worst case and 
i n  s t a t i s t i c a l  c i r c u i t  ana lys i s ,  t he  dc 
equations f o r  what has been c a l l e d  a 
"standard" Nor c i r c u i t  w i l l  be der ived .  
This c i r c u i t  i s  shown i n  Figure 5. Such 
der iva t ions  must be accomplished f o r  each 
c i r c u i t  parameter of every c i r c u i t  used. 
Examination of the  Logic Nor shown i n  
Figure 5 revea ls  two modes of f a i l u r e .  
These modes can be expressed a s  c i r c u i t  
parameters, and t h e i r  equations can be 
derived. 
Fa i lu re  Modes 
The first  mode of f a i l u r e  i s  the  c i r -  
c u i t ' s  i n a b i l i t y  t o  d e l i v e r  the  spec i f i ed  
amount of load cu r ren t .  This Nor was de- 
signed t o  d e l i v e r  fou r  u n i t s  of' such 
cu r ren t .  Degree of overdrive (DOD) ,which 
i s  used a s  a f i gu re  of meri t ,  i s  s e t  equal 
t o  the product of the  t r a n s i s t o r  cur ren t  
ga in  and the base cur ren t  of t he  t r a n s i s -  
t o r ,  divided by the maximum required out- 
pu t  cur ren t  ( four  u n i t s  of load c u r r e n t ) .  
This i s  expressed as:  
- ~FEIB DOD -  
41, 
where: hFE i s  the t r a n s i s t o r  cur ren t  gain 
IB is  the t r a n s i s t o r  base cur ren t  
IL is  one u n i t  of load cur ren t  
Fa i lure  occurs when DOD is l e s s  than one. 
The second mode of f a i l u r e  i n  t h i s  
Logic Nor i s  f o r  the  c i r c u i t  t o  be con- 
duct ing when cutoff i s  des i r ed .  The Nor 
t r a n s i s t o r s  must not  conduct when one of 
the  input  diodes i s  forward biased and 
returned t o  ground through a s a tu ra t ed  
t r a n s i s t o r .  Fa i lu re  occurs when the base 
t o  emi t te r  voltage of the t r a n s i s t o r  (vBR) 
reaches a c r i t i c a l  value t h a t  permits 
conduction. 
For d e f i n i t i o n  of symbols used i n  the  
following der iva t ions  see  Appendix B. 
Derivation of T rans i s to r  Base Current ( I ~ )  
Referr ing t o  Figure 6A, assume t h a t  
Q1 is  conducting. Let Ii represent  the 
t o t a l  leakage a t  the input  of the c i r c u i t .  
where VB i s  the t r a n s i s t o r  base t o  emi t t e r  
voltage a t  s a t u r a t i o n .  For I1 i n  equation 
( 3 )  , s u b s t i t u t e  equation ( 1 ) .  
For 12  i n  equation (5) ,  s u b s t i t u t e  equa- Derivation of Degree of Overdrive (DOD) 
t i o n  ( 2 ) .  
By de f in i t i on :  
(6  ) El + E~ =. I i ~ l  + I3 (R1+R2+R3 ) 
(1) DOD = ~FEIB A 
+ IB(RlfR2) 4 1 ~  
 or I i n  equation (6 ) ,  s u b s t i t u t e  equa- 
t i o n  74 ) .  IB and IL were derived above. After  pro- pe r  arrangement of primes i n  the  equation 
( E ~ + v ~ )  (R1+R2+R3) f o r  IL, these two equations a r e  subs t i -  ( 7 )  E l  + E2 = I i R l  + tu ted  i n t o  (1)  f o r  I g  and IL respect ive ly .  
R3 The r e s u l t  a f t e r  s impl i f i ca t ion  is the  following expression f o r  DOD. I 
+ IB(Rl+R2) A (2)  DOD = 
After  s implifying and Solving f o r  IB I t 
where, A = hFER; ("2+R3 ) ' ~ 2  ( ~ l + ~ 2  ) 
El E2 I i R l  v ~ ( R ~ + R ~ + R ~ )  (8) I~ =- - - -- - - v ~ ( R ~ + R * + R ~  - 1~~111 R1+R2 R3 R1+R2 ~ 3 ( ~ 1 + ~ 2 ) '  
I 
I 
Deriyation of $One Unit of Load Current (IL) and, B = 4R3(R1+R2) [E1(~;+~j)  - E2Ri 
I n  Figure 6~ one u n i t  of load i s  the  - (v,+v;) (R;+R~R;  )+R;R;I~~A] 
current  load one Nor c i r c u i t  represents .  
This diagram must be thought of a s  a load Derivation of Trans is tor  Base 
c i r c u i t  with Q2 being the  t r a n s i s t o r  of Voltage a t  Cutofl  (VBR)- 
t he  o r ig ina l  Nor c i r c u i t  being analyzed. Refer again t o  Figure 6B. This time 
(1)  El + Eg = R;I1 + R;12 R;I~  * i t  i s  the  c i r c u i t  ins tead  of t he  load which is of i n t e r e s t  i n  the  de r iva t ion .  
For 11 and I i n  equation (1)  s u b s t i t u t e  (4 )  -j--~~ = El - (v;+VD) 9 
equations ( 3 j  and (4)  respec t ive ly .  
( 5 )  El + E2 = El - (v~+v,!,) + (R;+R;)12 (5)  11 = R1 
For I2 and 11 i n  equation (1)  s u b s t i t u t e  
( 3 )  and (5) respec t ive ly .  
(7) El + E2 = El - V: - VD + ( R ~ + R ~ ) I ~  
El - (vC+v;) E2 +v; +v; -R&-J* - R 2 1 ~ ~ ~  ( 8 )  IL = - .8- 
R; 
E2 + V; + VD + R21CER 
R; + R; (8) I3 = 
I I t R2 + '33 
El E2 (9)  IL = - -  - (vC+vA ) ( R ~ + ~ ~ + ~ ~  ) For I3 i n  equation (6)  s u b s t i t u t e  equation Ri R;+R$ R; (R;+R~) ( 8 )  
*Note: Single primes a r e  used t o  d i s -  *Note: Double primes a re  used t o  d i s t i n -  
t inguish  parameters appearing i n  the 
load from t h e i r  counterparts  i n  the  guish parameters appearing i n  the source 
c i r c u i t  being analyzed. from t h e i r  counterparts  i n  the  c i r c u i t  being analyzed. 
R~ ( V ; + V ~ + R ~ ~ , ~ ~ )  - E2R2 
(10)  VBR = 
R2 + R3 
Before the  derived c i r c u i t  expressions a r e  
accepted as s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  they should be 
checked by labora tory  measurement of p a r t s  
and c i r c u i t s .  It is  usua l ly  a simple 
mat te r  t o  i n su re  no gross  e r r o r s ,  and 
I q u i t e  o f t en  approximations a r e  s u f f i c i e n t .  
I The first s t e p  i n  r e l i a b i l i t y  c i r c u i t  
ana lys i s  is  t o  perform a worst case anal-  
y s i s .  I n  t h i s  ana lys i s  worst case l i m i t s ,  
as derived i n  the  p a r t  t e s t i n g  program, 
a r e  entered i n t o  the  c i r c u i t  expression, 
and a determination of c i r c u i t  acceptab i l -  
i t y  is  made. If the  c i r c u i t  works under 
worst case condit ions,  the  ana lys i s  i s  
complete. If the  c i r c u i t  does not  work 
under worst; case conditions,  then  f u r t h e r  
ana lys i s  i s  required t o  determine the  prob- 
a b i l i t y  of f a i l u r e .  Table 3 presents  the  
r e s u l t s  of a t y p i c a l  worst case ana lys i s  
on the  c i r c u i t  described above. It can be 
seen  t h a t  both c i r c u i t  parameters fa i l  
under worst case condit ions.  
It can a l s o  be seen r e a d i l y  t h a t  the  
worst case condit ions cannot a r i s e  to-  
ge ther .  For example low p (hFE) occurs a t  
low temperature while high T o  and Ii 
occur a t  high temperature. such inconsis-  
t enc i e s  c a n ~ s o m e t h e s  be resolved by per-  
forming the ana lys is  once a t  high temper- 
a t u r e  and once a t  low temperature.  I f  t h i s  
co r r ec t ion  shows t h a t  the  c i r c u i t  charac 
t e r i s t i c  is s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  t he  ana lys is  
can s top .  Otherwise, i t  continues a s  a 
s t a t i s t i c a l  c i r c u i t  ana lys i s .  
There a r e  two p r inc ipa l  methods of 
s t a t i s t i c a l  c i r c u i t  ana lys i s .  The first, 
and most widely used is  the Monte Carlo o r  
random sampling technique .* This tech- 
nique randomly samples from the  d i s t r i b u -  
t i o n  of each p a r t  parameter and so lves  
the  c i r c u i t  parameter expression. Many 
so lu t ions  of t h i s  expression provide a 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of the  c i r c u i t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
considered. From t h i s  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  s ta- 
t i s t i c s  descr ibing the population can be 
ca lcu la ted  and used t o  determine probabi l-  
i t i e s  of f a i l u r e .  This is  q u i t e  a simple 
procedure and i s  r e l a t i v e l y  quick on high 
speed computing devices.  
The o ther  p r inc ipa l  method of statis- 
t i c a l  c i r c u i t  ana lys i s  i s  the  method-of- 
momynts o r  the propagation-of-errors tech- 
nique.  Essent ia l ly ,  t h i s  technique sub- 
s t i t u t e s  a Taylor expansion f o r  the  char- 
a c t e r i s t i c  expression. The theory of 
propagation of e r r o r s  permits a combina- 
t i o n  of component parameter moments t o  
form corresponding c i r c u i t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
moments. This extremely f l e x i b l e  tech- 
nique allows f o r  a simple so lu t ion  of 
cor re la ted  and non-normal p a r t  parameters 
a s  wel l  a s  the  l e s s  complex problems .l It 
has been shown t h a t  t he  two methods provide 
approximately equal answers. Reference 
1 neglec ts  the  f a c t  t h a t  the method of 
moments can be made even more accurate  by> 
considering co r re l a t ions  and, i f  necessars 
,a second order  expansion. 
Using the  method of mome'nts, which is 
well  descr ibed i n  references 4 and 5, t h e .  
following p robab i l i t y  of f a i l u r e  from com- 
ponent p a r t  v a r i a t i o n  was found f o r  the--- 
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E i the r  of these techniques may be per-  - 
formed separa te ly  a t  high o r  low tempera- 
tu re ,  a t  i n i t i a l  condi t ions,  o r  end-of- . 
l i f e .  The usual  technique is t o  synthe- 
s i z e  one d i s t r i b u t i o n  f o r  a11 conditions: 
Although the  example dea ls  with t r a n s i s -  
to r ized  d i g i t a l  c i r c u i t r y  the  technique-  
i s  appl icable  t o  tube and analog c i r -  
c u i t r y .  Several  of t he  references d e a l  
with such examples. 
Conclusions - .. 
This program of p a r t  t e s t i n g  coupled . 
with s t a t i s t i c a l  c i r c u i t  ana lys i s  has been 
extremely successfu l  a t  LMED. Using . these  
techniques along with o ther  elements of a 
s t rong  r e l i a b i l i t y  program, average com- 
ponent p a r t  f a i l u r e  r a t e s  of .008 x 10-6 : 
per  hour have been achieved. This accom- 
plishment has been achieved wi th  s tandard 
production components without b e n e f i t  of 
spec i a l  processing o r  "burn-in". 
With the  program i n  use on seve ra l  
R&D p ro j ec t s ,  the procedures a r e  con- 
t i n u a l l y  being improved. For example, 
s tud ie s  a r e  now underway t o  reduce the  
number of samples t e s t e d .  It is hoped 
t h a t  one sample can be sequen t i a l l y  sub- 
jected t o  a l l  t e s t  conditions,  providing 
g r e a t e r  accuracy a t  lower c o s t .  
Use of r e l i a b i l i t y  programs l i k e  t h i s  
one a c t u a l l y  permit improvements i n  de- 
s i g n  r e l i a b i l i t y .  permit the  s e l e c t i o n  o f .  
"most1' r e l i a b l e  designs and the  de tec t ion  . 
of designs needing improvement. This i s  
a b i g  s t e p  toward more r e l i a b l e  equip- 
ment. 
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WORST CASE DESIGN LIMITS 
XYZ Program 
Vendor A 1/8 watt resistor Dwg. No. Resistance fl.75$, -2.25% 
Ven-dor B 1/8 watt resistor Dwg . No. Resistance +l. 55$, -2.30% 
Vendor C 1 watt resistor Dwg . No. Resistance +16.58$, -21.20% 
Vendor D 1000 yyfd. 10% capacitor Dwg . No. Capacitance +12.20$, -11.60% 
Vendor E Signal Diode Dwg . No. VF at 50. ma 1.502v, .558v 
IR at -10v 3.811 ua 
Vendor E Signal Transistor 
C; at VR = 0 13.61 ~ f d .  
Dwg. No. Icbo at Vcdo = 30v 1Oya 
hFE at VCE = lv 
& IC = 30 ma 1110, 20 
VCE(S"~) Ic - = ;Om:] lv, .450v 




Circuit Parameter Minimum Maximum 







Part Conditions for 
Minimum Maximum 
APPENDIX A APPENDIX B .' . 
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND DEFINITIONS - EXPLANATION OF STATISTICS 
Symbol Def in i t ion  Symbol Def in i t ion  
HFE o r @  DC current  gain of a t r a n s i s t o r  N Number of samples used f o r  the I t e s t .  
v~~ Collector  t o  emi t te r  voltage drop 
of a t r a n s i s t o r  a t  s a tu ra t ion  7 The mean value, calculated from: 
n 
Base t o  emi t te r  voltage drop of a 
t r a n s i s t o r  a t  s a tu ra t ion  
ICER Leakage current  of the  t r a n s i s t o r  
with both junctions (CB & BE) 
back biased 
s2 Variance, calculated from: 
I i Total input  leakage of a nor c i r -  
c u i t  a t  s a tu ra t ion .  Usually t h e  
sum of t r a n s i s t o r  leakage and 
diode reverse currents .  The num- 
ber  of each is es tabl i shed by 
logic  ru le s .  
S Standard deviat ion,  equal t o  the 
square root  of the variance. 
Range The span of the data, calculated 
from: VD Forward voltage drop of a diode 
Range = x max - x min 
Min The minimum value recorded. 
v~~ Base t o  emi t t e r  voltage of the 
t r a n s i s t o r  es tabl i shed by the 
c i r c u i t  when cutoff  is  des i red .  
Max The maximum value recorded. DOD Figure of meri t  of the c i r c u i t s  
d r ive  capab i l i ty  defined as  
V The coeff ic ient  of var ia t ion ,  i n  
percent,  calculated from: . H E I B  DOD = -
IL 
Base current  of a t r a n s i s t o r  when 
sa tu ra t ion  is des i red .  
Standard e r ro r ,  calculated from: 
Unit load current  - a current  
d ra in  t h a t  a nor c i r c u i t  repre- 
sen t s  t o  its source.  
Momenta1 skewness, calculated 
from: IC Collector  current  of t r a n s i s t o r  
a t  s a tu ra t ion .  IC = N IL where 
N i s  the nusber of u n i t s  of load 
a c i r c u i t  i s  designed t o  de l ive r .  
A measure of skewness, calculated 
from: 
/? Kurtosis, calculated from: 
8 2 = w4/p22 
Third moment about the mean, 
calculated from: 3 f ( x i  - X) 
w3 = -i =1 
N 
Fourth moment about the mean 
calculated from: 
- 4 
f ( x i  - 3)  
~4 = i=l 
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SEVENTH MILITARY-INDJSTRY MISSILE AND SPACE RELIABILITY SYMPOSIUM 
18 - u JUNE 1962 
NAME 
-
AAKHUS, Robert C. Minneapolis Honeywell 
Ordnance Division 
600 2nd St. No. 
Hopkins, Minnesota 
United Testing Laboratories 
150 Wolf e Road 
Sunnyvale, California 
AALSETH, Jack ELdon 
Hercules Powder Company 
P. 0. Box a 0  
Cbberland, Maryland 
AARON, James Phillip, Jr. 
Prat t  & Whitney Aircraft 
P. 0. Box 2691 
West Palm Beach, Florida 
ABERNETHY, Robert B. 
Lockheed Missiles & Space Company 
510 MidcUefield Road 
M t .  View, California 
ADAMOWICZ, Charles M. 
A W ,  W i l l i a m  R. BUWEPSFLTREADREP PAC 
NAS North Island 
San Diego, California 
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